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Summary 
Waqfs (religious endowments) are a socio-cultural heritage established in the seventh century to 
provide means to express taqwa (piety) for the purpose of qurba (divine closeness) and for the 
safeguarding of socio-economic security of the progeny and the community. As an Islamic 
charitable endeavor, it was expected that waqfs would be administered according to the Shari
c
a 
by Muslim institutions of the mutawalli (custodian) with the kadhis (Muslim judges) and 
c
ulama 
(clerics) not only interpreting the requisite normative precepts under which it subsists, but also 
settling matters arising there from. This not being the absolute case, the scenario puts the 
institution of waqf in Kenya under constant negotiations between the Muslims and the secular 
state on the one side, and among diverse socio-ethnic groups of Muslims on the other.  
This study was, therefore, undertaken to achieve four significant objectives: To explore the 
historical development of the institution of waqf from the British colonial period (1900) to 
independent times (2010); examine secular state policies and civil courts’ rulings that influenced 
waqfs; interrogate Muslims’ response vis-à-vis the secular state and civil courts’ constructs in the 
practices of waqfs; and establish how Muslims use waqfs in their contribution to socio-cultural 
development of the society. To realize the set objectives, this study adopted a multi-disciplinary 
approach. Bourdieu’s theory of practice (1977), particularly the concepts of field, capital 
(symbolic, cultural, social, and political), and symbolic violence, aptly explained the negotiations 
among various state and non-state actors and agents in the control of resources including waqfs 
in the community.  
While James C. Scott’s (1976) concept of symbolic (ideological) resistance was useful in 
understanding Muslims’ response to state control of waqfs, together with Bourdieu’s theory of 
practice, they could not adequately explain the internal socio-ethnic and cultural dynamics that 
informed the behaviors to consecrate, control, manage, and uses of waqfs by Muslims themselves 
during and after colonization and outside the purview of the secular state. This accounts for the 
development and adoption of the concept of umiji-wamiji (locale identity and belonging) based 
on the historical fluid spatial relations between Muslim groups and regions in the country. 
Whereas primary data was collected in over ten months of extensive fieldwork along the 
predominant Muslim regions of Mombasa, Malindi/Kilifi, Lamu, and Kwale through informal 
talks with different waqf actors, analysis of requisite waqf records, and visits to waqf sites; 
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secondary data was obtained through review of cutting edge investigations on waqfs across 
Muslim societies.  
Normative precepts as well as qualitative and quantitative methods were used as the bases for 
analysis of the data, findings of which were presented using a fusion of historical, 
anthropological, and descriptive approaches. The study established that secular state legislations 
and civil judicial rulings ushered in control of waqfs subjecting Muslims into socio-economic 
and cultural subordination since the British colonial times. Consequently, cowed by the loss of 
the socio-cultural heritage and its privileges, Muslims unwittingly ‘exited’ from state controlled 
waqfs to uncontrolled charitable institutions including sadaqa (alms giving), community based 
organizations, and other non-labeled waqfs as provided by the Shari
c
a as part of Islamic charity.  
This exit did not only change the relations’ matrix between the ruler and the ruled into retaining 
ownership and control of resources for socio-cultural and economic power, but also helped 
Muslims to fulfill the spiritual obligation of giving back to the community through a wider 
concept of charity. This seemingly united response against state control of waqfs is, nonetheless, 
not to deny the prevalent internal dynamics in the Muslim community manifested in the use of 
waqfs to safeguard and promote temporal group and locale interests.  
 
Zusammenfassung Dissertation 
Die Institution des islamisches Stiftungswesens (waqf) reicht bis ins das 7. Jahrhundert zurück 
und steht für ein reiches sozio-kulturelles Erbe. Die vornehmlichen Aufgaben des islamischen 
Stiftungswesens waren finanzielle Mittel zu generieren, die als Ausdruck von Frömmigkeit 
(taqwa) Nähe zu Gott (qurba) bezwecken sollten. Zudem diente es dazu sowohl die 
Nachkommenschaft als auch die Gemeinschaft gesellschaftlich und wirtschaftlich abzusichern. 
Als ein islamisch-wohltätiges Unternehmen unterliegt das islamische Stiftungswesen einer durch 
das islamische Recht (Scharia) legitimierten Verwaltung, die dem Verwalter (mutawalli), der 
durch Kadis und islamische Gelehrte (
c
ulama) angeleitet wird, unterstellt ist. Seine Aufgabe ist 
nicht nur auf die Interpretation normativer Vorschriften, durch die die Existenz der Stiftung 
sichergestellt werden, beschränkt, sondern auch auf potentielle Konflikte, die daraus entstehen 
können, zu regeln.  
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Ferner bedingt diese islamische Institution im Kontext von Kenia auch einen ständigen 
Aushandlungsprozess gegenüber dem säkularen Staat einerseits und gegenüber den 
unterschiedlichen sozialen und ethnischen Gruppen der Muslime Kenias andererseits. Diese 
Studie hat folgende Hauptforschungsziele: Die Darstellung der historischen Entwicklung der 
Institution des waqf vom britischen Kolonialismus (1900) bis in die Gegenwart (2010). Die 
Analyse der Einflüsse eines säkularen Staatswesens und zivilrechtlicher Regularien auf das 
islamische Stiftungswesen sowie die muslimischen Reaktionen auf diese Rahmenbedingungen. 
Schließlich untersucht die Studie die Nutzbarmachung islamischer Stiftungen für die 
gesellschaftliche und kulturelle Entwicklung der Gemeinschaft durch die Muslime.  
Zur Umsetzung dieser Forschungsziele, bedient sich diese Studie eines multidisziplinären 
Ansatzes. Bourdieus Theorie der Praxis (1977) erhellt die Aushandlungsprozesse zwischen den 
unterschiedlichen staatlichen und nicht-staatlichen Vertretern und Akteuren in Bezug auf die 
Kontrolle über die Ressourcen – einschließlich des islamischen Stiftungswesens – der 
muslimischen Gemeinschaft. Insbesondere Bourdieus Konzepte zum sozialen Feld, Kapital 
(symbolisch, kulturell, sozial und politisch) und symbolischer Gewalt bieten vielversprechende 
Erklärungsansätze. James C. Scotts (1976) Konzept des symbolischen (ideologischen) 
Widerstands war nützlich, die Reaktionen der Muslime auf die staatliche Kontrolle des 
islamischen Stiftungswesens zu verstehen. Allerdings konnten weder Scotts Ansatz noch 
Bourdieus Theorie der Praxis die internen sozio-ethnischen und kulturellen Dynamiken 
vollumfänglich erklären.  
Diese Dynamiken umfassten Verhaltensweisen in Bezug auf die Schaffung, die Kontrolle, das 
Management und den Gebrauch von islamischen Stiftungen während und nach der Ära des 
Kolonialismus sowie außerhalb der Einflusssphäre des Staates. Auf Basis dieser Beobachtung 
und auf Grundlage der historisch bedingten Fluidität räumlicher Beziehungen zwischen 
muslimischen Gruppen und Regionen im Lande erfolgte die Entwicklung des Konzepts von 
umiji-wamiji (lokale Identität und Zugehörigkeit). Die primären Forschungsdaten sind das 
Ergebnis von über zehn Monaten Feldforschung in den überwiegend von Muslimen bewohnten 
Gebieten von Mombasa, Malindi/Kilifi, Lamu und Kwale. Es wurden informelle Gespräche mit 
unterschiedlichen Akteuren des islamischen Stiftungswesens geführt, entsprechende waqf 
Unterlagen analysiert sowie islamische Stiftungen vor Ort besucht. Als sekundäre Daten diente 
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die aktuellste wissenschaftliche Literatur zum islamischen Stiftungswesen in muslimischen 
Gesellschaften. Normative Konzepte als auch qualitative und quantitative Methoden waren die 
Grundlage für die Datenanalyse, deren Ergebnisse mit einer Verschmelzung historischer, 
anthropologischer und deskriptiver Ansätze präsentiert werden. Die Studie kommt zu dem 
Ergebnis, dass die Gesetzgebung des säkularen Staates sowie die daraus resultierenden 
zivilrechtlichen Regularien in eine Kontrolle über das islamische Stiftungswesen mündeten. 
Infolgedessen fanden sich die Muslime seit der britischen Kolonialherrschaft in einer 
untergeordneten sozioökonomischen und kulturellen Stellung wieder.  
Als Ergebnis des Kontrollverlustes über dieses soziokulturellen Erbes und dessen Privilegien, 
haben sich die Muslime von dem staatlich kontrollierten islamischen Stiftungswesen abgewandt 
und anderer nicht unter staatlicher Kontrolle stehender islamischer Wohltätigkeit bedient. Auf 
der Grundlage scharia-rechtlicher Möglichkeiten handelte es sich um freiwillige Gaben (sadaqa), 
wohltätige Organisationen unter der Kontrolle der Gemeinschaft sowie alternativer Formen 
islamischer Stiftungen. Somit haben sich die Muslime der staatlichen Kontrolle entzogen. 
Dadurch änderte sich nicht nur das Beziehungsgeflecht zwischen Herrschern und Beherrschten 
sondern hatte auch den Effekt, dass die Muslime weiterhin die Eigentumsrechte und die 
Kontrolle über sozio-kulturelles und wirtschaftliches Vermögen innehatten. Durch ein breiter 
angelegtes Konzept islamischer Wohltätigkeit waren die Muslime somit weiterhin in der Lage 
ihrer spirituellen Verpflichtung – die Sorge für die Gemeinschaft – nachzukommen. Diese 
offenbar konzertierte Antwort auf die staatliche Kontrolle über das islamische Stiftungswesen 
hat jedoch nicht dazu geführt, dass die innerhalb der muslimischen Gemeinschaft vorhandenen 
Dynamiken – das islamische Stiftungswesen für zeitlich und lokal begrenzte Gruppeninteressen 
zu benutzen – abhandengekommen sind. 
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Glossary of Terms 
While transliteration of Arabic words and terminologies followed the Encyclopedia of Islam and 
Muslim World (2004), translation of Qur’anic verses followed the Sahih International. Plurals of 
Arabic nouns are in the Anglicized form. Abbreviation of languages: Ar. is Arabic; Per. is 
Persian; Lat. is Latin; Heb. is Hebrew; Swa. is Swahili. 
c
ada (Ar.)  local customs, recurring habits and social morals of the people. 
adhan (Ar.)   the call for prayer. 
c
adl (Ar.)   being just. 
ahbas (Ar.)  consecrated properties or charitable trust in Islam, also habus.  
ahbas mu
c
ayyana (Ar.) purpose specific waqf. 
ahl al-bayt (Ar.)  people of the house i.e. family members of Prophet Muhammad. 
ahl al-sunna wa
c
l-jam
c
a (Ar.)  people of the sunna and community, or followers of strict and  
puritan traditions of Islam who seek to emulate practices of pious 
predecessors, a return to pristine Islam, Salafi.  
ahl al-tariqa (Ar.)   the term used in describing an ideological disposition of Muslims 
perceived to rely on medieval authority (taqlid) different from those 
advocating for return to pristine Islam (salafiyya); also conservative, or 
literally, people of the way, Sufis.  
ahmadiyya (Ar.) a messianic reform movement in Sunni Islam that believes in the teachings 
of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (d. 1908). 
al-asaba (Ar.)  an agnate heir. 
al-awqaf al-hukmiyya (Ar.)  revenue generating waqfs in form of estates in the towns of Fustat 
and Cairo during the reign of the Mamluk. 
al-rizaq al-ahbasiyya (Ar.) endowed agricultural lands. 
al-Shabab (Ar.) the youngsters, literally, a jihadist terrorist group based in East Africa. 
c
ana (Ar.)  long term lease of a revenue-generating waqf. 
al-nazir al-mashrut (Ar.) waqf custodian (nazir) appointed by stipulation and not related to 
the endower. 
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al-nazir bi
c
l asala (Ar.) waqf custodian (nazir) appointed by right of birth, i.e. blood 
relative of the endower. 
ansar (Ar.) helpers, the Muslim community in Medina who welcomed the migrants 
from Mecca. 
c
anwatan (Ar.) arms struggle, or invasion and combat. 
apotropos (Heb.)  trustee or guardian. 
asl al-mal (Ar.) subject matter of waqf. Also corpus. 
awa
c
il (Ar.)  the first (in relation to the earliest waqf in Islam). 
awl (Ar.)  increase (principle used in the distribution of inheritance). 
awwalan fa-awwalan (Ar.) one generation after the other. 
baraka (Ar.) blessings, ordinarily from God, but believed to be held and wielded by 
members of the Prophet’s family, sharifs. 
batala (Ar.)   null and void, also invalid. 
bay’ (Ar.)   sale. 
bayt al-mal (Ar.)  public treasury. 
bid
c
a (Ar.)  un-Islamic religious innovation in theology, ritual or customs that did not 
exist in early Islam but came into existence in the course of history. 
birr (Ar.)   righteousness or piety in the context of Allah’s grace or paradise. 
cy press (Lat.) as near as possible. 
darura (Ar.)   prevailing public concern or need, (also haja). 
da
c
wa (Ar.)  Islamic discourse of mobilization or missionary aspect in Islam calling 
people to the religion and reminding believers to remain steadfast in the 
faith, summons. 
dawla (Ar.) dynastic succession, particularly in the period after the rise of Abbasid 
power implying empire or nation-state. 
din  (Ar.)  religion. 
divini juris (Lat.)  heavenly jurisdiction, concerned with gods and religious symbols. 
diwan al-awqaf (Ar.)  state department or ministry in-charge of waqfs. 
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du
c
a (Ar.)  spontaneous, unstructured conversation with God, supplication. 
duksi (Sw.) elementary Qur’anic school. 
faddan (Ar.) acres (of agricultural land). 
fatwa (Ar.) legal or advisory opinion issued by a recognized authority on law and 
tradition in answer to a specific question or  broader issue facing the 
community. 
faqih (Ar.)   Muslim jurist practicing fiqh. 
fay’ (Ar.)  immovable property, lands conquered by Muslims, subject to tribute (also 
fai). 
fidei commissum (Lat.) practice where foreigners and exiled persons unable to establish res  
sacrae entrusted their properties to a trustee for the benefit of the progeny. 
fiqh (Ar.)   Islamic jurisprudence or science of law. 
fi sabil Allah (Ar.) in the course of God. 
fuqara (Ar.)   needy persons in the society. 
ghanima (Ar.)  booty in form of moveable properties. 
hadith (Ar.)  a genre of Muslim literature or individual text of this genre from early 
period of Islamic history conveying Prophet’s accounts, traditions, or 
teachings on religion and morality. 
haja (Ar.) See darura. 
hajj (Ar.) Muslim pilgrimage. 
halal (Ar.)   permitted or lawful. 
hawa
c
it (Ar.)  walled gardens in Medina believed to have been among the first waqfs. 
hekdesh (Heb.)  consecrated property. 
hiba (Ar.)   gifts. 
hikr (Ar.)  renting out a revenue-generating waqf property to improve output. 
hujaj al awqaf (Ar.) see waqfiyya.  
hunafa’ (Ar.)  monotheistic ascetics in Arabia during the times of prophet Abraham. 
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c
ibadi (Ar.)  also called ‘ahl al-istiqama’ or cibadiyya- the people of straightness. 
c
Ibadis are also part of the Khawarij (Kharijites, or ‘Exiters’). 
c
id (Ar.) Muslim holidays including the end of Ramadan (
c
id al-fitr) and 
c
id al-
adha.  
iftar (Ar.)   meal at the end of the fasting day. 
ilm al-faraid (Ar.)  Qur’anic regulations governing inheritance, the ‘science of shares’. 
ijab (Ar.)  offer of beneficiary of waqf given to a legal heir as a requirement of a 
valid waqf in Shi
c
a Islam.  
ijar al-mithal (Ar.)  the prevailing market rate or value of a given property. 
imam (Ar.) a leader, a model, an authority, or an exemplar; also a leader of the 
congregational prayer, leading Sunni theological scholars, or the infallible 
guide of the community in Shi
c
a Islam. 
istibdal (Ar.)  sale or exchange of worn out or unproductive waqf. 
istihsan (Ar.)   the common social good or welfare. 
ithna’ cashari (Ar.) branch of Shica Islam that believes in twelve imams, also Twelver Shica. 
jihad (Ar.) Striving or exerting oneself towards some goal, or (in the Islamic context) 
to attain and maintain the Islamic faith, or a virtuous struggle toward some 
praiseworthy end as defined by religion.  
ka
c
ba (Ar.)  sacred cube-shaped house or holy mosque built and consecrated by 
Abraham in Mecca. 
kadhi (Sw.) See qadi. 
khalifa (Ar.) political leader of the Muslim community or successor of the Prophet 
(Eng. caliph). 
kharaj (Ar.)   land tax levied on lands owned by non-Muslims in a Muslim state. 
khitma (Ar.)  recitation of the Quran by proxy seeking the grace of God with a view to 
benefiting the deceased.  
khums (Ar.)   one fifth. 
khutba (Ar.)   sermon. 
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kiamu (Sw.) one of the Swahili language dialects spoken around Lamu region in 
Kenya. 
kufr (Ar.)    disbelief or infidelity. 
legatum sub modo (Lat.) indirect legacy. 
liwali (Sw.)  Muslim administrative officer (district governor) during the East African 
Bu Sa
c
idi Sultanate before the coming of the British. 
madhhab (Ar.) manner followed, ideology, or institutionalized school of law espousing 
distinct jurisprudential disposition. 
madrasa (Ar.)  Qur’anic school, Islamic college, or place of instruction in religious law in 
Islam. 
mahbusa muharrama (Ar.) consecrated properties, synonym for waqf. 
mahram (Ar.)   close (blood) relative with whom marriage is disallowed. 
ma
c
lim (Ar.)  teacher. 
manfa
c
a (Ar.)   usufruct or benefits derived from waqf. 
masjid (Ar.)  customary place for performing the obligatory ritual prayer in the Muslim 
tradition, a mosque. 
masakin (Ar.)  the poor.  
maslaha (Ar.)   see istihsan. 
mawlid al-nabi (Ar.)   celebration of the birth day of Prophet Muhammad. 
mikoko (Sw.)  mangrove poles (sing. mkoko). 
milk (Ar.)   ownership.  
milkiyat Allah (Ar.)  divinely owned by God or property of God. 
mirath (Ar.)  total estate of a bereaved person to be shared among heirs as inheritance in 
Islam. 
mitzvah (Heb.)  religious duty. 
mji (Swa.)  town or locale (pl. miji). 
mu
c
abbad (Ar.)  principle of perpetuity in waqf, (also ta
c
abbid). 
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mu
c
adhdhin (Ar.)  person performing the call to prayers, adhan. 
mudaraba (Ar.)  contractual business relationship or partnership between two parties one 
offering capital and the other contributing labor and expertise with a view 
to sharing profits according to predetermined ratios. 
mudir (Ar.)  third-class magistrate (or director) during the East African Bu Sa
c
idi 
Sultanate of Zanzibar before the coming of the British. 
muhajirun (Ar.) Muslim migrants to Medina from Mecca. 
mukhabara (Ar.) sharecropping. 
musala (Ar.)  informal place of prayer usually in places or buildings other than mosques. 
mushaf (Ar.)   hard copy or written text of the Qur’an. 
mutawalli (Ar.)  a male manager or administrator of waqf (also wali or nazir-a). A female 
administrator is mutawaliyya. 
mwalimu (Sw.) see ma
c
lim, also name of a person. 
mwambao (Sw.)  the coastal Kenya Protectorate during British colonial period. 
mzee (Sw.)  old person, title of respect or address. 
nadhir (Ar.)   pledge, consecration, or vow. 
nazir (Ar.)  see mutawalli. 
nizara (Ar.)   trusteeship. 
pat ruvan (Per.)  practice where properties were consecrated and thought to be a possible 
origin of waqfs in Islam. 
piae causea (Lat.) practices of charity among Byzantines touted as a possible origin of waqf 
in Islam. 
qabala (Ar.)    see mukhabara. 
qabul (Ar.)  acceptance, especially of an offer (Ar. ijab) of beneficence as a 
requirement of waqf ahli in Shi
c
a Islam. 
qadi (Ar.)  Muslim judge,  (also kadi). 
qital (Ar.)   physical force or fighting, also part of jihad. 
qiyas (Ar.)    analogy. 
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qur’an (Ar.)  Muslims’ holy Book. 
qurba (Ar.)    divine closeness. 
rabbi (Heb.) a Jewish religious leader with mastery knowledge of the scriptures, oral 
traditions, and competence in interpreting the law. 
radd (Ar.)  return (principle used in the distribution of inheritance). 
ratib (Ar.)   people frequenting a specific mosque for prayers. 
res nullius (Lat.)  owned by ‘no one but God’. 
res sacrae (Lat.)   sacred objects or consecrating objects in Roman tradition thought as 
possible origin of waqfs.  
riba (Ar.)  interest. 
ruvanagan (Per.) see pat ruvan. 
sadaqa (Ar.)    charity, alms giving. 
sadaqa jariyya (Ar.)   charity whose benefits are believed to be perpetual. 
sadaqa mawqufa (Ar.) immobilized alms. 
sahih al-Bukhari (Ar.) authoritative hadiths collection in Sunni Islam by imam Bukhari (d. 870). 
sahih Muslim (Ar.) authoritative hadiths collection in Sunni Islam by imam Muslim (d. 874). 
salafi (Ar.)  see ahl al-sunna wa
c
l-jam
c
a. 
salf (Ar.)  advance payment for the lease of waqf, also premium. 
sarf (Ar.)   transfer of surplus benefits from one waqf to another. 
sawab (Ar.)   divine grace (merit) attained after doing good deeds. 
senatus consultum (Lat.) statutes necessary for the consecrating of property.  
shari
c
a (Ar.)  Islamic law derived from the Quran, Prophet’s traditions (hadiths), 
consensus by Muslim juri-consultants (ijma’) and analogy (qiyas). 
sharif (Ar.)  honorific title of nobility whose holders are allegedly traceable to the 
genealogy of the Prophet Muhammad. 
shurut al-waqif (Ar.)  specific conditions imposed by the endower on a particular waqf. 
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shaykh (Ar.)  honorific title for a religious leader, head of a tribe or village, Sufi order, 
or generally an old man. 
shaykh al-Islam (Ar.) honorific title given to the leading Muslim scholar in a particular locality, 
here in Chief Kadhi. 
shi
c
a (Ar.) theological groups in Islam united by a belief in the imamate of 
c
Ali bin 
Abi Talib as the first authentic caliph. They include the Twelvers, Zaydis, 
Khoja Isma
c
ilis, and Bohra Isma
c
ilis.  
sunna (Ar.)  normative examples of Prophet Muhammad as recorded in traditions about 
his speech, his actions, his acquiescence to the words and actions of 
others, and his personal characteristics. 
ta
c
abbid (Ar.) see mu
c
abbad. 
ta
c
amul (Ar.)  principle where customs and traditions of an Islamized group not 
antithetical to Shari
c
a are accepted to the legal body polity as a source of 
law or legal reference (also ta
c
aruf). 
tabdil (Ar.)   see istibdal. 
ta
c
bid (Ar.)   changing the specific conditions imposed by an endower on a given waqf. 
ta
c
qib (Ar.)  the descent strategy establishing right of beneficence among progeny of an 
endower. 
taqwa (Ar.)   piety, righteousness. 
tariqa (Ar.) the way (to follow) or ethical acts linked to spiritual development in form 
of manuals, guides, and literary works. 
tasrif (Ar.)  see sarf. 
tawhid (Ar.)   Unity of God.  
thalatha taifa (Sw.) three ethnicities – part of the Swahili Muslim confederation of Mombasa. 
thenashara taifa (Sw.) twelve ethnicities – Swahili Muslim confederation of Mombasa 
composed of the thalatha taifa and tisa taifa. 
thulth (Ar.)   one third. 
tisa taifa (Sw.) nine ethnicities – part of the Swahili Muslim confederation of Mombasa.  
c
ulama (Ar.)  the scholarly class in the Muslim society, i.e. those who know or have 
knowledge, clerics. 
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umma (Ar.)   community of believers in Islam. 
umuji (Swa.)   belonging to a specific town’s locale. (pl. umiji). 
c
urf (Ar.) see 
c
ada. 
ushenzi (Sw.) social perception associated with being uncivilized among the Swahili 
people. 
ustadh (Ar.)   see ma
c
lim.  
uungwana (Sw.) social perception associated with civilization among the Swahili people. 
vakif (Per.)   see ahbas (pl. evkaf). 
wabara (Sw.) upcountry folk. Used as an essentialist noun by the coastal communities in 
reference to the non-coastal immigrants in the region.   
wakil (Ar.)  agent or representative. 
walad (Ar.)   biological child. 
wamiji (Sw.)  dwellers of a specific town’s locale. 
wapwani (Sw.) coastal folk. Used as an essentialist noun in contrast to wabara. 
waqf (Ar.)   see ahbas. 
waqf ahli (Ar.) family or private (also posterity) waqf. 
waqf al-awlad (Ar.) see waqf ahli.   
waqf al-haramayn (Ar.) consecrations for the benefit of the two holy sites in Islam, Mecca 
and Medina.  
waqf al-khassa (Ar.) see waqf ahli.  
waqf 
c
amm (Ar.) public waqf. 
waqf al-turaha’ (Ar.)  waqfs for the burial expenses for the indigents in the Egyptian society 
during the reign of the Mumluk. 
waqf dhurri (Ar.)  see waqf ahli.  
waqfiyya (Ar.)  waqf deed or charter. 
waqf khayri (Ar.) see waqf 
c
amm.  
waqf li llah (Ar.)  see waqf 
c
amm. 
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waqf nama (Per.) see waqfiyya. 
waqf nuqud (Ar.) cash waqf. 
waqif (Ar.)  endower, or dedicator (female, waqifa). 
waqf mushtarak (Ar.) joint waqf established on indivisible shares of the property or waqf  
designated for both public and private benefits.  
wasiyya (Ar.)  bequest setting aside at most a third of one’s wealth as charity. 
xenodochia (Lat.)  charitable institutions in Byzantine Christianity.  
zakat (Ar).  alms. 
zakat al-fitr (Ar.) alms given out during celebrations of 
c
id holiday to mark the end of 
Ramadan.   
zawiya (Ar.)  Sufi order. 
zedakah (Heb.)  charity. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.0 Background of the Study  
This study examines the practices of waqf (religious endowment) among minority Muslims in a 
predominantly Christian society and within a secular state milieu. Waqf is an Islamic socio-
cultural heritage that lies at the intersection between the law of mirath (inheritance) and sadaqa 
(charity) for the purpose of attaining qurba (divine closeness) and sawab (divine rewards, merit) 
from God.
1
 It is an undertaking where a waqif (dedicator) consecrates some property in 
perpetuity to be held in trust by a mutawalli (also nazir, custodian) so that its manfa
c
a (usufruct) 
could be channeled towards predetermined religious objectives (van Leeuwen, 1999). 
Unlike other religious charitable institutions such as zakat (alms) and sadaqa, waqfs have no 
precise textual foundation in the Qur’an. Islamic traditions, however, trace the institution to some 
hadiths (sayings) attributed to Prophet Muhammad from the seventh century when he 
encouraged his companions to spend in charity for the benefit of the society (Barnes, 1986; 
Hennigan, 2004; Lev, 2005; Kozlowski, 2008). Throughout the eighth to thirteenth centuries, the 
institution evolved by adapting to varying theoretical and practical realities growing into an 
important economic and social institution in the Muslim community before attaining stability 
following establishment of the various madhhabs (schools of jurisprudence). As a matter of fact, 
during the fourteenth century, waqfs became significant element of the civil society in Islam 
providing the socio-economic mainstay of the endowers’ progeny as well as plethora of 
community welfare initiatives including education, housing, health care, and water among 
others, supplementing efforts of several governments of the time (Hodgson, 1974; Hoexter, 
2002; Hennigan, 2004; Dafterdar and Cizakca, 2013). 
However, despite immense contribution to the society, development of the institution of waqf 
always depended on the state facing periodic turbulence in most parts of the Muslim world. 
                                                          
1 Waqfs have several synonyms as used in different regions and among adherents of various madhhabs (schools of law) in Islam, 
including habs, hubs, hubus, [North Africa], vakif (pl. evkaf) [Asia], as well as mahbusa muharrama.  See Barnes, J. (1986). An 
Introduction to Religious Foundations in the Ottoman Empire, Leiden: Brill; Benthall, J., & Jordan, B. (2003). The Charitable 
Crescent: Politics of Aid in the Muslim World, London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd.; Hennigan, P. (2004). The Birth of a Legal 
Institution: The Formation of the Waqf in Third-Century A. H. Hanafi Legal Discourse, Leiden: Brill; El Daly, M. (2010). 
“Challenges and Potentials of Channeling Local Philanthropy towards Development and Social Justice and the Role of Waqf 
(Islamic and Arab-Civic Endowments) in Building Community Foundations”, Berlin: Humbolt-Üniversität zu Berlin. 
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Many factors, including institutional corruption, jurisprudential rigidity, poor management, and 
state (both Islamic and colonial) interference were attributed to the sorry state and near collapse 
of the institution in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century (Schoenblum, 1999; Shatzmiller, 
2001; Kahf, 2003). Nonetheless, concerted efforts begun in earnest across Muslim societies, 
particularly in the last decades of the twentieth century, like Iran (1984), Sudan (1987), Kuwait 
(1993), Malyasia (2004), and Qatar (2007), to revive and modernize waqfs. These coincided with 
the upcoming of the concept of civil society where in Islam, the model Islamic civil society 
included efforts to free waqfs from state control and supervision. These developments resulted 
into (trans-)national charitable organizations; establishment of policies and institutions; as well 
as reviewing perceived rigid jurisprudential interpretations regarding waqfs by predominant 
Muslim states with a view to returning the institution to its pristine time (Shatzmiller, 2001; 
Dafterdar and Cizakca, 2013). Accordingly, this study is an attempt to understand the contours of 
the institution among Kenya’s Muslim community since the last decades of the twentieth century 
and more specifically, to interrogate Muslims’ negotiation of the secular state milieu in 
practicing waqfs.  
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
Renowned investigations on waqfs, (Barnes, 1986; Powers, 1989; Hennigan, 2004; Kozlowski, 
2008), have extensively focused on the institution as lived in historically predominant Muslim 
communities like the Mamluk (1250-1517) periods, Ottoman Empire (1299-1922), and in the 
Asian sub-continent. Observations made in these studies portray waqfs as primarily practiced 
according to Islamic normative precepts under Muslim political, administrative, and juridical 
institutions. However, figures by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) derived from 
the National Housing and Population Census (2009), place Muslims in Kenya at 11.2 per cent 
(i.e. 4.3 million) of the thirty eight million people. This makes Muslims to be the largest minority 
religious group in the country. Above all, the institution of waqf is managed by a state agency, 
the Waqf Commissioners of Kenya (WCK) under the auspices of a secular law, the Waqf 
Commissioners Act (1951) rather than the Shari
c
a.
2
 Clearly, conclusions drawn from the 
                                                          
2
 The statute and the state agency governing waqfs are cited as Waqf Commissioners of Kenya. See the WCK Act (1951), chapter 
109, which is a revised version of the Waqf Commissioners Ordinance (1900).  
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experiences of predominant Muslim communities would not adequately explain the same among 
minority groups in predominant Christian societies, especially where administration of waqfs is 
strictly by secular state policies and civil statutes like in Kenya. 
Accordingly, some perceptions by studies on waqfs drawn from the predominant Muslim 
communities that endowers were accorded economic security through tax exemption for return in 
public investments leading to large scale consecrations (Kuran, 2001), do not apply to the present 
community under investigation. This is not to deny that some waqfs in Kenya provide social 
welfare services transcending religious boundaries. Nonetheless, for various reasons, they were 
either not registered as waqfs or were regarded as insufficient by the state and municipal 
authorities to warrant tax exemptions. This is mainly informed by the population of Muslims that 
dims significantly in the face of their Christian compatriots as well as the jurisdiction of the civil 
statute that controls waqfs which is limited to one region in the country, the coast province. 
Owing to the foregoing, the argument that some Muslims, particularly of ‘the politically 
dominant class’, appropriated waqfs as a means to shield their wealth against confiscation and 
taxation, or even legitimizing laundered public properties (Barnes, 1986; Kuran, 2001; 
Hennigan, 2004; Kozlowski, 2008) is also untenable in the Kenyan context. Confiscation of 
private property warranting invocation of waqfs to protect them was informed by the political 
culture of the Mamluk and Ottoman periods. During that age, political adversaries who lost in 
battles also had their wealth confiscated by the victors exposing them to economic, political, and 
social ruin. Apart from the non-existence of the ‘Mamluk/Ottoman-like’ political culture in 
Kenya, the demographic disadvantage of Muslims in the country could not sufficiently sustain 
the argument on the use of waqfs to protect wealth against confiscation. Moreover, although 
Muslim administrative institutions of the liwali (district governor) and mudir (director) 
established during the Bu Sa
c
idi Sultanate (1698-1888) were incorporated as part of the British 
colonial government, occupiers of the positions were very few compared to ordinary believers.
3
 
This emphasizes the fact that Muslims who composed of the political class were not only 
negligible but their waqfs were also outnumbered by those of the ordinary Muslims, rendering 
                                                          
3
 Liwalis and mudirs were mainly Arabs who worked as administrators of the Sultanate, normally stationed in urban centers. 
There were only six Muslim administrative officers of the liwali in the Protectorate, i.e. Gazi (south coast), Mombasa (central); 
Takaungu, Mambrui, Malindi, and Lamu (north coast); and four mudirs in Vanga (south coast), Mtwapa, Witu, and Faza (north-
coast). See Partridge, M. & Gillard, D. (Eds.) (1995). British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the 
Foreign Office Confidential Print, vol. 17. London: University Publications of America. 
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the assumption that the former appropriated waqfs “as a means of ensuring their families against 
loss of political influence and earning capacity” superfluous (Kuran, 2001:857).     
Based on this background, the scenario of waqfs in Kenya is a sharp departure from the popular 
Islamic understanding bringing into fore two significant considerations: First, the recognition of 
the institution in the constitution makes it an important socio-cultural heritage albeit with few, if 
any, studies on its various manifestations in a minority Muslim community. Second, the 
administration of waqfs is by a state agency and mainly through a secular statute rather than the 
Shari
c
a under which the institution subsists. Then, how did waqfs develop over time from the 
British colonial period to postcolonial times? To what extent did secular state policies and 
Common law judicial rulings influence the development of waqfs in Kenya? How do Muslims 
negotiate the secular state and Common law judicial constructs vis-à-vis the waqf practices in the 
country? And how do Muslims in Kenya use waqfs in socio-cultural development? This study 
was, therefore, undertaken to answer the pertinent questions raised in the ambiguous relations 
between an Islamic institution and a secular state cum civil institutional milieu. 
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
Based on the foregoing, the study endeavors to: 
i. Explore the development of the institution of waqf from the British colonial rule 
(1900) to postcolonial Kenya (2010). 
ii. Examine the secular state legislative policies and Common law judicial orders that 
influenced the development of waqfs during the two historical periods in the country. 
iii. Interrogate how Muslims negotiate the secular state and Common law juridical milieu 
vis-à-vis the practices of waqfs in the country. 
iv. Establish the various types of waqfs prevalent in Kenya’s Muslim community. 
v. Describe how Kenyan Muslims use the various types of waqfs in the socio-cultural 
development of the society.   
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1.4 Justification of the Study 
Despite the seeming significance of the institution of waqfs, both among the minority Muslims as 
a socio-cultural heritage and in the state as evident in the constitutional recognition of the same, 
there are very few studies on the subject along the East African coast, and fewer still in Kenya in 
particular, that explicitly discuss the institution. These include studies by Carmichael (1997), 
Sheriff (2001), Fair (2001), Bang (2001a), Oberauer (2008), Yahya (1995; 2008), and Hashim 
(2010). On their part, Sheriff, Fair, Bang, and Oberauer mainly investigated the institution 
among predominant Muslims in Zanzibar during the colonial period.
4
 Bang’s article, 
“Intellectuals and Civil Servants: Early 20th Century Zanzibar cUlama and the Colonial State” 
bears testimony on studies in waqfs during the colonial period where the institution was 
subjected to an array of secular state policies that put it under supervision and control.
5
 The 
problem, however, in virtually all of the studies carried out in Zanzibar is the tendency to 
perceive waqfs from the viewpoint of predominant Muslim societies and institutions. Hence 
these works could not be relied upon in presenting a contemporary picture of the institution 
among minority Muslims in Kenya on the face of secular state policies and civil institutions in 
the postcolonial times. 
On the other hand, Tim Carmichael’s article, “British Practice towards Islam in the East Africa 
Protectorate: Muslim Officials, Waqf Administration and Secular Education in Mombasa and 
Environs, 1895-1920”, sketches the ambiguous relations between Muslims and the colonial 
government in an array of socio-cultural matters with no serious attempt at addressing the issues 
raised by the present study.
6
 On their part, Hashim (2010)
7
 and Yahya (1995; 2008)
8
 lament the 
challenges bedeviling the institution including mismanagement though they echo the sentiments 
                                                          
4
 Bang, A. K. (2001). Intellectuals and Civil Servants: Early 20th Century Zanzibar cUlama and the Colonial State. In B. Amoretti 
(Ed.), Islam in East Africa: New Sources (pp.59-98). Herder Editrice E Libreria; Sheriff, A. (2001). Records of the Waqf 
Commission as a Source of Social and Religious History of Zanzibar. In B. Amoretti (Ed.), Islam in East Africa: New Sources 
(pp.27-45). Herder Editrice E Libreria; Fair, L. (2001). Pastimes and Politics: Culture, Community, and Identity in Post-
Abolition Urban Zanzibar, 1890-1945, Athens: Ohio University Press; Oberauer, N. (2008). ‘Fantastic Charities’: The 
Transformation of Waqf Practices in Colonial Zanzibar. Islamic Law & Society, 15(3), 315-370.  
5 Bang, A. (2001). Intellectuals and Civil Servants, op.cit. 
6
 Carmichael, T. (1997). British Practice towards Islam in the East Africa Protectorate: Muslim Officials, Waqf Administration 
and Secular Education in Mombasa and Environs, 1895-1920. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 17(2), 293-309. 
7 Hashim, A. (2010). Administration of Waqf Institutions in the Kenya Coast: Problems and Prospects. Refereed Biannual 
Journal Specialized in Waqf and Charitable Activities, 18, 56-66. 
8 Yahya, S. (1995). The Uses and Abuses of Waqf.  In M. Bakari & S. Yahya, (Eds.), Islam in Kenya (pp. 214-223). Nairobi: 
MEWA Publications; Yahya, S. (2008). Financing Social Infrastructure and Addressing Poverty through Waqf Endowments: 
Experiences from Kenya and Tanzania.  Journal of Environment and Urbanization, 20(2), 427-444.  
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on reviving waqfs as the panacea to the biting poverty afflicting the Muslim society in the region. 
Yet, as articles, they also suffer the academic limitation of in-depth analysis of the subject. 
Consequently, my investigation, in seeking to fill the knowledge gap, departs sharply from the 
preceding academic pieces as an ethnographic interrogation on how Muslims negotiated the 
institution of waqf in the midst of secular state political, economic, and socio-cultural policies 
from the British colonial era to postcolonial period.      
 
1.5 Scope and Limitations 
The study was conducted in four administrative regions (counties) of Mombasa, Malindi/Kilifi, 
Lamu, and Kwale, in the coast of Kenya. The choice of these research areas demonstrates a 
strategic and purposeful underpinning because the WCK Act is limited to the coast province, 
particularly, the predominant Muslim areas of the former British East Africa Protectorate (Sw. 
mwambao).  The Protectorate was a narrow coastal strip stretching ten miles inland from the sea 
shore from Kipini in the north to Vanga in the south (Hailey, 1979:105; Eliot, 1996; Ndzovu, 
2014). Although it would have made a lot of sense to include regions outside the former 
Protectorate for the purpose of diversity and comparison, but the limitation of the statute implies 
that Muslims outside the coast province could not establish waqfs in the legal definition of the 
Act. At best, theirs could only be regarded as non-labeled waqf initiatives. More so, owing to the 
concentration of Muslims in the former Protectorate, non-labeled waqfs outside this region have, 
for several reasons, been systematically overlooked by the state agency. In view of this, only 
areas defined by the Act as legally capable of endowing, and whose waqfs are captured in the 
state registry could be sampled.  
Moreover, the institution of waqf encountered some transformation between the fifteenth and 
seventeenth centuries to include cash in its various forms as corpus (waqf nuqud) as well as other 
adaptation facilities; and the upcoming of the Muslim civil society since the last decades of the 
twentieth century to free the institution from imperial supervision and control. These 
developments led to the establishment of private foundations and community based associations 
to provide socio-cultural welfare (Kuran, 2001; Kahf, 2003; Siraj and Hillary, 2006; Dafterdar 
and Cizakca, 2013). Nonetheless, the discussion in this study was based on waqfs in their 
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‘traditional’ sense as the new developments in Muslim civil society were largely yet to find 
footing in the community under investigation.
9
 Not oblivious of these limitations, hopefully, the 
findings of the study would be sufficient in drawing a general picture of the institution of waqf 
among minority Muslim groups in predominant Christian societies or secular state policies and 
civil institutions in contemporary times. 
Events in the post 9/11 largely shaped the global stage on (in-)security as evident in Kenya’s 
involvement in the ‘war against terror’ with al-Shabab militias in the neighboring Somalia. Since 
then, Kenya endured sporadic retaliatory attacks and the regions of interest were not spared 
either. As a matter of fact, the visit to Lamu was delayed several times owing to such incidents. 
While at Mombasa, I also came face to face with the scenario in two different occasions when 
the town was engulfed in riots following the extra-judicial extermination of two 
c
ulama (Muslim 
clerics) – Abu Bakar Sharif Makaburi and Aboud Rogo Mohammed - alleged to have harbored 
links with the terrorist group. This made visit to some waqfs in the town, even in the guide of 
WCK secretariat staff, quiet challenging including the now famous masjids Mlango wa Papa, 
Bahero, and Musa in Mombasa that were claimed to be radicalization and recruiting centers for 
the militant group.  
Coupled with the question of (in-)security was the ambivalence of some respondents. Since I 
largely had to be referred to my respondents by the WCK, more often than not, some mistook me 
for a Commission mole. My initial over-reliance on referrals by WCK from which I snowballed 
was informed by the lack of identification mechanism for waqfs in the community. Only the state 
agency kept records of physical addresses of waqfs, their endowers, as well as current 
beneficiaries and mutawallis. Therefore, because of the sensitivity of the subject, especially 
where private wealth and properties were concerned, and my indispensable connection with the 
state agency, requests for interviews were granted after several postponements and change of 
venues when respondents were satisfied that I was not a threat to their interests. This was 
particularly so where beneficiaries were locked in legal battles against the state agency. This 
scenario aptly illustrates the competing and conflicting interests in the institution of waqf 
                                                          
9
 Among contemporary changes in waqfs evident in transnational charitable organizations include according the institution a 
juristic personality. This puts the management in a board of mutawallis that enjoys powers akin to those of a private enterprise. 
This does not, however, stop the board from harnessing resources in form of waqf shares and certificates for specified causes in 
the umma. See Kuran, T. (2001). The Provision of Public Goods under Islamic Law: Origins, Impact, and Limitations of the 
Waqf System. Law & Society Review, 35(4), 841-898.  
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between various actors in the community. In this regard, my choice and sampling of respondents 
was basically purposeful and through snowball. Nonetheless, some informants like ordinary 
Muslims and the 
c
ulama were randomly sampled and informally interviewed. 
Important also to mention is the bureaucracy and delays I had to endure with regard to accessing 
state offices and repositories like court registries (both kadhi’s and civil) and the acquisition of 
research permit from the National Commission of Science, Technology, and Innovation 
(NACOSTI) that required frequent rescheduling of my fieldwork plan. Finally when time came 
to visit those sites, I also had to put up with disorganized and overwhelmed staff in accessing 
vital documents and information. Not to be forgotten is the social and moral ethics in the Muslim 
community in relation to free mixing of the genders. Interviewing female respondents, for 
instance, demanded that they be accompanied by their mahram (close relatives), thereby 
requiring that I fit into their schedule. Coincidentally, these restrictions provided rarest 
opportunities for group talks that would have otherwise been difficult to organize in ordinary 
circumstances.  
Like any ethnographic undertaking, therefore, my study was no exception to the various 
challenges but, paradoxically, also immensely benefitted from the merits associated with an 
‘insider’ researcher. By ‘insider researcher’ I mean “social research and interactions conducted 
between researchers and participants who share similar cultural, linguistic, ethnic, national, and 
religious heritage” (Ganga and Scott, 2006, as quoted in Bryant, 2010:45). I regard myself as an 
‘insider researcher’ because I am a Kenyan Muslim from the region where this study was 
undertaken. Accordingly, this puts me in equal pedestal with my respondents in the socio-
cultural, and at some instances, even ethnic milieu. Within this context, My study was enriched 
by the closeness with respondents that I easily engaged with owing to shared experiences and 
empathy that accorded me access to some sensitive information that an ‘outside researcher’ 
would be difficult to be privileged. 
My ‘insider researcher’ position notwithstanding, I also had to contend with the challenges of 
negotiating the asymmetrical power relation with my respondents. Researchers are perceived to 
wield power against participants on the view that they decide the subject of discussion, ask 
questions, and finally make analysis independent from the respondents (Kvale, 1996, cited in 
Alan and Arthur, undated, 3). To avoid demonstrating too much power against my respondents, I 
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identified myself as a learner rather than a researcher. In the eyes of informants, I was curious to 
learn and make sense of the situation placing them as my mentors, thereby working with rather 
than on them. As a matter of fact, I often allowed my respondents to decide on the venue, time, 
the sitting arrangement, and even who to include in the discussions. This explains the numerous 
cancellations and rescheduling of meetings. Effectively, this did not only accord room to my 
respondents to exercise their discretion but, eventually became a blessing in disguise. By inviting 
their relatives and friends, it in turn gave me the opportunity to conduct group talks. Among 
senior members in the community including the Chief Kadhi (both current and former) on their 
part, this also allowed them the convenience of being in their offices where they undoubtedly felt 
more at ease and in control than they would possibly have been elsewhere. Most times, I held 
informal talks with the Executive Secretary of the WCK in his office instead of the boardroom 
from where I was working. This ethnographic reflexivity underlines the view held by several 
authors including Munro et. al (2004), Thapar-Bjorkert and Henry (2004) that exercising power 
in a research undertaking is not an exclusive privilege of the researcher (cited in Alan and 
Arthur, undated, 3). 
‘Insider researchers’ on the other hand, as experienced during fieldwork, often face the challenge 
of potential biasness and confidentiality with sensitive information that, if mishandled, it could 
harm the respondents (Serrant-Green, 2002, cited in Kerstetter, 2012:100). To gain and sustain 
trust that enabled me to access sensitive data from my respondents, I sought their audience 
through second and third parties whom they knew and trust beforehand. This partly explains my 
initial reliance on the WCK to access my informants. My initial access to the WCK was, for 
instance, through referral by a serving Commissioner. While with respondents, I was also 
constantly aware of my inadequacies to access them without such referrals and made it a point to 
appreciate them as a matter of security. This eased their potential suspicions against me that 
developed to good levels of trust and confidence that enabled me to obtain the much needed 
information. All in all, engaging in the project accorded me a rare opportunity to encounter the 
other side of the Muslim community and Kenya at large which I have always been oblivious of. 
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1.6 Theoretical framework 
The present study is an ethnographic undertaking to understand the enacting of an Islamic 
practice by a minority group and the trends it generates in a predominantly non-Muslim but 
secular milieu. This involved a multi-disciplinary approach covering slightly over a century of 
negotiations by the Muslim community in the administration and development of the institution 
of waqf vis-à-vis secular policies and civil structures. Invoking Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of 
practice (1977), specifically the concepts of field, capital (social, economic, political, and 
symbolic), and symbolic violence, was thus relevant as it appropriately fits the state-society 
negotiations between the Muslim community and the British colonial government and 
subsequent postcolonial regimes on one hand, and among socio-ethnic groups of Muslims on the 
other. According to Turner (2011), and Echtler and Ukah (2015), centrality and marginality of 
religion in Bourdieu’s works equally compete for space. This is in the sense that despite his 
limited works precisely dealing with religion,  Bourdieu’s concepts in the theory of practice, 
drawn mainly from sociology of religion, occupy an important position in the study and practices 
of religions as a whole (Turner, 2011:102-123; Echtler and Ukah, 2015:1-32).
10
 For Bourdieu, 
the religious field is only “one of numerous distinct yet interrelated fields that together 
constitutes human society” (Rey, 2007:81; Echtler and Ukah, 2015). This understanding was, 
therefore, significant in deconstructing essentialist perceptions in the theory of practice and to 
demonstrate its applicability to wider concerns affecting human societies beyond its parent 
geographical and conceptual framework.  
Accordingly, the constituent concepts in the theory of practice are “apt for studies of the 
relationship between religion, class and power; religion, race and ethnicity; and religion and 
colonial conquest” (Rey, 2007:82) that this study endeavored to investigate under the lenses of 
waqfs. This is not to be oblivious of the aversion by the theory of practice to obstruct in-depth 
understanding of the ‘fantasy life’ of the subordinate groups in the society by reducing “field 
relations to the power binary of the dominant and the dominated” (Friedland, 1999:305, as 
quoted in Rey, 2007:124; Martin, 2000). Bourdieu portrays the subordinate groups in the society 
                                                          
10
 According to Rey (2007), Bourdieu published ten essays on religion that were mainly confined to Roman Catholicism (France) 
and Islam (Algeria). See Rey, T. (2007). Bourdieu on Religion: Imposing Faith and Legitimacy. London: Lightning Source UK 
Ltd, pp.58-80; Turner, B. (2011). Religion and Modern Society: Citizenship, Secularization and the State. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p.109. 
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as “virtually and structurally un-free and thus unable to rise up, resist, and act to change the very 
social order that enables their oppression” (Rey, 2007:122; Martin, 2000). This inadequacy was, 
however, complemented by two paradigms: James C. Scott’s (1976) symbolic (ideological) 
resistance (also hidden transcripts) and umiji-wamiji (locale identity and belonging) suggested by 
the researcher. In the manner of Martin, I argue that subordinate groups in the society also have 
the understanding and ability to decipher “contradictions in the established order and have the 
capacity to critique them, [hence] hidden transcripts demonstrate hidden grievances, alternative 
social organization, and other practices that are assumed to be repressed by the hegemony of the 
dominant” (2000:72-73).     
Within this context, Scott’s concept of symbolic resistance proved efficacious in explaining 
Muslims’ response to the secular state legislative policies and Common law judicial rulings in 
the development of waqfs in the country. It was established that colonial and postcolonial 
regimes appropriated secular policies and civil institutions to control resources, particularly land 
that, created a community of ‘Muslim peasants’ who were effectively disillusioned and 
condemned to economic, political, and cultural domination. Thus, the establishment of the WCK 
in 1899 that herald state domination, supervision, and regulation of waqfs was only but a 
microcosm. In expressing dissent against state sponsored socio-cultural subordination, Muslims 
did not comply with the imposed compulsory registration of waqfs. Above all, they silently 
‘exited’ from state controlled waqfs to express piety and qurba in non-labeled waqfs including 
sadaqa, private trusts, and community based associations.  
These alternative forms of attaining qurba were (still are) not only uncontrolled and 
uncoordinated, but also accorded Muslims the control over resources and privileges similar to 
those of waqfs while at the same time helped in fulfilling the religious obligations of giving back 
to the society. This subtly illustrates that resistance by subordinate groups in the society could as 
well be passive with a view to making “a total reversal of the established order where power, 
wealth, status, and material goods are in their hands” (Martin, 2000:73). Using Scott’s symbolic 
resistance was, therefore, crucial in understanding the ‘social world’ from the perspective of the 
subordinate Muslims’ strategies and improvisations to re-create autonomy and control over 
resources and the religious sphere. 
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Significantly, the view that Muslims are not a monolithic but rather a supra-community is not far 
from the truth. Muslims in Kenya are characterized by competing and, at times, fluid conflicting 
ethnic, jurisprudential, regional, and political affiliations. To understand how this diverse 
community uses waqfs in socio-cultural development, my study coins the concept of umiji–
wamiji in exploring the non-state-society engagement in the Bourdieu’s concept of capital among 
the various ethnic Muslim groups in the community. Apparently, religion (Islam) among Kenyan 
Muslims, though significant, but is not the main factor of identity and mobilization. The concept 
of umiji–wamiji thus, goes beyond the binary power struggles between the dominant and the 
subordinate groups over legitimacy in the society.  
Umiji-wamiji unravels the internal dynamics in the Muslim community that informed the 
constantly shifting borders of identity and belonging among diverse socio-ethnic Muslim groups 
in relation to access to resources and privileges in the region. This is true considering how waqfs 
were consecrated, their control negotiated, and eventually used in socio-cultural development as 
a microcosm. More importantly, since waqfs existed before and after colonization, the concept 
provides a significant framework in understanding the local trends and dynamics in the 
institution during these periods that could not be adequately explained by the two foreign 
concepts. Accordingly, fusing Bourdieu, Scott, and umiji-wamiji calls for an understanding of 
Muslims’ switch to uncontrolled and uncoordinated non-labeled waqfs not merely as a response 
to colonial and postcolonial state control of waqfs, but as “building social spaces relatively free 
from, and alternative to, life under domination” (Rey, 2007:116), the life outside secular state 
subordination, and the period thereafter. 
 
1.7 Methodology  
Knowledge on the history and traditions of the people is significant in understanding the 
circumstances that inform their contemporary trends. This explains the central place of historical 
approach in the study. The approach was used to identify the secular state legislative and 
Common law judicial constructs that influenced the development of the institution of waqf over 
time from the British colonial period (1900) when it was first placed under state supervision and 
control to the postcolonial era in 2010. More importantly, historical approach helped in 
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understanding the trends in Muslims’ responses vis-à-vis the transition from practicing waqfs 
under the Shari
c
a normative precepts to secular state control of the institution. The approach also 
made it possible to interrogate the extent at which various ethnic Muslim groups used waqfs in 
relation to the internal socio-cultural negotiations of the former governorates at the coast region.  
Although the study draws from anthropological insights, it goes beyond mere recording and 
presentation of political and socio-cultural negotiations between Muslims and the state on the 
one side and among diverse Muslim groups in the community on the other. For instance, other 
than establishing and describing the secular statutes and Common law judicial rulings that 
influenced waqfs in the community, using normative Shari
c
a precepts, the analysis further 
explored whether or not Muslims’ responses to such constructs could be situated within the 
broader concept of Islamic charity, qurba, and resource distribution in the society. Again, using 
normative precepts, it was possible to relate the compatibility or otherwise of established waqfs 
with the preponderant opinion about Shari
c
a, especially where legal heirs were involved in the 
distribution of the usufruct. To this end, analysis of qualitative and quantitative data that formed 
the basis of this discussion was both contextual and normative according to the Shari
c
a under 
which the institution of waqf subsists.  
The primary data, collected from over ten months of field research (November to December, 
2014; July to December, 2015; October to mid-November, 2016) consisted of waqfiyyas (waqf 
deeds); informal talks and group discussions with Waqf Commissioners (both current and 
former); Waqf Commission agents in Malindi and Lamu; waqf secretariat at Mombasa; 
beneficiaries and 
c
ulama. These talks were conducted in the local lingua franca, Kiswahili, and 
captured in voice recorders and field notes before being transcribed and translated in English by 
the researcher. Other documents that were reviewed during the study included court records 
(both kadhi’s and civil); archival records; lease contracts; records of appointment for the 
Commissioners and mutawallis; certificates of trusteeship; the WCK minutes; and compensation 
notices. Secondary data was collected through analysis of relevant existing works on the subject 
in public and private libraries and archives in Germany, Kenya, and Zanzibar. Some of the 
cutting edge information on the subject was also sourced through the internet.  
Registration of waqfs became mandatory upon establishment of the WCK failure of which was 
punished by law. The WCK secretariat, therefore, holds a repository of significant documents 
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including waqf deeds dating from the time when compulsory registration was introduced by the 
British colonial government. By the period of research (2014-2017), however, the WCK was yet 
to establish a digital archival system. Therefore, all vital records reviewed during study were not 
ordered and organized to enable preservation and retrieval in the conventional sense of an 
archive, but were rather piled in bundles and old files in several rooms of the Commission 
building. I was, however, privileged to see some of these records before they were availed to me 
in piece meal for review and analysis in the boardroom from where I worked. The ‘piece meal 
revelation’ of the bundles of waqf deeds alone lasted for three weeks during which I made a 
random sample realizing a total of 104 from about 350 deeds. While precise details of the 
sampled waqf deeds were noted and short notes made, some were photocopied or photographed 
partly becoming the basis of this discussion. Moreover, owing to age and poor preservation of 
these important documents, some of which were hand written and are of various lengths ranging 
from one to about ten pages, several of them were worn out before they were laminated. 
Subsequently, portions of some of the waqf charters were missing. Nonetheless, none of the 
sampled waqf deeds had serious defects that could radically interfere with the analysis.  
Waqf charters are the backbone of waqf practices in the Muslim world as they are the primary 
documents establishing a valid endowment. They identify the type of waqf, the waqif, and 
describe the type and nature of corpus. They mention the mutawalli(s) and how the position 
would be filled in future should it fall vacant. Waqf deeds also mention the primary beneficiaries 
and how usufruct should be distributed among them. Finally, the documents would essentially 
identify the residual beneficiaries, normally the indeterminate poor (masakin) and needy (fuqara) 
of the Muslim community or some other public worthy causes. Residual beneficiaries are 
invaluable means of encoding the special attachment a waqif had with certain socio-religious 
groups and localities in the community.  
The Shari
c
a provides for istibdal (exchange), 
c
ana (lease), and rent (hikr) of both revenue-
generating and revenue-consuming waqfs for the acquisition of better alternatives with a view to 
attaining perpetuity of the consecrations. Lease agreements contain details of the lessee(s), the 
leaser, salf (advance payment for lease, premium) charged, period of lease, and the agreed rent. 
Clearly, analysis of lease contracts was significant in ascertaining the considerations including 
ijar al-mithal (prevailing market rates) in relation to sound investment of waqf properties that 
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informed such transactions in the socio-cultural development of the institution. As WCK is a 
body corporate (with the powers to sue and be sued), court documents – court orders, judgments, 
summons, affidavits, and certificates of trusteeship of waqfs, were precise demonstration of the 
legal contestations involving ownership and control of waqf properties that also enriched this 
study. This information was collected and collated through visits to waqfs in the four 
administrative regions in the coast of Kenya and preserved through note taking, tape recording, 
and photography. 
 
1.8 Summary of Chapters 
In presenting the findings of the study, historical, descriptive, and analytical methods have been 
incorporated with the discussion adopting a spiral design. This makes every chapter to be the 
foundation upon which the proceeding discussion and analysis is built. Chapters one and two are 
the building blocks of the study. Chapter one sets the stage by identifying the main concerns, 
how they were investigated, and limitations of the study. Chapter two gives the interpretative 
insight into the normative precepts of waqf in Islam - the legal foundations; how and why waqfs 
are consecrated; and how they were established and managed in the formative periods. This aims 
at providing a broader understanding of the institution as practiced and mediated among Muslim 
communities in different historical epochs according to the Shari
c
a with the view of setting the 
background for the normative analysis of waqfs among the Muslim community under 
investigation.  
Secular legislative policies, civil institutions and Common law judicial strategies established 
during the British colonial period that placed waqfs under state control are the focus of chapter 
three. Importantly, the chapter explores relevant scenarios to illustrate how secular policies and 
civil constructs influenced the development of the institution. Using an array of legal ordinances 
and civil court judgments that applied the Shari
c
a as understood by the British, the colonial 
government determined the relationship with the Muslim community vis-à-vis the establishment, 
management, and use of waqfs.  
Secular policies, civil institutions and Common law courts’ precedents established during the 
colonial period that put the institution of waqf into imperial supervision and control were 
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inherited by subsequent postcolonial regimes. As illustrated in chapter four, this suggests that 
political elites in the independent state mainly echoed and perpetuated control of resources and 
political power. This put waqfs, and by extension, the Muslim community, into an extended 
period of state control and socio-cultural subordination. Unwittingly though, it also gave impetus 
to the flourishing of the internal socio-ethnic dynamics in the Muslim community as diverse 
groups and individuals sought to adapt and exploit the extended state control of resources to 
safeguard temporal group and private interests.  
Chapter five is an in-depth analysis of Muslims’ response to state regulation of waqfs since the 
colonial period. Muslims’ response is perceived in terms of spontaneous and continuous 
negotiation for control of resources against secular state policies and civil constructs as well as 
internal dynamics in the institution of waqfs. Accordingly, Muslims’ ‘exit’ from state controlled 
waqfs to non-labeled waqfs through non-compliance with official rules; establishment of 
community based organizations; preference to uncontrolled and uncoordinated charitable 
institutions of sadaqa, community organizations, and private trusts are the concerns of this 
section of the study. These draw our attention to efforts by the subordinate Muslim community to 
regain control over resources without attracting the wrath of the state while at the same time 
fulfill the religious obligations under a wider concept of charity as provided by the Shari
c
a. 
Chapter six analyzes how the minority Muslim community negotiated the contours of waqf 
outside the secular state, civil institutions and Common law judicial constructs. This draws 
mainly from the diverse types of waqfs in the community, to demonstrate how waqfs are lived, 
mediated, and generate trends under the prism of umiji-wamiji. Shurut al-waqif (conditions of the 
endower) in waqfs, particularly, offered the avenue through which inter- and intra-socio-cultural 
and locale negotiations were mediated. Endowers designated specific socio-ethnic groups, 
institutions, and regions, as beneficiaries of their waqfs demonstrating close and special 
attachment between them in relation to the internal dynamics of identity and belonging in the 
Muslim community. The chapter closes with the analysis on how the concepts of 
c
ana, hikr and 
istibdal are exploited for the economic (dis-)advantage of entrepreneurs and the diverse groups 
of beneficiaries as influenced by locale dynamics.  
Chapter seven is a recapitulation of the entire discussion and makes general observations on the 
negotiations between various actors in the institution of waqf in the country. As arguments in 
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preceding sections demonstrate, state (both colonial and postcolonial) involvement had 
significant ramifications on the institution. Secular policies, civil institutions and Common law 
judicial constructs placed the control of resources, and waqfs in particular, in the hands of the 
state. This did not go down well within a section of Muslims who resorted to the uncontrolled 
and uncoordinated charitable institutions with a view to reversing control of resources and fulfill 
the religious obligations for the attainment of taqwa and qurba. Paradoxically, this in essence 
enabled the perpetuation of internal socio-ethnic and cultural negotiations for identity, belonging, 
and access to resources and privileges in the Muslim community appropriately captured under 
the concept of umiji-wamiji. 
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         Chapter Two:   
         The Concept of Waqf in Islam 
2.0. Introduction 
This chapter provides the interpretative insight into the normative precepts of the institution of 
waqf in Islam. The discussion opens with a broad analysis of the several definitions of waqf as 
advanced by different scholars before zeroing on a working definition for this study. The 
discussion also meanders into the recurrent views in relation to the origin of the institution of 
waqf highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of the prepositions as elaborated in various 
investigations. The chapter further discusses the contours of the practice of waqf upon its 
formalization during the formative years of Islam: what constitutes a legal waqf; how waqf was 
managed during its formative age; how efforts were made to categorize the different forms of 
waqfs in early studies with a view to highlighting the underlying substantive features of each 
category; and most importantly, how ruined and economically un-supportive revenue-bearing 
waqfs could be revived to secure the principle of perpetuity. Finally, the discussion closes with 
an analysis on how and why waqfs were appropriated during earlier periods in the history of the 
Muslim society before the institution came to be controlled and supervised by Muslim states and 
invading colonial powers. The proceedings in this chapter are not only significant in 
understanding the rudiments of the institution and how it developed through different epochs in 
Islamic history, but also to lay the basis for analysis of the practices of waqf among Muslims in 
Kenya in the subsequent chapters. 
 
2.1 What is Waqf? Problem of Defining the Concept 
The Islamic institution of waqf has aroused intense academic interests from diverse backgrounds 
that have invoked various approaches including law (Powers, 1989; Engin and Alexandre, 2005; 
Anderson, 2008), history (Duff, 1926; Hathaway, 1994; Gil, 1998), economics (Cizakca, 1998, 
2004; Haneef, et al, 2014), and religion (Barnes, 1986; Qureshi, 1990; Banday, 2013) among 
others. Given the different approaches adopted by these research works, it has become difficult 
to have a unanimous definition of waqf. Van Leeuwen (1999:9-10) captures this difficulty and 
explains why: 
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Defining the institution of waqf is both at the same time simple and extremely 
difficult. It is simple because the concept of waqf has been described in legal 
handbooks of various kinds, in a terminology which is especially molded to avoid 
ambiguity and misinterpretations […] The question what a waqf is, is difficult, 
however, since the phenomenon is not confined to the realm of legal theory and 
juridical handbooks. It is also part of a historical reality and it touches upon the 
material and spiritual conditions of societies beyond the sphere of legal systems.  
As part of historical reality, waqf is, according to van Leeuwen, naturally integrative and has two 
basic incongruent manifestations – theoretical and the other occurring in the material world. 
More often, what is textually and theoretically described as constituting waqf may not 
necessarily and exactly be what is happening in the material world. Nevertheless, events in the 
later environment may not be invalidated as they are significant manifestations of waqf that seek 
to complement the texts in enabling the institution adapt to various situations (Hoexter, 1995; 
van Leeuwen, 1999).  
The scholar further postulates that for centuries, studies on waqf were based on either legal 
precepts with a view to developing convenient administrative frameworks; or on theoretical 
assumptions that being divine, the Shari
c
a from which the institution draws its mandate and 
operative structures are two sides of the same coin (1999:10). Such studies, as van Leeuwen 
opines, are consequently limited to specific aspects of waqfs, thereby making it difficult to arrive 
at a conclusive end of what waqf is.  
Literally, waqf is derived from the Arabic root verb waqafa - implying to stop, prevent or 
restrain. Barnes (1986), Sheriff (2001), and Hennigan (2004) agree in their definition of waqf as 
a process where “-‘a revenue-bearing property’ is withdrawn from commercial transaction and is 
made inalienable for some beneficent end; taken out of the condition of private ownership, the 
property is said to belong to God, and its revenue is assigned for some religious or charitable 
purpose” (Barnes, 1986:5, emphasis added). In other words, revenue-producing properties (asl 
al-mal) are withdrawn from commercial transactions to become mortmain under the watch of a 
mutawalli that, allegedly, do not contribute to any economic growth though their manfa
c
a is 
assigned to specified individuals, institutions, and other public welfare causes. This definition of 
waqf by Barnes does not depart sharply from that commonly adopted by the Shafi
c
i legal code, as 
explained by Imam al-Nawawi. To the Shafi
c
i madhhab (school of law) of Sunni Islam, waqf is 
“the alienation of ‘revenue-generating property’ with the principal remaining inalienable, while 
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its revenues are disbursed for a pious purpose, in order to seek God’s favor” (al-Nawawi, AH 
13855:314, as quoted in Sabra, 2000:70. See also El Daly, 2010, emphasis added). 
The major challenge in perceiving waqfs in the context of revenue-bearing corpuses as 
emphasized in the above definitions is to place great prominence on material (economic) 
benefits. In turn, this perception, observes Shatzmiller (2000:97-113), negates properties and 
institutions incapable of revenue-bearing that could as well, and have since immemorial times, 
been consecrated as waqfs based on the services they rendered to the community. Such revenue 
consuming corpuses may include, but not limited to hard copies of the Qur’an (mushaf), books of 
religious sciences, madrasas (Quranic schools), as well as masjids (mosques) among others also 
established by this study.
1
 The exclusive view on waqfs as revenue-bearing properties also fails 
to capture the spiritual facet, which - arguably, is the back bone of the institution in Islam 
(Hoexter, 1998; van Leeuwen, 1999).  
In the Ottoman understanding, Barnes (1986:5) posits, waqf means “to prevent the giving and 
taking possession of a thing so that the substance belongs to God, while its benefits pertain to 
mankind.” This perception to waqf is shared by others (Miran, 2009; Peters, 2000, as cited in El 
Daly, 2010).
2
 Two aspects of this definition merit brief comments - ownership of the corpus 
being divine and intended objective as for the service of humanity. The definition, nevertheless, 
falls short in giving the precise purpose forming the foundation of the institution of waqf in Islam 
– birr (righteousness) or for the soul of the endower. It also leaves unanswered questions with 
regard to how the benefits are to be expended among the beneficiaries in the legality of waqfs 
according to the preponderant view about Shari
c
a on the same. As pointed out earlier by van 
Leeuwen, some of the attempted definitions of waqf emphasize certain aspects of the institution 
ending up not being inclusive to all elements, at least as being perceived by the majority Muslim 
schools of theology.  
                                                          
1
 Qur’an 72:18 emphasizes the ownership of mosques (and other places of worship like musala – informal mosques) to Allah. 
The emphasis on the verse is twin fold – it stresses the absolute divine ownership of such places thus making them waqfs as well 
as the prohibition of invoking other beings in the mosque besides Allah. On non-revenue bearing waqfs, see Shatzmiller, M. 
(2000). The Berbers and the Islamic State: The Marinid Experience in Pre-Protectorate Morocco. Princeton: Markus Wiener 
Publishers; Sanjuan, G. (2007). Till God Inherits the Earth: Islamic Pious Endowments in al-Andalus (9th -15th Centuries). 
Leiden: Brill.  
2
 Similar positions are held by the Malik madhhab and some Hanafi scholars. See Layish, A. (1983). The Maliki Waqf According 
to Wills and Waqfiyyat. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 46, 1-32; Cattan, H. (1984). 
The Law of Waqf. In M. Khadduri & H. Liebesny (Eds.), Law in the Middle East: Origin and Development of Islamic Law (pp. 
203-222). Washington D. C.: The Middle East Institute; Qureshi, M. (1990). Waqfs in India: A Study of Legislative and 
Administrative Control. New Delhi: Gian Publishing House. 
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Nevertheless, their non-inclusivity notwithstanding, majority of the definitions seem to agree on 
significant pillars of waqf including inalienability (untouchability) and perpetuity. That the item, 
once declared as waqf would never be sold, purchased, inherited, or even given out as a gift. 
These and other principles are conflated in the definition of waqf by van Leeuwen (1999:11-12): 
Essentially a waqf consisted of an object which was endowed to a specific pious 
purpose for eternity. The founder (waqif) gave up his property rights and 
determined the pious purpose and the regulations for the exploitation of the 
object, which became the property of God. The object was dissociated from the 
market circulation and any form of alienation (sale, pawning, donation) was 
strictly forbidden. Waqfs were often founded for the benefit of mosques, which 
themselves also had the status of waqf […] waqfs could thus either be possessions 
yielding revenues and profit, or objects consuming these revenues and serving as 
religious or social institutions.
3
 
 
Proceeding from van Leeuwen’s definition, we discern that: (a) waqf has to be endowed for a 
specific pious cause; (b) the endowment has to be permanent; (c) once endowed, the endower 
surrenders his right of ownership to God; (d) the endower reserves the right to determine the 
pious purpose and exploitation of the corpus; and (e) disposal of the corpus is strictly forbidden. 
Within this context, the study perceives waqf as a valuable income generating or service 
rendering (non-)item that an individual voluntarily cedes private ownership and consecrates it to 
God through a management system that holds it in trust during which period its value would be 
improved, sustained, and appropriated for specified pious objective(s). The position adopted by 
this study on the definition of waqf is anchored on Qur’an 3:92 where attaining righteousness 
and piety is contingent on giving out freely in charity what one loves in truth, not merely as a 
means of disposing the (non-)item for being invaluable. Emphasis is placed on spending (non-
)properties that have utility and whose value could be improved for the benefit of both the giver 
and the recipient, while the rest of the conditions with regard to waqfs in Sunni Islam remain.
4
    
                                                          
3
 The Ahmadiyya view of waqf goes beyond objects to include human beings. ‘Waqfi Nau’, established during the reign of the 
fourth khalif, Hadrat Mirza Tahir Ahmad (1982-2003), allows believers to consecrate their children (waqfin) to the service of the 
jamaca (community). These children are catered for under ‘waqfi jadid’ established during the reign of the second khalif, Mirza 
Basheer-ud-Din Mahmood Ahmad (1914-1965). The Ahmadiyya view, undoubtedly, draws from Qur’an 3:35-37 where Mariam, 
the mother of Jesus (Issa bin Mariam) was consecrated for the service of God. See Simon, V. (2008). Islam and the Ahmadiyya 
Jamacat: History, Belief, Practice. London: Hurst & Co., pp.184-185. 
4
 Shica Islam has a different perception of waqf as a contractual agreement between the endower and the beneficiary requiring an 
offer (ijab) from the endower and acceptance (qabul) by the beneficiary. In this case, the Shica view does not recognize 
testamentary waqfs since offer and acceptance has to trigger an immediate transfer of the property to waqf. In view of the 
principle of ijab and qabul, waqf, opines Makdisi (1981), could thus be rejected by the recipient. In the majority opinion, 
however, such refusal may not necessarily invalidate the waqf as usufruct could be channeled to the residual beneficiaries like the 
poor, the needy, or to other public causes for the general good. See Makdisi, G. (1981). The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of 
Learning in Islam and the West. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press; Zaid, A. (1986). The Islamic Law of Bequest. London: 
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2.2 Practices of ‘Waqf’ in other Traditions: A Borrowed Institution Discourse  
The question regarding origin of waqf has remained controversial pitting two schools of thought 
on this issue. On one side of the argument is a team which opinions that waqf is a borrowed 
concept or practice from other civilizations, while on the other end is one which holds that the 
institution is Islamic, all foreign elements notwithstanding.  
A cross section of scholars argues that Muslims borrowed the institution of waqf from other 
civilizations that came into contact with during different epochs in history. This school of 
thought gives credit to civilizations like the Roman, Greek, Mesopotamia, Jewish, Sassanid, and 
Budhism who are alleged to have practiced waqfs in different forms before they interacted with 
Muslims who adopted and ‘refined’ the practice as part of their socio-religious act. This position 
is captured in the observation by Cizakca (1998:48):  
Charitable endowments have a history considerably older than Islam and it is also 
very likely that Islam may have been influenced by earlier civilizations. Ancient 
Mesopotamia, Greece, Rome as well as the pre-Islamic Arabs certainly knew of 
charitable endowments… While Roman origins have been rejected, primarily 
Byzantine, but also Mesopotamian, Sasanid, Jewish and Buddhist influences have 
been accepted as plausible. 
It is argued that the development of the institution of waqf in Islam is formulated along several 
foreign doctrinal and judicial concepts compounding the view that it is not originally Islamic. 
The Byzantine practice of piae causea is among the ideologies along which waqf was allegedly 
founded.  
Under the piae causea, Barnes (1986:13-14) argues that, charitable institutions were established 
in favor of an “anonymous and ever-changing collectivity” of the poor, the aged, orphans, 
widows, free-born girls, and for the ransoming of slaves. This view is also shared by others 
(Hennigan, 2004; Macuch, 2004).
5
 Barnes (1986:16) further explains that under the practice of 
piae causea, “the ownership of property dedicated to eleemosynary ends could be possessed by 
no one, but was given to God, and the fruits of its revenue were assigned to aid mankind.” 
According to the author, a specific legislation was established in the law code of Justinian (527-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Scorpion Publishing Ltd; Kozlowski, G. (2008). Muslim Endowments and Society in British India. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
5
The Babel Civilization is also said to have had similar practice where benefits of some properties were apportioned for the poor 
and widows. Among Egyptians, such properties were for the welfare of gods, temples, graves of kings, education and cultural 
services. See El-Daly, M. (2010).  Challenges and Potentials of Channeling Local Philanthropy, op. cit.  
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565 C. E.) that exempted such institutions against the Roman and Byzantine laws which 
prohibited designating charities to indeterminate beneficiaries as invalid legal entities.  
Later developments in the Roman law allegedly saw the category of anonymous invalid legal 
identities expanded to include institutions and towns giving rise to legatum sub modo (indirect 
legacy). Under this arrangement, a group of persons was accorded legal identity as trustees to 
whom the testamentary gift was given to administer on behalf of the institution and exercise 
judicial and legal personality over the charitable foundation (Barnes, 1986; Macuch, 2004). 
Nonetheless, the contending side that upholds waqf as an original Islamic institution faults the 
piae causae trajectory on the basis that Byzantine influences were confined to Egypt. They argue 
that the practice of piae causae did not last to the reigns of the Fatimid dynasty (909-1171 A.D.) 
who are alleged to have introduced waqf in the region (Hennigan, 2004).  
Another religious practice associated with waqf is the Roman legal concept of res sacrae (sacred 
objects). Under the Roman doctrine of res sacrae, Barnes and Hennigan again explain that, there 
were two levels of jurisdiction - heaven and earth.
6
 Divini juris (heavenly jurisdiction) was 
concerned with sacred objects and phenomena including religious symbols and institutions 
withdrawn from private ownership and dedicated to gods where they could not be sold, bought, 
or even alienated (Barnes, 1986; Hennigan, 2004; Bhala, 2011). Different from the Islamic 
concept of waqf, however, in res sacrae, Morand, (1910) clarifies that, it was the material subject 
of offer that was withdrawn from private ownership to res nullius (no one but God). It neither 
included its benefits nor other usufruct bearing properties that could be devoted for their 
perpetual maintenance and spiritual use. Morand further posits that establishing res sacrae 
required direct permission and requisite statutes from the state (senatus consultum). Once an item 
became under divini juris, it was the state that managed it (Morand, 1910, as cited in Hennigan, 
2004:54). This is a sharp departure from the institution of waqf in Islam where it is the individual 
on his own volition who establishes it, manages it, or appoints a mutawalli to oversee the growth 
of the institution and channel the usufruct to prescribed beneficiaries and causes.  
                                                          
6
 The Roman, and similar other connections to waqf like the pre-Islamic Iranian law have also been contested by various studies. 
See Arjomand, S. (1998). Philanthropy, the Law, and the Public Policy in the Islamic World before the Modern Era. In W. 
Ilchmann, S. Katz, & L. Queen II, (Eds.), Philanthropy in the World’s Traditions (pp.109-132). Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press; van Leeuwen, R. (1999). Waqfs and Urban Structures: The Case of Ottoman Damascus. Leiden: Brill.    
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More so, foreigners and exiles were prohibited from establishing legacies under the Roman laws. 
To circumvent this prohibition, there arose the practice of fidei commissum in which properties 
were entrusted to trustees who transferred the usufruct to the intended beneficiaries, mostly 
relatives, for a specified period of time or until their extinction. Thus the corpus became 
inalienable. Fidei commissum, allegedly, resembles waqf ahli (also waqf dhurri, family or 
prosperity waqf) and was claimed to have been the origin of the institution of waqf in Islam. 
Notwithstanding the apparent similarities, this conclusion is, however, often dismissed as flawed 
owing to the several differences between waqf and fidei commissum. According to Schacht 
(1957), the later is said to have been strictly a post-mortem transaction unlike the former which 
could take either form – prompt or testamentary (Schacht, 1957, as cited in Hennigan, 2004:55-
56). Besides, fidei commissum did not envisage any pious cause as residual beneficiary other 
than to ensure that an individual’s progeny was well taken care of upon the death of the endower. 
A pious religious cause of public charity and qurba, whether designated or assumed, is a 
significant element of waqfs in Islam according to the majority opinion of Sunni theologians.  
On their part, Perikhanian (1983) and Macuch (2004) trace the origin of waqf to the institution of 
pat ruvan (also ruvanagan, to the soul) under the Sassanid Persian law of property. Under this 
arrangement, the scholars explain, a principal property, (non-)revenue bearing as well as (im-
)moveable, was endowed ‘for the soul’ and considered inalienable. The property was then 
administered by a trustee(s) who channeled its benefits either to the progeny of the endower or 
some other pious public causes as predetermined by the dedicator in the endowment deed. The 
pious public benefits continuum ranged from the holding of services, distribution of alms, and 
provision of meals for festivals to works of social utility such as canals, bridges, or aqueducts 
and monuments (Perikhanian, 1983, as cited in Yarshater, 1983, vol. 3:2; Macuch, 2004:181-
196). And “once declared ‘for the soul’, the property could not revert to the endower’s 
ownership since it was dedicated for pious goals”, adds Hennigan (2004:59-61). The Sassanid 
ruvanagan practice is, therefore, held as a compelling foreign legal precursor of waqfs in Islam 
since it carried with it even the differences between proprietary and usufructory rights.  
As a means to wealth distribution in the society, waqf is also linked with the concept of charity 
as explained in different terms in other monotheistic beliefs like Judaism and Christianity. In 
Judaism, the concept of zedakah (charity) is considered as a significant mitzva (religious duty) 
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and a pre-qualification for a pious life. Under the Jewish practice of hekdesh (dedicated or 
consecrated), a property could be withdrawn from private ownership to become perpetually 
inalienable and managed by an apotropos (trustee) appointed by the endower. The rabbi 
(religious leader) or court though, customarily retained the overall supervisory rights of the 
property whose benefits could be channeled to charitable purposes in the society. It is further 
believed that hekdesh properties were owned by God like those in waqf (Stillman, 1998; 
Hennigan, 2004; Deguilhem, 2008). Among the Byzantine Christians, the Church also got 
widely involved in the xenodochia (charitable institutions) that were concerned with among other 
services like helping the aged, providing health care, taking care of orphans, and though to a 
limited extent, for the repair of religious institutions and for the benefit of the clergy (van 
Leeuwen, 1994:30-33; Lev, 2005).  
Therefore, the Byzantine piae causae, the Roman res sacrae, the Sassanid ruvanagan and the 
various forms of charity among monotheistic beliefs are among legal trajectories traced to 
various civilizations that allegedly influenced the institution of waqf in Islam. Yet, Muslim 
traditions, opines Kuran (2001:848), hold that “the waqf is sufficiently different from each of its 
pre-Islamic forerunners to be considered a distinct Islamic institution.” In view of this position, 
we now turn to the argument that seeks to justify the institution as uniquely Islamic. 
 
2.3 Textual and Historical Evidence of Waqf in Islam: An Islamic Discursive View  
Talal Asad (2009:20) espouses an Islamic discursive tradition as “a tradition of Muslim 
discourse that addresses itself to conceptions of the Islamic past and future, with reference to a 
particular Islamic practice in the present.”7 In essence, the concept seeks to explain Islam and its 
religious institutions as lived and negotiated across the umma (community of believers) not as 
fossil set of rules unrelated to the beliefs and practices of the faithful and incompatible with 
contemporary realities, but as a progressive discourse that relates to the past and the future 
                                                          
7
 Discursive tradition was suggested as a concept to the anthropological studies of Islam owing to the alleged inseparability of 
‘experience’ and ‘tradition’ in the faith vis-à-vis the Western conceptualization of religion and politics. For further discussion, 
see Asad, T. (1997). Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam. London: The John 
Hopkins University Press; Asad, T. (2003). Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press; Anjum, O. (2007). Islam as a Discursive Tradition: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors. Comparative Studies of 
South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, 27(3), 656-671; Asad, T. (2009). The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam. Qui Parle, 
17(2), 1-30. 
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through a present. In view of this, proponents of the institution of waqf as uniquely Islamic 
perceive it as a discursive tradition. Though not textually enshrined in the Qur’an, the institution 
is attributed to some hadiths of the Prophet during the seventh century, (i.e. past) which grew 
progressively through assumed rigid legal forms before reaching its peak in the thirteenth 
century (Hennigan, 2004). During the last decades of the twentieth century, waqfs adopted 
internal regulation mechanisms against earlier operational and jurisprudential rigidity 
transforming to a modern institution capable of responding to challenges and demands in relation 
to charity and wealth distribution in the society (Kuran, 2001), (i.e. present) and more 
significantly, as a religious practice meant for the attainment of qurba and sawab for the spiritual 
afterlife (i.e. future).  
Based on the foregoing, proponents of waqf as originally an Islamic tradition are further split into 
two ideologies – one purely theological and the other academic Islamic scholarship. While the 
latter group draws and appreciates existing similarities between waqfs and various waqf-like non-
Islamic practices as discussed above, Muslim theologians strictly draw inspiration from 
traditions of the Prophet; some companions’ acts of endowment; acts of individuals and those of 
other Muslim societies as their major points of reference to the genesis of waqf in Islam. 
Academic Islamic scholarship, as exemplified in Hennigan’s study (2004:50), holds the view that 
trust practices existed among Muslim societies “before the waqf treatises came into existence.” 
The generic term waqf was allegedly adopted in the first and second-century A.H. Islamic legal 
discourse in place of a wide range of trust-like terminologies in the Near Eastern cultures 
including sadaqa, hubs, sadaqa mahbusa, and habis sadaqa. The Shari
c
a is claimed to have 
adopted these terms and incorporated the practices as it did various other customs that were not 
antithetical in demonstration of the social heterogeneity of the society. Within this context, 
academic Islamic scholarship, as summarized in Hennigan (2004:52), concedes that waqf 
incorporated some foreign practices in its body polity though such foreign elements do not 
necessarily make it to be an alien concept in Islam. 
 
To reconcile the foreign and indigenous trajectories on the origin of waqf, Hennigan, suggests 
the concept of ‘unconscious borrowing’ of foreign non-Islamic or pre-Islamic practices by Islam. 
He contends that foreign elements infiltrated the nascent Shari
c
a when Muslim 
c
ulama 
unconsciously adopted local cultures of the people they conquered in “attempts to bring order” to 
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the legal discourse (2004:52). The author summarizes the notion of ‘unconscious borrowing’ in 
the following way: 
As a result, […] there was likely no overarching Islamic law of trusts, but merely 
a collection of local practices – Roman, Byzantine, Persian, Jewish, and Arab – 
that all shared some similar features, and almost certainly used different 
terminologies. The task confronting jurists […] was how to bring some measure 
of uniformity to this diverse landscape of trust practices and terminologies. The 
legal institution these authors devised to bring order to this milieu of trust 
practices – the ‘waqf’- permitted Roman, Byzantine, Persian and /or Jewish 
practices to enter (perhaps unnoticed) in to Shari’a (Hennigan, 2004:68).   
By extension, the espoused view on ‘unconscious borrowing’ partly seeks to account for the 
existence of foreign elements in the Shari
c
a not only with regard to waqfs, but also to various 
other socio-economic and cultural practices in justification of the perception of continuity and 
heterogeneity of the umma as having been established before and during Abrahamic (2510-2329 
B.H.) times. Most importantly perceived as an incorporative civilization, Islamic traditions 
recognize the principle of istihsan (also maslaha, common social good or welfare) where 
c
urf or 
c
adat (local customs) that are not adverse to Islam could be adopted as secondary sources of 
Shari
c
a (Stockreiter, 2015:29). As such, waqf in its different un-Islamic strands as a concept, 
could have probably and unconsciously permeated the Islamic tradition. Nonetheless, Hennigan 
(2004:107) observed that, whereas “the substantive law of waqf developed through rationalist 
discourse, the institution’s cultural (and hermeneutical) legitimacy rested upon the traditions of 
the Prophet and his companions.”  
Muslim theologians on their part draw evidence from historical events before and after the 
Prophet’s time to argue that waqf is originally an Islamic institution. Drawing reference from 
early Abrahamic Muslim society (Hunafa’) in Arabia, it is claimed that some rudimentary type 
of waqf was practiced from which the contemporary form developed (Barnes, 1986; Isin and 
Lefebvre, 2005). Moreover, both historical and religious texts identify Abraham as a person of 
immense wealth that he appropriated for the service of God and for the welfare of humanity. The 
ka
c
ba (house of Allah), for instance, is commonly quoted as a living testimony of Abraham’s 
works of charity that he built with his son, Ismael, and dedicated it for the worship of one God 
(Barnes, 1986; Lev, 2005). The Qur’an (2:125) affirms this opinion:   
 
 
28 
 
And [mention] when We made the House a place of return for the people and [a 
place of] security. And take, [O believers], from the standing place of Abraham a 
place of prayer. And We charged Abraham and Ishmael, [saying], "Purify My 
House for those who perform Tawaf and those who are staying [there] for worship 
and those who bow and prostrate [in prayer].
8
 
In the above verse, God talks of ‘my house’ implying the divine ownership of the property as 
waqf. Above all, looked at from the wider definition of waqf, the ka
c
ba is a permanent dedication 
by Abraham (i.e. perpetuity), hence could neither be sold (i.e. inalienable) nor its dedication 
revoked (i.e. irrevocable), and more importantly, it was dedicated for prayers (i.e. religious 
cause), (Qur’an 24:36). Thus, the kacba allegedly carries with it all the necessary prerequisites of 
a valid waqf (Benthall and Jourdan, 2003; Khan, 2008). Through such acts of charity, Abraham 
is said to have accorded his followers a living example from which they established numerous 
charities. On the strength of this account with Abraham regarded as the father of Islam, waqf is 
claimed to have existed in Islam since immemorial times.  
Barnes also agrees with the above account of Abraham constructing and dedicating the ka
c
ba for 
charity to be credible as advanced by renowned scholars of waqf. In his opinion, however, “such 
acts as altar building and alms giving more correctly fall within the realm of individual instances 
of charity, or sadaka, and not vakif” (1986:6). It is submitted in this study that Barnes’ 
perception of this charity not being waqf falls within the exclusive definition that emphasizes 
some elements in the expense of others. The author does not appreciate the holistic perception of 
waqf as a “religiously motivated behavior combined with or unrelated to altruism translated into 
practice to assume the different forms of assistance relevant to the needs of the society” (Lev, 
2005:144). His repudiation of Abraham’s act of waqf should, therefore, be understood from his 
exclusive definition of waqf as strictly a revenue bearing property. Accordingly, he contends 
that any “simple open courtyard and sun-dried brick masjids” do not qualify to be waqf in the 
first place, hence should not be conceived as being “in need of landed endowments for their 
support” (1986:7).  
The author further asserts that the account of Abraham’s act of sadaqa as being the foundation of 
waqf “is more properly in the realm of belief than historical fact” (Barnes, 1986:6). It is an 
undisputed maxim that while all waqf is sadaqa, not all sadaqa is waqf. However, in the 
                                                          
8
 See also Qur’an 72:18; footnote 3 above. 
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contested account above as corroborated by Qur’an 2:215, Qur’an 24:36, and Qur’an 72:18, 
Abraham’s charity is a living historical reality attracting millions of Muslims across the globe for 
the annual hajj (pilgrimage) rites. Therefore, it carries with it the “embodiment of a life of piety, 
the key to salvation, and an instrument of repentance and expatiation for sins” (Lev, 2005:144). 
These are spiritual foundations on which the institution of waqf is claimed to be built qualifying 
Abraham’s charity as waqf and not merely sadaqa.  
More closely drawn from the formative period of Islam to be the genesis of waqf is the concept 
of lands subject to fay’ (tribute) as advocated by Bercham (n. d., as cited in Barnes, 1986).9 
According to Bercham, spoils of war, both fay’ (also fai, property gained without fighting) and 
ghanima (booty) during the pre-Islamic times used to be distributed among the winning side in 
specific shares with the tribal chief entitled to khums (one-fifth) of the entire collection (Sahih al-
Bukhari, 4:327). Upon the establishment of Islam and subsequent conquest of the Bani an-Nadir, 
Bani Hawazin, Khaybar, and Fadak, the Prophet is claimed to have deviated from the pre-Islamic 
norm of distributing booty by dedicating the collection partly for his personal use and for the 
welfare of the umma (Quran 59:7-8; Sahih al-Bukhari, 4:153). This trend was upheld by his 
companions after his demise as illustrated during the reigns of Abu Bakr (r. 632-634 C.E) and 
c
Umar bin al-Khattab (r. 634-644 C.E) when fay’ was managed by the khalifa (caliph) for the 
course of God (Sahih al-Bukhari, 4:324-326). Therefore, “‘fay’ lands annexed to Islam through 
force of arms (
c
anwatan) were in effect vakif by virtue of their not being divided, but having 
their revenue restrained for the good of the entire Muslim community”, concludes Bercham (as 
quoted in Barnes, 1986:9).
10
    
                                                          
9
 Fay’ is explained as booty acquired through surrender to Muslims by invaded territories as was the case of Bani an-Nadir. 
These properties were centrally managed by the Prophet at the bayt al-mal (public treasury) who used them for his family upkeep 
as well as charity for the cause of God. See Qur’an 59:6; Sahih al-Bukhari, 4:153, 325-326; Frenkel, Y. (1999). Political and 
Social Aspects of Islamic Endowments (“awqaf”): Saladin in Cairo (1169-73) and Jerusalem (1187-93). Bulletin of the School of 
Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 62(1), 1-20.   
10
 Two options were open to claim ownership of conquered properties: divide them among Muslims or allow the local 
community to retain ownership but pay land tax (kharaj), hence becoming a form of waqf. The Prophet, upon conquest of 
Khaybar, allowed Jews to retain and plough their lands but pay half of the produce to the Muslims before they were expelled to 
Taima and Ariha during the reign of khalif cUmar bin al-Khattab (See Sahih al-Bukhari, 3:522, 524, 527, 531; 4:380).  Waqf on 
kharaj was also upheld during the reign of caliph cUmar upon the conquest of the Sawad province in Iraq. There is evidence, 
though, suggesting that booty used to be divided amongst Muslim warriors even during the period of the Prophet. See Sahih al-
Bukhari, 4:359-360, 363-366, 375, 378-379; Gil, M. (1998). The Earliest Waqf Foundations. Journal of Near Eastern Studies, 
57(2), 125-140; Sanjuan, A. (2007). Till God Inherits the Earth, op. cit., p.400; Kozlowski, G. (2008). Muslim Endowments and 
Society in British India, op. cit., pp.11-12. 
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It is debatable, however, whether or not fay’ constituted valid Islamic waqfs since fay’ were 
allegedly not anybody’s private property among the victorious Muslims. Rather, they were 
owned by non-Muslim subjects in the conquered territories and it was its kharaj (land tax) 
instead that was channeled to the Islamic state for distribution to beneficiaries (Barnes, 1986). 
According to the preponderant view, consecrated properties must be legally, whether singly or 
jointly, owned by the endower. Thus, the question of ownership of fay’ faults the legal trajectory 
in tracing the origin of waqf in Islam. Nevertheless, advocates of the theory assert that as 
community properties, legal ownership of fay’ rested with the central authority (i.e. first the 
Prophet then the caliphs) on behalf of all Muslims. They opine that since the Prophet’s (and 
caliphs) word was law unto itself, his not dividing the lands, which was one of two options of 
owning appended properties, became a norm in the establishment of waqfs for the benefit of the 
general Muslim public (Sahih al-Bukhari, 4:324-326; Hoexter, 1995; Gil, 1998). In essence, the 
argument that fay’ revenue benefitted all Muslims subtly suggests that it was communally (i.e. 
jointly) owned putting into rest the question of legal ownership. 
 
On the extreme end of the Islamic scholarship continuum is a section of Muslim jurists who hold 
the view that “there is no evidence that such a complex system of appropriating usufruct as a life 
interest to varying and successive classes of beneficiaries existed prior to Islam” (Cattan, 
1984:205). As a matter of fact, this group of jurists is aptly informed of the fact that the Qur’an 
does not make direct reference to waqfs. For this reason, they endeavored to seek for evidence 
from the text where general references to wealth distribution are made before turning to precise 
traditions attributed to the Prophet as having established waqf in Islam so as to give the practice a 
textual legitimacy. In one of the various inferences where Qur’an is interpreted to have enshrined 
the concept of waqf as a form of charity, God says: 
Righteousness is not that you turn your faces toward the east or the west, but 
[true] righteousness is [in] one who believes in Allah, the Last Day, the angels, 
the Book, and the prophets and gives wealth, in spite of love for it, to relatives, 
orphans, the needy, the traveler, those who ask [for help], and for freeing slaves; 
[and who] establishes prayer and gives zakat… (Qur’an 2:177).11 
 
                                                          
11 See also Qur’an 2:215; Qur’an 2:264; 270, 280; Qur’an 3:7, 86; Qur’an 3:180; Qur’an 58:12, 13; Qur’an 73:20; and Qur’an 
111:92.  
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In Qur’an 2:215, again, beneficence to charity is foremost for parents and kindred before other 
deserving cases - the orphans, the needy, and travelers. The ‘parents and kindred’ category of 
beneficiaries is further protected in the wealth distribution scheme by Qur’an 4:11-12 in the 
Shari
c
a guidelines of mirath. This brings into light the relationship between the concepts of 
charity and inheritance as manifested in waqf ahli. The subsequent section of Qur’an 2:215, - 
“orphans and the needy and the traveler”- is often interpreted to mean recipients of sadaqa that 
could either take the form of zakat or better still, waqfs (Barnes, 1986; van Leeuwen, 1999; 
Hennigan, 2004).   
In light of this, the compound noun sadaqa mawqufa (immobilized alms) is often used in Islamic 
theology to mean waqfs, demonstrating the close knitting between the parent idea of charity and 
the several manifestations in which the institution could be practiced and mediated in the 
community (McChesney, 1991; Singer, 2003; Sanjuan, 2007). Al-Kasani (d.587/1189) also 
opines that waqf is a form of sadaqa jariyya (perpetual charity) for the course of God (al-Kasani, 
1910, 4:221, cited in Hoexter, 1995:137). This view is enshrined in a Prophetic tradition:   
Abu Huraira (may Allah be pleased with him) reported Allah’s messenger (Pbuh) 
as saying: when a man dies, all his acts come to an end, but three; recurring 
charity (sadaqa jariyya) or knowledge (by which people benefit), or a pious 
offspring, who prays for him (Sahih Muslim, 3:14). 
 
The above tradition mentions three forms of perpetual charity all of which could be coalesced in 
the institution of waqf as observed by Cizakca (1998:49):  
Muslims needed an institution that would enable them to perform all three of 
these good deeds. This institution was the awqaf which can, indeed, assure 
ongoing, recurring charity for many years, even centuries, after the death of the 
founder. It can finance scholars whose lasting works would benefit mankind for a 
long period and the sawab that accrue to them would be shared by the waqf’s 
founder who had provided for their sustenance in the first place. Finally the 
management of the waqf can be entrusted to the offspring of the founder so that 
while, on the one hand, careful and loyal management is assured, on the other, the 
offspring would pray for the deceased for, thanks to his waqf, he or she is not 
destitute. 
 
In a similar tradition attributed to Muhammad, it is related that during the first year A.H., he 
wished to purchase a piece of land from the Bani an-Najjar to construct a mosque in Medina. The 
Bani an-Najjar, however, refused to take the money and gave out the piece of land freely instead 
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in the course of God (Sahih al-Bukhari, 4:32). In the opinion of some Muslim theologians, this 
dedicated piece of land was in essence a waqf in itself. The most recurrent tradition attributed to 
the Prophet as having established waqf in Islam, nonetheless, concerns a second year A.H. 
episode where 
c
Umar bin al-Khattab (577-644 C. E.) is claimed to have sought the Prophet’s 
guidance with regard to his acquired date-palms at Khaybar (Thamgh). The tradition relates that 
the Prophet advised 
c
Umar “to give it in charity (i.e. as an endowment) with its land and trees on 
the condition that the land and trees will neither be sold nor given as a present, nor bequeathed, 
but the fruits are to be spent in charity” (Sahih al-Bukhari, 4:26).12 Among designated 
beneficiaries of the charity were the kinsmen with some portion also used in the cause of Allah, 
the emancipation of slaves, feeding the poor, guests, and travelers. This tradition is claimed to 
have summed up the necessary pillars of a valid waqf further augmenting the view that the 
institution is originally Islamic.  
 
To emphasize the foregoing argument, Muslim theologians cite several other instances when 
companions of the Prophet allegedly established waqfs immediately following the one endowed 
by 
c
Umar bin al-Khattab.
13
 This is evidenced in one tradition attributed to the Prophet in which 
Abu Talha allegedly gave the Prophet his favorite garden (Bairuha) in Madina. The tradition 
relates that the Prophet mostly enjoyed the garden because of its shade and cool waters and Abu 
Talha surrendered it to him following the revelation of Qur’an 3:92 when Allah warned Muslims 
of not being able to attain piety until they spent in charity what they loved most. The Prophet is, 
                                                          
12 In other versions of this tradition, the Prophet is alleged to have advised cUmar, “If you wish you can keep it as an endowment 
to be used for charitable purposes”; and “If you like you can give the land as endowment and give its fruits as charity.” See Sahih 
al- Bukhari, 3:895; 4:33-34. 
13
 Debate regarding the question of first (awacil) waqf during the period of the Prophet seems inconclusive with reports from the 
Helpers (Ansar) and Migrants (Muhajirun) apparent. Besides the waqf by cUmar bin al-Khattab, there was allegedly one by Abu 
Talha al Ansary who endowed the well of ‘Bir caa’ to his progeny and cousins (waqf ahli). Hennigan. (2004), McChesney, 
(1991) and Sanjuan (2007) point to sources which claim the first waqf (in form of sadaqa) as having been established by the 
Prophet himself out of seven walled gardens (hawacit) in Medina before the fall of Khaybar in 7A.H /629 A.D., from some 
property willed to him by a Jewish convert, Mukhayriiq, who was killed in the battle of Uhud (3. A.H).  On a similar note, 
Qureshi proposes that the house of Arqam in which the Prophet stayed after the declaration of Islam in Mecca could probably be 
the earliest waqf since Arqam endowed the same for his children (1990:4). According to Sanjuan (2007), however, cUmar’s waqf 
came to be regarded as the first since it was recorded in all six Sunni collections of hadiths.  Several other companions are said to 
have endowed waqfs including Ali bin Abu Talib (Yenbo, valley of Q’ara), Aisha, Asma, Um-e-Habib, and Zaid bin Thabit. See 
McChesney, R. (1991). Waqf in Central Asia: Four Hundred Years in the History of a Muslim Shrine, 1480-1889. New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, p.7; Hoexter, M. (1998). Endowments, Rulers and Community: Waqf Al-Haramyn in Ottoman 
Algiers. Leiden: Brill, p.7; Gil, M. (1998). The Earliest Waqf Foundations, op. cit. pp.125-140; Sheriff, A. (2001). The Records of 
the ‘Waqf Commission’ as a Source of Social and Religious History of Zanzibar. In S. B. Amoretti (Ed.), Islam in East Africa: 
New Sources (p.27). Roma: Herder Editrice E Libreria; Hennigan, P. (2004). The Birth of a Legal Institution, op. cit., pp.169-
175; Sanjuan, G. (2007). Till God Inherits the Earth, op. cit., p. 58; Khan, A. (2008). Commentary on the Law of Waqf in India 
(The Waqf Act, 1995). Hyderabad, Saraswathi Printers, p.95; El Daly, M. (2010). Challenges and Potentials of Channeling Local 
Philanthropy, op. cit., p. 49. 
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however, said to have given it back to Abu Talha and advised him to endow it for his relatives. 
Consequently, he endowed the garden for Ubaiy bin Ka
c
b and Hassan bin Thabit as posterity 
waqf (Sahih al-Bukhari, 4:30).
14
 
 
In conclusion, this is but a cross section of the several textual and historical evidences that 
Muslim theologians cite to demonstrate that waqf is originally an Islamic institution. As we have 
established before, however, both sides of the scholarship divide unanimously agree that the 
institution, as is understood in the contemporary times, grew rapidly from the seventh century 
until the thirteenth century when it found its footing in the legal field as an established religious 
practice in Islam. 
 
2.4 Essentials of Waqf: Significant Pillars and the Validity of an Endowment 
Conservative interpretations, arguably informed by Qur’an 2:125 and Qur’an 72:18 where God 
emphasizes divine ownership of masjids that are themselves waqfs, holds that consecrations are 
charities for the cause of God, hence milkiyat Allah (divine properties of God).
15
 In the words of 
Qureshi (1990:31), “the creation of a waqf is essentially based on the legal fiction being that the 
property vests in God, in perpetuity, but income from the property is permitted to be utilized for 
certain specified purposes which under the Muslim law are recognized as pious or religious.” 
The causes could be outlined in the waqf deed, e.g. for mosque A, or institution B. Under this 
context, such waqf becomes ahbas mu
c
ayyana (purpose-specific waqf). On the other hand, waqfs 
could also be generic, e.g. for the benefit or maintenance of the poor, needy, fi sabil Allah (in the 
cause of God), etc.  
Once a property is declared as waqf, its ownership permanently changes from private to divine 
and the consecration could not be revoked with a view to withdrawing the property from the 
divine ownership (Lev, 2005; van Leeuwen, 1999). As such, even in the circumstances when the 
endower turns out to be the mutawalli at the same time, his position remains that of a custodian 
                                                          
14
 See also Sahih al-Bukhari, 3:511; 4:15, 33-34.  
15
 Muslim theologians, nonetheless, hold divided opinion regarding the question of ownership of waqfs. Three positions abound: 
(a) that ownership of waqfs belongs to the beneficiaries. This view is also shared by Shica Islam and posits that beneficiaries 
could alienate the corpus in whatever way they deem fit provided that it does not prejudice the rights of succeeding beneficiaries; 
(b) the dedicator assumes ceremonial ownership without the power to exercise other privileges associated with private ownership 
including sale or exchange of the corpus. This is the position held by Abu Hanifa; and (c) the waqf falls under divine ownership 
of God. This is the position shared by the majority of Sunni theologians. See Qureshi, M. (1990). Waqfs in India, op. cit., pp.29-
30, 97; Lienhardt, P. (1996). Family Waqf in Zanzibar. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies. University of 
London, 27(2), 95-106.    
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of the corpus charged with the responsibility of developing and sustaining it to fulfill its 
designated causes (El Daly, 2010). According to the hadith in relation to 
c
Umar bin al-Khattab, 
the property was permanently dedicated to God and could not be sold, mortgaged, given out as 
gift, or inherited as this would have impeded the aims of the waqf. Neither could the corpus be 
attached to settle debts owed by the waqif nor become subject of private ownership due to the 
law of adverse possession. Thus, a consecrated property is believed to be “in perpetuity, till God 
inherits it, He who will inherit the heavens, the earth and its inhabitants, for He is the best heir” 
(Al-Khassaf, undated, as quoted in Sanjuan, 2007:64. See also van Leeuwen, 1999; Hennigan, 
2004).  
What the endower, however, allegedly gets in exchange for the loss of private ownership (milk) 
of the corpus to God is the perpetual sawab during the entire life span of the usufruct of the 
property, hence, the essence of sadaqa jariyya. This emphasizes the view that the further the 
value of the property is invested for the intended objectives the better as its multiplier effect is 
believed to greatly benefit the endower until the Day of Judgment (Hoexter, 1998; van Leeuwen, 
1999; Tohirin, 2010). Therefore, majority of Sunni Muslim theologians holds that waqfs could 
not be established for a limited period of time. In their opinion, ta
c
abbid (also mu
c
abbad, 
perpetuity) of waqfs implies that the aim for which an endowed property is made could not be 
altered.  
The principle of ta
c
abbid of waqfs has, nonetheless, been the subject of debates across the 
scholarship divide. Opinion is sharply divided between perpetuity of asl al-mal and that of 
manfa
c
a in relation to the strict adherence of the conditions of the endower vis-à-vis the 
pragmatic realities of prevailing socio-economic circumstances according to the doctrine of 
istihsan. The preponderant view espouses the position of non-extinction of waqf by virtue of 
expiry of the objective for which it was created. Rather, it advocates for adaptability of waqfs to 
changing circumstances with a view to perpetuating the underlying principle of charity by 
channeling the usufruct to other deserving causes in the community upon failure of the initial 
purpose (Cattan, 1984:207; Lev, 2005; Sanjuan, 2007). Therefore, ta
c
abbid in the majority 
opinion, requires that both realms (of corpus and benefits) be applied to make it possible to 
harmonize stipulations of the dedicator and prevailing public realities (haja or darura) as 
propounded in the doctrine of cy press (as near as possible) that provides: 
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Where the dedication is to a religious or charitable institution, which in course of 
time, ceases to exist, the property so dedicated instead of reverting to the grantor 
or his heirs, would be applied […] to some other religious or pious institution, 
similar in character to the one which has failed, or to any other object by which 
benefit may accrue to human (Qureshi, 1990:132).
16
  
 
The popular opinion draws from this narrative to postulate that waqfs could not become extinct. 
However, a revisit to the canon that established waqfs clearly reveals that except for inferences, 
no direct mention of irrevocability is alluded to in the tradition. Nonetheless, understood on the 
prism of sadaqa, waqfs cannot be revoked because, “one who takes back his gift (which he has 
already given) is like a dog that swallows its vomit”, warned the Prophet (Sahih al-Bukhari, 
3:762, 790-792, 804). A parallel could also be drawn with religious teachings regarding nadhir 
(vows), - what is pledged and consecrated for the service of God must eternally remain as such 
as explained in Qur’an 3:35-37.17 Thus, looked at from the wider perspective of consecrated 
properties, waqfs could not be withdrawn from the causes for which they were pledged. At most, 
this is the opinion widely advocated by the majority of renowned Sunni Muslim jurists including 
ibn Hanbal (A.D. 780-855), al-Shafi
c
i (c. 767-820) and the disciples of Abu Hanifa, imams Abu 
Yussuf and Muhammad. 
However, according to Abu Hanifa (A.D. 699-767), waqf would be deemed null and void when 
the cause for which it was created becomes obsolete. Hence, failure of the principal purpose, 
opines Abu Hanifa, necessitates return of the corpus to the endower or his heirs upon his demise 
(Qureshi, 1990). By implication, therefore, according to Abu Hanifa, a waqf could as well 
become extinct. The imam also advances a contrary opinion from the majority that allows the 
cancelation of an existing waqf upon change of economic circumstances by the endower 
(Qureshi, 1990; Kozlowski, 2008; Banday, 2013). Clearly, he does not accept the idea by the 
majority on the principle of cy press where usufructs of the waqf could be used on similar causes 
in the community. 
                                                          
16 See Cattan, H. (1984). The Law of Waqf, op. cit., p.207. 
17 In Qur’an 3:35, God says; “[Mention, O Muhammad], when the wife of cImran said, ‘My Lord, indeed I have pledged to You 
what is in my womb, consecrated [for Your service], so accept this from me. Indeed, You are the Hearing, the Knowing.” The 
context here was in reference to Mary (Mariam), the mother of Jesus (Isa, A.S), who was consecrated for the service of God. The 
pledge was not cancelled or the consecrated withdrawn thereafter. Consecrations in the Jewish tradition could also not be 
withdrawn. It is commanded that; “Whoever states ‘I give such and such an object to charity …may not retract”. See Qur’an 
2:270-271; Qur’an 19:26; ‘hekdesh,’ Encyclopedia Judaica. Retrieved from 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/judaica/ejud_0002_0008_0_08693.html. (Accessed April, 2016). 
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Imam Malik (c. 708-795), on the other hand, propagates the view of conditional temporality of 
waqfs. He opines that waqfs could be “limited as to time or as to a life or series of lives, and after 
the expiration of the time or the extinction of the life or lives specified for beneficence, it 
reverted in full ownership to the waqif or his heirs” (Cattan, 1984:207). Under Shica Islam, 
however, until the waqf property has already been transferred for administration to the appointed 
mutawalli, it could as well be revoked. This suggests that Shi
c
a Islam equally espouses some 
measure of temporality in waqfs (Qureshi, 1990). 
 
2.4.1 (In-)alienability of Waqfs and Shurut al- Waqif (Conditions of the Endower) 
The principle of inalienability as advanced by the majority opinion of Sunni theologians implies 
that since waqfs belong to God, no human person should confiscate them with a view to 
changing their ownership into private establishments. The principle of inalienability, does not, 
however, in case of revenue-yielding properties, prohibit istibdal, 
c
ana or hikr of the corpus with 
a view to improving its input or acquiring a better one to fulfill the wishes of the endower once 
the original property is ruined or fails to yield sufficient income to sustain itself. Nonetheless, in 
either of the circumstances, the consent of the kadhi (or court) has to be obtained (Qureshi, 1990; 
Banday, 2013).  
Similarly, waqfs have, since immemorial times, not been immune to the law of compulsory 
acquisition by the state. However, the majority opinion of Muslim scholars holds that if waqf is 
alienated under such schemes the proceeds must be re-invested in another property to replace the 
initial one that would be managed in accordance with the shurut al-waqif (Banday, 2013). On 
consecrating waqf, therefore, the endower enumerates how the institution would be managed, 
disposed of, used, the designated beneficiaries with their respective portions, and other 
conditions attached to the beneficiaries. Among conditions often attached to beneficiaries include 
age, gender, and lineage. Others are social status, particularly among females, like being married, 
single, divorced, or widowed, in case of waqf ahli. Some waqfs also require the observance of 
certain rituals aimed at immortalizing the endower. These include recitation of the Qur’an or 
mawlid (commemoration for the birth of the Prophet) where waqifs are believed to benefit from 
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du
c
as (supplications) made for them during such rites (Shoenblum, 1999; Lev, 2005; Ghazaleh, 
2011).
18
  
Nevertheless, it is the conviction of the majority of scholars that shurut al-waqif could be 
changed (ta
c
bid) if they are perceived to be harmful to the society, beneficiaries, or when not 
beneficial to the waqf itself without necessarily invalidating the endowment (Oberauer, 2008; 
Powers, 2011). This prevailing view is ostensibly meant to instill a balance between legal theory 
and socio-economic practical realities of waqfs, an undertaking that is also sanctioned by Qur’an 
2:180-182 on wasiyya (testamentary bequests). In light of the text, it is strongly held that 
necessary changes could be made to the conditions of the waqf with a view to “make peace 
between parties”, and by extension, between specified wishes of the endower and practical needs 
on the ground.  
Included among shurut al-waqif that are often disregarded involve investment of the corpus. 
Conditions prohibiting lease of the corpus beyond a given period of time could be overlooked as 
circumstances may warrant longer period for economic viability. If on the other hand an endower 
had appointed his progeny as mutawalli but turns out to be ineffective, the kadhi reserves the 
right to disregard this provision and replace him for the benefit of the waqf (Makdisi, 1981; van 
Leeuwen, 1999). Further reasons that may necessitate change in shurut al-waqif include loss of 
the original waqf deed; ambiguity of purpose as spelt out in the clauses of the waqf deed, where 
purpose(s) for which waqf was established become obsolete; or when the purpose(s) was not 
mentioned at all. In all cases where shurut al-waqif are changed or completely disregarded, the 
usufruct of the waqf could be used for other pious causes in accordance with the doctrine of cy 
pres as held by the majority opinion (Layish, 1983; Sanjuan, 2007; Banday, 2013). 
 
                                                          
18
 The question of reciting Qur’an and devoting the (spiritual) rewards to somebody else remains contested. A section of scholars 
hold such rite as void and sufficient reason for the nullification of the waqf (or bequest). Ibn Hanbal is said to have held this 
practice as un-Islamic innovation (bidca) ruling that “bequests for the mere reading of the Qur’an and hiring the readers, as such, 
causes degeneration towards the merits of the Qur’an, such as, diverting people from pious reading and causing people to read the 
Qur’an rather for the sake of earning money.” Ibn Taimiyya is equally claimed to hold a similar view that “no reward is obtained 
from reading the Qur’an for the sake of money;” and one cannot, therefore, confer to another person what he could not earn. 
However, in a fatwa (advisory opinion) issued at the Grand Court in Makka in A.H. 1377 (c.1957) regarding the validity of a 
waqf with the provision of hiring reciters of the Qur’an for the immortality of the endower, the recitation requirement was 
annulled and usufruct channeled to other residual pious causes. See Zaid, A. (1986). The Islamic Law of Bequest. Op. cit., pp.54-
55.  
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2.5 Classical Administration of Waqfs: The Mutawallis, 
c
Ulama, and the Kadhi  
Essentially, waqf is an autonomous enterprise managed by a mutawalli appointed by the endower 
upon its establishment.
19
 In the words of El Daly (2010:61), “[waqf] is an individual act seeking 
the consent of Allah or the consent of one’s conscience, and their management remained subject 
to the choice of the endower by either taking over the nizara or by appointing a nazir.”20 A 
mutawalli could be an individual(s) or a corporate body (Qureshi, 1990).
21
 Moreover, unless 
provided for in the endowment deed, “the founder has no legal capacity to dismiss an 
administrator formerly appointed by himself due to the fact that the beneficiaries’ right to make 
use of the hubs is directly linked to the way it is managed” (Sanjuan, 2007:307).22 In case of 
eventualities, however, the kadhi could dismiss any mutawalli “guilty of wrongdoing either as a 
result of negligence or because he has squandered the revenues under his control” for the good of 
the waqf (Sanjuan, 2007:307; Hoexter, 1995).  
It is expected that the mutawalli would be a mature person of sound mind and legally 
responsible, with the capacity to carry out the functions of the office with knowledge and 
experience. He must be 
c
adl (just), i.e. have an honorable record to preserve the waqf “and not to 
depart from the intentions of the founder or from any rule fixed by him as to the objects of the 
benefactions” (Qureshi, 1990:240). Like a manager of a commercial enterprise in the case of 
revenue-bearing waqf, the mutawalli is further empowered “to do all those acts which are 
reasonable and necessary for the protection and administration of the waqf properties under his 
supervision” (Qureshi, 1990:264). These include seeking to improve the income of the waqf 
                                                          
19
 The title ‘mutawalli’ has several generic terms including nazir, qayyim, mushrif, wali, mubashir, muqaddam, and sahib al-
ahbas which could either be used interchangeably or in reference to different capacities and duties to denote trusteeship. See 
Makdisi, G. (1981). The Rise of Colleges, op. cit., pp.45-48; Sanjuan, A. (2007). Till God Inherits the Earth, op. cit., pp.268; 297; 
327-336.  
20 The endower of a waqf, except under the Malik madhhab could as well become a mutawalli of his waqf and merely an 
administrator without legal ownership of the property. This makes mutawallis to be of two types: by inheritance rights (al-nazir 
bicl-asala) and by stipulation (al-nazir al-mashrut) i.e. not a legal heir of the endower. See Makdisi, G. (1981). The Rise of 
Colleges, op. cit., pp.54-55. 
21
 According to the majority opinion, it is illegal for one mutawalli of a jointly administered waqf to make unilateral decisions. In 
the long absence or tender age of one of them where affairs of the waqf would be affected, the kadhi could appoint a temporary 
replacement until the return or maturity of the initial mutawalli. See Zaid, A. (1986). The Islamic Law of Bequest, op. cit., 
pp.126-128. 
22 Imam Abu Yusuf, though, holds a contrary opinion that whether the waqif has provided for or not, the kadhi retains the 
authority to remove the nazir when he is proved to be inefficient for the good of the waqf. See Qureshi, M. (1990). Waqfs in 
India, op. cit., p.261. 
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through hire, lease, or charge with the approval by the kadhi;
23
 protect the property against 
encroachment; apply the income to the designated objectives of the waqf; and where necessary, 
employ other agents to help him in discharging the administrative responsibilities. For reasons of 
good management practices, mutawallis are also expected to keep proper records and be open for 
auditing though they could not be compelled to spend the usufruct of the waqf in ways not 
provided for by the endower (Barnes, 1986; Hennigan 2004; Lev, 2005; Kozlowski, 2008). 
The Shari
c
a does not bar women or non-Muslims from becoming mutawallis (Qureshi, 1990). 
Customary practices have, nonetheless, in most times taken precedence in deciding how the 
position is filled particularly in favor of male descendants of the endower. This is especially true 
in patriarchal societies with the view to preserving the management of family wealth in the hands 
of men. In such cases, appointed mutawallis accrue economic and social privileges as they get 
double shares of the generated revenue both as beneficiaries and administrators.
24
 The position of 
mutawalli has also been dominated by males where the functions of the office demanded 
execution of certain spiritual rites. These may include leading prayers, delivering Friday khutba 
(sermon) or sounding the adhan (call for prayers) (Layish, 1983; Barnes, 1986; Kozlowski, 
2008). Within this context, the position accords mutawallis socio-cultural and symbolic 
privileges associated with the power to decide on the distribution of the revenues and 
beneficiaries, especially where limited resources are concerned.  
 
The 
c
ulama and the fuqaha’ (jurists) on the other hand hold a very significant position under the 
Shari
c
a for the general wellbeing of waqfs in the community. Waqfs provided a steady source of 
income for a large segment of the community of 
c
ulama and the fuqaha’ “who, apart from 
performing religious duties, had a monopoly on the interpretation of the Shari
c
a and accumulated 
the most influential bureaucratic, judicial, and administrative state offices” (Sanjuan, 2007:419; 
Kuran, 2001). Since mosques, Qur’an schools, and the zawiyas (Sufi orders) were among the 
major beneficiaries of waqfs, it goes without saying that “it is the fuqaha’ [and culama] who, by 
                                                          
23
 Despite the sanction of the kadhi (courts) being necessary in contracts of lease or rent for waqfs, it is opined that if found 
beneficial, such contracts would not be regarded as invalid even when not sanctioned. See Qureshi, M. (1990). Waqfs in India, 
op. cit., p.269. 
24 The Sharica does not clearly define the remuneration of the mutawalli. He is, moderately though, allowed to draw his, and even 
that of his friends’ providence from the waqf. The position of a mutawalli was mostly honorary with occupants working on 
voluntary basis for unspecified tokens in case of revenue-generating waqfs. However, kadhis could fix the tokens up to ten 
percent where endowers failed to provide for them in the waqf deeds. See Sahih al-Bukhari, 3:507, 895; Barnes, J. (1986). An 
Introduction to Religious Foundations in the Ottoman Empire, op.cit.; Qureshi, M. (1990). Waqfs in India, op. cit.; Kozlowski, 
G. (2008). Muslim Endowments and Society in British India, op. cit.  
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virtue of their knowledge in the cultural and legal realms, monopolized the religious and 
educational functions performed in those institutions” (Sanjuan, 2007:420). Such institutions 
became the conduits through which the 
c
ulama and the fuqaha’ greatly enjoyed the usufruct of 
waqfs while some even became dedicators themselves.  
 
The kadhi could as well be appointed by an endower as the first mutawalli apart from bearing 
witness to the endowing process or prepare the waqf deed for an illiterate endower. The kadhi 
could further assume mutawalliship if the post fell vacant without predetermined provisions on 
how it was to be filled, or when the beneficiaries of the waqf included the indeterminate legal 
entities, i.e. the poor, ill, or the general Muslim public. Once the kadhi assumes mutawalliship, 
he also retains the final decision on determining the deserving among beneficiaries and their 
relative portions, unless initially provided for in the waqf deed (Makdisi, 1981; Hoexter, 1995; 
Sanjuan, 2007). Thus, in deciding who and how much to give at any given point and time, waqfs 
accorded the kadhi a symbolic and material power and authority over a wider socio-religious 
constituency of Muslims. 
 
As a matter of fact, the Shari
c
a does not empower a mutawalli to commit to commercial contracts 
that could ‘alienate’ waqfs like leases. It is the jurisdiction of the kadhi to sanction or undertake 
any such contracts necessary for the good of the waqfs.
25
 Besides, from a legal perspective as an 
authoritative source of Islamic jurisprudence, all disputes related to waqfs fell within the kadhi’s 
jurisdiction. He settled disputes between mutawallis and beneficiaries with regard to their 
inclusion or exclusion, and clarified legal clauses relating to the functionality of waqfs. These 
included, but not limited to, transfer of revenues between endowments and use of revenues on 
pious purposes vis-à-vis prevailing community needs, and recovering illegally alienated waqfs 
(Makdisi, 1981; Sanjuan, 2007).  
 
Such was the role that kadhis and, generally, the 
c
ulama held in relation to waqfs in Islam that 
accorded them an expansive social, economic, and ‘symbolic capital’ in the community. Looked 
at from a different perspective, however, it ought to be appreciated that kadhis, as judicial 
                                                          
25
 The Sharica allows intra-waqf borrowing, i.e. tasrif (also sarf) among mixed or charitable waqfs. Waqf development loans in 
the contemporary times could also be secured through Islamic commercial banks as well as the two subsidiaries of the Islamic 
Development Bank (IDB) - the World Waqf Fund (WWF) and the Awqaf Properties Investment Fund (APIF). See Makdisi, G. 
(1981). The Rise of Colleges, op. cit.; Sanjuan, G. (2007). Till God Inherits the Earth, op. cit.  
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officers, were always part of the government and their independence could not be taken for 
granted. To a larger extent, it was kadhis who were used by some rulers to usurp control and 
administration of waqfs. In Egypt, for example, state control of waqfs started as early as A.D. 
737 during the reign of the tenth Umayyad khalifa - Hisham bin Abd al-Malik (691-743 A.D.) 
when the management was assigned to a state department, diwan al-awqaf, at the behest of kadhi 
Tawba b. Namir al-Hadrami (Rashid, 1978; Sanjuan, 2007). This was in addition to his judicial 
tasks of settling civil and criminal disputes with a view to ensuring that usufruct of waqfs were 
channeled towards the designated purposes.  
 
Similar trends were also noted in the Samanid Empire (A.D. 819-999) where a diwan al-awqaf 
was established (Rashid, 1978). By the reign of Abu Tamim Ma’ad al-Mu’izz (953-975 C.E.), 
the Fatimid dynasty ordered the complete handing over of waqfs and their related records to the 
state treasury. The state hence forth edged out the mutawallis to directly manage waqfs with 
beneficiaries and the state sharing the usufruct.
26
 Neither was the situation different during the 
reign of the Ottoman Empire where the department of waqf was elevated to ministry of Imperial 
Religious Endowments during the reign of Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839). Its main mandate 
was to register, control, and manage waqfs thereby, strengthening state grip over the institution 
(Barnes, 1986; Lev, 2005; El Daly, 2010).  
 
There are three paradigms adopted in explaining the deviation from classical administration of 
waqfs by individual mutawallis and 
c
ulama to state control: First, it is alleged that government 
takeover and control of waqfs was at times necessitated by the need to reign on inept and corrupt 
mutawallis and kadhis. The establishment of the ministry of Imperial Religious Endowments 
during the Ottoman Empire, for instance, was born out of such necessity as summarized by 
Barnes (1986:102): 
…it was charged that the kadis would give judgments both for and against 
litigants in some cases. What is more, they would recommend for office both 
successors and predecessors of religious posts, issue statements that were 
contradictory to one another, and charge exorbitant fees as bribes to appoint 
unqualified persons to religious offices... 
 
                                                          
26
 On state control of waqfs during the Abbasid Caliphate (A. D. 750-1258) by the Buwayhids, see Kozlowski, G. (2008). Muslim 
Endowments and Society in British India, op. cit. 
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With inept and inefficient kadhis, justice was not only a preserve of the highest bidders, but 
occupation of the positions of mutawalli by unqualified cronies also became the norm contrary to 
shurut al-waqif (van Leeuwen, 1999). This gross misconduct amounted to auctioning waqfs to 
people who were ready to pay high prices, consequently, turning the institution to a private 
property enterprise. It was presumed laudable under such circumstances, therefore, for the state 
to institute strict control and supervision of the administration of waqfs by requiring that 
mutawallis submit periodic reports to the state office, carry out quarterly auditing of office 
records and personal accounts. Mutawallis were also threatened with further investigation into 
their conduct and possible auction of their private properties to recover stolen waqfs should 
claims of misappropriation be proved against them (Barnes, 1986).  
 
Secondly, state involvement and supervision of waqfs was justified in instances where aims of 
the waqfs were closely related to some of the primary responsibilities of the state like provision 
of health care, education, housing, and other social-welfare services. Under such situations, 
therefore, state control of waqfs, particularly where the official line between din (religion) and 
dawla (state, politics) was unclear, was necessary ostensibly to defend the interests of the general 
public. This was evident in Persia, Egypt, and the Ottoman Empire (Hoexter, 1995, 2002; 
Sheriff, 2001; Sanjuan, 2007). Thus, where governments were involved in waqf affairs under this 
pretext fit into the role as part of their obligations as legitimate political establishments 
‘concerned’ with the welfare of the citizenry. 
 
Thirdly, state involvement in waqfs was perceived as a conscious political strategy aimed at 
stemming the rising popularity and independence of the 
c
ulama and the general Muslim 
community. Among colonial governments as manifested in British Zanzibar, India, and 
Palestine; British East Africa Protectorate (1888-1963) as established by this study; French 
Algeria, Syria, and Lebanon; and the Italian colony of Libya (1911-1941), the underlying reason 
was, arguably, to consolidate political power by controlling the economic mainstay of the 
c
ulama, zawiyas, and the diverse groups of beneficiaries (Deguilhem, 2008; Medici, 2011). 
Significantly, it also accorded Muslim political establishments an opportunity to use this 
religious institution to legitimize political authority and demonstrate its responsibility to the 
citizenry as it was the case in the Ottoman Empire from 1826. Powers (1989:538) summarizes 
this position in the following way:  
 
 
43 
 
In pre-modern times, the endowment system had been controlled by Muslim 
religious scholars (
c
ulama), who were the primary beneficiaries of public 
endowments and who, in their function as judges, oversaw the proper functioning 
of both public and family endowments. The endowment system had provided the 
c
ulama with an extensive economic base that made them largely independent of 
Muslim rulers. During the 19
th
 century, however, the religious scholars came in to 
conflict with Muslim and non-Muslim rulers who wanted to weaken the power of 
the 
c
ulama and gain access either to revenues generated by religious endowments 
or to endowment property itself. 
 
Although basically a religious institution, the economic potential of waqfs could not, therefore, 
go unnoticed by other interested parties like the state. The material assets accruing from the 
various waqf transactions offered a significant ‘economic, social, and symbolic capitals’ as well 
as a spiritual symbol that the political authorities could not easily neglect for the enhancement of 
their public image and policy (Kozolowski, 1996, 2008; Arjomand, 1998; van Leeuwen, 1999).   
 
2.6 A Brief History on the Classification of Waqfs in Islam 
It is debatable as to when and where formal attempts to categorize waqfs in Islam begun, or if it 
was necessary in the first place to do so. This is because, as Anderson (1959:154) posits, 
“classical texts on waqf make no distinctions whatsoever between what are now termed 
‘charitable waqfs’ on the one hand and ‘family waqfs’ on the other. Both, alike, were regarded as 
perfectly valid.” Concurring with Anderson, Baer (1969) and Hoexter (1995) hold that 
classification of waqfs is indeed a later development in the institution aimed at highlighting the 
underlying differences between initial beneficiaries of individual endowments. In their view, 
efforts to categorize waqfs were informed by Western legislations and ideologies (Hoexter, 
1995:141; Baer, 1969).  
Hoexter, Anderson, and Baer among others, further argue that categorizing waqfs on the bases of 
beneficiaries is misleading as beneficiaries tend to straddle between the various types of waqfs. 
As a matter of fact, beneficiaries cutting across several waqfs are a feature regarded as 
reminiscent with the institution since earliest times. Conversely, mutawallis could end up 
disregarding shurut al-waqif in relation to purposes of the waqf. Thus, they observe that, it is the 
aspect of perpetuity that necessitates the apparent lack of differences in waqfs since to maintain 
this requirement, all waqfs must designate the indeterminate poor and needy as ultimate 
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beneficiaries. Consequently, this makes the different types of waqfs to have no legal differences 
(Baer, 1969; Gil, 1984, 1998; McChesney, 1991; Hoexter, 1995).  
Lev (2005) identifies four distinct forms of waqfs based on the types of properties as adopted 
during the period of Mamluk Egypt. First was the al-rizaq al-ahbasiyya (endowed agricultural 
land) mainly created from approximately 130,000 faddan (acres) in the rural territory. These 
waqfs were administered by a nazir appointed among the civilian notables by the dynasty and 
supported mosques and zawiyas. Second was al-awqaf al-hukmiyya, normally administered by 
the chief Shafi
c
i kadhi, consisting of revenue-bearing estates in the towns of Fustat and Cairo. 
These were designated for the ransoming of Muslim prisoners of war, maintenance of the two 
holy mosques of Mecca and Medina, and other charitable purposes.  
At third position was waqf ahli administered either by mutawallis appointed by the dedicator, the 
kadhi, or the Sultans. This type of waqf departs sharply from the above classification criterion as 
is based mainly on purpose and designated beneficiaries rather than endowed properties. 
Proceeds of waqf ahli, whose sources of revenue are not clear, mostly benefited the endower’s 
progeny, religious, and educational causes. Finally, there was also waqf al-turaha’ established 
for the provision of burial rites of the indigents in the society. The first of such waqfs in Egypt is 
claimed to have been established by the Baybars before being common during the Mamluk 
period. Such social services were found mostly in hospitals including the eleventh century 
Samarkand and thirteenth century Mansuri hospital in Cairo (Lev, 2005).  
Along the East African coast, the first formal classification of waqfs is believed to have been 
undertaken by shaykh Ahmad b. Sumayt (1861-1925), the Shafi
c
i kadhi of Zanzibar (Oberauer, 
2008).  On his part, shaykh Sumayt classified waqfs into private (waqf al-khassa) and public 
(waqf 
c
amm) continuum.
27
 While the former catered for the endower’s descendants and 
dependants, including manumitted slaves, concubines, and religious institutions like mosques 
and madrasas, the later was meant for the support of the poor in the society. At times, however, 
strict demarcation between the two types of waqfs was not observed as demanded in accordance 
                                                          
27 Hoexter argues that these distinctions existed since earliest times as mentioned in the works of Mawardi though they were not 
strictly different types of waqfs according to beneficiaries as propounded in later studies. Rather, they involved how and who 
administers the manfaca of the waqf in relation to the claims of God and those of the community. See Hoexter, M. (1995). Huquq 
Allah and Huquq al-Ibad as Reflected in the Waqf Institution. Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, 19, 133-156 (here, pp.140-
141).   
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with the endower’s wishes, further blurring the differences between the two categories 
(Oberauer, 2008). The majority of contemporary academic discourses, however, classify waqfs 
as indicated below:  
2.6.1 Waqf Dhurri (Family or Private Waqfs)  
Also known as waqf ahli or waqf al-awlad, these consecrations are established to cater for the 
maintenance of the endower’s progeny with a provision to benefit the indeterminate masakin, 
fuqara, or other public worthy causes upon extinction of the family chain (Deguihem, 2008). In 
the several traditions attributed to the Prophet encouraging people to provide for their progeny, 
one typically stands out advising: 
…it is better for you to leave your inheritors wealthy than to leave them poor 
begging others, and whatever you spend for Allah’s sake will be considered as a 
charitable deed even the handful of food you put into your wife’s mouth…(Sahih 
al-Bukhari, 4:5).  
The moral teaching of this tradition informing establishment of waqf dhurri is that providing for 
one’s family is a revered religious obligation and a form of charity that draws one closer to God. 
Among properties that were frequently endowed for the maintenance of the family include 
immovable possessions like agricultural lands, buildings, and plantations. Contrary to the 
majority opinion, however, the Hanafi madhhab requires that the endower provides for an eternal 
public cause as residual beneficiary upon extinction of the progeny as a prerequisite for validity 
of the consecration (Layish, 1983:4). The practical reality is, nonetheless, that the possibility of 
such corpus passing over to the benefits of the general poor and needy or some other charitable 
causes for the interest of the general public could be very slim, almost non-existent. This is 
because waqifs often stipulate how benefits should trickle down from one ta
c
qib (generation of 
descendants) of the endower to the other, including the yet to be borne, until all the beneficiaries 
in this long chain have been exhausted (Sanjuan, 2007; Powers, 2011).  
According to Abu Hanifa, an endower could as well designate himself as a beneficiary of the 
family waqf.
28
 Imams Abu Yusuf and Muhammad (Abu Hanifa’s disciples) and the Maliki 
                                                          
28
 The Ithna’ cAshari sect (Shica Islam) is also not in favor of the endower being a beneficiary. The validity of family waqfs 
became a subject of protracted court battles in India in 1894 owing to the long chains of beneficiaries making the charitable cause 
almost non-existent. This was, however, settled by the passing of the Waqf Validating Act of 1913. See Qureshi, M. (1990). 
Waqfs in India, op cit., pp.83-84; Khan, A. (2008). Commentary on the Law of Waqf in India, op. cit., pp.103-104.  
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madhhab, nonetheless, object this view. In the majority opinion, therefore, a provision in the 
waqf deed according the endower a share of usufruct renders the waqf invalid (Makdisi, 1981; 
Layish, 1983).
29
 To circumvent the prohibition of an endower benefitting from his own waqf as 
opposed by the majority opinion, endowers occasionally dedicated the usufruct of waqf ahli to 
their minors or unborn children. This in turn accorded them the opportunity to remain as 
custodians, hence attaining unlimited access to the waqf until the birth and or upon maturity of 
the assigned beneficiaries (Layish, 1983; Powers, 2002). 
Significantly, endowers were morally obliged not to exploit waqf ahli to discriminate among 
heirs as beneficiaries of waqf or even give undue advantage over others (Sahih al-Bukhari, 
3:760). Accordingly, family endowments created in favor of males to the exclusion of females 
are abhorrent and could be invalidated according to the majority opinion of Sunni theologians 
(Powers, 2011). There are, however, various strategies employed by waqifs to circumvent moral 
and religious prohibitions in using waqfs to the disadvantage of descendants. A waqif could 
infuse equality between genders on the distribution of the usufruct of family waqf contrary to the 
Qur’an guidelines on inheritance and preponderant view on validity of waqfs by renowned 
Muslim theologians. By designating the distribution of usufruct of waqf “in equal parts” between 
the beneficiaries, he clearly refutes the divine guidelines in ilm al-faraid (law of inheritance) 
requiring that to “the male the like of the portion of two females” (Qur’an 4:11-12).30   
Waqifs could also choose to discriminate between beneficiaries (i.e. to make the waqf exclusive), 
by employing certain measures including: (a) privileging the males in administering the waqf 
where they would have double shares as wages and shares of beneficence; (b) omitting females 
from the chain of beneficiaries; or (c) putting a conditional clause to females’ shares, e.g. 
providing that they shall benefit only if they  do not marry, or upon divorce, or being widowed; 
and (d) excluding the daughters’ children to prevent the family wealth from trickling to the 
‘outsiders’. According to the Malik madhhab, however, unless specifically mentioned by the 
endower, preference to one gender over the other is an exception rather than a rule in the 
                                                          
29 Shica Islam allows a dedicator to be a beneficiary of his waqf if he provides for the poor and later becomes impoverished 
himself.  See Qureshi, M. (1990). Waqfs in India, op. cit. 
30 Waqifs could also invoke such phrases as thumma (thereafter) and awwalan fa-awwalan (one generation after another) in the 
waqf deeds to prohibit the progeny from sharing but draw the usufruct following each generation. They could, nonetheless, use 
waw (and) to indicate concurrence in the drawing of usufruct between generations of beneficiaries. See Powers, D. (2011). The 
Development of Islamic Law and Society in the Maghrib: Qadis, Muftis and Family Law. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 
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institution of waqf. Equality of gender in the sharing of usufruct of waqf ahli has to be 
maintained in accordance with the Prophet’s traditions (Sanjuan 2007; Powers 2011).  
 
2.6.2 Waqf Khayri (Charitable) and Mushtarak (Mixed) Waqfs  
Endowers of charitable waqfs usually dedicate their usufruct to public causes or institutions from 
which they are believed to benefit from supplications made for them by the beneficiaries in 
return. Beneficiaries of waqf khayri could, therefore, range from the indeterminate disadvantaged 
social groups like the masakin, fuqara, and socio-religious groups inhabiting certain regions in 
expression of the endower’s attachment with them. Others could be public welfare institutions or 
projects such as education, health care, masjids, and road networks. Often included also are 
welfare programs like iftar (meal at the end of fasting day), sponsoring of hajj rites, burial rites, 
and organizing for marriage among others (Hoexter, 1998; Lev, 2005; Deguilhem, 2008).  
The beneficiaries’ base under waqf khayri is thus, ‘the indeterminate legal entity’ enabling 
widening of the family circle and strengthening the social fabric of the umma (Ghazaleh, 2011:8-
9). As such, honest disposition of the usufruct to the greater public would, undoubtedly, rely on 
the mutawalli or it is otherwise susceptible to abuse. To avoid such abuses, mutawallis often zero 
in the beneficiaries base and distribute the usufruct among a few deserving cases, which 
according to some jurists, are “sufficient to discharge the executor from the duty related to such 
bequests” (Zaid, 1986:99). This analogy is said to be informed on a fatwa by shaykh Ibn 
Duhaish, head of the Grand Court of Makka (A. H. 1377) which provides:  
If a person makes a waqf (or bequest), with its revenue defined to be spent on the 
poor and needy people, and if among the children of the dedicator one is found to 
fit such a description, he or she is more entitled to it than the known poor or 
needy. Hence, he is to be given only the amount considered to suffice his or her 
need (as quoted in Zaid, 1986:99).  
Waqfs could also be consecrated simultaneously as mushtarak (mixed, i.e. dhurri and khayri) on 
specified proportions as identified by the endower (Powers, 1989; McChesney, 1991; Deguihem, 
2008). Thus in predetermined shares, beneficiaries could range from family members of the 
endower to public welfare institutions within or outside the endower’s geographical region of 
abode. Included among beneficiaries could also be the indeterminate poor of the two holy cities 
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of Mecca and Medina as an expression of religious attachment with the two in the Muslim world 
(Hoexter, 1998; Leeuwen, 1999).
31
 
 
2.7 Purpose and Objectives of Waqfs in Islam: The Spiritual Motivation 
The underlying purpose for establishing waqfs is, ostensibly, to respond to the numerous divine 
calls in the Qur’an and Prophet’s traditions to relieve the economic hardships of the less 
fortunate in the community. By doing so, therefore, it is presumed that one aligns himself with 
the divine teachings so as to acquire sawab and qurba from God by appropriating the established 
charity as a means rather than an end in itself. In the several such divine calls, God says: 
They ask you, [O Muhammad], what they should spend. Say, "Whatever you 
spend of good is [to be] for parents and relatives and orphans and the needy and 
the traveler. And whatever you do of good - indeed, Allah is knowing of it." 
(Qur’an 2:215). 
While encouraging believers to seek divine grace, God is at the same time warning against 
selfish accumulation of wealth without regard to the economically disadvantaged in the society. 
He warns such defaulters of dire consequences where “their necks will be encircled by what they 
withheld on the Day of Resurrection” for being irresponsible with what had been entrusted to 
them weakening the social fabric of the umma (Qur’an 3:180; Sahih al-Bukhari, 2:485-486). 
Within this context, therefore, establishing waqf becomes “a worthy moral gesture and piously 
religious act” (Doumani, 1998:15). 
Such demonstration of individual piety could be discerned in the waqf deeds as “most 
commonly, the founder indicates that he or she is seeking the face of God the Almighty and the 
abundance of His momentous reward” (Powers, 2011:384). As a matter of fact, the urge to seek 
the pleasure of God is not a preserve of any socio-economic group of believers in the community 
in the sense that, even a ruler who established waqfs “never did so as a representative of the 
                                                          
31
 Another type – waqf nuqud (cash waqfs) relies on money, whether cash, shares or government promissory notes, as its corpus. 
The corpus is lent out in a business contract called mudaraba that attracts a percentage fee as profit which is channeled to the 
designated beneficiaries as directed by the endower. See Mandaville, J. (1979). Usurious Piety: The Cash Waqf Controversy in 
the Ottoman Empire. The International Journal of Middle East Studies, 10, 289-308; Suhrawardy, A. (1911). Waqf of Movables.  
Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, 7, pp.342-358; Hoexter, M. (2002). The Waqf and the Public Sphere. In M. Hoexter, S. 
Einsstadt & N. Levton N (Eds.), The Public Sphere in Muslim Societies (p. 126). New York: State University of New York Press.  
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realm. His act of endowment, like that by anyone else, was the act of a private individual”, 
opines Hoexter (2002:121). This view is also shared by the study as established among 
consecrations by former liwalis and mudirs in Kenya’s Muslim community.  
The desire to seek sawab and qurba through endowments is also not restricted to Islam. 
Religious minority groups like Jews and Christians in the predominantly Ottoman Muslim 
society, for instance, are claimed to have established ‘waqfs’ because “charity and pious 
endowments were concepts shared by the three monotheistic religions” as a way of 
communicating with God (Lev, 2005:53). Jews (like those in Qayrawan, Tunisia) and Christians 
(in medieval Egypt) allegedly established and managed ‘waqfs’ that benefited their individual 
progenies, the indeterminate poor public, their religious institutions as well as the clergy (van 
Leeuwen, 1994:30-33; 1999; Macuch, 2004; Lev, 2005). Neither is the religious motivation 
restricted to the male gender as established by Doumani (1998). The author observed in his 
study, for instance that, forty seven per cent of waqfs in Tripoli and between twenty five and 
forty per cent in Istanbul, Cairo, Aleppo, and Jerusalem were established by women during the 
period 1800-1860.
32
 
Waqfs fit in the vast purview of charity, and sadaqa jariyya in particular. This partly explains the 
provision for social welfare causes or religious rites by some endowers of mushtarak and waqf 
khayri where beneficiaries would perform supplications for them (Doumani, 1998; Ghazaleh, 
2011). This was also observed by the present study as contained in some of the reviewed waqf 
deeds. In a nutshell, the spiritual viewpoint informs the principal reason for consecrations. 
Seeking qurba and sawab was encapsulated in the endowments whether by ensuring that one’s 
progeny would be catered for upon his demise (in the case of waqf ahli); or the non-revenue 
bearing religious institutions and causes would function uninterrupted for the service of the 
community (in the case of waqf khayri); or both (waqf mushtarak). It would be erroneous, 
nonetheless, to deny that waqfs could be used for various socio-political and economic reasons 
by different actors in the society since “politics and religion were not separate spheres but had an 
intricate entanglement” in the majority of Muslim societies (Lev, 2005:28). As Hennigan (2004), 
however, opines such circumstances should be viewed within the perspective of uses rather than 
                                                          
32
 On distribution of endowers by gender in Syria, see Doumani, B. (1998). Endowing Family: Waqf, Property Devolution, and 
Gender in Greater Syria, 1800-1860.  Journal of Society for Comparative Study of Society and History, 19(52), pp.3-41; Sanjuan, 
G. (2007). Till God Inherits the Earth, op. cit., p.95. 
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essence of waqfs. Taking cue from this background, we thus, in the following section of the 
discussion, seek to highlight the historical uses of waqfs among various Muslim communities. 
 
2.7.1 Politicization of Waqfs in Islam 
The appropriation of waqfs as a political tool was manifested in two perspectives: establishing 
waqfs to legitimize political authority as charitable and concerned with the public welfare or use 
existing waqfs to control the 
c
ulama and by extension, the umma, by appointing the former as 
administrators that political elites could manipulate. For instance, “the Fatimids, the Ayyubids 
after them, and the Mamluks non-native dynasties, employed pious endowments as a means of 
cultivating an image of themselves as legitimate rulers, also supported by the creation of 
madrasas and hospitals that would foster the image of the ruling family as philanthropic 
monarchs,” argues Sanjuan (2007:410).  
Significantly, appropriating waqfs as an economic tool for political ends was not a preserve of 
the ruling class, but also those with immense wealth with a view to gain entry into and negotiate 
the political field. Expounding this view, Kozlowski (1996:203) notes:   
…individuals controlling surplus wealth who possessed or aspired to social, 
cultural and political prominence established endowments as a way of expressing 
as well as preserving social influence […] When the ra’is built a mosque, it was 
usually located within his home compound and served needs of his own retinue 
[…] the communities activities of prominent men and women.  
Religious minority groups like the Jews and Christians in the predominantly Ottoman Muslim 
society were also alleged to have established ‘waqfs’ as a means to political legitimacy and 
identity (van Leeuwen, 1994, 1999; Doumani, 1998; Lefebvre, 2005; Deguihem, 2008). To such 
minorities, endowing and managing their ‘waqfs’ “by applying to the Sharica court, basing their 
applications on Shari
c
a” accorded them the economic and social wherewithal to contribute to the 
socio-cultural welfare of the community as a block (Reiter, 1996:34). This in turn made them 
conspicuous and assertive as socio-political communities than it would have been were they to 
act as individual adherents. This suggests that it is not only individuals who could appropriate 
waqfs for political purposes, but also minority socio-ethnic and theological groups within the 
Muslim society as was established by the present study among some Asian migrants in Kenya. 
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A cross section of scholars, however, holds the view that the line between religion and politics in 
Islam has always been blurred (Sheriff, 2001; Hoexter, 1998, 2002; Mwakimako, 2007). 
Eickelman and Piscatori observed that, there is a tendency to claim the inseparability between 
din and dawla in Islam. In their opinion, this was contingent on the belief that “religion and 
political power needed to be combined in one office to allow Shari
c
a implementation and 
protection of the umma” (2004:46). In this context, therefore, it becomes impossible or even 
unnecessary at times, to ascertain with clarity the primary objective of a believer, especially 
among the ruling elites, when undertaking a religious act involving charity. This is demonstrated 
in a study by van Leeuwen on the thirteenth century Damascus under the Ayyubid. Accordingly, 
he maintains that endowments established by members of the ruling circle, were appropriated “to 
accord spiritual legitimacy to the policies of the ruling elites, express their personal inclinations, 
or even reflect official state ideology as all the while they remained covered under the veneer of 
religion” (1999:97-101).  
 
The view was further compounded by sultans who established waqfs or removed from the direct 
control of individual mutawallis those already established waqfs that produced considerable 
income and supported certain religious rites like hajj and zawiyas by appointing administrators 
on the basis of theological dispositions. Consequently, as Makdisi (1981:39; van Leeuwen, 1994) 
observed, waqfs enabled the “control of the popular masses by having their religious leaders in 
one’s pay.” Corroborating this view is Barnes (1986:43) who submits that “a significant majority 
of waqfs during the 18
th
 century Ottoman caliphate were founded by the ruling class with those 
endowed by the reaya accounting for only ten percent.”33  
 
The argument also finds credence in the establishment of ministries and departments in-charge of 
waqfs across Muslim governments and invading colonial powers like the British East Africa 
Protectorate as established by the present study. These state bodies were managed by staff 
appointed by the rulers charged with the mandate of ensuring that control of waqfs remained 
under close imperial supervision (Barnes, 1986; Lev, 2005; Medici, 2011). As a result, almost 
every educational institution, health care facility, mosque, and orphanages, particularly, around 
the Ottoman cities, that were established on waqfs became under state control. Within this 
                                                          
33
 Barnes explains ‘reaya’ as consisting of the Muslim and non-Muslim peasantry and merchant class of citizens in the Ottoman 
Empire who formed the bulk of the population then. See Barnes, J. (1986). An Introduction to Religious Foundations, op. cit. p. 
43. 
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context, it was opined that “the foundation of waqfs by the examples of the ruling family should 
be seen as a deliberate policy to enhance the grip of the ruling elite on the urban infrastructure” 
(Isin and Lefebvre, 2005:15).  
 
As life in the political sphere became unpredictable with those falling out of favor losing their 
fortunes, some Muslims allegedly consecrated waqfs to protect their wealth against confiscation. 
“By dedicating his estate as a family vakif, a government official could place his property in a 
condition of untouchability for the enjoyment of his family and his posterity,” posits Barnes 
(1986:16-17). The argument is also supported by research findings of Isin and Lefebvre (2005), 
that between ninety five and ninety eight percent of all forms of waqfs in Tripoli and Nablus 
respectively from 1800 to 1860 identify the endower as the first mutawalli. Based on these 
observations, the authors conclude that waqf as an institution, offers a dedicator a “protective 
shield against imperial confiscation while obligating the founder for benefaction” (2005:14). 
 
The overwhelming incidences where waqfs were appropriated as a tool for entry in to and 
negotiation in the political sphere is not, however, in denial of several other waqfs by members 
of the ruling circle that could have been solely established for the salvation of individual souls as 
shown in the works of Singer (2003) and Lev (2005).
34
 The two authors assert that in the 
majority, if not all of the Muslim political establishments, women and eunuchs were the least 
expected to hold political offices. This was demonstrated in the waqfs of “the mother of 
Abbasids caliph Harun al-Rashid (786-809), and his wife, Zubayda; Khatun Safwat al-Mulk, 
mother of Duqaq; the Seljukid prince of Damascus; and wife of Tughtakin, the powerful Atabek 
and ruler of Damascus” (Lev, 2005:31). Other waqfs were those by Safiye Sultan, wife of Murad 
III (1574-1595) and mother of Mehmed III (1595-1603) in Eminönü, Istanbul (Singer, 2003). 
Also making it to the list were waqfs of the eunuchs like Masrur and Husam al-Din Lu’lu at the 
Fatimid palace and Fa’iq from the Abbasid caliph al-Mu’tamid (870-892) (Hathaway, 1998; Lev, 
2005; Sanjuan, 2007). These represent the exceptions within the ruling circles whose waqfs 
                                                          
34
 The term ‘ruling class’ was used to denote people and families that had political authority. However, not all people within this 
class wielded political power, for instance slaves, eunuchs, and women who belonged to the ruling families. These people, with 
or without political power, could thus be put together in a broader class of the ‘ruling circles’. See Lev, Y. (2005). Charity, 
Endowments, and Charitable Institutions in Medieval Islam. Florida: University Press of Florida, p.29. 
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could not be satisfactorily explained by political motivations making the perception that the 
consecrations were solely appropriated for political ends untenable.   
The foregoing argument on the use of waqfs as a means to protecting wealth against confiscation 
elicits two significant considerations: first is the composition and political culture of the Mamluk 
and Ottoman societies. Apart from being predominant Muslim societies, the prevailing political 
culture allowed victors to confiscate private properties from their victims exposing them to 
social, economic, and political ruin. This, undoubtedly, necessitated the placing of ‘properties in 
a condition of untouchability’. As established by the present study, however, the 
‘Mamluk/Ottoman like’ political culture did not exist in Kenya. This is, nevertheless, not to deny 
that there were seasoned politicians and Muslim administrators - liwalis and mudirs, who could 
be regarded as ‘ruling elites’ in the society associated with several waqfs.35 More so, though the 
administrative positions of the liwali and mudir were retained as part of the British colonial 
policy of indirect rule, the occupiers of such positions were very few in the Protectorate (only 
ten, according to Partridge and Gillard, 1995) to sustain the argument on using waqfs as a 
protection against confiscation of ill-gotten wealth. 
 
More importantly, statistics drawn from National Housing and Population Census of 2009 by the 
KNBS place Muslims at 11.2 per cent, translating to about four point three million of the thirty 
eight million Kenyans.
36
 With the predominant Muslim regions falling way below national 
averages in the provision of socio-cultural services and general development (see Appendices 1 
and 2), it clearly illustrates that Muslims are not only a minority, but also a marginalized group 
in a predominantly Christian society. Moreover, the institution of waqf is controlled by the 
government through a state agency, secular policies and civil institutions that not only make 
registration obligatory but also alienate normative precepts. Accordingly, this compounds the 
                                                          
35
On consecration of waqfs by wealthy merchants as part of social responsibility but turn to use the beneficiaries as political 
constituency. See Fair, L. (2001). Pastimes and Politics: Culture, Community and Identity in Post-Abolition Urban Zanzibar, 
1890-1945. Athens: Ohio University Press; Sheriff, A. (2001). The Records of the ‘Waqf Commission’, op. cit., pp.27-45. 
Oberauer, N. (2008). ‘Fantastic Charities’: The Transformation of Waqf Practices in Colonial Zanzibar. Islamic Law and Society, 
15(3), 315-370. 
36
 The population of Muslims in Kenya is a controversial and emotive subject on the account of a state policy that allocates 
resources on the basis of group population. Though contested, figures given by the KNBS derived from the 2009 National 
Population and Housing Census remain the only official statistics. Several sources, though, put the figure of Muslims between 
eight and twenty five percent. See KNBS, Population and Housing Census, Nairobi, 2009. Retrieved from 
file:///C:/Users/USER/Downloads/Volume%202-Population%20and%20Household%20Distribution%20by%20Socio-
Economic%20Characteristics%20(1).pdf. (Accessed April, 2016); Ndzovu, H. (2014). Muslims in Kenyan Politics: Political 
Involvement, Marginalization, and Minority Status. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press. 
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view that state control of waqfs was geared towards control of resources, and by extension, the 
Muslim community through the socio-cultural heritage. Significantly, Muslims’ marginality and 
the absence of a ‘Mamluk/Ottoman like’ political culture render the argument on the use of 
waqfs as a means to protecting wealth against confiscation or taxation untenable in the present 
circumstances.  
 
2.7.2 Use of Waqfs to Circumvent Laws of Mirath 
There is a dogma in Islam that “there is no hubs in circumvention of the shares of God, the 
Exalted”, (Shurayh al-Harith, d. 695-717 C.E. as quoted in Powers, 1983:22; Hennigan, 2004). 
However, this ethical precept did not deter some endowers from using waqfs to retain control of 
wealth by leaving it with preferred descendants and protect it against supposed fragmentation 
after their demise. Allegedly, other endowers resorted to waqfs to perpetuate age-old customs of 
locking out certain heirs, especially women, from inheritance. “Since Islam bars individuals from 
making wills as they choose, founding a waqf was the only possible way of circumventing the 
Shari
c
a laws of succession,” argues Reiter (1996:36). The perception of fragmentation of wealth 
through Shari
c
a guidelines of inheritance could not have been explained better than by Layish 
(1983:27): 
The Islamic system of succession is destructive of family property in that it causes 
its division among a great number of heirs and into uneconomic units. Succession 
involves a great number of participants; Qur’anic and agnatic heirs participate 
simultaneously (not successively) – subject, of course, to the rules of priorities 
and exclusion – and this increases the fragmentation of the property and the 
shrinking of the shares of the participants ad infinitum.  
More often, testamentary waqfs were particularly appropriated as a vehicle for circumventing the 
Shari
c
a guidelines of mirath (inheritance). This is due to the view that “it does not involve 
quantitative or personal restrictions and that an estate could fully be withdrawn from the rigors of 
mirath and dedicated exclusively in favor of an otherwise legal heir,” alleges Layish (1983:28). 
In his study, Layish established that 79 per cent of 211 waqfs in Tripoli and over 96 per cent of 
138 in Nablus from 1800 to 1860 were waqf dhurri. This led the author into concluding that 
waqfs could at times be appropriated by ‘un-Godly minds’ to circumvent the divinely fixed laws 
of mirath “so as to preserve the integrity of the property and provide for a select group of 
descendants in the exclusion of others” (1983:28). Another investigation by Doumani 
 
 
55 
 
compounded the view that waqfs accord the endower an opportunity to define social and family 
relations and structures in contradiction to the laws of mirath. He observes: 
Family endowments were flexible because, first, the endower could alienate his or 
her entire estate, not just the one-third maximum allowed for gifts […] The 
endower’s choice redefined his or her family members’ and descendants’ material 
base by restricting their rights of access to and ability to dispose of certain 
properties while committing them to follow a pre-determined formula for sharing 
the revenues or use of these properties. Second, the endower could choose what 
individuals or whole lines of descent can or cannot benefit from the use and the 
revenue of the endowed property (Doumani, 1998:7).
37
 
 
Owing to the perceived flexibility of the law of waqf as opposed to the law of mirath with regard 
to wealth distribution, endowers of waqf dhurri could as well decide who to appoint as 
mutawallis (mostly sons or close male relatives) and beneficiaries within the family. This, 
thereby, accorded endowers the excuse to prevent their estates, power, and prestige from being 
fragmented; retain connection to their properties; and by extension, perpetuate the age-old 
customary ideas of patriarchy in family descent and gender preference (Layish, 1983; 
Shoenblum, 1999; Hennigan, 2004; Lev, 2005).  
 
Significantly, however, it is not entirely true that testamentary bequests and waqfs lack 
quantitative and personal restrictions allowing complete withdrawal of estates from the confines 
of mirath laws as opined by Layish (1983). The Shari
c
a, based on traditions related to the 
Prophet, restricts the establishment of testamentary charities up to one-third of the total estate of 
a testator. Neither is a bequest in favor of a legal heir valid under the Shari
c
a (Sahih al-Bukhari, 
4:5-7; Powers, 1990:23).
38
 This law is strictly applied in the Hanafi madhhab (Ghazaleh, 2001:8-
9). More so, according to the Malik madhhab, “a waqf in favor of males to the exclusion of 
daughters is void (batala)” (Layish, 1983:9).  
Accordingly, appropriation of waqf ahli for the mentioned purposes is illegal in theory according 
to all Sunni Schools of law. This prohibition, nonetheless, as shown in various studies remains in 
                                                          
37
 Testamentary waqfs (waqfs established on the basis of legal bequests) are prone to contradicting the one-third rule on charities, 
date of effect of the waqf, as well as the disposition of a legal heir as either a beneficiary or even an administrator. An endower 
could implicitly state in his bequest that the waqf would only take effect after his death, i.e. he reserves the right to revoke it 
during his life time, and even appoint a legal heir as administrator, hence giving him an undue advantage over other heirs. Legal 
limitations on testamentary waqfs were thereby at times not observed, hence leading to the violation of the law of inheritance. See 
Layish, A. (1983). The Maliki Family Waqf According to Wills and Waqfiyyat, op. cit., pp. 1-32. 
38 In one version of the tradition, the Prophet advised Sacad who wished to make a charitable bequest of half of his estate saying, 
“…one third, yet one-third is too much.” See Sahih al-Bukhari, 8:725.  
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principle, but violated in practice. Consequently, there ensued endless court battles to challenge 
the decisions by some endowers to exclude certain family members (particularly women) as 
beneficiaries of waqfs in the later period of the Ottoman rule as well as British India in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Barnes, 1986; van Leeuwen, 1999; Powers, 2002). These 
legal contestations were also established among beneficiaries of some waqfs in Kenya by the 
current investigation. It is this susceptibility to abuse of the mirath law that partly accounted for 
the reforms in waqf ahli among predominant Muslim societies like Egypt, Turkey, Libya, 
Lebanon, and Syria. The reforms involved restricting the period of benefits to not more than 
sixty years from the death of the waqif. In the worst case scenario, waqf ahli were invalidated 
and the properties distributed among heirs as inheritance (Schacht, 1982; Pearl & Menski, 1998; 
Shoenblum, 1999; Kozlowski, 2008).
39
  
A sharp departure from the use of waqf ahli to deny women of their legal rights as heirs and to 
safeguard wealth against alleged fragmentation was, however, noted in Algeria. Layish (1983) 
observes in another investigation that after the World War 1, testamentary waqfs were 
particularly used in Algeria to favor wives and daughters so as not to fall into the mercy of male 
descendants and benevolence. Figures of beneficiaries provided in this study point to the view 
that, some endowers of waqf ahli designated their children as mutawallis and primary 
beneficiaries “to emphasize the immediate connection between the sequence of generations and 
entitlement to the waqf” without regard to gender (1983:8).  
 
The author further observes in another study during the period 1940s to 1960s that “waqf, as far 
as it existed in the Israel Muslim society, was not used as a means to deprive women of the 
family property or to curtail their rights” (1975:298). This development was also noted among 
some waqfs that designated female relatives as beneficiaries in the exclusion of males in Kenya 
by the present study. In some of the identified cases, for instance, women took half of the share 
of usufruct alongside pious causes in mixed waqfs, or even all of it in some family waqfs, apart 
from being appointed as mutawallis. Thus, this protected females culturally considered as ‘weak’ 
                                                          
39
 Changes effected in majority of these communities were allegedly in line with Malik and Hanbali madhhabs. They included 
temporality and revocability of waqfs; reversion of waqf corpus to the waqif or his heirs upon expiry of purpose for which waqf 
was established; and invalidation of restrictive conditions on the freedoms of (female) beneficiaries such as marriage, and 
residence. Consequently, between five and twenty percent of the value of each dissolved waqf was channeled to charitable causes 
where such residuary provisions were catered for. See Cattan, H. (1984). The Law of Waqf, op. cit., pp. 219-221. 
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against al-asabat (agnate heirs) who would have otherwise claimed a stake in the estate of the 
deceased under the law of mirath (See also Shaham, 1997:216-223).   
 
In a similar investigation on waqf ahli in Jerusalem under British mandate, Reiter (1996:77-79) 
observes that ten out of forty seven endowers had designated their wives as first generation 
beneficiaries. According to the law of mirath, a wife is entitled to one-eighth share of the estate 
or one quarter in the presence or absence of direct descendants respectively. In the observed 
cases, therefore, spouses got more than what they were entitled to under mirath law. These later 
investigations particularly gainsay the generalization that waqf ahli were appropriated as an 
avenue for circumventing the Shari
c
a guidelines of inheritance to the detriment of female heirs 
and relatives.  
 
By contrast as indicated, according to Reiter (1996), Layish (1983), Shaham, (1997), as well as 
the current study, establishment of waqf ahli could also ensure retention of property within the 
nuclear family to the interests of women as cognate heirs. Accordingly, this prevented some 
portion of it from falling into the agnates or the general public through bayt al-mal were it to be 
administered according to mirath law. Clearly, these observations underscore the view that no 
single reason could adequately explain the complexities in the establishment and use of waqfs in 
the Muslim society (Hoexter, 1998a, 2002; Hennigan, 2004: Lev, 2005).  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted the significant elements constituting waqfs as proposed by the 
majority opinion in Sunni Islam. Clearly, perpetuity, irrevocability, inalienability, and divine 
ownership, are among the basic principles on which the institution of waqf was founded. We 
have also discussed the strength and weaknesses of various legal trajectories that seek to trace 
the origin of waqfs in Islam as espoused by authors across the scholarship divide. The institution 
of waqf, as is understood in contemporary times, bears striking similarities both in principle and 
practice with several other practices aimed at attaining qurba by early civilizations like piae 
causea (Byzantine), res sacrae (Roman) and pat ruvan (Persian). These apparent similarities 
were, allegedly unconsciously, adopted by the Islamic tradition in its contact with the different 
civilizations at alternating times in history. Thus, their existence in the institution of waqf is not a 
confirmation that the practice is strictly alien since several traditions of the Prophet and early 
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companions’ practices attest to waqfs in Islam. Rather, they serve to demonstrate that charity and 
qurba are as old as humanity. In conclusion, therefore, charity is not a preserve of Islam as 
further evidenced in the practices of hekdesh and xenodochia among the Jewish and Christian 
communities respectively. 
 
Significantly, we have seen how, besides the spiritual motivation to attain sawab and qurba, 
waqfs also became a means towards the attainment of varied worldly goals. Through waqf, an 
endower could retain control of his wealth; protect it against alleged fractionalization under laws 
of inheritance; decide on the beneficence pattern; and even seek to privilege certain people 
among his own progeny. Waqfs, therefore, became an invaluable tool by which dedicators 
negotiated social relations on the one side, and accorded mutawallis, 
c
ulama, and kadhis the 
immense economic, social, and symbolic wherewithal on the other. 
 
Moreover, we have internalized how Islamic traditions envisage management of waqfs as 
opposed to state supervision. The mutawallis, 
c
ulama, and kadhis were at the center of waqf 
practices interpreting, executing, and mediating the institution. This centrality of the 
c
ulama and 
the mutawalli, arguably, accorded them access to revenue-bearing waqfs, exerting economic and 
socio-cultural influence in the community that made them apparent threat to some political 
establishments. To stem their influence with a view to consolidating political hegemony, Muslim 
and colonial governments established departments and ministries in which the 
c
ulama were 
conscripted to oversee waqfs according to formulated legislations and within strict supervision. 
In the following chapter we, therefore, endeavor to contextualize secular policies and civil 
institutions established by the British colonial government with a view to controlling resources 
that effectively influenced waqfs.  
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Chapter Three 
Secular Legislations and Common Law Judgments on Waqf Practices in Colonial 
Kenya 
3.0. Introduction 
Colonialism is itself a word deeply imbued with political meanings, both 
unimaginable and difficult to discuss without reference to the power relationship 
it constitutes. Among Muslims in Kenya, the colonial experience was both 
historically and culturally specific. Its ways of knowing and ordering experience, 
that is, its power relations are inherently different for the colonizer and the 
colonized, [and most importantly], at the heart of the British colonial power was 
how to negotiate the relationship between the interlocutors of religious knowledge 
and authority in Muslim society (Mwakimako, 2010:109-110).  
This chapter highlights the contours of power dynamics and negotiation of relationships 
witnessed between the Muslim community and the British colonial authorities in the East Africa 
Protectorate spanning over seven decades. The conflicts and negotiations foremost took place in 
the juridical field, hence the opening of this discussion with an overview of the kadhi’s courts in 
relation to the British colonial government’s control of resources and waqfs in particular. The 
argument shows how significant it was for the British colonial government to gain control of the 
legal sphere (juridical and legislations) that informed their subsequent relations with the Muslim 
community in the economic, political, and cultural fields. We first witness the takeover of the 
Protectorate’s political hegemony from the Sultan followed by rapid constriction of the legal 
jurisdiction of the kadhi’s courts to a narrowly interpreted Muslim personal status law. Then 
swiftly came the establishment of a state agency – the Waqf Commissioners of Kenya (WCK) - 
not only in filling the void left by the kadhi’s courts in the supervision of waqfs, but also to 
enshrine centralized administration and supervision hitherto unknown in the Protectorate. 
Several other legislations were also established to ensure control of resources by the colonial 
government. The discussion in this chapter is significant in laying the foundations for the 
proceeding argument in the postcolonial times where administration and control of waqfs by the 
state mirrors colonial policies as significant statutes, particularly on waqfs, are unchanged. This 
does not only profoundly influence the development of the institution but also provides the 
vehicle through which internal dynamics of identity, belonging, supremacy, and beneficence to 
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waqfs within the Muslim community are negotiated and mediated in adaptation to state control of 
the institution. 
3.1 Limiting the Jurisdiction of Kadhi’s Courts and the Establishment of Policies to 
Administer Waqfs in Colonial Kenya 
The year 1887 when the British East Africa Association was granted concession by the Sultan 
over his territorial hegemony is the appropriate starting point to understand the intricate 
relationship between waqfs and the kadhi’s courts on one hand, and the struggle for control of 
‘economic capital’ for negotiating the political and social fields in the coast of East Africa 
between various actors on the other hand. Unwittingly, the concession not only made the Sultan 
concede political power but also the control of resources and ‘economic capital’ in the territory 
as the discussion hereunder reveals.  
 
Extensive research on the coast of East Africa including those in legal studies (Anderson, 2008; 
Kimeu, 2011), history (Sperling, 1988; Stockreiter, 2015), and a host of Islamic academic 
endeavors (Hashim, 2006; 2010; Mraja, 2011; Mwakimako, 2011; Ndzovu, 2014b) agree that 
kadhi’s courts had largely been in existence in the region as an integral part of the Muslim 
judicial system from as early as the eighth century.
1
 Though the Islamic legal system was 
uncodified, it is believed to have entrenched some rule of law that survived over two hundred 
years of Portuguese conquest from 1698 under the Bu Sa
c
idi Sultanate of Zanzibar whose 
dynasty also extended to the coast of Kenya. Under imperial supervision of the Sultan, despite 
there being no formal courts to implement the Shari
c
a, dispensation of justice drastically changed 
from the traditional arbitration model under councils of elders to a centralized Shari
c
a driven 
judicial system. Since then, kadhis became mediators and juri-consultants issuing legal opinions 
and spiritual advices to the society (Stockreiter, 2015:35; Hashim, 2005). This judicial system, 
arguably, remained in use throughout the Sultanate preceding the British and the German 
colonial governments.  
 
Upon their arrival, therefore, Salim observes, “the British and the Germans found the coastal 
areas of East Africa under the dominion of the Sultanate of Zanzibar who had representatives 
                                                          
1
 On introduction and spread of Islam along the East African Coast see Sperling, D. (1988). The Growth of Islam among the 
Mijikenda of the Kenya Coast, 1826-1933. London: School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. 
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along the coast administering it on his behalf and resolving disputes among his Muslim subjects” 
(Salim, 1978, as quoted in Kimeu, 2011:20). This opinion is rightly shared by others 
(Carmichael, 1997; Hashim, 2005; Anderson, 2008). Stockreiter (2010:561) summarizes how the 
Islamic judicial system operated under the Sultan: 
The law applied by kadhis, classical or uncodified Islamic law, was an ongoing 
discursive tradition driven by legal scholars’ consultation of the main sources of 
law, the Qur’an and hadith (deeds and sayings of the Prophet), and works of 
jurisprudence generated by legal scholarship of different schools, places and 
periods of time. 
Further, kadhi’s courts across the sultanate applied the Sharica based on their individual 
madhhab, notably the predominant 
c
Ibadi and Shafi
c
i legal codes (Bang, 2001a; Stockreiter, 
2010, 2015).
2  
 
Historical sources further posit that what prevailed along the Sultanate was a Muslim judicial 
system akin to what existed during the Islamic caliphate. It follows from logical deduction that 
with ‘full jurisdiction’ to Muslim subjects, hearing and determination of matters regarding waqfs 
were also within the mandate of the kadhi’s courts as evidenced across several Muslim 
societies.
3
 This presumption is further crystallized by the view that Muslim courts have 
historically no precedent of legal jurisdiction over matters affecting the society based on the 
nature of disputes. For instance, no separate courts for commercial disputes or civil litigations 
different from family law are recorded to have existed in the history of Islam (Reiter, 1996; 
Layish, 1997; Powers, 2011; Stockreiter, 2015).  
 
According to Hashim (2005, 2010), and Mwakimako (2011), British colonial influence and 
control of resources started to be felt in Zanzibar, the seat of the Sultanate, spreading throughout 
the region from 1887 following the granting of concession to the British East Africa Association 
by the Sultan over his territorial hegemony. Consequently, “the Association assumed powers to 
pass laws for the government of districts, and to establish courts of justice and appoint judges” 
                                                          
2 These differences were later abandoned following entrenchment of the kadhis and the Sharica under the Islamic Law 
(Restatement) Act of 1964, which provided that Islamic law of any sect shall be followed by the courts in matters of personal 
status. See Hashim, A. (2005). Servants of Sharica: Qadis and the Politics of Accommodation in East Africa.  Journal of Sudanic 
Africa, 16, 27-51. 
3
 On Muslim communities where kadhis heard and determined cases involving waqfs, see Layish, A. (1975). Women and Islamic 
Law in a non-Muslim State: A Study Based on Decisions of the Shari’a Courts in Israel. Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press; Lev, 
Y. (2005). Charity, Endowments and Charitable Institutions in Medieval Islam. Florida: University Press of Florida; Powers, D. 
(2011). The Development of Islamic Law and Society in the Maghrib: Qadis, Muftis and Family Law. Burlington: Ashgate 
Publishing Company. 
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(Mwakimako, 2011:330). Under the concession arrangement, however, the Islamic judiciary 
framework was exempted from the British authority and the Sultan continued to appoint kadhis 
who administered justice according to the Shari
c
a under his authority (Hashim, 2005, 2010; 
Anderson, 2008; Chesworth, 2011). Mwakimako (2011:330) explains the philosophy for the 
exemption of the direct control of the Islamic judiciary from the British positing: 
The agreements deliberately emphasized the sovereignty of the Sultan so that the 
public understood that judicial or government powers and functions conceded to 
the Association were to be exercised by it only in the name and under the 
authority of the Sultan. 
 
In 1888, the Association experienced economic constraints that forced it to transfer its mandate 
to the Imperial British East African Company (IBEAC). Consequently, IBEAC inherited the 
concession earlier granted to the Association by the Sultan. As its predecessor, IBEAC also 
agreed to abide by earlier ratified terms of the concession that, “these possessions [i.e. 
Protectorate] are to be held by the Company as His Highness’ wakil (plenipotentiary and agent) 
and they are to be administered according to the Shari
ca” (Anderson, 2008:82). This suggests 
that the Association officials were administrators with no judicial training or powers to exercise 
in the territory, hence the agreement that they utilize existing Islamic judicial institutions. As a 
matter of fact, “the first judge appointed by the British arrived in Mombasa with the title of 
‘Legal Vice Consul’’’ (Mwakimako, 2011:330). Incidentally, this arrangement perfectly suited 
the in-direct rule policy adopted by the colonial government.  
  
Clearly, the British administrative officers also exercised extra-territorial jurisdiction of the 
Crown over British subjects. “In administering their jurisdiction over the Sultan’s and British 
subjects, the administrative officers, thus, sat in dual capacity as the Sultan’s judges 
administering Islamic law or as consular officers administering the English laws,” continues 
Hashim (2010:222). Similar observation was made by others (Ogot, 1973; Hirsch, 1994). In 
essence, this dual capacity employed by the British administrators reduced the Sultan to a 
symbolic head of state (Bakari, 2001), a scenario that aptly demonstrates the struggle for control 
of political power and the economic wherewithal enveloped in what Hashim (2010:223) 
describes as “a self-appointed mission of civilization.”4  
                                                          
4
 The concept of ‘self appointed mission of civilization’ is used in the study strictly drawing from the colonized subjects’ point of 
view in relation to political control by the British colonial government. This is because there was virtually no difference between 
the various administrative policies of colonial powers in the eyes of the colonized who perceived them as invaders who assumed 
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My examination of the negotiations between the British colonial government and the Muslim 
community on the control of resources, and waqfs in particular, draws from Bourdieu’s concept 
of capital (power). Bourdieu (1986:241) conceives capital in terms of “accumulated labor (in its 
materialized form or its incorporated, ‘embodied’ form), which, when appropriated on a private, 
i.e. exclusive, basis by agents or groups of agents, enables them to appropriate social energy in 
the form of reified or living labor.” In simple terms, capital in its various strands (economic, 
social, cultural, and symbolic), is the specific quantity and structure of resources that qualify an 
agent to enter and survive the daily struggles and interactions of a given social space (Bourdieu, 
1986:241-243; Bourdieu and Waqcuant, 2004). In the wider context, capital should be 
understood as “a social relation within a system of exchange, and the term is extended to all the 
goods, material and symbolic, without distinction, that present themselves as rare and worthy of 
being sought after in a particular social formation” (Bourdieu, 1987, as quoted in Mahr, Harker, 
and Wilkes, 1990:13). 
 
Further, Bourdieu (1985:16-17; 1987:121) advances the concept of field, relevant to our 
discussion, not in terms of physical but “social space of objective relationships” where infinite 
amount of daily life and interactions of social agents (i.e. negotiation, competition, and even 
conflicts) take place. It is in the social space where various potentialities and networks of 
relationships determined by the positions of individual agents exist and infinite interactions of 
social agents take place. In other words, a field could be conceptualized in terms of dynamic 
sphere of forces or, “competitive arena of social relationships wherein variously positioned 
agents and institutions struggle over the production, acquisition, and control of forms of capital” 
(Rey, 2007:41-46; Mahr, Harker, and Wilkes, 1990). Not oblivious of the theoretical context in 
which the concepts were used, the study adopts them owing to their propensity to be applicable 
in “interpreting the relationship between religion, class, and power; and religion and colonial 
conquest” in the negotiation for control of resources taking waqfs as a microcosm (Rey, 2007:45, 
82). This is manifested in the struggles between the colonial state and the Sultan and by 
extension, the Muslim community as discussed and among various ethnic and jurisprudential 
Muslim groups in the Protectorate. In view of this, the study perceives waqfs, religion, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
total control. This is, however, not to be oblivious of the differences between the British in-direct rule and the French assimilation 
policies in Africa. See further Seesemann, R. & B. Soares. (2009). ‘Being as Good Muslims as Frenchmen’: On Islam and 
Colonial Modernity in West Africa. Journal of Religion in Africa, 39(1), 91-120. 
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judiciary (law) as fields on one hand, and the 
c
ulama, beneficiaries, endowers, kadhis, waqf 
commissioners, and the British colonial government among others as actors and agents with 
varying amounts of capital and knowledge in the various fields on the other hand.  
 
Significantly, each of the foregoing fields has tacit (non-formal) rules of engagement (i.e. field-
specific rules), demands, features, and structures that agents or actors have to apply and adapt to 
future tendencies and opportunities in their daily interactions to survive (Wacquant, 2011). 
Therefore, the position of individual agents in the field is directly proportional to the capital they 
posses and bring into the field to access benefits and privileges. We also have to appreciate that, 
though different fields have relative autonomy from each other, they could as well influence one 
another since they are all embedded in one social space (Mahr, Harker, and Wilkes, 1990; Rey, 
2007).  
 
Accordingly, control of resources, and waqfs in particular, perfected through control of the 
judiciary and the legislative organs as it unfolds hereunder should be understood in terms of 
power contestation, i.e. both economically and politically. As part of strategies to realize the ‘self 
appointed mission of civilization’, therefore, it was imperative for the British colonial authorities 
to embrace, but gradually suppress existing ‘native’ customs and institutions by interpreting and 
applying them according to English (British) perception and not as per the traditional wisdom in 
which they were established. Undoubtedly, this required enormous economic resources 
(revenues and fortunes in terms of currency and property rights) and political capital to conscript 
and sustain human capital (i.e. those operating within and outside the ‘native institutions’ 
including the kadhis and waqf commissioners as agents) that would sanction and legitimize state 
policies.  
 
It is also important to bear in mind that wielding and exercising political power subtly 
demonstrates symbolic capital - a quasi-magical power or credit that enables acquiring the 
equivalent of what is obtained by physical or economic force that is recognized and legitimized 
like a body of practices and representations (rites and beliefs). In essence, symbolic capital, 
according to Bourdieu (2000:242; 1990:112-121; 1977:171-183) “is not a particular kind of 
capital but what every kind of capital becomes when it is misrecognized as capital, that is, as 
force, a power or capacity for (actual or potential) exploitation recognized as legitimate.” This 
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encompasses language, charm, charisma, seduction, titles of nobility, and other human actions 
that lead to a relation of meanings that are socially founded and recognized, both internal and 
external. In other words, “to be seen as a person or class of status and prestige, is to be accepted 
as legitimate and sometimes as a legitimate authority. Such position carries with it the power to 
name activities and groups, the power to represent commonsense, and above all, the power to 
create the official version of the social world” (Mahr, Harker, and Wilkes, 1990:13). Thus, 
symbolic capital best explains what the British colonial government was assumed to wield upon 
imposing herself on the colonized subjects as “possessing the power to recognize, to consecrate, 
to state, with success what merits being known and recognized” (Bourdieu, 2000:242). Arguably, 
it is this power that enabled them to control the political sphere and the economic resources in 
the territory. 
 
By 1895, the British officially took over the concession agreement making the coast a colony 
under full British executive and judicial authority before issuing the first comprehensive Order in 
Council for the administration of the region as a Protectorate two years later (Mwakimako, 
2011). Within this context, the Commissioner for the Protectorate similarly assumed the position 
of an administrator and Governor though all cases and law suits between locals continued to be 
decided according to the Shari
c
a. Thus, at the very least, “the British colonial government 
initially allowed local Muslim judges, primarily resident Arabs, to hear most civil and criminal 
cases involving Muslims” (Hirsch, 1994:214-215).5 This was under the ‘non-interference’ 
concession terms ratified earlier in 1887. 
 
Of significance to the question under investigation, allowing kadhis to hear and determine civil 
and criminal petitions involving Muslims subtly underscores the argument that until the 
establishment of the Protectorate, there was neither a legal body in-charge of waqfs nor separate 
courts that heard and determined disputes arising there from. Hence, all litigations pertaining to 
waqfs also fell under the jurisdiction of the kadhi’s courts while administrative functions of the 
consecrations resided with mutawallis as Islamic traditions require. However, continued reliance 
of customary institutions and traditional modus operandi would not have worked to the colonial 
                                                          
5 In recognition of the office of the kadhi in dispensing justice among ‘native subjects’ professing Islam, the British colonial 
government expanded the jurisdiction of the kadhi’s courts beyond mwambao by appointing the first Muslim kadhi to the North 
Eastern Frontier District (NFD) in 1927. The law of waqf was, however, limited to the Protectorate. See Kerrow, B. (2010) as 
cited in Ndzovu, H. (2014a). Is the inclusion of Kadhi Courts in the Kenyan Constitution against the Principle of a Secular State? 
Berlin: Frei Universität Berlin, p.17. 
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project of political and economic control in the region. Hence, the British cautiously adopted the 
existing institutions in their in-direct rule policy while gradually reforming them for economic 
and political expedience.  
 
Yet, as aptly asserted by Bang (2001a) and Hashim (2005), the colonial government’s 
administrative policy to incorporate existing judicial institutions like the kadhi’s courts to the 
state was not a sharp departure from the Sultan’s policy that also employed the culama to 
consolidate his rule and grip on the judiciary. As a matter of fact, “under Sayyid Said the office 
of the Sultan combined the legislative, administrative, and judicial functions of the government,” 
posits Lofchie (1965, as quoted in Hashim, 2005:29-30; Bang, 2001a). In essence, this illustrates 
that waqfs were not fully independent from the political establishment since kadhis were an 
organ of the sultanate. More often, as discussed in chapter two, a section of the 
c
ulama was 
occasionally appointed by Muslim rulers to oversee waqfs, particularly those with enormous 
significance to the community. True to this precedent, synchronized arms of government 
remained desirable to the British colonial authorities as kadhis and cooperating 
c
ulama were 
conscripted into the civil service and for the control and administration of waqfs. 
   
The systematic restructuring of the Muslim administrative and judicial framework was 
undertaken in the auspices of the East African Order in Council of 1897. The Order in Council 
re-organized the judicial system into two categories of ‘Native courts’.6 The first was composed 
of the High Court, the Chief ‘Native court’, Provincial courts, District courts, and Assistant 
Collector’s courts. This category was presided over by a British judicial officer and guided by 
the Indian Civil Procedure Code (CPC) and the Indian Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes 
(PCPC). The second category consisted of the kadhi’s courts and Court of local chiefs (African 
local courts). This cluster of courts was presided over by a local authority and guided by the CPC 
and PCPC as well as the local laws or customs existing in their respective jurisdictions 
(Stockreiter, 2015:35-41; Anderson, 2008; Hashim, 2010).
7
 
                                                          
6
 The ‘Native Courts’ Regulations (1897) define ‘native’ as “[…] any native of Africa not of European or American origin and 
any person not of European or American origin, who, within the dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar, would be subject to His 
Highness’ jurisdiction, even though such person should not have been born in Africa.” See Anderson, J. (2008). Islamic Law in 
Africa. London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, pp.82-83; Ndzovu, H. (2014b). Muslims in Kenyan Politics: Political Involvement, 
Marginalization, and Minority Status. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, p.36.  
7 The provision by the colonial government that kadhi courts apply the CPC and PCPC was strategically geared towards creating 
what Schacht calls ‘Anglo-Mohammedan jurisprudence’, i.e. dispensing of Islamic law based on modern English jurisprudence 
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Classifying judicial institutions in a binary opposition of ‘Native’–Western was clearly a 
conscious strategy by the British colonial authorities that consequently put the colonized subjects 
to the trap of ‘symbolic translations’ in relation to control of the legal field and perceptions to 
life in general. Referring to a culture in the common derogatory terms as ‘customary’, ‘native’, 
or ‘traditional’ was in line with the adopted racial hierarchy policy in which Africans were 
placed at the bottom strata of the society. Precisely, it was a means for the British colonial 
government to disqualify ‘native institutions’ since “to be a native implied one being denied of 
human rights and important privileges that were reserved for the ‘civilized groups’” (Ndzovu, 
2014b:36). This was characteristic of the civilization of Africa mission where African 
institutions were perceived in terms of being ‘native’ or ‘traditional’, according ‘civilizing 
agents’ the means of qualifying them as antithetical to their ‘officially established’ social and 
political order. This classificatory scheme fitted as part of the strategies that preceded racial and 
class negotiations witnessed between the British, Arabs, Asians, and Africans, in that order, in 
the Protectorate.  
 
Further, categorization of the courts into ‘lower-higher’ or ‘native-English’ spectrum also meant 
that the lower chambers (kadhis and African local courts) became mere ‘subordinate courts’. 
Accordingly, this accorded the British colonial government the right to closely supervise and 
control the jurisdiction and powers of the local juri-consultants whom they conscripted, 
ostensibly, to sanction and implement their desired reforms (Bang, 2001a:59). ‘Native courts’ 
lacked appellate jurisdiction that only lied with the higher (read English) chambers that retained 
the mandate to interpret local customs using British lenses (Mwangi, 1995). While dealing with 
Muslim subjects in the Protectorate, ‘Native courts’ were to be guided by the CPC and PCPC, 
and have regard to the general principles of the Shari
c
a as ratified in the concession charter.
8
 This 
consideration was, however, weakened by a contradictory provision that allowed the High Court 
when hearing appeals from the ‘Native courts’ to “take whatever steps it may deem right or 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
as they did in British India. Consequently, this had influence on some Islamic practices like waqfs as manifested in the Privy 
Council decision of 1894. See Schacht, J. (1982). An Introduction to Islamic Law. Clarendon: Oxford University Press, pp.94-96; 
Stockreiter, E. (2015). Islamic Law, Gender, and Social Change in Post-Abolition Zanzibar. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 44-45. 
8
 Article 3 of the East African Order in Council of 1897 provides; “[…] all Muslims domiciled under the dominions of the Sultan 
of Zanzibar were to be governed by the Islamic law in matters related to criminal, civil and personal status laws.”  See Hashim, 
A. (2010). Coping with Conflicts: Colonial Policy towards Muslim Personal Law in Kenya and Post-Colonial Court Practice. In 
S. Jeppie, E. Moosa, & R. Roberts (Eds.), Muslim Family Law in Sub-Saharan Africa: Colonial Legacies and Post-Colonial 
Challenges (pp.221-245). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.  
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desirable for satisfying itself as to the Muhammadan laws and customs applicable to the case” 
(Article 57, Order in Council, 1897, as quoted in Anderson, 2008:83). Thus, while it affirmed to 
respect and not to interfere with the dispensation of justice according to the Shari
c
a, the British 
colonial government also gave itself the right to define what is ‘Islamic’, albeit not according to 
established Muslim practices of jurisprudence, but English interpretations (i.e. ‘Anglo-
Mohammedan jurisprudence’, Schacht, 1982:94-96) in clear exercise of the espoused symbolic 
capital. 
 
Using section 17 of the Courts’ Ordinance of 1931, we could also shed light on the jurisdiction 
and mandate of the subordinate courts established by the East African Order in Council of 1897. 
Conveniently, they could be explained according to: (i) the type of offence to be handled by the 
court; (ii) amount of fine to be imposed there in; and (iii) the type and severity of punishment 
that the judgment was likely to confer upon a plaintiff in the said court (Hashim, 2005; 
Mwakimako, 2011; Stockreiter, 2015). More particularly, kadhi’s courts were accorded 
jurisdiction over Muslim Arabs, Baluchis, and Africans in matters relating to personal status, 
marriage, inheritance, and divorce in which the value of the subject-matter in dispute did not 
exceed one thousand Kenya shillings (Article 55, British Native Courts Regulations, 1897, as 
cited by Hashim, 2005:30; Anderson, 2008; Stockreiter, 2015). 
 
Clearly, the reforms in the legal jurisdiction of the kadhi’s courts in the Protectorate were 
informed both by economic and political expediencies of the British colonial government as well 
as their experience of the kadhi’s courts in India,9 and Egypt.10 Prior to this limitation, matters of 
waqf lied within the jurisdiction of kadhis as it applied to several Muslim communities including 
India and Egypt (Layish, 1975; Lev, 2005; Miran, 2009; Powers, 2011). “Although there was no 
clear definition, personal status usually included marriage, divorce, inheritance, and, following 
the kadhis’ scope of jurisdiction in India, religious endowments (waqf)”, summarizes Stockreiter, 
(2010:562; 2015:45; Powers, 1990; Hoexter, 1995). Finally, and quiet significant to the 
development of Islamic judicial practices, the East African Order in Council also established the 
                                                          
9
 See Makdisi, G. (1981). The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press; Qureshi, M. (1990). Waqfs in India: A Study of Legislative and Administrative Control. New Delhi: Gian Publishing 
House; Kozlowski, G. (2008). Muslim Endowments and Society in British India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
10 See Layish, A. (1983). The Maliki Family Waqf According to Wills and Waqfiyyat. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and 
African Studies, University of London, 46, 1-32; Powers, D. (1989). Orientalism, Colonialism and Legal History: The Attack on 
Family Muslim Endowments in Algeria and India. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 31, 535-571. 
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office of shaykh al-Islam (Chief Kadhi). The Chief Kadhi was mandated with supervising the 
kadhi’s courts and hearing and determining appeals arising from therein and which could be 
channeled for decision at the High Court.  
 
Subjecting local judicial institutions like the kadhis courts to European systems of justice; 
supervising, controlling them, and limiting their jurisdiction; and demanding that they apply 
alien procedures like the CPC and PCPC in the administration of justice mirrors what Bourdieu 
describes as symbolic violence. Bourdieu (1990:127; 2000:170) defines symbolic violence as the 
“gentle, invisible violence, unrecognized as such, chosen as much as undergone, that of trust, 
obligation, personal loyalty, hospitality, gifts, debts, piety, in a word, of all the virtues honored 
by the ethic of honor.”11 Precisely, symbolic violence is vented upon a social agent with his or 
her complicity through the effects of misrecognition and encouraged by denial by those on whom 
that violence is exercised. This suggests that the victim, as a social agent, understands and 
“recognizes a violence which is wielded precisely in as much as one does not perceive it as such 
and, therefore, lead them to construct this relation from the stand-point of the dominant as 
‘natural’ and which gives all its manifestations their hypnotic power” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
2004:342; Rey, 2007). Symbolic violence thrives in an environment of symbolic domination and 
perpetuated through disguised strategies that conceal them. Accordingly, the power to represent 
the legitimate social world was best exemplified through the legal field by use of symbolic 
violence by the colonial state to enforce what it regarded as ‘legitimate’ versions of both the 
legislative process and the judiciary in the Protectorate. In this case, therefore, “symbolic 
violence is the imposition of systems of symbolism and meaning upon groups or classes in such 
a way that they are experienced as legitimate” (Jenkins, 1992, 104, as quoted in Rey, 2007:55; 
Mahr, Harker, and Wilkes, 1990). 
 
As a matter of fact, majority, if not all the Arab kadhis were handicapped in the English legal 
training and procedures, and the British colonial authorities exploited this deficiency in cultural 
capital (i.e. English legal expertise) as a tool in defining the professional relations and 
negotiating the juridical field. Except for the submitted reasons as argued, it was illogical for the 
British colonial government to insist that kadhi’s courts adopt non-Islamic laws of evidence and 
                                                          
11 See also Bourdieu, P. and Wacquant, L. (2004). Symbolic Violence. In Bourgois, P. and N. Scheper-Hughes (Eds.), Violence in 
War and Peace: An Anthology (pp. 272–274). Carlton: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
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procedures to administer the Shari
c
a.
12
 Doing so, undoubtedly, led to miscarriage of justice. But 
owing to the political and symbolic hegemony coupled with the social ideology of the British, 
kadhis had to ‘accept’ the situation as a normal, even justifiable part of the judicial order, hence 
becoming unwitting social agents of symbolic violence.  
 
In essence, categorizing the courts as explained above and limiting their legal jurisdiction in 
terms of the value of fines to be imposed was the final step in the British strategies towards 
removing the jurisdiction of waqfs from the Muslim courts. As indicated, the value of litigation a 
kadhi’s court could hear and determine did not exceed one thousand Kenya shillings. Therefore, 
matters of waqf were taken out of the jurisdiction of the kadhi’s courts for three counts: (a) the 
narrow and compartmentalized interpretation of Muslim personal status law along English 
(British) perceptions to mean marriage, divorce, and inheritance; (b) majority of revenue 
generating waqfs included properties that were worth than the stipulated amount that Muslim 
courts could legally handle;
13
 and (c) waqfs matters were categorized as real estate contracts 
whose procedures did not only require English legal training and expertise but were mainly in 
English language that the Arab kadhis were not culturally endowed in. Thus, “waqf 
administration was among the tasks previously handled by the ‘ulama which now became 
increasingly governmentalized,” observed Bang (2001a:75). 
 
Having removed the hearing and determination of matters of waqf from the Muslim courts, it 
meant that mutawallis and the 
c
ulama would freely manage consecrated properties. However, 
from their experience in India and Egypt, the British colonial authorities were aware of the socio-
economic and political influence of the institution of waqf in the society vis-à-vis the colonial 
project. Not being oblivious of this fact, the British colonial government established the WCK in 
March 1899. The official position on the establishment of the state agency was to register, 
                                                          
12
 According to Stockreiter, non-Sharica procedures of evidence were put in place in 1899 and later buttressed by the Evidence 
Decree of 1917 that ultimately excluded Sharica rules of evidence all together. See Stockreiter, E. (2015). Islamic Law, Gender, 
and Social Change, op.cit. p.43.   
13
  In Zanzibar, however, the value of the subject matter of the kadhi’s courts was not only higher (five thousand shillings) than 
that of Kenya but kadhis also continued with the adjudication of matters of waqfs as part of the civil jurisdiction to personal status 
law spelt out in the Zanzibar Courts Decree of 1923. This piece of legislation did not apply to the Kenyan side of the 
Protectorate. See Bang, A. (2001a). Intellectuals and Civil Servants: Early 20th Century Zanzibar Ulama’ and the Colonial State. 
In S. Amoretti (Ed.), Islam in East Africa: New Sources (pp.59-98). Roma: Herder Editrice Libreria; Laura, F. (2001).  Pastime 
and Politics: Culture, Community, and Identity in Post-Abolition Urban Zanzibar, 1890-1945. Athens: Ohio University Press. 
Hashim, A. (2005). Servants of Shari’a, op. cit. 
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control, and administer the considerable amount of property endowed as waqfs for the benefit of 
families and Muslim institutions in the Protectorate (Bang, 2001a).  
 
In essence, therefore, establishment of the WCK was, in itself, a noble idea that would have 
streamlined the institution and improve its efficiency. However, considering the political 
environment in which the state agency was conceived and operationalized, it became the vehicle 
through which popular modernizing capitalist ideals advocated by the colonial authorities were 
spearheaded (Fair, 2001). More so, it was used to check the social, political, economic, and 
symbolic influence of the 
c
ulama and the diverse groups of beneficiaries and mutawallis who 
mainly depended on the waqfs for their socio-cultural welfare (Kuran, 2001). As a matter of fact, 
the enactment of the Waqf Commissioners Ordinance that formed the secular guide for 
administration of waqfs by the colonial state came a year later in 1900.  
 
The establishment of the WCK is indeed perceived by several authors to have been the last 
strategy in the overall control of resources (read economic capital) in the Protectorate by the 
British. This is because the colonial government had earlier interfered with mikoko (mangrove 
poles) business and abolished slavery denying plantation agriculture of the cheap labor that it 
relied on (Sheriff, 1991; Bakari, 2001; McIntosh, 2009; Mwinyihaji, 2014). Clearly, waqfs, 
according to the British, remained a potential economic and socio-cultural mainstay without 
whose seizure and control the local Muslim community could amass to challenge their political 
hegemony. The British understood the inherent power of waqfs to create a common identity of 
autonomous social groups keen on protecting and advancing particular interests of their members 
(Powers, 1989; Kozlowski, 1998; Hoexter, 2002). Carmichael (1997:209) articulates this fear 
saying: 
Waqf is a uniquely Muslim institution rooted in religious ideals. Yet, its role at the 
interface of private property and various religious foundations, such as the 
mosques and Qur’anic schools that waqf funds support, make it an obvious 
instrument for exerting influence in many spheres of Muslim life. Therefore, it 
should not be surprising that the British sought a role in waqf management. 
 
Thus, with limited jurisdiction of kadhi’s courts to Muslim personal status law and the WCK in 
place, the negotiation for control of waqfs as economic resources between the British and 
Muslim community was almost over in favor of the former. Therefore, controlling the judicial 
field turned out to be the perfect starting point in the Protectorate, and more importantly, to 
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prevent “the culama who formed the core of the ideological apparatus” (van Leeuwen, 1994:33) 
that the society and institution of waqf relied for its interpretation and spiritual guidance on the 
one hand, and the community of endowers and beneficiaries “from acquiring a strong, 
independent economic basis” (1994:31) to contest the economic and political hegemony of the 
colonial government on the other. 
 
3.2 Economic Space Control: The Effects of Colonial Policies on Waqf Practices in 
the Protectorate 
 
This section of the discussion highlights the diverse secular policies instituted by the British 
colonial government in the control of the economic sphere, and waqfs in particular, in the 
Protectorate. As discussed hereunder, the new policies hitherto unknown to the local Muslim 
community involved different sectors of the economy ultimately impacting the practices of waqfs 
in the region. This was manifested in the way the state appointed Commissioners and influenced 
the decision making process in the state agency in light of the new secular policies.  
 
Upon establishment, the WCK was composed of eight persons including the Civil Secretary 
(always a British) and the liwali as ex-officio members. Other members were Muslims, one 
appointed by the liwali and five others appointed by the Governor (also a British) from a panel of 
names submitted by the Civil Secretary. As Mwakimako (2010:118) argues, except for “one’s 
ethnic affiliation together with proven loyalty to the colonial state”, no qualifications were 
necessary for appointment as Commissioner. Commissioners were also remunerated by the state 
and served for a renewable term of five years unless they either resigned or were removed by the 
Governor. However, many of them were retained for longer periods to perpetuate the colonial 
legacy (Carmichael, 1997).
14
 Significantly, this suggests that endower’s and beneficiaries’ 
interests were neither represented nor taken into account when appointing the Commissioners. 
 
More often, as Carmichael posits, decisions of the Commission had to be sanctioned by the 
colonial government though, when the state desired to undertake any dealings for its 
convenience, it did not have to seek the authority of the Muslim Commissioners. This partly 
explains the lack of specific qualifications for appointment as a Commissioner so as to ensure 
                                                          
14
 The full board was for instance retained upon expiry of its mandate in 1957 to 1962, a trend that was repeated during the 
postcolonial period. See Appendix 3. 
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that only cooperating Muslims served in the state agency under close supervision by European 
officers who were co-opted as members of the Commission.
15
 Accordingly, this denied the 
Commissioners the independence and the right to use their judgment and discretion in 
accordance with the Shari
c
a and ancient customs pertaining to waqf practices as they became 
mere instruments in discharging government orders (Carmichael, 1997:301).  
 
State influence on the decision making process of the state agency was evident in several 
occasions interfering with the use of waqfs in ways not designated by endowers. For instance, 
from 1911 to 1912 the government through the provincial administration, i.e. the Provincial 
Commissioner (PC) and the District Commissioner (DC) in Malindi region, asked the WCK to 
use waqf funds in improving sanitation and public health as well as allocate undeveloped waqf 
lands to residents for farming (Carmichael, 1997:301). Although the Shari
c
a allows qabala (also 
mukhabara, sharecropping) as a means of improving productivity of agricultural waqf lands, in 
the cited case, the government was not proposing qabala but opening the lands to private 
ownership.
16
 More importantly, the waqf lands in question had not become ‘unproductive’, but 
merely ‘undeveloped’. So, even the question of qabala becomes contestable under the Sharica, 
let alone using the same as private shambas or appropriate waqf revenues in total disregard of the 
shurut al-waqif.  
 
Again, from 1954 to 1955 the colonial government pushed to have the closed cemetery of the 
Mazrui and the ruined Jamia masjid of Wakilindini declared national monuments under the 
Preservation of Objects of Archeological and Paleontological Interest Ordinance, Cap 314.
17
 As 
opined by J. S. Kirkman, the in-charge Royal Gedi National Park Malindi, since the cemetery 
was closed, the site could be converted to a public garden in line of “the policy of the city of 
London and most English cities for the last twenty years to convert closed cemeteries and ruined 
Churches into Public Gardens with flowers that is open to the public (sic).”18 Therefore, Kirkman 
                                                          
15
 The last European WCK secretary, Mr. Hawkins retired around 1945 to give way to the first African secretary, shaykh Haidar 
Mohammad of Mombasa. WCK, archive, Mombasa; interview with Mohammed Shalli, Mombasa, November, 2014.  
16
 On qabala see Sahih al-Bukhari, 3:523, 532-537; Donaldson, W. (2000). Share Cropping in the Yemen: A Study of Islamic 
Theory, Custom and Pragmatism. Leiden: Brill; Sanjuan, G. (2007). Till God Inherits the Earth: Islamic Pious Endowments in 
al-Andalus (9-15th Centuries). Leiden: Brill; Safari, M., Arif, M., & Muhammad, S. (2014). Sukuk Securities: New Ways of Debt 
Contracting Debts. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons Pte. Ltd.; Lahsasna, A. (2014). Sharicah Non-Compliance Risk management 
and Legal Documentations in Islamic Finance. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons Pte. Ltd. 
17 The Ordinance is presently the National Museums and Heritage Act, Cap 216 [Revised 2012], Laws of Kenya. 
18 Letter by J. S. Kirkman to the District Commissioner, Mombasa, January, 1955, WCK archive, Mombasa.  
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proposed that WCK leases out the two waqfs to the Municipal council of Mombasa to restore and 
protect them “as befitting the Mazrui family and also to maintain and beautify in the interest of 
Mombasa where it was seen by many visitors.”19  
 
This proposal was opposed by the Muslim community citing the same statute (Preservation of 
Archeological and Paleontological Interest Ordinance) which also protected such areas of 
worship from being used inconsistent with their character.
20
 Despite opposition, however, a 
seemingly skewed compromise was realized in favor of the colonial government and the Mazrui 
cemetery was gazetted as national monument. According to the compromise, the National 
Museums of Kenya (NMK) became co-trustees of the waqf with the WCK who retained the title 
of ownership bestowed upon it in 1909. Since both the NMK and the WCK are state agencies, it 
is clear that the colonial government influenced the decision making process in the 
dismemberment of the waqf.  
 
3.2.1 Compulsory Registration and Takeover of Waqfs 
For ease of supervision and control, the colonial government imposed compulsory registration of 
waqfs failure to which a mutawalli became “guilty of an offense and liable to a fine not 
exceeding two thousand Kenya shillings, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six 
months” (WCK Act, section 10, 4). Mutawallis were required to register their waqfs within two 
months from the date of consecration giving precise details of the physical address, endower, 
type of waqf, related properties, details of legal ownership (i.e. land title deed), and revenues 
expected.
21
 Enforced compulsory registration and fear of consequences for non-compliance 
clearly accounted for the large number of waqfs under state control during the colonial period as 
shown in Table 1. Of the 104 sampled waqf deeds, 83 (79.8 per cent) were registered during this 
period with the highest number at 71 (68.3 per cent) from 1920 to 1930. 
 
 
                                                          
19 Minute 2 of the meeting held in the DC’s Office, Mombasa, February, 1955, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
20 The National Museums and Heritage Act, CAP. 216, Section 42 (a) provides that, “[…] the Minister may acquire the 
monument by way of compulsory purchase […] but that power shall not be exercised in the case of a monument which, or any 
part of which, is periodically used for religious observances.” See also Section 43 (3a); letter of reply by shaykh Mbarak Ali 
Hinawy, the liwali of the coast, to the Town Clerk, Mombasa Municipality and copied to the PC, coast; DC, Mombasa; Secretary 
for Education, Labor and Lands, Nairobi and Secretary for Forest Development, Game and Fisheries, Nairobi, January, 1955, 
WCK archive, Mombasa. 
21
 Interview with Muhammad Shalli, Mombasa, October, 2014.  
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Period 1900s 1910s 1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s 
No. of waqfs 2 3 24 47 3 2 
Percentage 1.92% 2.88% 23.08% 45.19% 2.88% 1.92% 
 
Period 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Undated Total 
No. of 
waqfs 
2 0 1 1 11 8 104 
Percentage 1.92% 0% 0.96% 0.96% 10.58% 7.69% 100% 
 
Table 1: Registration of waqfs from 1900 to 2000.     (Source: WCK, 2014) 
 
 
There was, however, no survey of waqfs during the colonial period making it impossible to 
ascertain the volume of properties that the British colonial government seized control of. From 
available evidence, nonetheless, it could be argued that the lack of survey was a conscious 
tactical move by the colonial government not to bring into public knowledge the exact worth of 
waqfs. This was probably meant to pre-empt public outcry and court battles as witnessed in India 
following the invalidation of some waqfs by the Privy Council judgment of Abul Fata v. 
Russomoy (1894), (Anderson, 2008:96-97; Schacht, 1982; Banday, 2013); and the usurpation of 
waqfs in Zanzibar among other British colonies (Fair, 2001:69-82). Accordingly, the lack of 
disclosure of the volume of waqfs through survey stemmed the need to make the state agency 
inclusive. This is because disclosure could have probably demanded the inclusion of Muslims 
with diverse backgrounds, knowledge, and interests in the state body, making control of the 
institution challenging on the part of the colonial government. 
 
The Act also empowered the Commission to take over the administration of privately 
administered waqfs (both family and public) in varying circumstances. Section 12, sub-sections 1 
(a) and (b) provide: 
Commissioners may take over administration of waqfs which are being conducted 
in an improper or unauthorized manner in any case in which it appears to the 
Commissioners that (a) there is no properly constituted trustee of a waqf; or (b) 
any trustee is acting in an improper or unauthorized manner … in the case of waqf 
khairi of their own motion, and in the case of waqf ahli on the motion of the 
majority of the beneficiaries, hold an inquiry.   
 
Thus the Commission could bring waqfs under its direct management whenever the state felt that 
they were not properly administered. One such instance involved the Wakilifi masjid at mji wa 
kale (Old town) in Mombasa in 1957. Upon inquiry as required by law it was established that the 
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endower, Ali bin Muhammad bin Juma, had not established a precise formula for filling in the 
vacant position of the mutawalli.
22
 After the demise of the first two he had personally appointed 
– Abdulrahman bin Nasib bin Ali and Ali bin Khamis, Naaman bin Ali imposed himself as 
mutawalli and also served as a mu
c
adhdhin (adhan crier).
23
 WCK, therefore, took over the waqf 
allegedly for lack of a legal mutawalli and improper management. Naaman bin Ali was, 
nonetheless, employed as the caretaker by the WCK.
24
 
 
3.2.2 Colonial Policies on Land and Immovable Properties that Impacted on Waqfs 
The place of land as a factor of production both in the capitalist economy advocated by the 
British colonial government and in the institution of waqf cannot be gainsaid. However, capitalist 
economy perceived land ownership from a private view point different from the communal 
ownership as practiced in the Protectorate. Since then, acquisition and ownership of land in the 
region was marked by possession of a land title deed upon survey and demarcation. 
Consequently, from 1908, through the Land Titles Ordinance, huge tracts of land in the 
Protectorate changed ownership from community or ‘native reserves’ to Crown Lands despite 
widespread protests and claims of historical tenure from the locals (Hailey, 1979:106-107).
25
 
 
The Ordinance further empowered the Governor “to grant lease or otherwise alienate in Her 
Majesty’s behalf any Crown lands for any purpose and on any terms and conditions as he may 
think fit” (Anderson, 2008:91). This part of the Ordinance was particularly backed by the 1894 
Land Acquisition Act of India introduced in the Protectorate (later East African Land 
Regulations of 1897) that gave the British colonial government the right to seize ‘native land’ 
supposedly for public purposes (Pouwels, 1987; Carmichael, 1997; Ndzovu, 2014b). The net 
                                                          
22
 Section 12(2) requires that the WCK issues notices of inquiry to interested parties to appear and give evidence before the 
WCK. Notices were issued in local dailies in both English and Kiswahili and displayed in public places and the mosques. See 
Government of Kenya, Wakf Commissioners Act, Cap 109; Mombasa Times, November 3, 1957 and November 5, 1957. WCK 
records indicate that Abdulrahman bin Nasib bin Ali and Ali bin Khamis had died by June 1957, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
23 Correspondence between WCK’s Advocate and Naam bin Ali inquiring if indeed the former was the legally constituted 
mutawalli, June, 1957, WCK archive, Mombasa.  
24 Minute 50/94 of November, 1994; letter of appointment, October, 1994, WCK archive, Mombasa.  
25
 The Crown Lands Ordinance (1951) defines Crown land as “[…] all public lands in the colony which are for the time being 
subject to the control of Her Majesty by virtue of any treaty, convention, or agreement, or by virtue of Her Majesty’s 
protectorate, and all lands which shall have been acquired by Her Majesty for the public service or otherwise howsoever, and 
includes all lands occupied by the African tribes of the colony and all lands reserved for the use of members of any African tribe, 
save only the lands declared to be native lands by the Native Lands Trust Ordinance.” See Hailey, W. (1979). Native 
Administration in the British African Territories. London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, pp.106-107; Anderson, J. (2008). 
Islamic Law in Africa, op. cit. pp.90-91; Syagga, P. (2010). Public Land, Historical Land Injustices and the New Constitution. 
Society for International Development (S.I.D), Nairobi: Constitution Working Paper Series no. 9, 6. Retrieved from 
www.sidint.net/docs/WP9.pdf. (Accessed April, 2016). 
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effect of these Ordinances was to abrogate locals’ ownership of some of their customary lands 
and reduce them to squatters, majority of who were incidentally Muslims, thereby interfering 
with their socio-economic welfare.  
 
By virtue of such Ordinances, the British colonial government also appropriated lands endowed 
as waqfs some of which were not compensated as required by law. A case in point was a 
cemetery land that was acquired for the construction of a railway line at Changamwe, Mombasa 
(Carmichael, 1997). According to the Shari
c
a, waqfs acquired through compulsory acquisition by 
the state are to be paid for so that replacements could be established in line with the initial 
consecrations. The lack of compensation upon acquisition of waqf lands by the British colonial 
authorities meant that no substitute waqfs were established to carry on the aims of the previous 
ones as required by the Shari
c
a. Undoubtedly, this had a ripple effect on the socio-economic and 
cultural wellbeing of the chain of beneficiaries of those waqfs. 
 
This is not, nevertheless, to deny several other waqfs acquired by the colonial government under 
similar circumstances, but compensated during the period 1950 to 1960. They include the waqf 
land of shaykh Mbaruk bin Rashid bin Salim el-Kehlany in Mombasa in 1954 that was meant for 
the benefit of his two masjids in Mombasa and Gazi. Understandably, the WCK had bargained 
for a replacement land of equal value, but the colonial government paid in cash in compensation 
for the waqf land after allegedly failing to acquire “suitable land at the coast which could be the 
subject of an exchange.”26 Other waqfs acquired by the state include those whose usufructs were 
meant for masjid Mandhry and masjid Mwana Iki bint Suleiman in Mombasa. In both instances, 
the government also paid in cash.  
 
While the WCK records indicate that compensation for the waqf of bint Suleiman was divided 
between the two holy masjids – Mecca and Medina as well as masjid Kikeshi as designated by 
the endower, that of masjid Mandhry was claimed to have been “added to other amounts from 
similar waqfs for the purchase of other properties.”27 However, by the period of study, no 
                                                          
26 It would have been quiet contrary to British colonial principles of capitalist economy to replace the land waqf with yet another 
piece of land. Here, the government paid seventy two thousand eight hundred and thirty three Kenya shillings. See letter of 
response by the Government Collector to WCK, April, 1955; Government award notice of compensation, March, 1955; WCK’s 
letter of response to notice of acquisition, December, 1954, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
27 The colonial government paid nine thousand six hundred and sixty Kenya shillings for the waqf of Mandhry and seven hundred 
and seventy three Kenya shillings for the waqf of Mwanaiki. Interview with Muhammad Shalli, Mombasa, December, 2014. See 
also minute 2068 of April, 1957, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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replacement waqfs had been established in place of the land waqfs of shaykh Mbaruk. It was also 
not possible to ascertain whether the compensation funds remained in the WCK accounts and if 
indeed were immune to fluctuation since 1950s. Paradoxically, the WCK Act did not 
contemplate for compulsory acquisition of waqfs by the government. The Act, therefore, does 
not provide for the same. 
 
Moreover, no land transaction could be legally binding without first being confirmed as 
rightfully owned and sanctioned by the government as provided in Section 19 of the Ordinance: 
No rights or title to the possession of land within […] the dominion of the Sultan 
of Zanzibar, claimed under and in accordance with Muhammadan law, shall be 
recognized as against the Crown or Government, unless the person claiming such 
right or title shall not only establish in himself such right or title but prove […] 
that he or some predecessor in title was in possession […] prior to 14th December, 
1895 (as quoted in Anderson, 2008:91).  
  
Such Ordinances particularly dealt a blow to claims of ownership by the locals in the 
Protectorate on the basis of lack of titles that were to present to the Land Registration Court to 
prove their ownership (Berg-Schlosser, 1984; Syagga, 2010). In other instances, mutawallis 
could also not develop some waqfs for lack of titles of ownership as demanded by the Crown 
Lands Ordinance. This is true of some waqf lands and wells in Malindi region where the WCK 
failed to develop them due to lack of title deeds from 1911 to 1912 (Carmichael, 1997). This 
clearly illustrates that, the shift in the perception of land ownership did not only impact on the 
already established waqfs from being developed but also hindered the establishment of land-
based waqfs due to lack of ‘legal ownership’.28 
 
While the statute did not contemplate for compulsory acquisition, it however, empowered 
Commissioners to dispose of waqfs in selected instances. Sections 16 (2) and 17 provides: 
If it appears to the Waqf Commissioners that in respect of any waqf the intensions 
of the maker cannot reasonably be carried into effect and that it is accordingly 
expedient that the property the subject of the waqf or any part thereof should be 
sold, the Waqf Commissioners may cause that property or part thereof to be sold, 
and shall apply the proceeds […] in such manner as the Waqf Commissioners 
think fit for the benefit of the beneficiaries of the waqf. 
 
                                                          
28 At one instance around 2005-2006 before I embarked on the current project, I was involved in plans to establish a community 
integrated school at Marigiza village, Msambweni county, Kenya. Mzee Ali Athuman Mwachausa had offered a piece of land as 
waqf but due to lack of title of ownership, the project could not be registered with the local Education and Social and Cultural 
offices. This led to the abandonment of the project. 
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Apart from Commissioners having the liberty to decide what is most suitable to the beneficiaries, 
albeit without necessarily consulting them, the Act does not place time span within which such 
use should be made with a view to maintaining utility of the sale proceeds. This could partly 
explain the delay by the Commission to acquire replacement waqfs in place of those 
dismembered through compulsory acquisition as it is not compelled by law to take fluctuation in 
to consideration.  
 
Further, some regulations on immovable properties impeded the development of waqfs by 
logically prohibiting their being endowed as such during the colonial era. This could be 
discerned from the African Property Preservation Ordinance (1916) that established: 
No building, standing coconut palm, standing fruit tree, or other standing tree 
situated in an area to which this Ordinance has been applied shall be sold, leased, 
hypothecated, mortgaged or pledged by any means whatsoever to any person who 
is not a member of an African tribe inhabiting such area and residing therein (as 
quoted in Anderson, 2008:91). 
 
By prohibiting any form of pledge – including waqfs, this piece of legislation undoubtedly 
impeded the establishment of new waqfs after its enactment. This is because it does not take 
cognizance of the fact that Islamic charity and qurba on which waqf is founded is not limited by 
race, ethnicity, or even locality.  
 
There are several waqfs that were consecrated by non-African Muslims, particularly Asian 
immigrants, who also maintained social and spiritual attachments with their ancestral homes as 
expressed in their waqf deeds. These include the waqf dhurri of Gulamhussein Adamji whose, 
though primary beneficiaries are the endower’s descendants in Mombasa, residual beneficiaries 
are the pilgrims of Karbala in Iraq;
29
 the waqf dhurri of Haji Ismael Haji Adam whose primary 
beneficiaries are Muslims of Asian descent of the Memon ethnic community while residual 
beneficiaries are poor and beggars at the two holy masjids in Mecca and Medina as well as 
Baghdad;
30
 and several other waqfs whose primary and residual beneficiaries are non-Africans.
31
 
Indeed, within the context of the WCK Act, not all Asians were recognized as Muslims and 
                                                          
29
 The waqf of Gulamhussein Adamji consisted of several parcels of land (shambas) and houses in Tudor, Mombasa. See waqf 
deeds of Gulamhussein Adamji, fols. 38/9, plots no. 3806/1 & 2519, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
30 See waqf deeds of Hajji Ismael Hajji Adam, fols. 51- 52; on plot no. 5158; Hajji Ebrahim Adam, on plot no. 8173/5, fol. 67, 
WCK archive, Mombasa. 
31 See waqf deeds of Moosaji Issaji, fol. 120; Hajji Ismael Hajji Adam (above) for waqf al- Haramayn (Mecca and Medina); 
Minute 2039 of 17/2/1956 on the compulsory acquisition of waqf of Mwanaiki bint Suleiman whose compensation was 
distributed between the masjids of Mecca, Medina, and Kikeshi, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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could not, therefore, consecrate legal waqfs.
32
 As such, the African Property Preservation 
Ordinance further inhibited them from establishing new waqfs considering the limitations on the 
choice of beneficiaries on their part. It is no wonder that there are very few waqfs by non-African 
Muslims in the WCK registry despite Asian Muslims forming a sizeable group in the 
community. It is possible to argue that they either did not register their waqfs as required or 
resorted to other charitable institutions besides waqfs, both of which remain possible as discussed 
in chapter five. 
 
What is evident in the above cases, therefore, is the appropriation of legislative instruments as 
political power and symbolic violence by the colonial government to control and negotiate the 
cultural and economic fields of the Protectorate even where it disregarded religious feelings of 
the community. As witnessed in some instances, either the government took away waqfs without 
compensation or used its powers within the WCK to see that the compensation did not realize its 
utility in acquiring substitute properties. Accordingly, colonial policies were not only a blow to 
practices of waqf in the region, but also set in motion the economic, social, and cultural 
subordination of the Muslim community.  
 
3.3 Contradicting Legislations and Civil Judgments against the Shari
c
a on Waqf 
Petitions in Colonial Kenya 
As argued in the previous section, control of the judiciary and legislative fields by the British 
colonial state also influenced the judicial processes in the Protectorate as judgments were 
delivered in accordance with the British understanding of the Shari
c
a, i.e. ‘Anglo-Mohammedan 
jurisprudence’. Among such decisions concerned waqfs and had serious ramifications on the 
future of the institution in the community. A case in point involves a High Court ruling in 1952 
on the validity of waqf dhurri where Fatuma binti Mohamed bin Salim had designated her 
progeny and upon their extinction, the agnates. Three other masjids were also designated as 
residual beneficiaries of the waqf.  
 
                                                          
32
 Section 2 of the WCK Act (1900) defines a Muslim as “[…] an Arab, a member of the Twelve tribes [Thenashara Taifa, i.e. 
Swahili Muslims confederation], a Baluchi, a Somali, a Comoro Islander, a Malagasy or a native of Africa of the Muslim faith.” 
See Government of Kenya, Waqf Commissioners Act, Cap 109. 
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The High Court invalidated the waqf based on the principle of precedence in Common law. Two 
legal precedents specifically influenced the decision of the High Court in this suit: that of a Privy 
Council judgment on Abul Fata v. Russomoy (1894); and the decision by the East African Court 
of Appeal on Said bin Muhammad bin Kassim, etc. vs. the Waqf Commissioners, Zanzibar 
(1946). Both judgments were allegedly informed by the Hanafi law that requires the inclusion of 
a charitable cause as ultimate beneficiary for the validity of a waqf. Accordingly, the waqfs were 
invalidated because of long chains of beneficiaries that made the perceived charitable causes so 
remote and almost non-existent (Anderson, 2008:96-97; Schacht, 1982; Qureishi, 1990; Banday, 
2013).  
 
The invalidation of the waqf dhurri of Fatuma binti Mohamed bin Salim in 1952 was, 
nonetheless, against both the preponderant view about Shari
c
a (see chapter two) and the WCK 
Act of 1951 on the validity of waqfs. Sections 4 (1b, i and ii) of the Act provides: 
Every waqf heretofore or hereafter made by any Muslim which is made, either 
wholly or partly, for any of the following purposes […] the maker of the waqf is 
an Ibadhi or Hanifa Mohammedan, for his own behalf during his lifetime, is 
declared to be a valid waqf if – (i) it is in every other respect made in accordance 
with Muslim law, and (ii) the ultimate benefit in the property the subject of the 
waqf is expressly, or, in any case in which the personal law of the person making 
the waqf so permits, impliedly, reserved for the poor or for any purpose 
recognized by Muslim law as a religious, pious or charitable purpose of a 
permanent character.  
 
Like the Act as indicated above, the majority opinion in Sunni Islam would have, nonetheless, 
validated the contested waqf on the mere dedication of the same being charity on its own merit 
(Kozlowski, 1998). All other Sunni madhhabs do not peg the validity of waqfs on the number of 
beneficiaries or residual charitable causes. Therefore, the court decisions that established the 
legal precedents were a clear case of misinterpretation of the jurisprudential positions in the 
Shari
c
a. 
 
As a matter of fact, the Privy Council decision is also claimed to have been reversed in India by 
the Mussalman Waqf Validating Act of 1913 (Schacht, 1982; Kozlowski, 1998; Anderson, 
2008). Further evidence was also adduced to prove the contradictions of the court decision in 
Zanzibar over the Shari
c
a as well as the Zanzibar Waqf Validating Decree of 1946. Clearly, these 
legal arguments rendered the basis of the High Court ruling on the case of Fatuma binti 
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Mohamed bin Salim as untenable (Anderson, 2008, 1951; Schacht, 1982). By relying on the 
doctrine of precedence applied in English Common law which does not exist in Shari
c
a 
(Anderson, 2008), the judgment established grounds for the contestation and invalidation of 
similar waqfs in the postcolonial era (see chapter four). This emphasizes that miscarriage of 
justice was not only to the economic and socio-cultural detriment of beneficiaries, but also with a 
view to putting into disrepute the institution of waqf altogether on the basis of non-Islamic 
jurisprudential practices. 
 
In another incident, the Supreme Court declared null and void some sections of the charitable 
waqf of Mohammed bin Rashid bin Badai in 1942. The corpus of the waqf consisted of two 
farms at Kisauni and Miritini and a residential plot in Mombasa Island for the benefit of his soul; 
those of his deceased parents and siblings; Ghazali madrasa; da
c
wa (propagation); and other 
charitable activities as deemed fit by the WCK as designated mutawallis.
33
 The court upheld the 
validity of the section of the waqf on the residential plot but nullified the other section on 
agricultural lands. This was paradoxical in the sense that there are no two ways in waqf 
according to the majority opinion in Sunni Islam. A waqf is either valid or not at all but cannot 
be split with some sections held as valid and others as invalid. Again, in 1949 the same court 
nullified the waqf of Mohammed bin Soud consisting of a piece of farm at Kisauni, Mombasa. 
Consequently, four heirs of the endower – Ahmad, Soud, Khadija and Salima – divided the 
properties in accordance with the law of mirath.
34
  
 
A landmark judgment involving another land waqf also delivered in a Mombasa court in 1949 
would suffice to explain the reasons for the invalidation of the previous two waqfs. In Said bin 
Abdalla and Sabahu binti Ali vs. the Waqf Commissioners and the Registrar of Titles, the court 
held that the creation of a land-based waqf was either a ‘transfer of land’ or ‘dealing in land’ 
under the terms and regulations of the Registration of Titles Ordinance (1901).
35
 In this context, 
the waqf was nullified for contravening the regulations regarding transfer of land (Anderson, 
2008:98). This is because the Registration of Titles Ordinance barred the Registrar of Lands not 
to recognize any dealings that contradicted the provisions: 
                                                          
33
 See testamentary waqf of Mohammed bin Rashid Badai dated September 12th1935 (English translation), the WCK, Mombasa. 
34 WCK archive, Mombasa. 
35
 Civil Case no. 40 of 1949, High Court of Kenya, Mombasa, WCK archive, Mombasa. See also Anderson, J. (2008). Islamic 
Law in Africa, op. cit. p.98. 
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A registrar must not register any instrument purporting to transfer or otherwise 
deal with […] land  […] except in the manner herein provided nor unless such 
instrument be in accordance with the provisions hereof, but any instrument in 
substance in conformity with the forms annexed hereto shall be sufficient (as 
quoted in Anderson, 2008:98).
36
 
 
Precisely, waqfs were considered real estate properties whose contracts were guided by English 
Common law and procedures. Accordingly, the Registration of Titles Ordinance did not 
recognize waqf deeds as valid documents in the establishment and transfer of waqf lands because 
the charters do not identify legal persons to whom the properties are transferred. Transfer of 
ownership of real estate, in view of the Ordinance, required that waqf lands be transferred to 
mutawallis or institutions as legal beneficiaries, but not to indeterminate entities like the poor 
and needy. Clearly, by not recognizing waqf deeds as binding documents in the transfer of waqf 
lands to mutawallis and beneficiaries, the statute technically invalidated land waqfs. Above all, 
since the Shari
c
a places ownership of waqfs to God, who is in this case not a legal entity, the 
requirement by the Registration of Titles Ordinance was a case of a misapplied piece of 
legislation.  
 
There is no doubt that the British experience regarding waqf lands in Zanzibar influenced the 
dynamics of the legislations and court decisions regarding land in the Protectorate. It has been 
argued before in the study that though land formed a significant factor of production, it was 
perceived differently by the Muslim community and the British colonial government. The British 
viewed land in terms of capitalist economy that should be put into ‘productive use’ but not to be 
pawned or inhabited by a chain of dependants as largesse (Fair, 2001). It would be recalled that 
during the 1900s in Zanzibar, mutawallis of huge tracks of waqf lands were forced to charge 
monthly rents to the occupants in a view to instilling capitalist economic ideals. The British 
colonial government, nonetheless, faced insurmountable challenges in convincing mutawallis to 
change their perceptions on waqf lands and occupants from mere acts of generosity to income 
generating ventures through house rents and land taxes (Fair, 2001:200-210; Oberauer, 2008).  
 
Unlike in Zanzibar, however, where some beneficiaries were manumitted slaves who looked up 
to their former masters for dependence, majority of beneficiaries of land waqfs in the 
                                                          
36
 A similar legislation – the Land Transfer Ordinance of 1920 - existed in Jerusalem during the British mandate where it became 
impossible to register waqfs in the kadhi’s court without the consent of the land registry department. See Reiter, Y. (1996). 
Islamic Endowments in Jerusalem under British Mandate. London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., pp.37-38.   
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Protectorate were either descendants of the endowers or public causes. Therefore, nullification of 
land waqfs in Kenya could be interpreted as attempts by the British colonial government to stem 
a repeat of the Zanzibar crisis where mutawallis resisted embracing capitalist ideals advocated by 
the colonial government. Revocation of the waqfs, in essence, put the farms in the direct 
ownership of individual heirs who could then be swayed to adopt capitalism rather than allowing 
their shares to be used as charities by the community. This helped the British colonial 
government to achieve its “self imposed mission of civilization, progress, equity, and good 
government” at the expense of a religious tradition of charity and qurba in form of waqfs 
(Hashim, 2010:223). 
  
In summary, the various secular policies and civil institutions instituted by the colonial 
government to control resources also influenced the institution of waqf. As discussed, the 
colonial government controlled the juridical and legislative processes from where authorities 
could invoke contradictory legislations and judgments against the Shari
c
a demonstrating the 
application of ‘Anglo-Mohammedan jurisprudence’ in the region. On the other hand, the 
selective appointment of waqf Commissioners who worked under strict guidelines and 
supervision ensured that the state would have a leeway in implementing its policies in the 
Protectorate. Clearly, this was a case of appropriation of political power and symbolic violence 
for the control of resources in a colonized territory.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has documented the contours in the conflicts, negotiations, and control of economic, 
political, and social resources among different actors and fields in the British East Africa 
Protectorate. Starting with the negotiation for political and economic power from the Bu Sa
c
idi 
sultanate upon the coming of the British, we have established that subsequent control of the 
political field by the later accorded it the legitimacy to influence the juridical and legislative 
spheres. This enabled the British colonial government to establish laws and civil institutions that 
restructured and limited the jurisdiction of the kadhi’s courts as well as influencing the civil 
judgments emanating there from. From the inclusive understanding of Muslim personal status 
law, the colonial authorities also re-defined it to the exclusion of waqfs. Ultimately, this placed 
control of the economic mainstay of the interlocutors of Islamic knowledge and authority - the 
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kadhis and 
c
ulama – as well as the mutawallis and diverse groups of beneficiaries in the hands of 
the colonial government.   
To strengthen economic and political hegemony, the colonial government only conscripted 
Muslims perceived as ‘sympathetic’ with the ability to propagate state policies and according 
them religious legitimacy. This partly explains the formulation of the Waqf Commissioners 
Ordinance 1900 (later Act of 1951) to accord the state an upper hand in the appointment of 
Commissioners who worked under British colonial officers seconded to the state agency. 
Moreover, the colonial authorities exploited existing ethnic rivalry between Muslims as evident 
in the appointment of Commissioners to represent competing and conflicting Muslim groups in 
the region (see Appendix 3). Ultimately, the general policies in managing waqfs as established 
by the colonial government provided fertile grounds for the negotiations for control of socio-
cultural and political spheres in the Muslim community along ethnic and regional boundaries 
expounded in chapters four and six as internal umiji-wamiji (locale identity and belonging) 
dynamics.  
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Chapter Four  
Managing Waqfs in Postcolonial Kenya: Perpetuating State Control  
4.0 Introduction 
… I find the excuse that Malindi had no representation in the Commission rather 
wanting. How many other districts are not represented? Why do we want the 
Waqf Commission to look like a coastal affair that does not concern other 
Muslims in the country? (Shaykh Ibrahim Lithome, April, 2010). 
Such are the sentiments that the position of a Waqf Commissioner arose during the postcolonial 
period as the WCK Act remains unchanged. With the active involvement of secular state in the 
control of waqfs, what informed the appointment of a Commissioner as a state mutawalli during 
the postcolonial period? Of what influence were secular policies on the development of waqfs in 
the postcolonial times? And how did Muslims negotiate the secular milieu in the practices of 
waqfs during the postcolonial era? The answers to these questions and the internal dynamics that 
inform the affairs of the state agency are the main focus of this section of the study, hence 
development of the chapter around the Waqf Commissioners of Kenya Act (1951) that 
established the state agency and the secular policies instituted since the colonial times. From the 
appointment of Waqf Commissioners to imposed compulsory registration; nullification of waqfs, 
allegedly, inconsistent both with the Shari
c
a and the Common law; dismemberment of waqfs 
through executive decrees and adverse possession to the takeover of waqf administration by the 
state agency for lack of established mutawallis, the discussion unravels the influence of secular 
state policies and Common law judgments on the institution and how Muslims negotiated these 
developments during the postcolonial period.  
 
4.1 Appointment of Waqf Commissioners: Ethnic Affiliations and Loyalty to State 
Policies 
 
The normative precept that the position of a mutawalli is honorary with no fixed remuneration 
(Sahih al-Bukhari, 3:507, 895) changed with the establishment of the WCK as a supervisory 
body. Since then, waqf Commissioners were appointed and remunerated by the state 
compounding the dynamics in the position, particularly during the postcolonial period, when 
filling it demanded varied and salient albeit unwritten considerations. In constituting the WCK as 
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state mutawallis, Section 6 (1) of the WCK Act provides that the agency shall be made of eight 
persons of whom: 
(a)One shall be the Provincial Commissioner of the Coast province, who shall be 
ex officio a member; (b) one shall be the Chief Kadhi, who shall be ex officio a 
member; (c) one shall be a Muslim appointed by the Minister on the 
recommendation of the Provincial Commissioner of the Coast province; and (d) 
five shall be Muslims appointed by the Minister from a panel of names submitted 
by the Provincial Commissioner of the Coast province after taking into 
consideration Muslim opinion in relation thereto. 
 
As provided, the Act does not specify the qualifications for appointment of Commissioners. 
Considering that the statute significantly remains unchanged, the colonial precedent for 
appointing Commissioners - socio-ethnic affiliations and perceived loyalty to state policies 
could, therefore, be assumed to be effective in the postcolonial period. State officers – the PC 
and the Chief Kadhi – are also incorporated as ex-officio members.1 Within this context, 
appointments to the state agency during the postcolonial period were laden with socio-political 
and symbolic undertones that turned them to raw contests between the state and Muslims on one 
hand, and amongst socio-ethnic and political Muslim groups on the other.  
 
During field work, I was particularly intrigued by the stipulation that five members of the state 
agency were appointed from a panel of names that took ‘Muslim opinion’ into consideration. 
Despite being a Muslim and brought up in the coast region, I have not heard of Muslims’ opinion 
being solicited in appointing Waqf Commissioners. Neither is there a democratically elected 
Muslim body that could claim to speak for the majority of the Muslims in the country, let alone 
the coast province from whose position the nomination of Commissioners could be paramount 
owing to the legal limitation of the Act.
2
 So, how was Muslims’ opinion with regard to 
                                                          
1
 According to the history of Provincial administration, there have been about two Muslim PCs in the coast province in 
independent Kenya – Ismael Chelang’a and Yussuf Hajj. Except for special cases when the Commission meetings were held in 
their offices, non-Muslim PCs sent Muslim representatives to the WCK meetings. Interviews with Mohammed Shalli, Mombasa, 
November, 2014; Zubeir Hussein Noor, Mombasa, November, 2014.  
2 Section 1 of the WCK Act (1900) read in conjunction with legal notice no. 604 of 1963 restricts the legal jurisdiction of the Act 
to coast province. According to Hassan Ndzovu, establishment of the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) in 1973 
was meant to attain social control of the Muslim community by the state at the expense of political, economic, and theological 
development. This suggests that the board did not entirely represent Muslims’ interests. Therefore, several organizations were 
formed to offer alternative voices including the Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK); the National Muslim Leaders 
Forum (NAMLEF); National Union of Kenya Muslims (NUKEM); and Jam’at Ta’lam al-Quran (community for the Teachings 
of the Quran, JTQ) among others. However, none of these bodies could claim the legitimacy of being Muslims’ mouth piece. See 
Ndzovu, H. (2014b). Muslims in Kenyan Politics, Political Involvement, Marginalization, and Minority Status. Evanston: North 
Western University Press, pp. 79-105. 
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appointment of the Commissioners sought? Or what actually constituted Muslims’ opinion in as 
far as appointing the state mutawallis was concerned?  
 
Suffice to say that the positions and responsibilities of some state officers in the statute including 
the Governor, Civil Secretary, and the liwali acquired new names as Minister for legal and 
constitutional affairs or the Attorney General (AG); the Chief Kadhi; and the PC respectively 
during the postcolonial period.
3
 Even with these amendments, nonetheless, the government 
retained the power to appoint Commissioners. In this regard, as confided by some informants, 
Muslims’ opinion in the spirit of the amendments entailed the Chief Kadhi as the legal state 
advisor on Islamic issues. From logical deduction, it implies that the Chief Kadhi sanctioned 
recommendations made by the PC or he submitted the five names to the PC for approval by the 
AG.
4
 In simple terms, the state consults within its institutions and decides who to appoint as 
Commissioner on the basis of socio-ethnic affiliations and perceived loyalty to its policies. And 
how does the government identify from the diverse ethnic groups Muslims perceived as 
sympathetic to state policies in the postcolonial era? The answer to this question echoes the 
concepts of social and cultural capital as advanced by Pierre Bourdieu. 
  
Bourdieu (1986:248-249) conceives of social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential 
resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized 
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition or in other words, to membership in a 
group.” Summarized differently, social capital is all about lasting social relationships, 
connections, and networks of family, friends, workplace, and neighbors based on trust and 
corporation to ensure common norms, social control, and most times, mutual benefits. These 
social networks are meant to provide a chance to the members within the group to “enjoy certain 
privileges they have not necessarily earned” (Svendsen and Svendsen, 2003:623; Bourdieu, 
1986; Rey 2007). According to Bourdieu (1986:249), the relationships and networks are socially 
instituted to imply obligations and could be manifested “by the application of a common name, 
(the name of a family, a class, or a tribe or of a school, a party, etc.) and a whole set of 
constituting acts designed simultaneously to form and inform those who undergo them [thus] 
enacted and so maintained and reinforced.”  
                                                          
3 Legal Notice 604 of 1963 on sections 1, 6, 24 and 26 of the WCK Act. 
4 Interviews with Muhammad Shalli, Mombasa, November, 2014; Zubeir Hussein Noor, Mombasa, November, 2014. 
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On the other hand, Bourdieu (1986:243-248) espouses cultural capital in the form of long-lasting 
dispositions of the mind and body (embodied state, i.e. culture and cultural competence, 
cultivation, incorporation, socialization, and assimilation); in the form of cultural goods 
(objectified state, i.e. material objects and media including but not limited to writings, paintings, 
and instruments); and in the form of objectification (institutionalized state, i.e. academic 
qualifications and or certificates of cultural competence acquired through training in a socially 
recognizable institution) (emphasis in original; see also Svendsen and Svendsen, 2003). In this 
sense cultural capital “denotes knowledge of or competence with aesthetic culture or specific 
distinctive cultural traits, tastes, and styles of individuals who share a common sense of honor 
based upon and reinforced by shared conventions” (Di Maggio, 1982, as quoted in Lareau and 
Weininger, 2003:574). In the wider context, cultural capital could be perceived in terms of 
instruments, both technical and social, for the appropriation of symbolic wealth (i.e. cultural 
heritage of the society) worthy of being sought and possessed (Di Maggio, 1982, cited in Lareau 
and Weininger, 2003).  
Based on the foregoing, appointment of Waqf Commissioners in the postcolonial era could be 
summarized by four important considerations: social capital, symbolic capital, cultural capital, 
and more importantly, regional (read the former Protectorate) balancing. The Chief Kadhi 
recommends five people within his social network who possess the requisite cultural competence 
that in the opinion of the PC, also based on his National Security Intelligence Services (NSIS) 
reports are ‘loyal to state policies’. It goes without saying that this arrangement gives the Chief 
Kadhi the audacity to recommend, hence, literally appoint his allies and avoid his distracters with 
ease.
5
 A critical look at the appointed Commissioners over time confirms this view. The list 
includes renowned politicians and business men as opinion makers and symbolic figureheads 
from respective socio-ethnic groups being reappointed several times on recommendation of the 
Chief Kadhi (see appendix 3).
6
 This practice maintained the status quo not only in waqf 
                                                          
5
 This also opened the door for potential candidates or socio-ethnic and political groups to lobby with the Chief Kadhi or the PC 
for appointment as Waqf Commissioners. See correspondence between Coast Peoples’ Party (CPP) and the WCK, March, 1961; 
correspondence between O.K.T. Kashero of Harambee masjid and the WCK, July, 1970; correspondence between Malik Said 
Basheik and the PC, February, 1975, WCK archive, Mombasa. Interview with Zubeir Hussein Noor, Mombasa, November, 2014. 
6 Correspondence between Chief Kadhi and the PC on the re-appointment of Waqf Commissioners, Ref 3/4/86; 16/9/81; 3/5/82; 
11/6/86; January, 1962; March, 1986; Gazette Notices no. 1943, July, 1982; 2050, May, 1986. It was also customary for the 
WCK to request serving commissioners to be re-appointed or their potential replacements debated and agreed upon in 
Commission sittings. See correspondence between the WCK and Commissioners, January, 1962; minute 2176 of January, 1961; 
letter to Hon. Abdallah Ndovu Mwidau, February, 1962; the WCK’s letter to PC seconding the appointment of shaykh Said 
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administration but also in the internal socio-ethnic equilibrium of Muslim groups, particularly, in 
the former Protectorate. Borrowing from Mwakimako’s (2010) terminologies, this brings us to 
the notion of umiji (locale) and wamiji (townspeople) in the institution of waqf.  
 
4.2 Competing for Supremacy: Muslims’ Internal Rivalry and Ethnic Dynamics in 
Constituting the Waqf State Agency 
There existed a number of autonomous but symbiotic cosmopolitan city-states along the Eastern 
coast of Africa including Mombasa, Gedi, Pate, Lamu, Malindi, Zanzibar, and Kilwa from as 
early as the eighth century attracting visitors from across the globe.
7
 The Mazrui became liwalis 
and representatives of the Ya
c
rubi dynasty in many of these city-states after overthrow of the 
Portuguese in 1698 (Said-Ruete, 1929; Berg, 1973; Al-Mazru’i 1995).8 When the Bu Sacidi 
replaced the Ya
c
rubi dynasty in 1749 A.D., the Mazrui shifted their allegiance to the former. 
However, protracted succession disputes that pre-occupied the Bu Sa
c
idi in Oman enabled many 
of the governorates under Mazrui liwalis to exist as autonomous and rival city-states for over a 
century until 1837 (Spear, 1988; Freeman-Grenville, 1988; McIntosh, 2009).  
Over time, the city-states grew into important towns distinguishing themselves in a binary 
contrast – with Malindi and Mombasa as political nerves of the region while Lamu and 
Takaungu (Kilifi) developed into legendary centers of Islamic knowledge and authority.
9
 This 
suggests that old aged negotiations and conflict for supremacy in the economic, political, social, 
and cultural fields as witnessed in the close to two centuries’ autonomous life of the centers only 
mutated but did not end at least from the viewpoint of waqfs. This is true considering the fact 
that the British colonial authorities, through in-direct rule policy, upheld the socio-ethnic 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Mohammed Mandhry, August, 1965; the WCK’s letters to Hon. Mohammed Jahazi and Ahmed Ali Omar, June, 1968, WCK 
archive, Mombasa.  
7
 Fair, L. (2001). Pastimes and Politics: Culture, Community, and Identity in Post-Abolition Urban Zanzibar, 1890-1945, 
Oxford: Ohio University Press, pp.10-12; East African City-States. Retrieved from: http://www.blackpast.org/gah/east-african-
city-states. (Accessed April, 2016); East Africa’s Swahili Coast. Retrieved from 
http://www.africanworldheritagesites.org/cultural-places/swahili-coast.html. (Accessed April, 2016); Kilwa and the Swahili 
Coastal Trading States. Retrieved from: http://www.vhinkle.com/africa/kilwa.html. (Accessed April, 2016).  
8On the emigration of the Mazrui to the East African coast see Al-Mazrui, A. (1995). The History of the Mazru’i Dynasty of 
Mombasa. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.21-22; Fair, L. (2001). Pastimes and Politics, op.cit; Nicolini, B. (2014). Notes 
on Asian Presence along the Swahili Coast during the Nineteenth Century. Quaderni Asiatici 107, (September), 61-86. 
9 See Sperling, D. (1988). The Growth of Islam among the Mijikenda of the Kenya Coast, 1826-1933 London: University of 
London, School of African and Oriental Studies; Seesemann, R. (2006). African Islam or Islam in Africa? Evidence from Kenya. 
In R. Loimeier and R. Seesemann (Eds.), The Global worlds of the Swahili: Interfaces of Islam, Identity and Space in 19th and 
20th Century (pp. 229-250). Berlin: Lit. 
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hierarchy according Arab Muslims preferential treatment over African Muslims and recognized 
the former as legitimate leaders of the coastal communities (Ndzovu, 2014b). With the waqf Act 
un-changed, post-British regimes continued to ape this hierarchy as evident in the appointment of 
the Chief Kadhi (Mwakimako, 2010), and the waqf Commissioners.  
Postcolonial state policies, therefore, aped the colonial ones giving impetus to Muslims’ socio-
ethnic negotiations in the society. This could be explained better in Mombasa as a microcosm. 
According to Mwakimako, Mombasa’s socio-political sphere has been traditionally decorated by 
tribal alliances and rivalry pitting the Mazrui on the one side and the Tisa Taifa and Thelatha 
Taifa (i.e. Thenashara Taifa, twelve ethnicities) Swahili Muslim groups on the other.
10
 The 
relations between the two Swahili Muslims’ federation and the Mazrui were determined by 
changing needs and circumstances for the mutual benefits of either side. For instance, despite 
their antipathy, issues of shared concern, like the appointment of the Chief Kadhi, could easily 
unite the Thelatha Taifa and Tisa Taifa against the Mazrui. This is due to the fact that “Muslims 
recognized the authority of 
c
ulama on the basis of their influence within the boundaries of miji 
(sing. mji, locales), racial, and ethnic groups” (2010:110). Therefore, appointment of the Chief 
Kadhi who also influences the nomination of Commissioners and the affairs of the waqf state 
agency has ever been a socio-ethnic and regional contest between the Swahili Muslims’ 
confederation and Mazrui in Mombasa on one hand, and Mombasa vis-à-vis her neighboring 
former city-states, especially Lamu, on the other since the position was established.
11
  
Etymologically, the term umuji (pl. umiji) is derived from a Swahili noun mji (pl. miji) meaning 
town. The verb umuji (i.e. of belonging to a town) and the compound noun wamiji (towns’ 
people) were primarily used as socio-ethnic tags in relation to the ambiguous spatial boundaries 
between the two groups in the Mombasa milieu. The Mazrui family inhabited the present Old 
                                                          
10
 The Thenashara Taifa represents a federation of Swahili Muslim groups consisting of Wakilindini, Tangana and Changamwe, 
(also called Thelatha Taifa) on one hand, and Mvita, Jomvu, Mtwapa, Kilifi, Pate, Faza, Shaka, Gunya and Katwa, (the Tisa 
Taifa) on the other. According to Hassan Ndzovu, the socio-ethnic formations were critical in the negotiations for inclusion and 
exclusion in the British political landscape facilitating the formation of political associations to advocate for ethnic temporal 
interests that could be felt in the present times. See Al-Mazru’i, A. (1995). The History of the Mazru’i Dynasty of Mombasa, 
op.cit; Mwakimako, H. (2010). Conflicts and Tensions in the Appointment of Chief Kadhi in Colonial Kenya 1898-1960s. In S. 
Jeppie, M. Moosa & R. Roberts. (Eds.), Muslim Family Law in Sub-Saharan Africa: Colonial Legacies and Post-Colonial 
Challenges, (pp.109-134). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press; Ndzovu, H. (2014b). Muslims in Kenyan Politics, op. cit. 
11
 There have been ten Chief Kadhis since establishment of the position in Kenya. Mombasa has produced five, four from the 
ethnic Mazrui Arabs while Lamu has produced 4. The only non-Kenyan Chief Kadhi was shaykh Abdallah Salih Farsy (1912-
1982). See Seesemann, R. (2006). African Islam or Islam in Africa? op. cit., pp.229-250; Mwakimako, H. (2010). Conflicts and 
Tensions in the Appointment of Chief Kadhi, op. cit., pp.109-134. 
92 
 
town and areas neighboring Fort Jesus from where they established their political base after the 
expulsion of the Portuguese. In the classical sense, therefore, typical Swahili Muslims would 
refer to the Old town as mjini (town) from where Mombasa city-state was administered in 
contrast to the shamba (farm land) peripheral neighborhoods where the Swahili Muslims were 
associated with.
12
 Thus, appointment of Commissioners to the state waqf agency always sought 
to have representatives (wamiji) from these two locales (i.e. urban and peri-urban) and the 
surrounding former city-states (also miji) to safeguard the intricate socio-ethnic and political 
dynamics of the Mazrui–Swahili Muslims’ confederation divide, and that of Mombasa vis-à-vis 
her rival neighbors.  
Informing this perception was a critical analysis of the list of serving and former Commissioners. 
Mombasa normally got three or more (out of the six ordinary) seats while the rest were shared 
among neighboring towns – Takaungu, Malindi, Lamu, and rarely, Kwale.13 It was on the 
context of these considerations that the appointment of shaykh Ibrahim Lithome in 2009 caused 
uproar from the coastal miji that had been overlooked in the appointment cycle.
14
 Shaykh 
Lithome was a legal advisor to the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) and an 
expert in the Shari
c
a. Based on these attributes, he possessed the requisite cultural, symbolic, and 
even social capital to merit his appointment as Commissioner of the state agency. However, 
despite being an invaluable resource to the Muslim community, his nomination was strongly 
contested by Lamu and Malindi on the claims that he was an ‘outsider’ from the coast region.  
It is a fact that section 1 of the WCK Act read in conjunction with Legal Notice No. 604 of 1963 
restricts the jurisdiction of the state agency to the coast province. However, this does not prohibit 
the appointing of Commissioners from outside the region. Precisely, section 6(1) on the 
                                                          
12
 This view is further emphasized by the location of present administrative offices including the PC’s, High Court, Central Bank, 
Mombasa town hall, and most importantly, the State house and the historical Fort Jesus within the precincts of Old town. The 
socio-ethnic tags could also relate to the fluid ‘uungwana’ (civilized) and ‘ushenzi’ (un-civilized) boundaries of the Arab, 
African, and Swahili Muslims. Interview with Muhammad Shalli, Mombasa, November, 2014. See also Ndzovu, H. (2014b). 
Muslims in Kenyan Politics, op. cit.  
13
 Some informants justified the appointment policy based on the amount of waqfs available in each town with those having no 
waqfs being left out. However, this view is weak considering that there has never been a survey of waqfs to support this position. 
Further, to demonstrate the close relations between the former governorates in the concept of umiji, members of the ‘moon 
sighting committee’ are only drawn from Mombasa, Malindi and Lamu. See Friday Bulletin Reporter. (Friday Bulletin, June 10, 
2016, Issue No. 684). Reconstitute Moon Sighting Committee. Nairobi, pp. 1-2. Retrieved from: www.jamiamasjidkenya.org. 
(Accessed April, 2016). Interviews with Muhammad Shalli, Mombasa, November, 2014; Aboud Hadi, Malindi, October, 2015; 
Shaykh Muhdhari A. S. Hussein, Mombasa, October, 2015. 
14 Letter of complaint by Ahmad Aboud Hadi, Malindi, September, 2009; correspondence between Abdurahman A. Abdurahman, 
Lamu, and the WCK, June, 2009, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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composition of Commissioners is ambiguously silent on the areas of abode of nominees contrary 
to what was erroneously alleged by the complainants (see section 4.1). Consequently, Muslims 
across the country have equal chances and rights of being appointed as Commissioners of the 
WCK. It was further argued by the disgruntled parties that being an ‘outsider’, it would be 
difficult for shaykh Lithome to be available for Commission assignments given the long distance 
to Mombasa, (the headquarters of the WCK), from Nairobi, where he resided.
15
 Clearly, 
Lithome’s cultural, symbolic, as well as social capital was deemed irrelevant in as far as the 
internal socio-ethnic and political dynamics of the wamiji (Mazrui–Swahili Muslims’ 
confederation) and neighboring coastal miji’s Muslim groups were concerned. For this reason, 
his appointment was revoked and was replaced by a Commissioner from Malindi.
16
 Therefore, in 
the context of umiji-wamiji and waqfs in particular, individual identity and ‘Muslimness’ is 
contingent to socio-ethnic affiliation and locale (or regional) belonging with some perceived to 
be more inclined than others. 
In conclusion, though serving the state agency as a Commissioner was a prestige that every 
Muslim wished to attain, it tended to be a preserve of some powerful cartel of Muslim elites from 
the coastal towns. In other words, “waqfu una wenyewe” (i.e. WCK [and waqf] has its owners).17 
The appointment of other Muslims outside the umiji-wamiji continuum, their cultural 
competencies and symbolic resources notwithstanding, is not guaranteed as evident in the case of 
shaykh Lithome. This view was subtly compounded by an incident that occurred around May 
2013 involving two Swahili women as narrated by an informant. The women had visited the 
WCK office to protest rent increment on waqf houses they were occupying. Despite incessantly 
explaining their dissatisfaction, the Commission Secretary remained adamant that the status quo 
would stand in reflection of ijar al-mithal for the interest of the waqfs. The women were 
infuriated by this reply and ranted against the Secretary saying, “hizi [nyumba za] waqfu ni zetu 
sisi. Ziliwekwa na mababu zetu wa Mandhry, siyo zenu nyie Wabajuni” (the waqf houses belong 
to us [while thumping their bosoms]. They were consecrated for us by our Mandhry fore-fathers; 
                                                          
15
 Conservative estimates put the distance between Mombasa and Nairobi at five hundred kilometers, taking about 8 hours to 
cover by bus or 50 minutes by charter plane.  
16
 Gazette Notice no. 1260 of February, 2010 on the revocation of the appointment of shaykh Ibrahim Lithome (Nairobi) and his 
replacement, Prof. Abdallah Nadji Said (Malindi). Lamu has had no commissioner since 2009. This makes the claim that Waqf 
Commissioners were appointed on the basis of amount of waqfs in a town to be superfluous. Group interviews with Mwalimu 
Hussein Said, Hamid Abdurahman and Abdallah Swaleh, Lamu, December, 2015; Muhammad Shalli, Mombasa, November, 
2014. See also minutes 17/2010, WCK archive, Mombasa.  
17 Interview with Rashid Mwandeo, the WCK, Mombasa, October-December, 2014, (translation is mine). 
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they are not for the Bajunis [i.e. ethnic-Muslims from Lamu to which, incidentally, the Secretary 
belongs]).
18
 This incident was twin fold: it illustrated a preponderant perception among the 
wamiji that waqfs are their exclusive right and should be left for them to manage and use as they 
deem appropriate, and the deeply entrenched antipathy among Muslims in the region along 
socio-ethnic and locale affiliations. 
 
4.2.1 Levels and Influence of umiji-wamiji Dynamics in Waqfs   
Departing from the appointment of Commissioners to the state agency, we discern two levels of 
umiji - national and regional - that influenced the institution of waqf in the postcolonial period. 
At the national level, socio-ethnic and political negotiations for control of waqfs between locales 
with considerable Muslim populations was seemingly sanctioned and perpetuated by the WCK 
statute that limits the jurisdiction of the state agency to coast province. In effect, Muslims outside 
the coast region could not establish waqfs in the spirit of the Act, except for non-labeled waqfs 
like private trusts, zakat, and sadaqa as part of Islamic charity. This legal limitation partly 
accounts for the inability by the state agency to administer consecrations beyond the coastal area 
or even resolve reported claims of misappropriation of waqfs in Kisumu (Nyanza region) in the 
1980s and Narumoru (Central province) around 2010.
19
  
On the other hand, although the WCK Act does not bar the appointment of a Muslim outside 
coast province as a Commissioner, the furor that followed the nomination of shaykh Lithome and 
his subsequent nullification suffices to understand the negotiations for the control of waqfs 
between Muslims and the state, and amongst Muslims themselves along umiji-wamiji 
perspective. Among issues that Lithome observed upon nullification of his appointment was the 
tendency to make the WCK, and waqf in general, exclusively a coastal affair.
20
 Lithome’s 
                                                          
18 Interview with Muhammad Shalli, Mombasa, November, 2014, (translation is mine). 
19
 Muslims in Nyanza had raised concerns to the District Officer (DO) over mismanagement of waqfs in Kisumu town. The 
Commissioner of Lands (not the WCK), later appointed the Kisumu Muslim Association (KMA) as trustees of the contested 
waqfs. Similar claims were lodged by Muslims in Narumoru (Central Kenya) who petitioned the Kenya National Commission on 
Human Rights (KNCHR). The KNCHR referred the matter to the WCK who replied of being tied by law to handle the case. See 
correspondence between the KMA, the WCK, kadhi, Nyanza region and the DC Nyanza, August, 1981- January, 1982; 
Narumoru Medina mosque committee, KNCHR, and the WCK, November, 2011- February, 2012, WCK archive, Mombasa.  
20
 In the letter questioning revocation of his appointment, shaykh Ibrahim Lithome wondered; “[…] I find the excuse that Malindi 
had no representation in the Waqf Commission rather wanting. How many other districts are not represented? Why do we want 
the Waqf Commission to look like a coastal affair that does not concern other Muslims in the country?” See correspondence 
between shaykh Lithome and the WCK through the Chief Kadhi, April, 2010, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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appointment was questioned and nullified on the basis of not being a coastal Muslim, the legal 
area to which the WCK Act defines national umiji. In essence, therefore, national umiji 
perpetuates negotiations of disconnect between Muslims and the state, and amongst Muslims 
along geographical boundaries in as far as waqfs are concerned.  
Below national umiji is the regional (town locales) that encompasses only a few coastal miji 
where the WCK Act is actualized. Here, it departs from two levels of struggle for control of 
waqfs as an economic capital for the negotiation of social and political fields – Mombasa as a 
microcosm and the neighboring towns’ locales. Within Mombasa town and its environs as 
explained before, the socio-political negotiations for waqfs were ever a contest pitting two 
sections representing the fluid spatial boundaries between the Swahili Muslim federation and 
their allies on the one side, and the Mazrui and their sympathizers on the other. These were, 
undoubtedly, deep rooted struggles that endowers had imbibed and were constantly aware of 
even as they consecrated waqfs, and largely informed the choice of Commissioners with a view 
to maintaining the internal equilibrium of the Mombasa Muslim protagonists.  
Outside Mombasa, umiji regards the historical relations between the town and her neighbors that 
informed considerations on the appointment of waqf Commissioners. Some respondents argued 
that Commissioners were appointed from among “waqf producing regions only.”21 However, 
since the WCK Act does not provide for survey, it was impossible to ascertain the volume and 
distribution of waqfs to support this assertion. WCK only manages registered waqfs that could 
not be held as representative of the total volume of waqfs in the coast province, let alone the 
entire country. Precisely, the twin incidents of Narumoru and Kisumu confirm the hundreds of 
waqfs dotting the country that because of one reason or the other remained unregistered or are 
registered under various institutions besides the WCK. The probable justification in the criteria 
of appointing Commissioners, therefore, lied in the urge to have people representing and 
safeguarding the socio-ethnic, political, and cultural interests of individual locales and city-states 
that existed in the coast region during the Bu Sa
c
idi sultanate.  
                                                          
21
 Interviews with Mohammed Shalli, Mombasa, November 2014; Ahmed Aboud Hadi, Malindi, October, 2015; Shaykh 
Muhdhar A.S. Hussein, Mombasa, October, 2015. See also correspondence between the WCK and Abad B. Muyongo, August-
September, 2006, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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The conspicuous disregard of areas within the coast province, but outside the former Protectorate 
like Tana River and Taita-Taveta in the waqf negotiations further corroborates the foregoing 
opinion. The Protectorate extended inland only ten nautical miles from the coast line (Hailey, 
1979; Eliot, 1996; Ndzovu, 2014). This makes the two hinterland regions of Taita-Taveta and 
Tana River not being part of the former Protectorate despite being in the coast province and 
commanding considerable population of Muslims, and by extension, waqfs. Consequently, waqfs 
from these areas have been overlooked and no Commissioner has been appointed since the 
establishment of the state agency. Thus, establishment of waqfs within the Protectorate was 
constantly informed by these historical incidents as endowers sought to advance and safeguard 
temporal locales’ interests as evidenced in various waqf deeds (see chapter six).  
As socio-political and ethnic interests of the wamiji and umiji took precedence in appointing 
Commissioners, beneficiaries, waqifs, mutawallis, merit, gender, and other considerations were 
disregarded.
22
 The result was the entrenchment of inefficiency and complacency within the 
WCK causing widespread dissatisfaction and apathy among majority Muslims who felt exploited 
and marginalized in successive appointment cycles and administration of waqfs by the state. 
Disgruntled Muslims also accused the state agency of gross failure and nepotism, particularly, in 
the award of lease and rent contracts of waqfs and how the body generally transacted business. 
This could not have been articulated better than in the lament by the beneficiaries of the waqf of 
Bamkele in Mombasa town.  
The waqf of Bamkele has a vast corpus base composed of a total of forty four parcels of land and 
other properties within and outside Mombasa town. Of these, plot no. 84/XLI was contested 
because it was a prime premises comprising three commercial sites in the heart of the town 
leased to a local entrepreneur for 99 years from 1988 at a salf of sixty thousand Kenya shillings 
with two thousand six hundred shillings as monthly rent.
23
 According to the beneficiaries, the 
lease contract was not in good faith for the economic interest of the waqf but to the benefit of the 
                                                          
22
 By 2010, there was no female Waqf Commissioner in the WCK. The WCK Act does not, however, bar a female Muslim from 
being appointed as a member of the Commission. Their being overlooked from appointment could be attributed to male 
chauvinism prevalent in the local Muslim community who also legitimize the same through religious prohibitions that restrict 
free mixing of the genders. Interviews with Mohammed Shalli, Mombasa, November, 2014; Zubeir Hussein Noor, Mombasa, 
November, 2014. 
23 Letter by Zubeda bint Salim bin Iddi Bamkele to the WCK, July, 1999, cc. the Chief Kadhi, the PC coast Province, and tenants 
of the contested plot along Biashara Street, Mombasa. See also communication to the WCK by the complainant, July, 1988, 
WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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entrepreneur. They argued that apart from the contract being concluded without their 
involvement, the price was below ijar al-mithal. Accordingly, they concluded that economic, 
social, and symbolic capital were the possible considerations in the award of the lease.
24
  
The above incident serves to highlight Muslims’ dissent against the WCK compounded by the 
lack of transparency and representation in the state agency. Unlike in Kenya, the Indian law of 
waqf is particular on the election (not appointment) of members of waqf boards in a system of 
proportional representation that brings together Muslim politicians, mutawallis, Muslim 
organizations, members of various madhhabs, and experts in the Shari
c
a among others.
25
 The 
specificity of the Indian statute also rules out possible scenarios of socio-ethnic and political 
favoritism in the election of Commissioners that bedevils the WCK. As such, it instills 
confidence in the hearts of Muslims in the community as well as efficiency in the board.  
Therefore, the apparent lack of specific qualifications for the appointment of Commissioners in 
the statute was possibly meant to render the appointees easy to manipulate for the economic and 
political conveniences of the British colonial government. However, this was inadvertently 
inherited and perpetuated in the postcolonial Kenya, albeit for similar ends as was consequently 
hijacked by certain individuals and cartels along the umiji-wamiji considerations. However, as 
the state-WCK relationship took an ambivalent turn from the recent past, the void in the specific 
qualifications when appointing Commissioners accorded the historical umiji-wamiji negotiations 
for control of economic and socio-cultural spheres among ethnic-Muslim groups, particularly in 
the former Protectorate, an invaluable platform for its reenactment.  
 
4.3 Compulsory Registration: Challenges and Protests against State Control vis-à-
vis Revival of Waqfs 
Compulsory registration of waqfs remained an important requirement even during the 
postcolonial period. However, the inability to enforce the rule, political interference, and weak 
penalties on non-compliance made state supervision and control of waqfs a challenging task 
during this era. Unlike the British colonial period where the state employed a hands-on approach 
                                                          
24 Group interviews with Ali Salim Bamkele, Abdurahman Bamkele, Ahmed Bahaidar Bamkele and Hamid Salim Bamkele, 
Mombasa, November, 2015. See also internal memo by the Secretary, WCK, to Commissioners, July, 2010, WCK archive, 
Mombasa. 
25  See the Waqf Act of India of 1995, sections (9) and (14); Waqf (Amendment) Act of India of 2013. 
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to ensure control of resources, the 
c
ulama, and various groups of beneficiaries for political 
hegemony, the postcolonial regimes developed an ambivalent attitude towards hands-on control 
of the institution.  
 
As a matter of fact, registration of waqfs declined sharply from the 1940s as shown in Table 1. 
Only 7 (6.7 per cent) waqfs were registered between 1940 and 1960, i.e. two decades before 
independence. The scenario worsened in the postcolonial period as the central registry realized 
13 (12.5 per cent) waqfs from 1970s to 2000s. This scenario begs for answers as to why 
compulsory registration started to decline during the colonial period despite hands-on approach 
by the colonial government. By neither means does this decline suggest that Muslims stopped 
establishing waqfs; nor is it a pointer that waqfs stopped being the economic, social, and 
symbolic means worthy the negotiations witnessed then and for a long period in the postcolonial 
era manifested in protracted court battles involving waqfs and the internal intrigues that 
characterized appointment of Commissioners. Clearly, registration of waqfs declined in 
expression of Muslims’ dissatisfaction with centralized administration and control of the 
institution. 
 
Precisely, state control of waqfs was resented because major actors – endowers, diverse groups 
of beneficiaries, 
c
ulama, and Muslim socio-cultural institutions – gradually lost independence 
and control of the institution. Consequently, this weakened the sectors catered for by waqfs; 
rendered the traditional positions obsolete; and eroded the privileges and influence of the actors 
in the society in sharp contrast to the steady socio-political ascendance of the British colonial 
government. In other words, control of resources by the colonial government, and waqfs in 
particular, had accorded it the economic and political power to dictate the level and nature of 
negotiations on the relationship between them and the Muslim community on the one side, and 
amongst Muslims themselves on the other. This caused apathy in a cross section of Muslims who 
responded through non-compliance with the requirement for compulsory registration of waqfs.  
 
The situation was no different during the postcolonial period as successive regimes failed to 
undo the colonial state policies and legislations in relation to waqfs. These include lack of 
reforms in the WCK statute; continued appointment of Commissioners along socio-ethnic and 
locale backgrounds; political interference on waqfs; as well as dismemberment and invalidation 
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of waqfs through secular policies and institutions (see sections 4.5.1 to 4.5.3). To retain control 
of resources and fulfill the religious requirement on charity and qurba, a cross section of 
Muslims established non-labeled waqfs that they registered with other state bodies like the 
prisons, military, ministries of education and health (see also Mwakimako, 2007a), or private 
trusts and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) as discussed in chapter five. 
 
Significantly, compulsory registration became impossible to enforce in the postcolonial period as 
the state body also lost the vigor to pursue non-complying mutawallis. This is mainly due to the 
minimal fine imposed on defaulters that in essence even when imposed upon offenders it does 
not benefit the state agency (WCK Act, section 10, 4). This, evidently, placed the state agency in 
an awkward situation with so many waqfs out of its control while at the same time battling with 
inherited battered image.
26
 The Act further bestowed upon the agency the audacity to disregard 
endowers’ wishes as contained in various waqf deeds, and by extension, the Sharica on waqfs 
whenever they deemed fit. This created discontent in the Muslim community. Section 16(2) of 
the WCK Act provides: 
In any case where in the opinion of the Waqf Commissioners the intentions of the 
maker of a waqf are unlawful or unascertainable or are incapable of being carried 
out, or where any surplus revenue remains after fulfilling the intentions of the 
maker of the waqf, the Waqf Commissioners shall […] apply the property or 
surplus property or revenue in such manner as the Waqf Commissioners think fit 
for the beneficiaries of the waqf.  
 
As expressed in the clause, the Act thus granted the Waqf Commissioners the authority to 
disregard the shurut al-waqif and spend waqf revenues against designated causes provided that it 
found the execution of the endower’s stipulations unlawful or unascertainable. Included among 
these are recitation of the Qur’an at the endower’s grave yard, salaries for Qur’an teachers, and 
organizing religious rites like hajj, mawlid, khitma, and iftar. This occasionally led to dissents 
and protests by the diverse groups of beneficiaries and progeny of endowers.
27
   
 
                                                          
26
 Group interviews with Ali Salim Bamkele, Abdurahman Bamkele, Ahmed Bahaidar Bamkele and Hamid Salim Bamkele, 
Mombasa, November, 2015; Mohammed Abdallah, Ali bin Khamis, Rahman Abdallah and Rashid Khamis, Mombasa, 
November, 2015; Said Sharif Abdallah, Malindi, November, 2015. 
27 Most of the rites were disregarded allegedly for lack of funds. Once in a while, however, the WCK claimed to give some 
usufruct of the waqfs to madrasas, mosques, and other public institutions in fulfillment of endowers’ wishes. Interviews with 
Muhammad Shalli, Mombasa, November, 2014; Mohammed Abdallah, Rahma Abdallah, and Ali bin Khamis, Mombasa 
October, 2015; Said sharif Abdallah, Malindi, October, 2015. 
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More so, by providing that the WCK could use the property of waqf or its surplus revenue in 
such manner as the Commissioners think fit, the Act subtly enshrined impunity to commit or 
omit important decisions without consulting the concerned parties. Ostensibly, this was on the 
belief that decisions made by the state agency would be to the best interests of the diverse groups 
of beneficiaries and waqifs. On the contrary, this was not always the case as established by the 
study crystallized by the lament by the Bamkeles above and, the apparent failure by the WCK to 
re-invest compensation funds from some compulsory acquired waqfs as was evident in chapter 
three. Disenfranchised beneficiaries of these and many other waqfs were at logger heads with the 
state agency questioning its decisions to lease them out to private investors allegedly at minimal 
rates and without consulting them. Consequently, some of the beneficiaries sued the 
Commission.
28
 This demonstrates that not all decisions made by the state agency on behalf of the 
beneficiaries and waqifs as empowered by the Act were popular, causing dissatisfaction and 
apathy among a cross-section of the Muslim community, hence the non-conformity with the 
compulsory registration rules.  
 
In interpreting the socio-economic and political subordination of traditional actors of waqfs that 
caused resentment and subsequently, non-compliance with imposed registration rule, we draw 
from Bourdieus’ concept of symbolic violence – “the violence exercised upon a social agent with 
his or her complicity” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2003:272; Bourdieu, 1990, 2000). In the case of 
waqfs, it is clear that the state policies established an environment of symbolic domination 
against traditional actors in the Muslim community since the colonial period. The victims – 
waqifs, mutawallis, 
c
ulama and the general community of beneficiaries - as social agents 
understood and recognized the violence wielded precisely against them (i.e. being subordinate in 
the economic, social, and symbolic fields and capital). However, due to the political power of the 
colonial authorities and subsequent postcolonial government, particularly in the 1960s to 1970s, 
they ‘feigned’ not to perceive it as such, thereby constructing their relationship with the state 
from the stand-point of their being subordinate as natural (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2003). 
                                                          
28
 The Bamkeles have had protracted legal battles against the WCK among them challenging alleged usurpation of administration 
of their private waqfs and leases to Shigog investments limited believed to be owned by a renowned businessman in the town. 
Group interview with Ali Salim Bamkele, Hamid Salim Bamkele, Abdurahman Bamkele and Ahmed Bahaidar Bamkele, 
Mombasa, November, 2015. See also Civil Suit no.165 of 1926 in the High Court of Kenya at Mombasa; correspondence 
between Shigog, the WCK, and the Attorney General, 2010-May, 2012, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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Conversely, this perception also instilled apathy and resentment among Muslims manifested in 
the low figures captured in the central registry of the state agency.  
  
In the last decades of the twentieth century, however, the opening up of the democratic space in 
the country also meant slackening of conspicuous presence by the state in the supervision and 
control of waqfs. Direct interference by the government through the provincial administration as 
was the case of Malindi waqfs (see chapter three) and the waqf of Salim bin Mbaruk bin Dahman 
at Kanamai (see section 4.5.3) was relatively relaxed. As a matter of fact, the relationship 
between the state agency and its benefactor in the twenty-first century could aptly be described 
as ambivalent. According to a pre-independence agreement that incorporated the former 
Protectorate to the Kenya colony, the state was bound to protect Muslims’ historical claims to 
land and religious institutions (see chapter five).  
 
Despite this historical and constitutional obligation, nonetheless, the postcolonial government 
faced a dilemma. It could not risk conspicuous involvement in the development of Muslims’ 
religious institutions (like the WCK and kadhi’s courts) and their supervision without drawing 
the anger of the majority Christian population for alleged bias as evidenced during the review of 
the constitution. Within this context, the state resorted to controlling the WCK from the 
periphery. It engaged the WCK in-directly on need basis so as to maintain control of the 
institution for more or less the same reasons that led to its establishment without drawing the 
wrath of either religious community. Accordingly, this accorded the WCK and Muslims in 
general an ambiguous degree of hands-off in the control of waqfs.  
 
Around the same time, the judiciary also demonstrated some independence from the political 
elites by delivering land mark rulings including the revocation of legislations that earlier 
nullified some waqfs like the case of Mazrui lands (see section 4.5.2 below). This further eased 
the apathy among some Muslims against the state agency. More imperatively, there was a new 
development in the institution across the Muslim world in the last decades of the twentieth 
century – the renewed zeal to resuscitate waqfs. In their study, Siraj and Hilary (2006) and 
Mohamad and Cizakca (2013) observe that several countries with significant Muslim majority 
like Sudan, Kuwait, Malaysia, and Qatar established legal and legislative reforms to recover, 
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preserve, and develop waqfs to help finance socio-economic and cultural development (see also 
Kahf, 2003; Nabaa, 2016).  
 
It could not be conclusively established to what extent the renewed zeal influenced the 
establishment of new waqfs amongst Kenyan Muslims. However, as established by the study, 
there were new waqfs registered with the WCK. This could appropriately account for the rise in 
the registration figures to 11 (10.6 per cent) during the first decade of the twenty-first century as 
shown in Table 1. This suggests a gradual change of heart lessening the apathy among a cross-
section of Muslims who had earlier refused to register their waqfs in protest to centralized 
administration. Clearly, this is a significant pointer towards revival of the institution as observed 
earlier by Kahf, Siraj and Hilary, and Dafterdar and Cizakca that could be difficult to ignore.
29
 
 
4.4 State Control of Waqfs and Jostling for Power and Privileges by Interest 
Groups 
 
The normative obligation of the kadhi taking over the management of waqf in the absence of a 
mutawalli with a view to protecting the interests of the endower and the diverse groups of 
beneficiaries was transferred to the state agency. Accordingly, the state agency continued to take 
over management of private waqfs allegedly for lack of precise mutawallis during the 
postcolonial period. As provided by section 11(b) of the WCK Act, nonetheless, state takeover, 
particularly of waqf dhurri where the process is initiated by the majority, negates the interests of 
the minority beneficiaries. This is demonstrated in an incident narrated by Mohammed Shalli. 
According to Shalli, a beneficiary sought intervention of the state agency for allegedly being 
denied of his share of usufruct of waqf ahli by his germane siblings but the WCK became legally 
barred from helping him since he was the minority in that circumstance.
30
 Within this context, 
the statute could be seen as condoning violation of the rights of some beneficiaries fanning 
family feuds.  
 
Another incident where the state agency took over the management of waqfs merits brief 
comments. This involved masjid Msalani at Bondeni, Mombasa in 1976. Upon inquiry as 
                                                          
29
 In Kenya, efforts to resuscitate waqfs begun in February 2016 with the government establishing a task force to review the Waqf 
Commissioners Act. See Friday Bulletin Reporter. (Friday Bulletin, March 4, 2016, Issue No. 670). Calls for Views as Waqf 
Commission Act Review Starts; Friday Bulletin Reporter. (Friday Bulletin, March 18, 2016, Issue No. 672). Waqf Review 
Commission to Hold Public Hearings. Retrieved from: www.jamiamasjidkenya.org. (Accessed April, 2016). 
30 Interview with Mohammed Shalli, Mombasa, November, 2014. 
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required by law, it was established that the first mutawalli – Mohammed bin Rashid Basami – 
had died leaving a vacuum in the custody of the waqf since it was unclear if the endower had 
provided for the succession to the position. In the absence of a precise mutawalli, mwalimu Said 
bin Ahmed who was also the imam (prayer leader) usurped the position on self appointed basis 
exposing the masjid to frequent quarrels for control. The WCK, therefore, took over management 
of the masjid for lack of a legitimate mutawalli. For a long time upon the demise of mwalimu 
Ahmed, Khamis Omar Shaibo became the de facto imam. In the year 2000, WCK confirmed 
Shaibo as mutawalli and imam but was opposed by a self imposed ‘executive committee’ that 
went ahead to establish a ‘trust of the mosque of Msalani.’31   
 
Apparently, a mu
c
adhdhin or imam of a mosque is not only an honorific spiritual title in a 
Muslim community. Apart from demanding that the holder of these titles exhibits the requisite 
cultural capital – basic knowledge of Islamic fiqh (jurisprudence) - the position is also laden with 
privileges and influence akin to what Bourdieu describes as symbolic and social capital that 
place the holder in a level above ordinary ratibs (worshippers), especially in well endowed 
masjids. In the context of waqfs, social capital could as well be institutionalized in socially 
constructed titles like mu
c
adhdhin, liwali, imam, kadhi, ma
c
lim, shaykh, or ‘member of an 
executive committee of a masjid’ among others. Holding any of such honorific titles, therefore, 
places the holder in a vantage position to acquire and manage economic resources like donations 
and other charities made in the masjid. Since economic capital has the highest convertibility rate 
(Bourdieu, 1986:252-255), it is obvious that holders of such titles are better placed to exchange it 
into various other capitals when the need arises, i.e. social, cultural, and at times, even political.  
 
It is against this background that the conflicts witnessed at Msalani masjid upon confirmation of 
the imam by the state agency should be understood as contestation for the control of social, 
economic, and symbolic privileges.
32
 Informing this perception is the remuneration (i.e. 
economic capital) of the mu
c
adhdhin and imam as well as catering for utility bills including 
water and electricity by the WCK upon takeover of the masjid. Around 2011 the state agency 
also applied for and acquired title of ownership (i.e. symbolic capital) for the waqf cementing the 
                                                          
31 Khamis Omar Khamis (Shaibo) had usurped the role of imam since the demise of mwalimu Said bin Ahmed causing 
contestation from the ‘executive committee’ of the mosque, led by Salim Awadh. See copy of inquiry, March, 1976; Shaibo’s 
correspondence to the WCK, March, 2000; WCK’s letter of appointment to Shaibo, July, 2000; Awadh’s correspondence with 
the WCK, May-July, 2001; the WCK’s correspondence to the Registrar of Titles, January, 2003, WCK archive, Mombasa.   
32 Records of inquiry in to the mosque of Msalani, October, 1957, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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takeover.
33
 During the cause of this research, the waqf was declared a historical monument (i.e. 
symbolic capital) and had attracted a renovation grant of about thirty five million Kenya shillings 
from a private donor (i.e. economic capital).
34
 Drawing from the above narrative, events in the 
Msalani waqf clearly corroborate our view of contestation for economic, social, and symbol 
capital. Majority, if not all masjids under the state agency have their imams, mu
c
adhdhin, and 
some times, cleaners drawing salaries from the Commission. Even those not under the state 
agency are catered for by independent committees and sponsors. This demonstrates that attaining 
any of the positions in a masjid guarantees the holder of some economic mainstay directed to 
such institutions through waqfs or ordinary donations, charities, and other related privileges.  
 
Above all, entry of the NMK through declarations of waqfs as national monuments as evidenced 
in the cases of masjids Msalani, Wakilindini, as well as the Mazrui cemetery (see chapter three) 
among others, occasionally transforms the contestation to intra-state agencies’ conflict. In the 
circumstances, the WCK had to contend with the interests of the diverse groups of beneficiaries 
and ratibs apart from its state counterpart – the NMK. At stake is probable economic and 
symbolic capital encapsulated in donations to renovate waqfs as witnessed in masjid Msalani that 
could also draw the interests of local politicians and contractors. These struggles and lack of 
consensus by various actors often stall the reconstruction processes leaving the waqfs in 
structurally condemned state. More so, because of being non-revenue generating properties, 
some waqfs, like masjid Msalani, rely on others through tasrif as well as donations from well 
wishers to support them, thereby, periodically inflaming the contestation.
35
 
 
4.5 Invalidation of Waqfs: The Effects of Secular Legislations and Judicial Rulings 
on Waqfs in Postcolonial Kenya 
 
The Shari
c
a holds waqfs established contrary to basic principles including those that favor one 
gender; or contradict the law of mirath; or bear other inconsistencies with guidelines on waqf in 
view of the majority opinion as null and void. Moreover, the preponderant view holds that waqfs 
could neither be alienated on the basis of adverse possession nor opened up for inheritance. 
However, in a legal plurality society, particularly where the Shari
c
a comes second to English 
                                                          
33 Correspondence from Lands Registrar, December, 2011, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
34 Communication between the WCK and donor, June, 2012, WCK archive, Mombasa; interview with Mohammed Shalli, 
Mombasa, November, 2014. 
35 Interview with Mohammed Shalli, Mombasa, November, 2014. 
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Common law, this may not necessarily be the case. Besides, the limitation of the jurisdiction of 
the kadhi’s courts to a narrowly defined Muslims’ personal status law and the lack of Appellate 
Court of the kadhis in postcolonial Kenya meant that maters arising from waqf could only be 
adjudicated in the civil courts where presiding judges are not bound by the Shari
c
a. 
Consequently, some waqfs that could have otherwise been upheld as valid in the Shari
c
a milieu 
were invalidated as expounded in the following scenarios: 
 
4.5.1 Invalidation of Waqfs: Conflicts between the Shari
c
a and the Common Law 
 
The influence of the doctrine of precedence in Common law on court decisions continued to be 
felt in the postcolonial era causing legal conflicts with the Shari
c
a regarding the validity of 
waqfs. Even so, the WCK Act pre-empted the Islamic jurisprudential conflicts that informed the 
legal precedents in Common Law by holding waqfs consecrated according to varying madhhab 
as valid (see chapter three). Nonetheless, questions were raised in the civil courts with a view to 
invalidating some waqfs in the postcolonial period. This was evident in Civil Suit no. 55 of 2011 
in the High Court in the matter of the waqf of Said bin Rashid al-Mandhry.  
 
In this litigation, one of the alleged administrators, Ali Said Mohammed, sued to have the waqf 
invalidated for inconsistencies with laid down procedures. The petitioner avowed that the “waqf 
lacks an expression to the effect that the ultimate benefit in the property the subject of the waqf is 
reserved for the poor or for any other purpose recognized by Muslim law as religious, pious, and 
charitable purpose of a permanent nature.”36 He also argued that the waqf had become un-
economical to maintain as it realized little revenue, thereby requesting that it be dissolved to 
enable inheritance of the properties according to the Shari
c
a guidelines of mirath. However, one 
fundamental flaw that the court established in the petition was that the applicant failed to enjoin 
the WCK as respondents despite the waqf having been registered by the state body. On the basis 
of this technical default, the mater was differed to grant WCK the right of reply.
37
  
 
The petitioner in the above litigation raised concerns that warrant brief comments. Both issues 
raised by the complainant are based on the jurisprudential differences that characterized the legal 
                                                          
36 Amended originating summons, ground 2, Civil Suit no. 55 of 2011 in the High Court of Kenya, WCK archive, Mombasa.  
37 Order of the High Court, Civil Suit no. 55 of 2011, September, 2011, WCK archive, Mombasa. The matter was, however, still 
pending during research. 
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debate in the formative period of the institution of waqf. On the issue of formula, preponderant 
view on the Shari
c
a would uphold the validity of the waqf on its own merit as Islamic charity 
established for the purpose of attaining qurba. This position is subtly held by the WCK Act for it 
does not confine the validity of waqfs to a specific theological dispensation. More so, the 
contested waqf was presumably established under Shafi
c
i legal code to which the majority of 
Kenyan Muslims ascribe (Freeman-Grenville, 1988; Horton, 2001; Stockreiter, 2015). Except for 
Hanafi law, the overriding opinion, including Shafi
c
i theology, do not insist on the inclusion of a 
charitable cause as ultimate beneficiary for the validity of waqfs rendering the applicant’s claims 
of inconsistency with the Shari
c
a, at least as held by the majority of renowned Sunni theologians, 
superfluous.  
 
The second concern regarded the economic viability of the waqf. As alleged by the complainant, 
the waqf had become ‘uneconomical’ to maintain, though not in ruins. As provided by the 
appellant, the question of continued viability could appropriately be explained under the 
principle of (ir-)revocability of waqfs. Except for imam Malik, the majority position on this 
context holds that the property could be exchanged, leased, or even sold and its revenue invested 
in another waqf (see chapter two). Yet, a quick perusal of the endowment deed revealed that the 
corpus included 8.92 acres of prime residential land in Tudor estate, Mombasa, valued at four 
hundred and forty six million Kenya shillings from fifty million shillings per acre according to 
ijar al-mithal.
38
 Within this premises, the claims of economic viability of the waqf clearly do not 
hold.  
 
On the other hand, the WCK at some point started to file a ‘no objection motion’ to suits seeking 
dissolution of posterity waqfs in civil courts that were not under its direct management, the 
current one included.
39
 This implied that the right of reply accorded to the state agency on the 
petition could not necessarily impede the applicant. Therefore, on the basis of the doctrine of 
precedence in Common Law, the petitioner sought to capitalize on the jurisprudential disparities 
in Sunni Islam to have the waqf invalidated for economic expedience. This explains his appeal 
                                                          
38
 Interviews with Mohammed Shalli, Mombasa, November, 2014; Zubeir Noor, Mombasa, November, 2014.  
39
 The WCK’s reply to Advocate regarding Civil Suit no. 55 of 2011 in the High Court, January, 2012. See also WCK’s reply to 
summons against Miscellaneous Cause no. 10 of 2012 in the High Court, May, 2013; Miscellaneous Application no. 4 of 2013 in 
the High Court (Family Division); communication between the WCK and beneficiaries of the waqf of Omar Mohammad Bakar 
of Lamu on dissolution, February, 2008; the WCK’s reply to the request by beneficiaries of the waqf of Yabu bint Saburi on 
dissolution, April, 2011; Miscellaneous Cause no. 14 of 2015 in the High Court, (still pending), WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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that the consecration be dissolved to allow inheriting of the property rather than disposing it and 
using the proceeds to establish a substitute waqf as required under the Shari
c
a.  
 
Moreover, the failure to review the judicial framework in relation to the jurisdiction of the kadhi 
courts in the postcolonial period also meant a continued application of the ‘Anglo-Mohammedan 
jurisprudence’ (Schacht, 1982). Since kadhi courts lacked Appellate powers, Muslims 
dissatisfied with decisions of the ‘subordinate court’ could appeal at the High Court where 
adjudication is not bound by the Shari
c
a, a scenario that occasioned legal clashes between the 
kadhi’s and civil courts in relation to waqfs as aptly illustrated in two cases: The first involved 
Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2014 at the High Court lodged against a decision by the kadhi’s court on 
Succession Petition No. 103 (A) of 2004 in the matter of family waqf of Athman bin Kombo bin 
Hassan.  
 
It was alleged that in establishing the above waqf, the endower denied his daughter, Fatuma 
Hassan Momo, and wife, Skotchi Shame Mwidau, of their Qur’anic rights of inheritance by not 
including them among beneficiaries of the waqf. The applicant, Hassan Kadi Omar, also claimed 
that the respondents, Bakari Kombo and Hassan Kombo, denied him of his share of the usufruct 
despite being a legal heir of a descendant of the endower born after consecration of the waqf and 
covered by the waqf deed as provided.
40
 Upon careful review of the submitted waqf deed, the 
kadhi’s court declared the waqf invalid on the basis of inconsistency with the Qur’an guidelines 
on mirath.
41
    
 
In the Civil Appeal at the High Court, the disgruntled respondents in the Succession Petition 
challenged the kadhi’s decision on the annulment of the waqf. The appellants argued that the 
respondent was not heir of the endower as claimed, but a descendant of the mutawalli of the waqf 
who was incidentally a brother of the endower. In this regard, the mutawalli was not a joint 
endower of the waqf and the respondent could not, therefore, challenge its legality. It turned out 
that Hassan Kadi Omari was an agnate relative who could not claim usufruct of the waqf in the 
existence of cognate descendants of the endower. However, though the relationship between the 
complainants in the appeal case and the female relatives in the inheritance petition was not put 
                                                          
40
 The endower had provided for his ‘children yet to be borne’ as part of the beneficiaries. See waqf deed of Athman bin Kombo 
bin Hassan, folio No. 97, WCK archive, Mombasa.   
41 See Court Order, May, 2010, Succession Petition no. 103 (A) of 2014 at the kadhi’s court, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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into doubt, the High Court set aside the decree of the kadhi’s court and reinstated the waqf 
effectively denying the latter of their right to inheritance as outline in Quran 4:11-12.
42
  
 
According to the argument by the applicants of the Succession Petition corroborated with the 
waqf deed produced before the kadhi’s court, one would argue that the family waqf was void in 
accordance to the Shari
c
a for denying legal heirs of their right to mirath. As discussed in chapter 
two, the preponderant view gives precedence to Qur’an guidelines and right to inheritance over 
the right to waqfs. However, the High Court was not bound by the Shari
c
a or even applied it as 
understood since the colonial period. It is, therefore, possible to relate that the decision by the 
High Court did not take cognizance of the normative principles on the validity of waqfs 
overruling the ‘subordinate court’ to uphold an invalid waqf that was inconsistent with the 
Shari
c
a. This was a mistake that the kadhi’s court sought to correct in its decision on the 
Succession Petition, an apparent miscarriage of justice that could have possibly been rectified in 
an Appeal Court of the Kadhis that is lacking in the present circumstances. 
 
The second case in this scenario involved application of the Common law on adverse possession 
to invalidate a waqf. As provided both by the Shari
c
a and the Waqf Commissioners Act, 
however, the law of adverse possession – where one becomes entitled to property owing to a 
prescribed period of uncontested occupation or squatting – does not apply to waqfs.43 A 
departure from this legal exception could, nonetheless, be noted from Civil Suit no. 60 of 2006 at 
the High Court that resulted in the dismemberment of waqf. In this suit, Hamzaali petitioned the 
court to recognize him as proprietor of the corpus of the waqf of Adam Abdulhussein based on 
the law of adverse possession.  
 
According to the plaintiff, the last surviving beneficiary of the posterity waqf who was also his 
aunt and a widow of the endower, Rukiyabhai, appointed him through bequest as sole 
beneficiary of the estate before her demise in 1986. Therefore, Hamzaali requested the court to 
grant him right of possession for having been in “continuous and uninterrupted possession for a 
                                                          
42 See Decree of the High Court, Civil Appeal no. 17 of 2014, September, 2014, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
43
 Section 15 of the WCK Act provides; “[…] notwithstanding anything contrary in any Act or law for the time being in force, no 
title to any property the subject of a waqf shall, after the commencement of this Act, be acquired by any person by reason of that 
person having been in adverse possession thereof or by reason of any law of prescription.” 
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period of twenty years.”44 Significantly, the WCK was not enjoined in the case though the court 
raised a genuine question on “whether or not the Limitation of Actions Act will apply to land 
held in trust by the waqf?”45 However, while delivering his ruling, the judge made reference to 
section 569 of Halbury’s laws of England regarding trespass in possession of charity land and 
ruled in favor of the petitioner.
46
  
 
Three issues in the above petition are of major concern: First, the waqf deed was not produced in 
court making it difficult to ascertain the residual beneficiaries of the waqf. It is, nonetheless, safe 
according to the Shari
c
a to hypothesize that some charitable cause, and not the petitioner, could 
have been designated or assumed as ultimate beneficiary. In this regard, the alleged wasiyya 
appointing the petitioner as beneficiary of the estate becomes irrelevant. Secondly, as a corporate 
body in charge of waqfs, the WCK was denied its right of reply to the petition. Consequently, the 
court relied on evidence from one party. Finally, although the court raised a fundamental 
question on the relevance of the law of limitation of actions, it was oblivious of the differences 
between waqfs and trusts thereby using the latter as a benchmark to the former leading to the 
miscarriage of justice.
47
 
 
4.5.2 Invalidation of Waqfs through Parliamentary Acts 
 
The Mazrui land trust commonly known as the Takaungu land at Kilifi district comprised of 
2,716 acres consecrated as waqf ahli of the Mazrui Shak’si followers of Salim bin Khamis. This 
land trust was established by the British colonial government through the Mazrui Lands Trust 
Act of 1914 for private ownership of the Mazrui family in clear illustration of the colonial 
policies that accorded some ethnic Muslims preferential treatment over others.
48
 In 1989, 
                                                          
44
 Order of the High Court, Civil Suit no. 60 of 2006 in the matter of MSA/XLII/13, p.2, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
45 Order of the High Court, Civil Suit no. 60 of 2006 in the matter of MSA/XLII/13, p.3, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
46 Vol. 24 article 569 of the Halbury’s Laws of England on trespass in possession of charity land as quoted in the judgment 
provides; “[…] if the trespasser, or a person who claims independently of the right of the charity, gets into possession of charity 
land, time will run against the title of the charity just as it would against any cestui que trust entitled under a trust, if the trustee 
were out of possession and the property was held by a stranger.” See Order of the High Court, Civil Suit no. 60 of 2006 in the 
matter of MSA/XLII/13, p.3, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
47 Trusts differ from waqfs as religious institutions in that the later are guided by a law believed to be divine and could not be 
alienated though they could be exchanged or sold and their proceeds used to establish replacement waqfs to be managed 
according to the shurut al-waqif. See Qureshi, M. (1990). Waqfs in India: A Study of Legislative and Administrative Control. 
New Delhi: Gian Publishing House; Kozlowski, G. (2008). Muslim Endowments and Society in British India. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; Khan, A. (2008). Commentary on the Law of Waqf in India (The Waqf Act, 1995). Hyderabad, 
Saraswathi Printers. 
48
 The land was registered as private under certificate of ownership number 409, of April, 1914, issued under the Land Titles Act 
(Cap 282) Laws of Kenya to shaykh Ali b. Salim. See Kenya National Archives – KNA/PC/Coast/1/11/41. 
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however, the postcolonial parliament established the Mazrui Lands Trust (Repealed) Act 
revoking the private ownership of the land, hence the waqf.
49
 
 
In debating the Repeal Act, it was argued that the initial Act that established private land 
ownership for the Mazrui family disregarded ancestral land rights of the Mijikenda inhabiting the 
area. The Repeal Act, therefore, invalidated the waqf ostensibly to enable settling of other 
deserving landless Kenyans. Nevertheless, this was without compensation to the beneficiaries of 
the waqf contrary to the Shari
c
a and the Land Acquisition Act (1983).
50
 The repeal infuriated the 
Mazrui for the loss of their private property, and by extension, a cross section of Muslims for the 
invalidation of the waqf. This scenario was occasionally reenacted in public forums to epitomize 
perceived historical injustices in relation to land ownership, marginalization, and economic 
exploitation of the Muslim community in the region (al-Mazrui, 2004:7).      
 
In a Civil Suit no. 185 of 1991 in the High Court in the matter of Mazrui Lands Trust (Repeal) 
Act and the Constitution of Kenya, the aggrieved beneficiaries petitioned the court against 
acquisition of the waqf land without compensation. The applicants argued that the Repeal Act 
violated their constitutional right to property and desecrated the waqf ahli protected by the 
Shari
c
a, thereby asking that the Act be nullified to restore the land waqf.
51
 In its ruling, more than 
two decades later, the court granted the request of the applicants and ordered for the 
compensation of the complainants.
52
 In its two decades seizure of the waqf land without 
compensation, however, the state had made it impossible for an alternative waqf to be established 
as required by the Shari
c
a. Therefore, although the waqf land was restored, its development 
lagged behind for more than twenty years. 
 
                                                          
49 The waqf was administered by a lands board of trustees composed of C.W Hobley (PC, Mombasa), shaykh Rashid b. Salim 
(head of Mazrui), shaykh Mohammad b. Soud (liwali, Takaungu), shaykh Khalfan b. Abdallah (kadhi, Takaungu), shaykh 
Muhammad b. Juma (mudir, Roka) and Riziki b. Mohammad. See the Mazrui Lands Trust Act (1914), section 3; 
KNA/PC/Coast/1/11/41; judgment on Civil Suit no. 185 of 1991 in the High Court in the matter of Mazrui Lands Trust (Repeal) 
Act and in the matter of the Constitution of Kenya between the Mazruis and the Attorney General, 2-3, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
50
 The Land Acquisition Act (1983), Section 5 on compensation provides; “[…] as soon as practicable after entry has been made, 
the Commissioner shall make good or pay full compensation for any damage resulting from the entry.” See also Section 75(1), 
Constitution of Kenya (1963) and Article 40(3), Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
51 Article 40(3) of the Constitution of Kenya (2010) prohibits the state against depriving a person of his property or interest over a 
property without compensation. See also applicants’ requests 1-6 as contained in the High Court judgment, Civil Case no.185 of 
1991, Mombasa, July, 2012, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
52 Judgment of July, 2012 by the High Court on Civil Suit No. 185 of 1991, WCK archive, Mombasa. See also section 8, Land 
Acquisition Act, Cap 295 Laws of Kenya. 
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4.5.3 Dismemberment of Waqfs through Executive Decrees 
The waqf of Salim Mbaruk bin Dahman was established in 1933 on 9.74 acres of beach farm at 
Kanamai, (Takaungu) Kilifi district as waqf khayri “for the benefit of his soul and of the local 
Muslims.”53 Around January 1953, the waqf land was leased to Hassanali Hussein Suleiman 
Virjee for a period of 99 years, but transferred it to Goolshan eight years later upon consent from 
the WCK.
54
 Again, one year later, the waqf changed hands when Goolshan sold his lease-hold 
rights to the Christian Council of Kenya (renamed National Council of Churches of Kenya, 
NCCK).
55
 Before sanctioning the transfer of lease, however, the WCK sought to establish the 
NCCK’s use of the waqf land. When the NCCK confirmed that they wished to erect a Church, 
the WCK objected to the transfer explaining that “it would be contrary to the principles of the 
Shari
c
a for the property to be used for the purposes indicated.”56 
 
In reply to the withheld consent, the NCCK dispelled the WCK’s fears by assuring that the 
premises would be a retreat center for all people without regard to ethnic or religious affiliations 
though the WCK was not moved.
57
 To secure the land, the NCCK gave in to the imposed 
conditions and signed the lease contract. However, the NCCK violated the agreement by refusing 
to pay ground rent; fell down coconut trees without the consent of the WCK; and constructed a 
Church. It turned out that the NCCK contravened the contract on the auspices of the provincial 
administration that coerced the Chief Kadhi to use his authority to repeal restricting clauses in 
the lease agreement despite opposition from the WCK.
58
 
 
All the while, refusal by the NCCK to pay rent also inhibited execution of shurut al-waqif that 
included maintenance of an orphanage and madrasa at Takaungu. This was contested by the 
beneficiaries forcing the WCK to seek the intervention of the Registrar General to compel the 
NCCK to honor the agreement and enable it to execute the waqf’s mandate.59 Despite this 
intervention and several meetings between the NCCK and the WCK at the behest of the PC, the 
                                                          
53 Letter by the WCK Secretary, K. S. Riyami to the PC coast province, October, 1972, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
54 Transfer of lease from Hassanali H. S. Virjee to Goolshan Ladies Wear Ltd, March, 1961. See also lease agreement between 
Virjee and the WCK, January, 1953, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
55 Transfer of lease from Goolshan Ladies Wear Ltd to the NCCK, July, 1962, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
56 Correspondence between the WCK and the NCCK’s Advocate, August, 1962, WCK archive, Mombasa.    
57
 Correspondence between the WCK and the NCCK’s Advocate, September - November, 1962, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
58 Correspondences between the PC coast province, the Chief Kadhi and the WCK, May, 1967. See also Al- Mazrui H. (2004). 
Memorandum to the Commission of Inquiry, op.cit, pp.10-11, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
59 Correspondence between the Registrar General, the WCK and the NCCK, May - October, 1971, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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NCCK refused to pay. As a matter of fact, the NCCK changed the argument claiming to have 
acquired the premises as ‘freehold’ without rent requirements and that the WCK should consider 
selling the waqf altogether to end the standoff.
60
 While launching the center in October 1971, the 
NCCK used the occasion to petition the President (Mzee Jomo Kenyatta) to have the WCK 
terminate further encumbrances to the waqf land. Subsequently, the WCK succumbed to a forced 
istibdal of three-bedroom Swahili house offered by the NCCK in waiver of claims to the beach 
farm. As observed by al-Mazrui (2004:11-13), the WCK accepted the substitute property “with a 
view of not embarrassing the President to remove the relationship existing between the WCK as 
landlords and the NCCK as lessees.”61 It is clear from these events that pressure from political 
elites led to the dismemberment of the waqf. 
 
Examined from a broader perspective, the foregoing events that culminated in the establishment 
of a ‘Christian resort center’ in the heart of a ‘Muslim region’ arguably pass for a religio-political 
contestation. This is because, prior to independence, two of the predominantly Muslim regions in 
Kenya – the Protectorate and the North Eastern Frontier District (NFD, later Northeastern 
province) agitated for secession. While those in the Protectorate wanted to join Zanzibar so as to 
remain under the rule of the Shari
c
a, the NFD wanted to secede and join Somalia for similar 
reasons (McIntosh, 2009; Ndzovu, 2014b). Significantly, the two regions had grown suspicious 
of the Christian up-country Kenya given their historical (dis-)engagement with the British 
colonial authorities that left the former economically and socio-culturally neglected and 
marginalized.
62
 Therefore, Muslims feared that under a unitary system of government, they 
would be economically, politically, and religiously subordinate to their majority Christian 
compatriots who were also well endowed in cultural and economic prowess. These fears were, 
even so, allayed in a pre-independence agreement that undertook to respect and preserve Muslim 
institutions and registered freehold titles to land among other efforts to integrate the Muslim 
community (al-Mazrui, 2004; Mwakimako, 2007b; Chesworth, 2010). 
                                                          
60 Minutes of the WCK meeting held in the PC’s office, September, 1970; minutes of the meeting of January, 1972; 
correspondences between the WCK, the NCCK, Commissioner of Lands, and the PC coast Province, October - September, 1972.  
61 See also minutes of the WCK meeting held in the PC’s office at Mombasa, December, 1973; minute 143 of special meeting of 
the WCK and the NCCK, July, 1974; minute 26/76(1) of WCK meeting, July, 1976; the NCCK’s correspondence to the PC coast 
province, September, 1972; PC’s correspondence to the WCK, October, 1973; correspondence between the NCCK and the WCK, 
January – July, 1974; correspondence between the NCCK and the WCK, July - August, 1974; WCK archive, Mombasa. 
62
 See also Adow, M. (2013). Not yet Kenyan. (Documentary). Retrieved from: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/aljazeeracorrespondent/2013/10/not-yet-kenyan-2013102885818441218.html. (Accessed 
April, 2016). 
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However, considering the frequently enacted historical injustices narrative against the two 
Muslim regions;
63
 the deliberate attempts to nullify land waqfs through legislations (e.g. the 
Mazrui Lands Repeal Act, 1989); and the impunity with which the NCCK negotiated the 
leasehold agreement with the WCK, it suggests that a complex configuration of interests were at 
play in the contestation for religio-political and economic spaces in the region that manifested in 
the waqf incident. The NCCK violated the lease agreement with support from political elites and 
state administration epitomized by the President during the inauguration of the center whose 
presence could not have merely been coincidental.
64
 Precisely, the President’s alleged executive 
order to the WCK (read Muslims) to terminate their claims of ownership of the waqf land was 
laden with political power and symbolic violence meant to intimidate the minority Muslims to 
recognize the prevailing officialdom (read Christian) after the fall of the sultanate. Consequently, 
“keeping in mind the political realities of that time”, writes al-Mazrui (2004:12), “when none 
could safely be seen to resist or opposed presidential directives”, dismemberment of the waqf 
passes for a political duel between Muslims and the Christian political elites. 
  
On the other hand, erecting a Church and a Christian resort center on a waqf land in the midst of 
the perceived heartland of Islam in the country was, arguably, a move in the NCCK’s stake for 
negotiation and control of the religious field. By appropriating political power, the NCCK was 
determined to test and question the dominance of Islam in the coast region by establishing a 
Christian center with a view to fight for a share of adherents. These negotiations resonate so well 
with the Church’s spirited opposition witnessed three decades later during the constitutional 
debate that frustrated Muslims’ efforts to expand the legal jurisdiction of the kadhi’s courts to 
include the adjudication of waqfs (see chapter five). It is within this context that the 
establishment of the Christian center at the predominantly Muslim region, and importantly, on 
waqf land, stands appropriately as contestation for the religious field between Muslims and their 
Christian compatriots. Needless to emphasize the economic gain that the NCCK eyed in the 
                                                          
63
  On historical injustices against the Muslim regions, see Africa Center for Open Governance (AFICOG). (2009). Mission 
Impossible: Implementing the Ndung’u Report. Nairobi. Retrieved from: 
http://www.africog.org/reports/mission_impossible_ndungu_report.pdf. (Accessed April, 2016); Al-Mazrui. (2004). 
Memorandum to the Commission of Inquiry, op. cit. pp.1-15, WCK archive, Mombasa; O’Brien, E. (2011). Irregular and Illegal 
Land Acquisition by Kenya’s Elites: Trends, Processes and Impacts of Kenya’s Land Grabbing Phenomenon. Nairobi. Retrieved 
from: http://www.kenyalandalliance.or.ke/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/KLA-commercial-pressure.pdf. (Accessed April, 2016). 
64 The NCCK was then under the chairmanship of Rev. Thomas Kalume who was also a Member of Parliament (MP) for Malindi 
North constituency from 1969. See also correspondences between the PC, coast province, the Chief Kadhi, and the WCK, May, 
1967; Al-Mazrui. (2004). Memorandum to the Commission of Inquiry, op. cit, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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establishment of the resort center on the beach farm in contrast to the Swahili house offered to 
the WCK as substitute waqf.         
 
4.5.4 Invalidation of Waqfs through Precedents on Muslims’ Popular Practices 
Dissolution of family waqfs is not a new phenomenon in the history of the institution. It is 
alleged that predominant Muslim societies like Turkey, Egypt, and Syria not only opened 
existing waqf ahli for inheritance but, also banned the establishment of new ones owing to their 
susceptibility to abuse the Shari
c
a guidelines of inheritance and perpetuation of discriminative 
gender based cultural practices (Schacht, 1982; Pearl and Menski, 1998; Kozlowski, 1998, 
2008). The ban subtly implied that until proved to contradict divine injunctions, the majority 
opinion on the validity of waqf ahli remains. As it turned out, however, annulment of waqf ahli 
in the cited Muslim lands established historical precedents that could be an affront to the 
preponderant view about Shari
c
a as evident in the Succession Petition no. 29 of 2014 at the 
kadhi’s court.  
 
In the mentioned petition, Mwarabu bint Mohammad bin Abdallah Zeheniyah had established 
waqf dhurri in favor of Amina bint Adam Dadrahman el-Balushiya failure whom her 
descendants, with masjid Mazrui as the residual beneficiary.
65
 Owing to family feuds, a section 
of third generation beneficiaries applied to have the waqf administered by the WCK in 2012. 
Then another section of disgruntled beneficiaries sued the WCK two years later for usurping the 
administration of the waqf despite the existence of Amina’s progeny. However, the complainants 
also requested that due to the large number of beneficiaries involved, (thirty, including males and 
females), the waqf be revoked and the property inherited as it had become un-economical to 
maintain.
66
  
 
In its order of July 2014, the kadhi’s court granted the first appeal of the complainants and 
removed the waqf from the WCK’s administration, but refused to invalidate the waqf on the 
claims of continued economic viability. Arguably, the decision by the kadhi’s court not to 
invalidate the waqf was informed by the majority opinion on the principle of ta
c
abbid (see 
                                                          
65
 Mwarabu bint Muhammad bin Abdullah Zeheniyah had no children, so Amina could have been the closest relative. There is no 
mention of a husband or other descendants in the waqf deed where she appointed shaykh Khamis bin Masoud Zeheniyah to 
execute her will. See waqf deed of Mwarabu bint Abdallah dated June, 1946 (unmarked), WCK archive, Mombasa.   
66 Clause 9, Succession Petition no. 29 of 2014, Chief Kadhi’s Court, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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chapter two). Yet, upon review of the judgment by the Chief Kadhi in January 2015, the order of 
the lower court was quashed and the waqf was dissolved. Commenting on this review, the Chief 
Kadhi asserted that “family waqfs could also be dissolved and property inherited by heirs as is 
the case in other Arab lands,”67 (emphasis added). Accordingly, this suggests that the basis of the 
Chief Kadhi’s order is the popular historical precedent in the Muslim societies mentioned before 
where similar waqfs were invalidated rather than legal merit of the present case. By disregarding 
the historical and cultural contexts in which the waqfs were invalidated in those Muslim 
societies, this was, arguably, a veiled attempt to introduce the doctrine of precedent despite the 
Shari
c
a remaining uncodified. In the mentioned Muslim societies where waqf ahli were 
invalidated, the failure probably rested on the judiciary and the 
c
ulama to create awareness and 
reform the perceived rigid operational and institutional law of waqfs (Kuran, 2001), rather than 
ban a section of the practice altogether. Therefore, the preponderant view is that only waqfs that 
are inconsistent with the Shari
c
a are void. Clearly, this does not apply to all waqf ahli.  
 
As established by the study, claims of disputes and diminutive shares of usufruct of waqf ahli 
owing to large numbers of beneficiaries warranting dissolution of the consecrations should not 
be blamed on the consecrations. Rather, the blame could be apportioned to the inability by 
beneficiaries and mutawallis to rise above the perceived rigidity to invest and expand the corpus 
as provided by the principles of 
c
ana, hikr and istibdal (see chapters one and six). Therefore, 
claims to dissolve waqfs citing diminutive shares could further be mere ploys to dismember the 
consecrations for economic (read capitalism) and symbolic expedience as was evident in the case 
of waqf of Said bin Rashid al-Mandhry (see section 4.5.1). Such petitions to dissolve family 
waqfs notwithstanding, the institution demonstrated the potentiality to guarantee not only the 
socio-economic stability of its beneficiaries, but also the wider community without regard to 
religious and social affiliations. 
 
4.6 Other Civil Policies Influencing Waqfs in Contemporary Kenya: The Land 
Acquisition and National Museums and Heritage Acts  
 
Waqfs in Kenya do not subsist in isolation but within a conflagration of civil procedures and 
agencies outside the Shari
c
a that their establishment and management have to negotiate to 
                                                          
67 Interview with shaykh Muhdhar A. S. Hussein, Mombasa, October, 2015, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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survive. First among such statutes is the Land Acquisition Act, Cap 295 (1983) that accords the 
state unlimited access to land for public interest and development. Precisely, section 6(1a) 
provides: 
Where the Minister is satisfied that any land is required for the purposes of a 
public body, and that the acquisition of the land is necessary in the interests of 
defense, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, town and 
country planning or the development or utilization of any property in such manner 
as to promote the public benefit; and so certifies in writing to the Commissioner, 
he may in writing direct the Commissioner to acquire the land compulsorily under 
this part.  
Going by the statute, immovable waqf properties like land and buildings are not immune to 
compulsory acquisition. This eventuality is, nonetheless, provided for by the Shari
c
a through the 
principle of istibdal where ruined or depleted consecrations could be sold or exchanged to 
acquire replacement corpuses that would be managed according to the aspirations of the 
endower. On the basis of the Act as provided above, some waqfs were acquired by the 
government during the postcolonial times as evident in a number of cases: 
The first regards the waqf dhurri of Mwinyifaki bin Matano at Jomvu Chaka Reli, Mombasa, 
which was acquired in 1972 but was, nonetheless, not compensated allegedly because of missing 
records at the lands registry.
68
 The second involved the waqf khayri of Duweiky at Malindi 
acquired in 1974 and compensated in cash.
69
 By the time of research, however, like similar cases 
during the colonial era, the WCK had not established replacement waqf for Duweiky.
70
 The 
inability to acquire replacement waqfs from compensations dating back to the colonial period 
weighs heavily against the state custodian. Owing to market fluctuations, it could be difficult to 
acquire replacement waqfs after some years or even commit the funds to non-designated 
expenses. More so, the delay does not help in achieving the requisite rule on perpetuity of waqfs, 
hence disadvantaging endowers in their spiritual aspirations as well as causing untold suffering 
to the diverse groups of beneficiaries. 
                                                          
68
 Kenya Gazette Notice no. 799/800, March, 1972. The details of the three acre plot were formerly given as MN/V/135R, WCK 
archive, Mombasa. Interviews with Muhammad Shalli, Mombasa, November, 2014; Zubeir Hussein Noor, Mombasa, November, 
2014. 
69 The government offered One million forty thousand eight hundred and forty two Kenya shillings as compensation. See notice 
of compulsory acquisition, plots 1147 & 1148, October, 1974; payment notice, October, 2002; payment voucher, November, 
2002; Gazette notice no. 3490 & 3492, July, 1998, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
70Minutes 3/2003(9); 116/2008(25), WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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The second statute is the National Museums and Heritage Act (1910). The NMK was established 
to “identify, protect, conserve, and transmit the cultural and natural heritage and promote cultural 
resources” in the country (NMK Act, section 4). The agency is empowered to purchase or 
exchange, take on lease, or acquire by gift properties of scientific and cultural significance. 
Alongside acquisition, it could also declare a place or immovable structure to be of historical and 
cultural interest worthy protecting.
71
 In this context, the Act accorded the state agency unlimited 
access to properties some of which were waqfs. Among these are the Mazrui cemetery and the 
ruined Wakilindini jamia masjid that were declared as protected sites between 1954 and 1955 
(see chapter three). Others include Rodha masjid in Lamu (since 1980); a ruined masjid at 
Kikambala; plus a host of other waqfs in Mombasa’s Old town like masjids Mandhry and 
Basheikh, and the Kongo masjid in Diani, Kwale district.  
Although acquisition of properties of cultural interest by the state body precludes areas of 
religious significance like masjids and cemeteries, the Act allows the NMK to enter into 
partnership with owners or custodians of such sites, thereby placing the NMK as co-trustees with 
the WCK on some waqfs.
72
 In this regard, consulting the NMK in relation to renovation of waqfs 
becomes compulsory failure of which it is punishable by law (Section 41, 2).
73
 This partly 
explains the conspicuous presence of the NMK in some waqfs as consultant engineers since 
renovations must conform to specified standards. As a matter of fact, there were instances when 
the WCK only sanctioned reconstruction of waqfs but delegated the work to the NMK from the 
issuing of tenders until hand over of the property to the WCK.
74
  
The regional office of the state agency at Mombasa allegedly offers free consultation and 
architectural designs on waqfs under its co-trusteeship as part of its social responsibility. Most 
probably, it is due to the fact that the resident officers are indigenous Muslims who feel obliged 
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 See also Lamu Old town as UNESCO world heritage site. Retrieved from:  http://whe.unesco.org/en/list/1055. (Accessed 
April, 2016). 
72 Section 42(a) of the National Museums and Heritage Act provides; “[…] if the Minister considers that a monument is in danger 
of being destroyed, injured or allowed to fall into decay, he may acquire the monument by way of compulsory purchase under the 
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act (Cap. 295) but that power shall not be exercised in the case of a monument which, or any 
part of which, is periodically used for religious observances.” 
73 Section (2) of the National Museums and Heritage Act provides; “[…] the owner or occupier of a monument which is the 
subject of any such [guardianship] instrument or agreement intends to build or to do any other act or thing in contravention of the 
terms of the instrument or agreement, the High Court may grant an injunction to restrain that building or other act or thing.” 
74
 The NMK was involved in the renovation of several mosques including Ibadhi and Mandhry in Mombasa as well as Rodha and 
Msikiti wa Pwani in Lamu. Interviews with Muhammad Shalli, Mombasa, December, 2014; Kalandar Khan and Abu Swamad A. 
Ali, National Museums of Kenya (NMK), Mombasa, September, 2015. 
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to give back to the society. Whether or not this social responsibility would be continued when 
the indigenous Muslims are replaced with non-indigenous, or even non-Muslims, remains to be 
seen. On the other hand, the NMK does not finance the reconstruction of these waqfs yet it 
collects substantial foreign exchange from them since they are part of tourist attraction sites. 
Neither does it remit portions of the proceeds to its co-trustee (the WCK) nor beneficiaries of the 
waqfs. This lack of monetary remittances from the NMK partly impedes some beneficiaries from 
maintaining their waqfs. Moreover, since reconstruction has to conform to structural designs 
approved by the state body, it is also impossible for the beneficiaries to dispose the waqfs to 
private developers most of whom have expressed the desire to put up high rise residential and 
commercial buildings contrary to regulations by the NMK.
75
 Consequently, majority of waqfs 
under the co-trusteeship of the NMK and the WCK are in disrepair.  
A closer analysis of the relationship between the NMK and the WCK on waqfs reveals a scenario 
akin to the use of political power and symbolic violence in negotiating and shaping the economic 
and socio-cultural fields with the beneficiaries of the waqfs, and by extension, the Muslim 
community. The state, through the NMK Act, dictates on how the waqfs should be maintained 
with regard to structural designs but does not finance their maintenance, yet it is the largest 
beneficiary of their output through tourism. On the other hand, beneficiaries of the waqfs survive 
in a state of symbolic domination deprived of their economic, social, and cultural privileges. 
 
Conclusion 
Attainment of independence in Kenya did not necessarily herald new beginning, particularly 
with regard to waqfs, as secular policies and civil institutions established by the British colonial 
government remain effective. Except for amending the WCK Act to re-align it with the 
restructured provincial administration, the statute, therefore, puts the institution of waqf into 
extended control by the state. Accordingly, compulsory registration; takeover of waqfs allegedly 
for improper management; and delays in the establishment of replacement waqfs dismembered 
through compulsory acquisition continue unabated. In constituting the state agency, only 
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 Interviews with Muhammad Shalli, Mombasa, December, 2014; Zubeir Hussein Noor, Mombasa, November, 2014. Kalandar 
Khan and Abu Swamad A. Ali, National Museums of Kenya (NMK), Mombasa, September, 2015; Mohammed Abdallah, Rahma 
Abdallah, and Ali bin Khamis, Mombasa October, 2015. 
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Muslims perceived as loyal to state policies are appointed as Commissioners at the expense of 
waqifs, mutawallis, and beneficiaries.  
Significantly, appointing Commissioners on the basis of socio-ethnic affiliations and perceived 
loyalty to state policies rekindled negotiations for cultural, social, and economic supremacy and 
control along umiji-wamiji dispositions akin to life during the period of city-states. It was within 
this context that some Muslims perceived appointment to the waqf state agency or positions of 
the mutawalli and imam as an opportunity not only to protect temporal socio-ethnic and 
economic interests of certain groups but also to acquire individual social, symbolic, and even 
economic capital. This was the preponderant view, particularly in the alleged traditional waqf-
rich zones that turned the appointments into constant negotiations and a delicate balance with 
those left out crying foul.  
More so, owing to limited jurisdiction of the kadhi’s courts, there abounds miscarriage of justice 
as adjudication of matters of waqfs in the civil courts is not in accordance with the Shari
c
a 
causing dismemberment of waqfs. With this perpetuation of state control of the institution, the 
subsequent chapter would, therefore, seek to understand how the Muslim community responded 
or even adapted to the situation in practicing waqfs. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Muslims’ Response to State Control and Adaptation to Internal Dynamics of Waqfs 
 
5.0 Introduction 
 
Secular state policies and civil constructs that herald supervision and control of waqfs caused a 
paradigm shift in the socio-cultural life of the institution and the community as a whole. They 
cast aside the Shari
c
a normative precepts on waqf practices; sidelined traditional actors in the 
affairs of the institution; disrupted the social fabric of the community as waqf resources were 
used contrary to designated causes; and threatened the institution since the Shari
c
a was applied as 
understood by the colonial government. This chapter, therefore, seeks to analyze how Muslims 
responded to this scenario in the practices of waqfs. The use of James C. Scott’s concept of 
symbolic resistance is critical in understanding the silent but spontaneous and effective efforts by 
the subordinate community not only to reverse the control of resources without attracting the 
wrath of the secular government, but also to uphold the religious obligation of practicing charity. 
Significantly, Muslims’ switching to the uncontrolled charitable institutions and non-labeled 
waqfs was a ready alternative provided by the Shari
c
a under the expansive concept of charity. As 
illustrated in the discussion, waqfs adopted wide range of local customs and traditions at 
different times since its inception making it to be lived and mediated variedly across the umma. 
Use of the different alternatives, therefore, reflects a stage in the evolution of the institution 
calling for the understanding of the response in the perspective of a continuous process of 
adaptation to internal and external dynamics in waqfs. 
 
5.1 Symbolic Resistance: Muslims’ Response to State Control of Waqfs 
The establishment of the WCK in the British East Africa Protectorate in 1899 fits the scenario 
where both Muslim and invading colonial governments controlled waqfs to stem the influence of 
the 
c
ulama and the diverse groups of beneficiaries for political hegemony (see chapter two). 
Accordingly, on the strength of civil legislations and the judiciary that was not bound by the 
Shari
c
a, the colonial government appropriated political and symbolic capital as well as symbolic 
violence to enforce what it regarded as ‘legitimate’ versions of the social world. Using Muslims 
perceived as sympathetic to state policies to serve as Commissioners under the supervision of 
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European officers, the state controlled the economic mainstay and the socio-cultural sphere of 
the diverse groups of beneficiaries and actors of waqfs in the community.  
However, as established by the study, use of symbolic violence by the British colonial 
government to whip Muslims into ‘Islamic officialdom’ (Hyden, 1985) in light of British lenses 
in as far as waqfs were concerned, was short-lived. The fallout begun immediately it became 
apparent that the community was under immense symbolic, economic, socio-political, and 
cultural subordination. Consequently, the community unwittingly ‘exited’ from the state 
sponsored Islamic officialdom in a way aptly described by James C. Scott as symbolic 
(ideological) resistance. In his writings on peasant societies, Scott (2009:34) espouses symbolic 
resistance as “the ordinary means of class struggle [and] techniques of first-resort in the common 
historical circumstances in which open defiance was impossible and entailed mortal danger.”  
Symbolic resistance offers a framework to understand the behavior and actions of subordinate 
groups in power relations when the powerful may have an interest in over-dramatizing their 
reputation and mastery (Scott, 1990:xii; Martin, 2000). The main purpose of symbolic resistance 
is to avoid notice and detection that could result into direct confrontation with the authorities. 
This involves “no overt protest and requires little or no organization or planning” (Scott, 
1987:417). While engaging in symbolic resistance, subordinate groups would, therefore, employ 
a wide range of ‘infrapolitics’, i.e. actions practiced outside the visible spectrum of what usually 
pass for political activity. These include sabotage, desertion, withdrawal, feigned ignorance, and 
non-compliance to official demands which are perceived as safe and require neither formal 
organization nor make headlines (Scott, 1987:419; 1985, 2008). Within this context, therefore, 
Muslims’ response to state control of waqfs in the former Protectorate adequately passes for 
symbolic resistance as explained below: 
5.2 The Rise of a Community of ‘Muslim Peasants’ 
The economy of the former city-states in the Protectorate was mainly slave labor driven but was 
first destroyed by the Portuguese when they occupied the coast, before it became vibrant again 
after their expulsion in the seventeenth century. In the early twentieth century, slave trade was 
abolished by the British colonial government permanently interfering with the economy of the 
city-states (Sheriff, 1991; Partridge and Gillard, 1995; McIntosh, 2009; Mwinyihaji, 2014). 
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Other than seeking to control labor and resources, abolition of slavery was, however, not 
followed by contingent plans for the former slaves like repatriation or resettlement with the 
majority having been sourced from the present day Tanzania (McIntosh, 2009:28, 55-58). More 
so, centuries of slave labor had produced a distinct Muslim Arabo-African culture called Swahili 
owing to intermarriages between the masters and their slaves. Therefore, without contingency 
plans upon abolition of slavery, a large indigenous population, manumitted slaves, and the 
Swahili were rendered jobless, economically insecure, without permanent residence, and 
condemned to permanent squatting. 
In the British colonial project of resource control, land became the central factor of production. 
Accordingly, the colonial government established various policies that helped them convert large 
tracts of ‘native land’ into Crown lands in the Protectorate. These policies effectively rendered 
the local community to be squatters due to lack of title deeds that since then became the evidence 
of land ownership (see chapter three). Alienation of land exacerbated the worsened socio-
economic fortunes in the community owing to the collapse of plantation agriculture and mikoko 
business following abolition of slavery, and compounded by compulsory acquisition of land 
waqfs either without compensation or ambiguous use of their proceeds. These developments put 
the Muslim community into subordination as the colonial government was on steady ascendancy 
and firm control of resources. Above all, political, cultural, and economic relations between 
locals in the Protectorate and the British colonial government took a turn for the worst following 
the change of base of operation to Nairobi. As a result, the colonial government tended to favor 
upcountry Christians than Muslims in the Protectorate who endured long periods of neglect and 
disengagement (McIntosh, 2009; Ndzovu, 2014).  
With resources, particularly waqfs, strictly under control of the British colonial government, the 
largest impact was arguably felt in the sector of Muslim education. Ordinarily, Muslim 
educational institutions – madrasas and duksis (elementary Quranic schools) were attached to 
mosques and the 
c
ulama who attended to those institutions were expected to be full time servants 
of the community in imparting knowledge being maintained through waqfs. Orphanages were 
also among major beneficiaries of waqfs.
1
 State control of waqfs, therefore, adversely affected 
                                                          
1
 Among waqfs designated for Muslim education include those of Latifa bint Saleh bin Awadh, fols. 100-101; Rehema bint Ali, 
fol. 254; Ali bin Salim, fols. 94-95; Amria bint Ali bin Khamis, fol. 36; Seif bin Salim bin Khalfan el-Bu Sai’di, fols. 20-21, 
WCK archive, Mombasa. Main expenses were salaries of teachers, auxiliary staff, students’ stipends, and books. 
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this sector through loss of its major source of support as resources could be utilized in non-
designated causes throwing it into disarray.  
As a substitute, Christian missionaries introduced formal education with the support of the 
colonial government that many Muslims viewed with suspicion. Their apathy was premised on 
the fact that missionaries were using education as a disguise for evangelization since baptism 
became a prerequisite to admission into mission schools (Mwakimako, 2007b; Loimeier, 2007).
2
 
With few racial-based and ill-equipped formal schools that developed much later, the baptism 
requirement impeded the majority of Muslim children from accessing formal education. 
Consequently, this created resentment informing the urge among Muslims to secede in the eve of 
independence fearing further subordination by their upcountry Christian compatriots (see chapter 
four).  
The inadequate levels of formal education disadvantaged Muslims from competing favorably 
with their Christian counterparts in economic development, political negotiations, job 
placements, and civil service appointments creating the minority-marginalization narrative in the 
region (Ndzovu, 2014a:1-23; McIntosh, 2009). Clearly, British colonial policies on land and 
control of resources were favorable recipe for the gradual growth of a community of ‘Muslim 
peasants’ in the Protectorate. However, owing to the imperial power of the colonial government, 
Muslims could not openly question the policies that put them under subordination. Rather, they 
resorted to symbolic resistance appropriately manifested in the institution of waqf as a 
microcosm.  
5.3 Trends and Patterns of Symbolic Resistance against State Control of Waqfs in 
the Protectorate since Colonial Period 
The change from the Shari
c
a normative of waqf practices started with the establishment of the 
WCK where centralized supervision and control through compulsory registration was imposed. 
However, as Scott (1985:xvi; 2012:xx) observed, one does not necessarily need to “risk an open 
land invasion” while squatting would secure access to land; or “openly petition for rights to 
wood, fish, and game” where poaching would accord the same goods and services. Accordingly, 
since the spiritual, socio-economic and cultural purposes of waqfs could as well be accomplished 
                                                          
2
 See also Kresse, K. and Mwakimako, H. (2016). Guidance (Uwongozi), Shaykh al-Amin bin Mazrui: Selected Essays from the 
First Swahili Islamic Newspaper (here sahifa no.3, 7th Jamad’ Thani 1349 A.H./29th October 1930), Leiden: Brill. 
124 
 
through several alternative charitable activities including sadaqa, zakat, community associations, 
and private trusts as provided by the Shari
c
a, Muslims turned to them as a means to protest the 
imposed state control.  
According to the figures captured in Table 1, registration of waqfs experienced a decline from 
the colonial period (see chapter three). Only 7 (6.7 per cent) waqfs were registered from 1940 to 
1960, two decades before the end of colonial rule. Compared to 74 (71.2 per cent) waqfs 
registered from 1910 to 1930 upon establishment of the state agency, this represents 54.8 per 
cent decline over an equal length of time. This suggests that a cross section among Muslims did 
not register their waqfs when it was dangerous to question imperial policies. Yet, as depicted in 
the figures, non-compliance with compulsory registration of waqfs was not a coordinated 
response in the Muslim community, neither was it openly declared in the conventional sense of a 
resistance movement. Rather, it was a kind of ‘everyday form of resistance’ (Scott, 2009) and a 
means by which the socially, economically, culturally, and politically subordinate Muslim 
community manifested their dissent against centralized management of waqfs by the state.  
During the postcolonial period, the land problem in the former Protectorate was not addressed 
but was rather exacerbated. Apart from invalidating waqf lands, political elites in subsequent 
regimes grabbed Crown and community lands. From the 1970s to 1990s particularly, land in the 
region was used to reward political loyalty apart from resettling of non-locals commonly referred 
in an essentialist term as wabara (upcountry folk) at the expense of the wapwani (indigenous 
coastal dwellers). This became (and remains) a recurrent emotive and sensitive issue that 
occasionally flares into bloody clashes between the wabara and wapwani over control and 
ownership of land (McIntosh, 2009; Ndzovu, 2014b). Neither did postcolonial regimes establish 
policies to help the region catch up with the rest of the upcountry areas in development. As 
illustrated in the National Housing and Population Census (2009), predominant Muslim regions 
lag behind in development and provision of social welfare including education, electricity, water, 
and employment opportunities (see appendices 1 and 2). As a result, locals in the former 
Protectorate are disenfranchised owing to prolonged periods of political marginalization, 
economic exclusion, and exploitation. In the words of Cooper (1980:293), this makes them “less 
independent, less secure, and more exposed to the vagaries of markets and politics… [where] 
125 
 
food shortages have become chronic… [and] wage labor is more often a necessity…” (as quoted 
in McIntosh, 2009:29).   
Drawing from figures illustrated in Table 1, Muslims’ disenfranchisement is demonstrated in the 
continued non-compliance with the compulsory registration rule. Only 13 (12.5 percent) waqfs 
were registered from 1970 to 2000. Apart from non-registration of waqfs, a cross section of 
Muslims also established non-labeled waqfs like private trusts and community associations. 
These are valuable means by which the Muslim community symbolically expressed its 
displeasure against continued government control of waqfs and extended socio-economic and 
cultural subordination in the postcolonial period. This was particularly the norm from the 1990s 
following expansion of the democratic space in the country as evident in several cases:  
The first involves the Mazrui land waqf that was revoked through government legislation but 
later restored by the court (see chapter four). Upon restoration of the waqf land in 2012, the 
beneficiaries established a Mazrui community land trust “for the sake of preservation into 
perpetuity of the assets and properties comprised in the 2,716 acres of land in Takaungu.”3 As 
contained in the spirit of the trust deed, the Mazrui trust is a non-labeled waqf. This is because it 
provides for the administration of the corpus “according to Islamic Sharica law [and the] waqf 
land cannot be sold, but the benefit accruing thereof may be enjoyed, leased, transmitted and/or 
passed on to the next generation.”4 However, since it was designated as a trust, it technically 
became independent from the rigors of the WCK and by extension, the political maneuvering 
and direct control by the government. 
The second case involves the ‘trust of the mosque of Msalani’ established in 2011 by the self-
appointed executive committee in defiance of the WCK (see chapter four). As administrators of 
the masjid upon inquiry and takeover allegedly owing to lack of an established mutawalli, the 
WCK appointed a caretaker who was opposed by the ‘executive committee’ that defiantly 
established the ‘trust of the mosque of Msalani’ instead. Save for the land title deed that the 
WCK used to petition the Registrar of Titles and the Land Registry not to recognize the mosque 
committee, this would have taken the waqf out of the mandate of the WCK.
5
 This is not to forget 
                                                          
3
 Clause 3 of the trust deed of the Mazrui Community Land Trust, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
4 Clause 2(a) of the trust deed of the Mazrui Community Land Trust, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
5 Trust deed of the Mosque of Msalani, Mombasa, May, 2001; the WCK’s correspondence to the Registrar of Titles and the 
Lands Registry, January, 2003, WCK archive, Mombasa.  
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the uncountable number of orphanages, masjids, integrated schools and madrasas, as well as 
health centers and trusts run by local committees and registered under different bodies (see also 
Mwakimako, 2007a). Majority, if not all of these social welfare institutions, demonstrate group 
cohesion and solidarity that capitalized on the principles of waqf to harness resources for the 
wellbeing of the community outside the purview of the state agency. 
The Muslim Education and Welfare Association (MEWA) of Mombasa and Tawfiq hospital in 
Malindi would suffice as illustrations of community associations established through the 
principles of waqf. MEWA was founded in 1985 as a local initiative in response to the appalling 
standards of formal education of Muslims in the town owing to the systemic neglect of the region 
by colonial and successive postcolonial regimes. The community pulled resources together to 
provide bursaries, educational materials, and partial scholarships to advancing students. Since it 
must align itself to a legal framework, the project was registered as an NGO in 1993. Presently, it 
also runs a hospital offering health care at subsidized rates apart from offering library facilities, 
career training, and Ramadan iftar to poor Muslims.
6
  
Tawfiq hospital in Malindi, a brainchild of two local groups, Tawfiq Muslim Youths and Muslim 
Education and Development Association of Malindi (MEDA), was established in the 1990s to 
provide subsidized healthcare in an area that suffered similar neglect by the government. 
Nowadays, the hospital operates from the support of the local community, volunteers, and a 
plethora of well wishers, both local and international, including the Islamic Development Bank 
(IDB); World Assembly of Muslim Youths (WAMY); the International Islamic Relief 
Organization (IIRO); and the Islamic Foundation (Saudi Arabia).
7
 The hospital also runs 
Ramadan iftar program, zakat al-fitri, funerals for the poor, caring for the elderly and orphans, 
and da
c
wa through a well established masjid within the hospital. The hospital’s appeal for 
support as stated in its website -“whatever good you put forward for yourselves you will find it 
with Allah. Indeed, Allah of what you do is seeing” - is drawn from Qur’an 2:110 in relation to 
Islamic charity and qurba religiously legitimizing giving back to the community. 
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 Interviews with Mohammed Shalli, Zubeir Noor, Mombasa, November, 2014. See also 
https://www.betterplace.org/en/organisations/10087-mewa-muslim-education-and-welfare-association. (Accessed April, 2016). 
7 The bulk of help from the renowned international Muslim bodies and individuals come in the name of Islamic charity. Some 
organizations, like WAMY and the Africa Muslim Agency (AMA) also run Muslim schools and orphanages. Interviews with 
Ahmed Aboud Hadi, Malindi, November, 2015; Hamdoun, WCK Agent, Malindi, November, 2015. 
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Clearly, Muslims dissented state control of waqfs. Majority of respondents during research also 
demonstrated lack of confidence in the state agency and cast aspersions on the impartiality of the 
Commissioners. They perceived the WCK as an agent of internal colonization and subordination 
calling for its replacement with miji-based waqf boards.
8
 My interaction with the Muslim public 
in the course of the study also upholds the hypothesis that despite being an old institution in-
charge of a significant socio-cultural heritage, the WCK is unknown beyond the borders of the 
alleged traditional waqf towns of Mombasa, Malindi and Lamu, and more specifically, among 
the ‘wenyewe wa waqfu’ community. While many respondents revealed basic knowledge about 
waqfs, their alleged unawareness on the existence of the state body illustrated some level of 
feigned ignorance that was difficult to ignore. Conversely, it subtly confirmed the view that the 
largest majority of Muslims in the country, and the coast province in particular where the WCK 
is legally confined to, expresses qurba and charity in other ways outside the confines of the state 
agency.  
Thus, the proliferation of charitable trusts; preference to un-controlled and decentralized qurba 
initiatives like community associations evidenced in the cases of MEWA and Tawfiq hospitals; 
feigned ignorance over WCK; and non-compliance with compulsory registration rules, should be 
understood within the lenses of symbolic resistance against state control of waqfs in Kenya. 
These are valuable, but inconspicuous means of expressing dissatisfaction with state policies on 
the institution of waqf that sought to re-establish control over economic, symbolic, and social 
capital. As Scott (2012:7-8) posits, “such petty acts of insubordination typically make no 
headlines. But as just millions of entozoan polyps create, willy-nilly, a coral reef, so do 
thousands acts of insubordination and evasion creates an economic or political barrier reef of 
their own.” In the same way, non-registration of waqfs with the WCK and ‘exit’ to alternative 
qurba initiatives denied the state the much needed control of the socio-economic and symbolic 
power espoused by waqfs. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 Interviews with Ahmed Aboud Hadi, Malindi, November, 2015; Ali Salim Bamkele, Hamid Salim Bamkele, Abdurahman 
Bamkele and Ahmed Bahaidar Bamkele, Mombasa, November, 2015. 
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5.4 Constitutional Negotiations to Free Waqfs from State Control in Postcolonial 
Kenya 
 
The constitutional negotiations to free waqfs from state control in postcolonial Kenya were 
undertaken in the auspices of reforming the kadhi’s courts during the change of the constitution 
in 2000s. Like the kadhi’s courts, the WCK Act was retained in the Independence Constitution 
courtesy of a tripartite agreement between the Sultan of Zanzibar, the Prime Minister of Kenya, 
and the British Secretary of State. The charter provided that Islam would be the official creed in 
the Protectorate and that “all cases and law suits between natives will continue to be decided 
according to Shari
ca” (Carmichael, 1997:292; Anderson, 2008). In the opinion of al-Mazrui 
(2004:3), guarantee for the use of the Shari
c
a as provided by the charter entailed “freedom of 
worship and the preservation of religious buildings and institutions like waqfs.” Accordingly, 
these ought to have been collated in the kadhi’s courts and entrenched in the constitution as part 
of the postcolonial judicial structure.  
 
However, the Independence Constitution adopted the kadhi’s courts with the narrowly defined 
Muslim personal status law (Mwakimako, 2007b, 2010; Chesworth, 2011; Osiro, 2014). Section 
66(3) of the Independence Constitution provides: 
A kadhi’s court shall have and exercise the following jurisdiction, namely the 
determination of questions of Muslim law relating to personal status, marriage, 
divorce or inheritance in proceedings in which all the parties profess the Muslim 
religion; but nothing in this section shall limit the jurisdiction of the High court or 
of any subordinate court in any proceeding which comes before it.
9
 
 
The ambiguous relation between waqfs and kadhi’s courts was thus carried over to the 
independent period as the Act left out waqfs, despite being an integral part of Islamic inheritance, 
to be managed differently in accordance with the WCK Act.  Since then, various amendments 
were carried out in the Independence Constitution in Kenya at different times until a new one 
was promulgated in August 2010. However, the kadhi’s courts statute and the WCK Act were 
virtually untouched. In the course of review of the Constitution in the 2000s, Muslims’ desire to 
expand and enhance the jurisdiction of the kadhi’s courts included the determination of 
commercial and civil disputes arising from waqfs. Clearly, this was an attempt to broaden the 
scope of personal status law and inheritance as understood in the Shari
c
a to include waqfs, 
                                                          
9
 See also section 5, Kadhi’s Court Act, 1967. 
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wasiyya, and hiba (gifts) (Powers, 1990:19-20). This was captured in Article 2000(1) of the 
Bomas Draft constitution (2004):
10
 
The jurisdiction of a kadhi’s court extends to (a) the determination of Muslim law 
relating to status, marriage, divorce, including matters arising after divorce, and 
inheritance, and succession in proceedings in which all parties profess Islam; (b) 
the determination of civil and commercial disputes between parties who are 
Muslims, in the manner of a small claims courts as by law established, but 
without prejudice to the rights of parties to go to other courts or tribunals with 
similar jurisdiction; (c) the settlement of disputes over or arising out of the 
administration of waqf properties.
11
 
 
It was further proposed that there be established a High Court of the kadhi’s and a Kadhi’s Court 
of Appeal (Bomas Draft, Article 1999, 1). However, dissenting decisions of the proposed 
Kadhi’s Court of Appeal, according to the Draft, could as well be appealed against in the 
Supreme Court (Bomas Draft, Article 1999, 4). The suggestion to grant appellate jurisdiction to 
kadhi’s courts stemmed from the urge to accord Muslims dissatisfied with decisions of lower 
chambers of the kadhis to have their cases revisited by a bench of Muslim judiciary who could 
exercise their joint opinion based on the Shari
c
a rather than the Common law applied in the 
existing judicial system. As subordinate courts in the judiciary structure, decisions by the kadhi’s 
courts, as established by the current study, have in a number of occasions been overruled by the 
High Court causing miscarriage of justice (see chapter four).
12
  
 
As proposed in the Bomas Draft Constitution, nonetheless, the enhancement of the kadhi’s courts 
did not preclude the right to seek legal redress from civil courts by Muslims, or even in cases 
pitting Muslims against non-Muslim litigants. The choice of the kadhi’s courts for the purpose of 
arbitration remains the private conviction of individual Muslims. However, the proposals were 
misconstrued as being both spiritual with the view of favoring one religious community over 
                                                          
10 The proposed draft constitution draws its name from the venue where it was conceived – the Bomas of Kenya –and from where 
the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC) operated. This also differentiates it from parallel drafts, like the Wako 
and Kilifi that came up later in opposition to the Bomas one. See also Wario, H. (2014). Debates on Kadhi’s Courts and 
Christian-Muslim Relations in Isiolo Town: Thematic Issues and Emergent Trends. In J. Chesworth, & F. Kogelmann (Eds.), 
Sharia’a in Africa Today: Reactions and Responses. Vol. 15 (pp.149-176). Leiden: Brill.  
11 See also Hassan, I. (2004). Working Document for the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission on the Kadhi’s Courts, 
Chief Kadhi and Kadhis. Retrieved from: http://www.commonlii.org/ke/other/KECKRC/2002/10.html. (Accessed April, 2016). 
12 For further discussion on miscarriage of justice in civil courts involving Muslims owing to clash of Regulations between Civil 
law and the Sharica, see Hirsch, S. (1994). Kadhis Courts as Complex Sites of Resistance: The State, Islam and Gender in Post-
Colonial Kenya. In M. Lazrus-Black, (Ed.), Contested States (pp.207-230). New York: Routledge; Mwangi, K. (1995). The 
Application and Development of Sharica in Kenya: 1895-1990. In M. Bakari, & S. Yahya (Eds.), Islam in Kenya (pp.252-259). 
Nairobi: MEWA Publications; Hashim, A. (2006). Unity within Diversity: Unification and Codification of Muslim Law of 
Personal Status in East Africa. Khartoum: African Universities Congress, pp.328- 349; Anderson, J. (2008). Islamic Law in 
Africa, op. cit., pp.86 – 107; Hashim, A. (2010). Coping with Conflicts, op. cit., pp.221-245. 
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others as well as legal, aspiring to establish a parallel religious judicial system for Muslims. The 
proposals were, thus, opposed by an adhoc group of Christians, the ‘Kenya Churches’, 
(composed mainly of the Pentecostals with support from Methodist and Anglican leaders), a 
move that did not only raise tension and mistrust between Muslims and Christians in the country, 
but also temporarily stalled the constitutional review process (Mwakimako, 2007b; Tayob and 
Wandera, 2011; Wario, 2014).
13
  
 
To understand the opposition by the alliance of ‘Kenya Churches’ to expand the legal 
jurisdiction of the kadhi’s courts we engage the concept of religious field as propounded by 
Bourdieu. A religious field is characterized by “competition for religious power [which] owes its 
specificity… to the fact that what is at stake is the monopoly of the legitimate exercise of the 
power to modify, in a deep and lasting fashion, the practice and world-view of lay people, by 
imposing on and inculcating in them a particular religious habitus” (Bourdieu, 1987:126, 
emphasis in original). Significantly, a religious field has both internal and external stakes as 
religious groups compete for control over production, consumption of religious capital, and 
dominance of the religious space. Hence, the positions of power in the religious field results 
from the confrontation of ‘religious demands’ (i.e. the religious interests of different groups). 
This is because, “the position of power that a religious formation occupies within the religious 
field, depends on the power of the social group from which it draws its support in the field” 
(Mahr, Harker, and Wilkes, 1990:538).  
 
It is an undisputed fact that Islam preceded Christianity in Kenya from as early as the eighth 
century. Since the coming of the Portuguese in the fifteenth century, however, Islam and 
Christianity have competed ‘for the soul of Africa’ mission in Kenya’s religious landscape. The 
competition was compounded in the late nineteenth century with the establishment of British 
colonial rule that provided conducive environment for Christian missions (Mwakimako, 
2007b:290-292; Loimeier, 2007). More so, the negotiations ‘for soul of Africa’ were heightened 
in the wave of advocacy for the Shari
c
a in some parts of Africa in the early 2000s that 
culminated in the declaration of the Shari
c
a in several parts of West Africa particularly, in some 
                                                          
13
 See also Kadhida, J. (Daily Nation, May 24, 2010). Kadhi Courts Illegal, Judges Rule. Retrieved from: 
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/Kadhi%20courts%20illegal%20judges%20rule/-/1056/924614/-/rcndgfz/-/index.html; Nation 
Reporter. (Daily Nation, July 21, 2010). Clerics Insist on Removal of Clauses. Retrieved from:  
http://www.nation.co.ke/Referendum/Clerics%20insist%20on%20removal%20of%20clauses%20/-/926046/962348/-/sw9atdz/-
/index.html. (Accessed April, 2016).  
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states in Nigeria and Mali (Frederiks, 2010; Chesworth and Kogelmann, 2014). Accordingly, the 
opposition by the alliance of ‘Kenya Churches’ to improve kadhi’s courts in the new constitution 
should be understood within the historical context of the two faiths contesting over religious 
legitimacy and control of the religious field. As the constitutional talks in Kenya coincided with 
the Shari
c
a debates among some countries in Africa, the fear of the ‘Kenya Churches’ was 
probably hinged on the misconception that Islam would gain a formidable constitutional 
legitimacy in the negotiation for control and dominance of the religious space. In the worst case 
scenario, it was polemically claimed by the ‘Kenya Churches’ that Muslims were intending to 
impose the Shari
c
a on the majority Christians in the country, thus stocking fear and mistrust 
between the two religious communities (Mwakimako, 2007b:287-307).  
 
Contrary to the perception by the ‘Kenya Churches’, it was not the intention of Muslims to use 
constitutional amendments to compete for numbers and control of the religious field. Therefore, 
to ease the tension and continue with the review of the constitution, it was resolved that kadhi’s 
courts be retained as they appeared in the Independence Constitution – as subordinate courts with 
the narrowly interpreted and limited jurisdiction to Muslim personal status law among litigants. 
The failed negotiations to empower kadhi’s courts thus effectively dealt a blow to the efforts to 
free the control of waqfs from the state.
14
 
 
5.5 Adaptation to Internal Dynamics in Waqfs 
Muslims’ exit from state controlled waqfs should, on the other hand, be understood within the 
wider context of waqfs being a ‘discursive tradition’ (Asad, 2009; see chapter two). The 
development of the institution of waqf assumed different faces at various epochs in response to 
local customs and needs making it to be lived and mediated variedly across the Muslim world. 
Accordingly, the various alternatives assumed by Kenyan Muslims during symbolic resistance 
represent a phase in the internal dynamics of the institution as part of Islamic charity. To 
demonstrate that waqf is a ‘discursive tradition’, we reconstruct its development as follows:  
                                                          
14
 Unlike in Kenya, similar proposals to reform and enhance the efficiency of the kadhi’s courts were adopted and ratified in 
Zanzibar. As contained in the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2003, the jurisdiction of the kadhi’s court in 
Zanzibar now includes hearing and determination of matters of waqf while an Appellate Court of the Kadhis was also established. 
See Hashim, A. (2005). Servants of Shari’a, op. cit., p.38. 
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(a) The ‘formative phase’ beginning in the seventh century (first century A.H). During this 
period, for lack of precise textual legitimacy in the Qur’an, the institution was believed to have 
been initiated by the Prophet through a number of traditions and the actions of his companions. 
Thus the main concern during this period was to establish the religious legitimacy and essentials 
of waqf. The growth and development of the institution during this period was also perceived to 
be progressive and adaptive to various local customs and needs with a view to balancing between 
theory and practice. Waqfs attained stability in the thirteenth century following the formation of 
the different madhhabs (Barnes, 1986; Kozlowski, 1996; Hennigan, 2004);  
(b) Waqfs entered the ‘classical phase’ in the fourteenth century. This was, arguably, the golden 
age of waqfs as the institution flourished becoming an essential part of the Muslim society and 
social welfare. Most public institutions and social welfare services including water, education, 
urban housing, health care, madrasas and mosques were either waqfs themselves or maintained 
through waqf revenues (Hodgson, 1974:124; Hoexter, 2002);  
(c) Waqfs entered the ‘transformative stage’ from the first decades of the fifteenth to the 
seventeenth century. The main debate here was whether or not to adopt cash as a corpus. Cash 
waqfs were dominant throughout the Ottoman Empire in the first half of the sixteenth century but 
faced opposition in Syria owing to the aspect of riba (interest) which is abhorrent in Islam. The 
debate, however, closed with the adoption of cash waqfs as part of the 
c
urf for the public good 
(istihsan) given that its abolition would have dealt a blow to the hundreds of social welfare 
services that they supported in the community. Other forms of moveables such as ornaments, 
armor, and animals for their products were also adopted as waqf corpuses (Suhrawardy, 1911; 
Mandaville, 1979; Hoexter, 2002; Gerber, 2002);  
(d) From the eighteenth to early nineteenth century, nonetheless, the institution of waqf entered 
the ‘redundancy and stagnation age’. Owing to their immense influence in the social welfare of 
the society, waqfs had established diverse groups of economically secure and independent 
Muslims that were antithetical to political hegemony. Muslim rulers in the Ottoman Empire, for 
instance, established the Ministry of Imperial Religious Endowments that put waqfs under state 
supervision, effectively controlling the mainstay of the diverse groups of beneficiaries. Part of 
the 
c
ulama was also conscripted as mutwallis along theological biases to accord the state a 
religious legitimacy. This coincided with colonial invasion as evident in British India and Egypt; 
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French Algeria, Syria, and Lebanon; and the Italian colony of Libya where the main concern of 
the colonial project was resource control. Like Muslim rulers, colonial powers also put waqfs 
under control by establishing departments and ministries with personnel working under strict 
guidelines and supervision. Consequently, state control, mismanagement, and use of waqfs 
against designated causes paralyzed social welfare in the Muslim society rendering the role of 
waqfs almost obsolete during this period (Barnes, 1986; Kozlowski, 1996; Sanjuan, 2007; 
Medici, 2011); 
(e) Upon the end of colonial rule in the mid nineteenth century, most Muslim states embarked on 
land reforms that also affected the institution of waqf. This could be regarded as the ‘period of 
botched reforms and extended state control’. Apart from inheriting colonial infrastructure to 
control the institution, majority of land waqfs were either nationalized or redistributed in the 
ensued reforms that extended to the early twentieth century. In other countries like Egypt, 
Turkey, Libya, Lebanon, and Syria, waqf dhurri were limited to sixty years after the death of the 
waqif or abolished altogether. Accordingly, except in Morocco where waqfs are said to have 
flourished, many of the reforms by new nation states put the institution under extended control 
and supervision (Schacht, 1982; Kozlowski, 1998, 2008; Kogelmann, 2004, 2005); 
(f) From the last decades of the twentieth century, however, the institution of waqf entered the 
‘disillusionment and new awakening phase’. It was a period of new awakening in the sense that 
some predominantly Muslim countries including Kuwait, Sudan, Iran, Qatar, and Malaysia 
embarked on genuine reforms on waqf policies and reviewing perceived rigid jurisprudential 
interpretations with a view to returning the institution to its pristine time. This period was also 
characterized by the upcoming of the civil societies that were disillusioned by failures in some of 
the independent states to reform colonial policies and provide social welfare services. Muslim 
civil society groups, therefore, pushed to free waqfs from state control by establishing 
community based charitable organizations some of which acquired transnational status 
(Kozlowski, 1998; Kuran, 2001; Hennigan, 2004; Dafterdar and Cizakca, 2013). 
The transnational Muslim charitable organizations are using the goodwill of the institution to 
harness resources in form of waqf shares and certificates the usufruct of which is channeled to 
specific social welfare causes across the Muslim umma. Included among others are the 
International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO, Saudia); Islamic Relief Organization (IRO, 
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UK); World Assembly of Muslim Youths (WAMY); Al-Haramayn Islamic Foundation (AHIF); 
and Africa Muslim Agency (AMA). The IDB also runs a number of subsidiaries that revive 
waqfs across the Muslim world like the Awqaf Properties Investment Fund (APIF) and the World 
Waqf Fund (WWF). Included also in the provision of social welfare in the Muslim umma are 
private trusts including the King Faysal Foundation (KFF); Alwaleed bin Talal Foundation; and 
Shaykh Zayid al-Nahyan (Kuran, 2001; Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, 2003; Siraj and Hillary, 
2006; Dafterdar and Cizacka, 2013).    
In summary, therefore, though Muslims dissented state controlled waqfs and exited to non-
labeled waqfs, they remained within the ambit of Islamic charity and qurba. Significant, 
however, were their inconspicuous efforts as subordinate group to decipher the contradictions in 
the secular state policies and civil institutions of subjugation and re-define the control and excise 
of social, symbolic, and cultural capital provided by waqfs. 
Conclusion 
Preceding discussions illustrate the significant role of waqfs in the socio-cultural and religious 
life of a Muslim community where life is perceived as one totality. It is not just about resource 
distribution, but also performing a religious duty and maintaining the social fabric of the 
community. The secular state (both colonial and postcolonial) policies and civil institutions that 
governed waqfs, therefore, interfered with the life pattern of the Muslim community subjecting it 
to subordination. In the face of imperial power, however, the community could only turn to the 
silent but effective means to reverse the control of resources without attracting the wrath of the 
state. This explains the non-compliance with the imposed compulsory registration rules and use 
of sadaqa, community based organizations, and private trusts.  
The discussion in this chapter has also shown that Muslims engaged the state within the 
constitutional boundaries with a view to manage waqfs for their welfare. This was, nonetheless, 
faced by conflicting religious interests and rendered futile. Significantly, the use of alternative 
and uncontrolled charitable options does not only demonstrate the urge to control resources, but 
also exploration of the varied options that the Shari
c
a provides under the expansive umbrella of 
Islamic charity in the face of restrictive socio-cultural and political conditions for the fulfillment 
of spiritual obligations.  
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Chapter Six 
Distributing Usufruct of Waqfs in Kenya: Safeguarding Cultural, Economic, Socio-
Ethnic Interests, and Gender Considerations 
6.0 Introduction 
Islamic charity was a sacred charity, a form of worship, rather than a 
form of altruism behavior. It would be wrong, nonetheless, to depict 
Islamic charity, or the charities in other monotheistic religions, as driven 
only by bad conscience or by an expectation of a divine reward. Complex 
motives were at work, and the distinctly human trait of altruism and its 
existence within the system of a sacred charity cannot be denied (Lev, 
2005:144). 
 
This observation by Lev (2005) does not depart sharply from Hennigan’s (2004) view on the 
essence and uses of waqfs in Muslim societies, i.e. both agree on the intricate nature of the 
institution, particularly on the aspect of waqfs as gifts inter vivos. Waqf accords the dedicator the 
freedom to choose what to endow and whom to include as beneficiary, bringing into fore the 
fusion of religion, economy, and culture in Muslim societies (Shahin, 1998; Hennigan, 2004; 
Lev, 2005). It is in this context that the chapter attempts to situate the institution of waqf among 
Muslims in Kenya and understand its place in the socio-cultural negotiations between diverse 
competing and conflicting groups in the society. Central to the argument in this chapter are the 
different types of waqfs available in Kenya’s landscape; the choice of formula - Qur’anic and 
non-Qur’anic, in the distribution of usufruct in relation to ‘domestic’ and ‘public economy’ as 
well as gender considerations; and the questions of 
c
ana, hikr and istibadal vis-à-vis 
improvement of the output of revenue generating waqfs. The use of relevant case studies and the 
perception of umiji-wamiji propounded in chapter four are pertinent in understanding how the 
unfolding ethno-social negotiations shaped the development of waqfs in the community.  
Distribution of usufruct of waqf departs from two perspectives – Qur’anic and non-Qur’anic 
shares. The Qur’anic model is informed by the divine law of mirath –“for the male what is equal 
to the share of two females”- enshrined in Qur’an 4:11-12.1 Distributing usufruct of waqf based 
on this dogma strictly follows the divine guidelines giving preference to male over female 
beneficiaries. A cross section of scholars regards this dogma as rigid since disregarding it 
                                                          
1 For further discussion on Islamic inheritance, see Qur’an 4:176; Sahih al- Bukhari, 8:731, 736. 
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amounts to kufr (disbelief) (Barnes, 1986; Reiter, 1996; Powers, 2002; Kozlowski, 2008). The 
second formula of distributing usufruct of waqfs – non-Qur’anic, allegedly draws its legitimacy 
from Hanafi scholars’ fatwa traced to second century A.H. It espouses that if a founder fails to 
specify the mode of distributing usufruct, it was to be assumed that he had intended to have it 
equally shared among designated beneficiaries. This opinion is allegedly anchored on a tradition 
attributed to the Prophet regarding gifts inter vivos that advises parents to share them out equally 
amongst their children and give preference to daughters only when necessary (Sahih al-Bukhari, 
3:758-760).
2
 Against this backdrop, the various types of waqfs in the former Protectorate are 
contextualized and the impact of the adopted formulas in distributing usufruct to beneficiaries by 
different endowers analyzed hereunder. 
 
6.1 Safeguarding Family’s ‘Domestic Economy’: The Ambiguous Place of Women 
in Waqf Ahli in Kenya 
Family or posterity waqfs constituted 63 of the 104 sampled waqf charters representing 60.6 per 
cent of the total waqfs registered by the WCK. From these figures, one could discern that 
majority of endowers were primarily concerned with the welfare of their progeny and the urge to 
retain the usufruct within the family parameters. This is undoubtedly informed by the nature of 
waqf itself – as sadaqa in which case the main beneficiaries are those within the precincts of the 
endower. Establishing charity for the benefit of one’s family is believed to be a meritorious act in 
Islam as propounded in a tradition of the Prophet: 
…The most excellent dinar is one that a person spends on his family, and the 
dinar which he spends on his animal in Allah's path, and the dinar he spends on 
his companions in Allah's path […] who is the person with greater reward than a 
person who spends on young members of his family (and thus) preserves (saves 
them from want) (and by virtue of which) Allah brings profit for them and makes 
them rich (Sahih Muslim, 5:2180).  
Several verses of the Qur’an and hadiths of the Prophet also emphasize the need to spend on 
one’s family as a form of sadaqa while warning against the lack of it effectively breaking the 
                                                          
2 Powers defines gift inter vivos (gift between living people) as “a voluntary gratuitous alienation of property by a person to 
another not made in contemplation of death.” See Powers, D. (1989). Orientalism, Colonialism and Legal History: The Attack on 
Muslim family Endowments in Algeria and India. Journal of Comparative Studies in Society and History, 31(3), 535-571; Reiter, 
Y. (1996). Islamic Endowments in Jerusalem under British Mandate. London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, pp.100-101.  
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social fabric.
3
 Accordingly, a number of the waqf deeds reviewed in this study had elaborate 
chains of beneficiaries suggesting that the usufruct would be confined within the ‘domestic 
economy’ (Sanjuan, 2007). Included among these were two waqfs of Mwanajumbe bint Ali bin 
Khamis el-Mandhry. In these waqfs, the dedicator designated her nieces, Amina and 
Mwanamkuu bint Said bin Ali bin Khamis el-Mandhry and their descendants from generation to 
generation with el-Mandhry masjid in Mombasa as the ultimate beneficiary.
4
 Neither of the waqf 
deeds indicated the formula for distributing usufruct assuming equality in share distribution 
among the first two generations of beneficiaries.  
The second case concerns the family waqf of Mwanajuma bint Kulo who designated her nephew 
and niece Abdallah Mwinzagu and Mwanasha Mwenyehija respectively and their descendants as 
beneficiaries from one generation to the next.
5
 A third example is the waqf dhurri of Adam 
Dadrahman in which he designated his wife, three daughters, “and to those who may hereafter be 
borne unto me and their children.”6 By designating the yet to be borne, Dadrahman, like in 
several similar cases, was bent to ensure that the usufruct of the sadaqa remained within the 
family circle. Again, as in the earlier two waqfs, no precise formula for the distribution of the 
usufruct was given.  
A sharp contrast from the above is the waqf dhurri of Haji Ebrahim Haji Adam Naserpuria in 
which the endower designated her three daughters as equal beneficiaries of the family waqf in 
the exclusion of his two sons.
7
 Moreover, male descendants were sidelined in later generations 
since usufruct was to trickle down to the daughters’ children from generation to generation. In 
these and some other cases where the non-Qur’anic model of sharing usufruct was adopted, 
whether assumed or prescribed, it turns out that women – daughters, wives, and other female 
cognates, were the most preferred beneficiaries of family waqfs.
8
 This could be understood in the 
context of waqfs as gifts inter vivos where, in relation to the Prophet’s tradition above, women 
were accorded priority where gender was the main consideration in the distribution of usufruct. 
This is in contrast to the Qur’anic formula where shares are predetermined in favor of male 
                                                          
3 See Qur’an 2:264; Qur’an 3:7; Sahih al- Bukhari, 3:763-764; 767, 802; 4:11, 20, 22-24; 166, 232; Sahih Muslim, 5:2181, 2183.  
4
 Waqf deed of Mwanajumbe bint Ali bin Khamis el-Mandhry, fols. 32; 34-35, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
5 Waqf deed of Mwanajumbe bint Kulo, fol. 15, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
6 Waqf deed of Adam Dadrahman, fols. 26-27, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
7 Waqf deed of Haji Ebrahim Haji Adam Naserpuria, fol. 30, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
8
 Waqf deeds of Khamis bin Tabibu, fol. 28; Mishi bint Mwalimu, fols. 40-41, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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beneficiaries. Taking the waqf dhurri of Naserpuria for instance, the three daughters would have 
shared the usufruct with their two brothers in the ratio one to two (1:2). The same case would 
have applied to the beneficiaries of usufruct of the family waqf of bint Kulo above. Precisely, the 
Qur’anic principle of distributing usufruct of waqfs was adopted in the waqf dhurri of 
Gulamhussein Adamji where four sons and two daughters were designated as beneficiaries.
9
 
Two waqf dhurri of Mohammed bin Omar bin Aish el-Auf present yet another instance where 
Qur’an guidelines of inheritance were preferred in distributing usufruct of the waqf among three 
sons.
10
 Interestingly, the wife was left out as beneficiary but named as mutawalli in both waqfs 
instead. The Qur’anic formula was again used in the waqf dhurri of Nassor bin Mohammed el-
Nahdy and Haji Kassim Haji Mohammed where male beneficiaries got bigger shares compared 
to their female counterparts.
11
 
Examining the preference on Qur’anic guidelines of inheritance in sharing the usufruct of waqf 
dhurri by endowers reveals a tendency to protect descendants from competition by agnates as 
well as retaining portions of the estate within the ‘domestic economy’ that would have otherwise 
trickled to the agnates or surrendered to the bayt al-mal as required under mirath law.
12
 This is 
clearly discernible in the waqf dhurri of Mwarabu bint Mohammed bin Abdallah who designated 
her only daughter, Amina bint Dadrahman el-Balushiya then to her children from one generation 
to the next with the Mazrui masjid as residual beneficiary.
13
 Another case involves one of the 
waqf dhurri of Mohammed bin Said Adnan Bamkele where a daughter, Bukheiti bint 
Mohammed was designated as the sole beneficiary then her descendants.
14
 The tendency was 
also evident in the waqf dhurri of Nanachema bint Athuman al-Famawiya where Aisha bint 
Manswab bin Abdurahman was designated as the first generation beneficiary and thereafter her 
descendants from generation to generation.
15
 
                                                          
9 Waqf deed of Gulamhussein Adamji, fols. 38-39, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
10 Waqf deeds of Mohammed bin Omar bin Aish el-Auf, fols. 48-9; 56-57, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
11 Waqf deeds of Nassor bin Mohammed el-Nahdy, fols. 62-63; 64-65; Haji Kassim Haji Mohammed, fols. 69-70, WCK archive, 
Mombasa. 
12 There is no bayt al-mal in Kenya. Properties of Muslims who die without heirs are given to the WCK by the Public Trustee in 
monetary form to be placed in to a “Surplus Funds Account” and utilized as deemed fit by the state agency. This may not 
necessarily include investing the funds for the spiritual benefit of the dedicator. See section 18, WCK Act (1951). Interviews with 
Muhammad Shalli; Zubeir Hussein Noor, Mombasa, November, 2014. 
13
 Waqf deed of Mwarabu bint Mohammed bin Abdallah, (unmarked), WCK archive, Mombasa. See also Succession Petition no. 
29 0f 2014 at the Kadhi’s court, Mombasa in relation to plot 406/3 on this waqf, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
14 Waqf deed of Mohammed bin Said Adnan Bamkele, fol. 130, WCK archive, Mombasa. The endower had several other waqfs 
where different beneficiaries shared the usufruct according to different formulas.  
15 Waqf deed of Nanachema bint Athuman al-Famawiya, fol. 160, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
139 
 
According to the Qur’an guidelines of mirath, a daughter who survives the deceased as the only 
heir is entitled to one half of the estate after deductions of other expenses and legacies. Where 
there are more than two daughters, they share two-thirds of the estate with the remainder going 
to agnates or the public treasury for the benefit of the general poor and beggars in the community 
(Qur’an 4:11-12).16 Therefore, significant portions of the endowers’ estate in the mentioned 
cases above were retained within the ‘domestic economy’ by use of waqf as a means of sharing 
wealth in the family than it would have been under mirath law. This is because as waqf, non-
designated beneficiaries could not lay claim to the usufruct as they would possibly do under 
mirath.  
Another way to ensure that the usufruct of waqf dhurri did not go out of the ‘domestic economy’ 
was to restrict women’s shares of the usufruct, especially wives and daughters, from being 
inherited by their descendants and relatives regarded as ‘outsiders’ from the endower’s 
viewpoint. This included placing conditions such as compulsory return of the wives’ shares to 
donor’s descendants upon the former’s demise, while daughters were entitled to shares only if 
they remained unmarried.
17
 Contrary to waqfs, Qur’an guidelines of mirath grant the daughter’s 
children (grandchildren of the endower) with their husbands and relatives of the wife some 
shares of the property upon their demise (Qur’an 4:11-12). Had the endowers allowed female 
beneficiaries to take their shares to the marital and parental homes respectively, it would have 
been akin to sanctioning the taking out of the usufruct beyond the confines of the family circle. 
In both cases however, the conditional entitlement to shares of usufruct as well as locking out 
what would have been legal heirs suggests denial of the right to inheritance, making the waqfs 
inconsistent with the Qur’an guidelines. Such waqfs are often prone to legal challenges by 
aggrieved beneficiaries in the kadhi’s court as was established by the study (see chapter four).  
It was, nevertheless, not only female beneficiaries who were capped from taking usufruct of the 
waqfs from the endower’s cognates as was demonstrated in the waqf ahli of Mwanakombo bint 
                                                          
16 The bayt al-mal, according to imam Malik, has the right to seize the property of a Muslim who dies without legal heirs or 
where some portions of wealth remain after legal heirs get their rightful shares. In the principles of awl (increase) and radd 
(return), however, remaining portions of inheritance (and waqfs distributed according to this formula) may in such circumstances 
also remain with the cognates. See Bhala, R. (2011). Understanding Islamic Law (Sharica) (here, pp.1089-1163). New 
Providence: New Jersey; Ghazaleh, P. (2011). Pious Foundations: From Here to Eternity? In G. Pascale (Ed.), Held in Trust: 
Waqf in the Islamic World (pp. 1-22). Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press. 
17
 Waqf deeds of shaykh Said bin Rashid bin Abdullah el-Mandhry, fols. 16-17; Mohammed bin Kaili el-Kilindini, fol. 105; Haji 
Ismail Haji Adam, fols. 51-52; Alibhai Adamji Dhar, fols. 78-88, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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Jaka. In this waqf, the dedicator designated her daughter, Mwakazije bint Bwana Amir and her 
children as beneficiaries in the exclusion of the husband, Beujas bin Amir.
18
 As a husband, 
Beujas was denied of his right to inheritance where he was entitled to one quarter of the usufruct 
according to the Qur’an guidelines of inheritance. Had he petitioned this waqf before the kadhi’s 
court, it could have possibly been invalidated on the basis of inconsistence with the Shari
c
a as 
held by the majority opinion.  
These cases demonstrate the use of waqf as sadaqa inter vivos to protect cognates against 
competition from agnates. It also helps to retain portions of the usufruct within the confines of 
the ‘domestic economy’ that would have otherwise gone to benefit the ‘public economy’. 
Significantly, they subtly illustrate the flexibility of the Shari
c
a to balance between textual 
demands and practical realities of life. Nonetheless, it is not possible to determine the 
circumstances that informed the choice of one method of distributing usufruct of waqfs over 
another. Different endowers adopted different formulas depending on predisposed circumstances 
that deemed suitable at the time of establishing their endowments. Undeniably, though, as 
corroborated by the cited cases, the Qur’an guidelines of inheritance were flouted to the 
detriment of both genders, a misdemeanor that kadhi’s courts were petitioned to redress. 
 
6.2 Waqf Khayri and Mushtarak Waqfs: Charitable Endowments and the Concern 
for ‘Public Economy’ 
Charitable waqfs accounted for 37 (35.6 per cent) of the total waqfs reviewed during the period 
of study. In all the registered charitable waqfs, endowers clearly expressed the desire to 
consecrate their wealth purposely for the social welfare of the community and for the spiritual 
goal of attaining qurba with the Creator. In one example, the waqf of Naserpuria was 
consecrated for the benefit of the poor and beggars “as decided by the trustees except among 
descendants of Haji Adam Fakir Mohammed,” and for the annual dinner of the Naserpuria 
Memon community.
19
 Clearly, the endower’s urge was to ensure that the waqf would benefit 
majority of the poor in the community than limiting it within his family circle. A number of 
                                                          
18 Waqf deed of Mwanakombo bint Jaka, fol. 118, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
19 Waqf deed of Haji Ebrahim Haji Adam Naserpuria, fol. 31, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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possibilities could explain the shurut al-waqif to single out the descendants of Haji Mohammed 
as non-deserving beneficiaries:  
First, it could be postulated that Haji Mohammed and Haji Adam were close relatives, probably 
cousins. In this scenario, if the poor descendants of Haji Mohammed were not excluded, they 
could have laid exclusive claims as the most deserving beneficiaries of the endower by blood 
relations based on the fatwa of shaykh Ibn Duhaish (A. H. 1377) (see chapter two). The poor and 
needy relatives of an endower, according to the fatwa, have beneficence priority to waqfs 
established by their relatives than the general poor and beggars in the community. Granted, the 
poor descendants of Haji Mohammed would have taken back the usufruct of the waqf to the 
‘domestic economy’. Secondly, as relatives, it could be possible that Haji Adam aimed at 
restraining them from getting double shares both as beneficiaries of the waqf and agnate heirs as 
is provided for under the Qur’an guidelines of mirath. 
Another case of charitable endowment involves the waqf khayri of Seif bin Salim bin Khalfan el-
Busaidi, which was designated for his Liwali Seif Masjid in Lamu. In a typical demonstration of 
control of property long after demise through shurut al-waqif, the dedicator detailed how 
usufruct should be channeled towards salaries for the mu
c
adhdhin, Qur’an teacher, and annual 
mawlid feast.
20
 Salim bin Khalfan bin Amir el-Busaidi also consecrated a piece of land at 
Kikowani, Mombasa, as cemetery for the benefit of the Memon Muslim community.
21
 
Accordingly, as contained in the various waqf deeds, establishing waqf khayri is not only 
indicative of endowers seeking qurba with God but also enables the usufruct to trickle to the 
‘public economy’. 
More so, designating religious institutions like masjids, madrasas, and orphanages, also brings 
into light the endower’s spiritual attachment with such institutions in the community. 
Unwittingly though, socio-religious attachments by endowers as exemplified in the choice of 
such institutions as well as locales gravitate towards safeguarding temporal ethnic and cultural 
                                                          
20 Salaries for mucadhdhin, Qur’an teachers, water carriers, mawlid feasts, Ramadan iftar, annual khitma recitations, and 
performance of hajj by proxy are some of the recurrent rituals emphasized by endowers for the purpose of reaping spiritual 
recompense in their afterlife. See the waqf deeds of Latifa bint Saleh bin Awadh, fols.100-101; Rehema bint Ali, fol. 254; Ali bin 
Salim, fols. 94-95; Amria bint Ali bin Khamis, fol. 36; Seif bin Salim bin Khalfan el-Busaidi, fols. 20-21, WCK archive, 
Mombasa. 
21
 This was an extension of the cemetery earlier consecrated by Haji Mohammed Haji Kassim for the Memon Muslim 
community. See waqf deeds of Salim bin Khalfan bin Amir el-Busaidi, fol. 109; Haji Mohammed Haji Kassim, fol. 110, WCK 
archive, Mombasa. 
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interests of select groups of Muslims in the exclusion of others crystallizing the view of umiji-
wamiji in waqf practices among Muslims in the region as argued. The waqf khayri of Haji Adam 
for the poor and annual dinner of the Naserpuria Memon community; the waqf of Seif bin Salim 
for his Liwali Seif Masjid at Lamu; and the exclusive cemetery for the Memon Muslim 
community as consecrated by bin Amir el-Busaidi in Mombasa aptly corroborate the view on 
umiji-wamiji dynamics vis-à-vis socio-ethnic and political alignments of Muslim groups in the 
former Protectorate as elaborated elsewhere in this study. 
Mushtarak (mixed) waqfs were the third type of endowments registered with the WCK and 
constituted a paltry 4 (3.8 per cent) of the total. As discussed in chapter two, mushtarak waqfs 
concurrently benefit the endower’s progeny and other charitable causes in a predetermined 
proportion as provided in the waqf deed. In one example of recently (2006) registered waqfs, 
Mariam Mohammed Mwanjira consecrated a mixed waqf for the benefit of her eight agnates 
(three females and five males) in equal shares alongside a local masjid and madrasa.
22
 Another 
case involves the waqf of Mohammed bin Khamis bin Mbwana Kheri el-Bajuni in which 
usufruct was to be shared between the progeny of the endower and a masjid he had established.
23
 
In a similar case, Aisha bint Abdullah bin Jabir designated reciters of the Qur’an for the benefit 
of her soul. At the same time, the usufruct was to benefit her granddaughter Aisha bint Khamis, 
then her children from generation to generation with the Muslim poor and beggars in the 
community as ultimate beneficiaries.
24
 Much as endowers were keen on their spiritual afterlife, 
therefore, they were also not oblivious of their social responsibilities within their extended 
family chains even in instances when they had no direct descendants.  
 
6.3 Gender and Waqfs: Negotiations for Socio-Economic Space between Sexes 
among Muslims in Kenya 
The question of gender remains one of the most contested issues in waqfs with regard to the 
actual endowing and beneficiary trends in Islam. This is because majority of studies (the current 
partly being no exception) tend to compartmentalize waqfs in the perspective of revenue 
                                                          
22
 Waqf deed of Mariam Mohammed Mwanjira dated June, 2006, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
23 Waqf deed of Mohammed bin Khamis bin Mbwana Kheri el-Bajuni, fol. 279, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
24
 Waqf deed of Aisha bint Abdullah bin Jabir, fol. 201, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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generating corpuses pitting economic dynamics against gender in relation to property ownership 
and disposal in Muslim communities. Consequently, establishing waqfs is widely conceptualized 
in terms of negotiations between genders for the control of socio-economic space with its 
associated benefits that is most times perceived to be skewed in favor of males. Males are 
particularly claimed to use waqfs as a means to retain control of family wealth and protect it 
against both the alleged fragmentation through mirath and to perpetuate customary traditions of 
patrilineal property ownership in the community (Layish, 1983; Doumani, 1998; Hennigan, 
2004; Kozlowski, 2008). 
Taking cue from the above narrative, male endowers accounted for 72 (69.2 percent) compared 
to females’ 29 (27.9 per cent) of the total.25 Accordingly, this suggests that Kenya’s Muslim 
community is not an exception in the traditionally held view of the peripheral status of women 
vis-à-vis property ownership. However, their minimal contribution notwithstanding, women are 
active actors in the institution both as endowers and protected beneficiaries. As a matter of fact, a 
significant number of women were designated as first mutawallis even in waqfs established by 
men. Of the 29 waqfs established by women, 20 (69 per cent) had female mutawallis. Added to 8 
others consecrated by male endowers in which women were designated as second mutawallis, 
this makes an average of about 26.9 per cent of all waqfs under the custody of female Muslims in 
the former Protectorate. Clearly, women were significant co-partners with their male 
counterparts in the development of the institution of waqf, as far as the Kenyan context is 
concerned.  
The active involvement of women in waqfs among Muslims in the former Protectorate is an 
indictment against the sustained policy of appointing Waqf Commissioners as national 
mutawallis. Despite women making up 27.9 per cent and 26.9 per cent of endowers and 
mutawallis respectively, by 2010, no woman was appointed in the state agency as Commissioner. 
Socio-ethnic and political dynamics of umiji-wamiji that tended to inform the appointment of 
Commissioners had no room for female actors, hence their conspicuous absence from the state 
body. This is despite the agency dealing with properties whose beneficiaries cut across the 
gender divide. Apart from constituting a sizeable proportion of endowers and mutawallis, women 
                                                          
25 Trusts and waqfs established jointly by social groups of both men and women accounted for 3 (2.9 per cent). 
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were also major beneficiaries as evident in some waqf deeds explained elsewhere in the study. 
Through waqfs, endowers protected female relatives including daughters and wives as 
beneficiaries against competition with the agnates under mirath law.  
This could further be deduced from the waqf of Khamis bin Tabibu el-Kilindini in which his four 
daughters were the only beneficiaries.
26
 Were the usufructs of the waqf distributed according to 
the Qur’an guidelines of inheritance, the daughters would have shared two-thirds of the estate 
with the balance going to agnates or the bayt al-mal. Another case concerns the waqf of Haji 
Adam where three daughters were the designated beneficiaries in the exclusion of two sons (see 
section 6.1). In this waqf while females seem to have been outright favored, the sons were made 
joint mutawallis with the position becoming the exclusive right of their descendants upon their 
demise, just as usufruct was exclusively for the daughters and their descendants.
27
 This 
arrangement ensured that only up to one third of the family estate would be controlled by male 
descendants as wages while the daughters shared the remaining two thirds usufruct of the waqf.  
In other waqfs, however, women were the victims than they would have been were the properties 
distributed purely as inheritance. Among cases were those successfully appealed against in the 
kadhi’s court but eventually rescinded by the High Court (see chapter four). Another instance 
involves the waqf dhurri of Mwanakame bint Juma bin Mwinyingwisa where a sister of the 
endower, Mwanajuma bint Juma bin Mwinyingwisa, was designated as the sole beneficiary of 
the first generation before the endower’s daughter, Fatuma bint Abu Bakr bin Rashid and her 
children. The husband of the endower, Abu Bakr bin Rashid, was on the other hand excluded all 
together. The sister was again the first mutawalli to be succeeded by the husband of the 
endower.
28
 It could not immediately be established why the endower chose her sister in place of 
her daughter and husband as first generation beneficiary and mutawalli though the waqf clearly 
flouted the Qur’an guidelines of inheritance. The same fate befell the husband in the family waqf 
of bint Jaka (see section 6.1).  
                                                          
26
 Waqf deed of Khamis bin Tabibu, fol. 28. See also the waqf deeds of Mwarabu bint Mohammed bin Abdallah, plot no. 406/3 
in the Civil Suit no. 29 of 2014 in the Kadhi’s court, Mombasa in the matter of estate of Mwarabu bint Abdallah; Mohammed bin 
Said bin Adnan Bamkele, fol. 130; Nanachema bint Athuman al-Famawiya, fol. 160, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
27 WCK, waqf deeds of Haji Ebrahim Adam Naserpuria, fols. 30; 31; 66-67; WCK archive, Mombasa. 
28 Waqf deed of Mwanakame bint Juma bin Mwinyingwisa, (unmarked), WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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Therefore, the use of waqfs as gifts inter vivos, at least among Muslims in Kenya as shown in the 
foregoing cases, could be an affront to the Qur’an guidelines of inheritance despite the varying 
circumstances informing the decisions. This is an outright inconsistence with the divine law and 
basic principles of waqf as held by the majority opinion that departs from two perspectives: In 
the first scenario, which incidentally tends to be the most conspicuous, Qur’an guidelines were 
flouted to retain the usufruct of waqfs within the domestic economy and protect female heirs who 
would have otherwise been exposed to undue competition from agnates. Informing this opinion 
is the view that it was illogical for an endower to claim to seek qurba and sawab through waqf 
but turn round to violate the means by which the divine closeness was sought. In other words, 
majority if not all endowers who flouted the Qur’an guidelines through waqfs were probably 
ignorant of the divine law in the first place. This finds credence in several waqf charters written 
in clear legal jargon with endowers making finger imprints as signatures in the presence of 
kadhi’s, Registrar of Titles, and Advocates.29  
 
In this regard, the legal experts, who were probably not adequately informed about the Qur’an 
guidelines and Shari
c
a in general, failed to advice endowers leading to the flouting of the divine 
law. This is likely considering that kadhis were mainly Arab Muslims who were not necessarily 
experts in the Shari
c
a appointed in consideration of socio-ethnicity and perceived loyalty to state 
policies. The rest were mostly civil officers and private legal practitioners not adept in Shari
c
a. In 
the second scenario, benefits were to the males pointing to the widely held assumption of the 
urge to retain family wealth in their control and to spearhead cultural practices of male 
dominance in the community. These two seemingly contradicting aspects present a significant 
observation that gainsays a widely held assumption premised on the latter scenario as the 
claimed overall objective underlying the use of family waqfs in majority of the Muslim 
communities.  
 
 
 
                                                          
29
 Waqf deeds of Clara bint Juma, (unmarked) dated September, 1971; Mwanakame bint Juma bin Mwinyingwisa, (unmarked), 
dated June, 1933; Mwanajuma bint Kulo (unmarked), dated February 1927, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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6.4 Designating Waqf Beneficiaries along Socio-ethnic Considerations: A 
Perpetuation of the umiji-wamiji Dynamics 
We established that the Mazrui settled in the former city-states as liwalis of the Ya
c
rubi and the 
Bu Sa
c
idi dynasties after the fall of the Portuguese rule and existed as autonomous governorates 
before the coming of the British in the 1890s. Upon establishment of the Protectorate, Mombasa 
became a strategic regional hub and administrative center. This economic and political growth of 
the town did not, however, end the deep rooted socio-cultural and political alignments between 
the former liwalis and the Swahili confederation that remained key considerations in the relations 
between the two Muslim groups. 
To appreciate the ambiguous relations between the Mazrui and the Swahili Muslims’ federation, 
we need to recall the establishment of the post of Chief Kadhi (see chapter three); the 
postcolonial provincial administrative changes that affected the position of the liwali in relation 
to waqfs; and how the liwali’s replacement in the Waqf Commission shaped future development 
not only in the Islamic judiciary, but also the appointment of Commissioners (see chapter four). 
Significant also are the considerations that informed the appointment of the occupier of the 
position of the Chief Kadhi during the colonial and postcolonial periods, precipitating endless 
negotiations between 
c
ulama from Lamu and Mombasa (miji) on the one side, and between the 
Mazrui and Swahili Muslim federation (wamiji) of the Mombasa locale on the other. One does 
not need to look far to realize how umiji-wamiji socio-political dynamics were nurtured under the 
supervision of the state. The list of occupants of the position of the Chief Kadhi, who 
incidentally have an upper hand in the appointment of Waqf Commissioners, would readily 
corroborate this viewpoint. As appointment to this office oscillated between 
c
ulama from Lamu 
and Mombasa, the Mazrui were preferred every time the appointments were made from 
Mombasa despite lament by other Muslim groups including the Swahili confederation, thereby 
cementing socio-political animosity between the latter and the former.
30
  
Since the WCK Act does not qualify the selection of Commissioners, it is argued that 
appointments were undertaken in consideration of socio-political and economic interests of the 
various ethnic and religious groups within the former Protectorate as evidenced in Mombasa as a 
                                                          
30
 See Mwakimako, H. (2010). Conflicts and Tensions in the Appointment of Chief Kadhi in Colonial Kenya, 1898-1960s. In S. 
Jeppie, E. Moosa & R. Roberts (Eds.), Muslim Family Law in Sub-Saharan Africa: Colonial Legacies and Post-Colonial 
Challenges (pp.109-134). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 
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microcosm. Consecration behaviors captured in a cross section of the waqf deeds as shown in 
Table 2 appropriately suggest that historical negotiations were imbibed by endowers and 
accounted for the choice of beneficiaries along socio-ethnic affiliations. This is because shurut 
al-waqif forms one of the canons of waqf in Islam and its disregard is only an exception but not a 
rule. When an endower, therefore, stipulates in the waqf charter that primary or residual usufruct 
of his consecration shall “pass over to poor beggars of the Naserpuria Memon community of 
Mombasa;”31 or “to el-Mandhry masjid in Mombasa;”32 or to “the poor of the Arab and Swahili 
communities of Mombasa,”33 the mutawalli has to effect this to the latter not only in fulfillment 
of the aspirations of the endower but also in perpetuation of the umiji-wamiji dynamics.
34
  
This view is further crystallized by the existence of other waqfs consecrated by the same 
endowers but dedicated to the social welfare of the poor and beggars of the Muslim community 
without regard to socio-ethnic affiliations. A case in point regards the waqf of Haji Adam 
designating a madrasa established by his late father and other charitable institutions for the 
benefit of the widows and poor as decided by the trustees.
35
 This particular waqf contrasts with 
the one above established by the same endower in which he designated the Naserpuria Memon 
community of Mombasa as residual beneficiaries. In another waqf, Haji Mohammed established 
a cemetery and madrasa for the exclusive benefit of the same socio-ethnic group (Memon 
Muslim community) that was later extended through the waqf of bin Amir el-Busaidi.
36
 This 
partly explains the occasional appointment of Muslims of Asian descent as Waqf Commissioners 
as well with a view to representing such minority groups in the Muslim community.
37
 
                                                          
31 Waqf deeds of Haji Ebrahim Haji Adam Naserpuria, fols. 30-31; 66-67; Haji Ismail Haji Adam Mohammed, fols. 51-52; Salim 
bin Khalfan bin Amir el-Busaidi, fol. 109, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
32
 Waqf deeds of Mwanajumbe bint Ali bin Khamis el-Mandhry, fols. 32; 34-35; Kassim bin Rashid bin Abdallah el-Mandhry, 
fol. 23; WCK archive, Mombasa. 
33 Waqf deeds of Mohammed bin Abdurahman Basheikh, fols. 4-5; Nassor bin Mohammed el-Nahdy, fols. 62-65; 75-76, WCK 
archive, Mombasa. 
34 Around 2008-2009, some Muslim activists in Mombasa allegedly went on air in local media blaming the WCK for corruption, 
inefficiency and failure to use waqfs to help fight poverty among Muslims in the region. This prompted media personalities to 
visit the WCK to seek clarification the following day. In response, the Secretariat refuted the allegations on the strength of 
availed waqf deeds that tied usufruct to specific beneficiaries and families. Interview with Muhammad Shalli, Mombasa, October 
- December, 2014.  
35 The trustees of this waqf were incidentally the endower and his sons (jointly). Based on socio-ethnic trends, it was, however, 
likely that the poor and beggars of the Memon Muslim community would be accorded preference over non-Memon Muslims who 
may consider approaching the trustees for assistance based on the waqf deed. See waqf deed of Haji Ebrahim Haji Adam, fol. 67, 
WCK archive, Mombasa. 
36 Waqf deed of Haji Mohammed Haji Kassim, fols. 110; 172, WCK archive, Mombasa.  
37
 See the list of Waqf Commissioners, appendix 3. 
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Therefore, designating one particular socio-ethnic group as exclusive primary or residual 
beneficiaries of waqfs in the Muslim community in a given geographical locality within the 
former Protectorate, particularly in Mombasa, echoes the view of wamiji espoused in the study. 
Muslims negotiated the socio-cultural and religious fields within the premises of group identity, 
and in the case of Mombasa locale, it was in relation to the Mazrui–Swahili Muslims’ federation 
continuum. Since relations in the socio-cultural sphere and religio-political landscape in the 
Mombasa locale were determined by alliances and rivalry, it made group identity (read social 
capital) of significance in making members relevant in the respective negotiations. 
There are various groups of migrant ethnic Asian and Arab Muslims, including the Baloch (Swa. 
Baluchi), the Basheikhs, Hadhramis, and the Mandhrys, caught in the socio-ethnic negotiations 
of the main protagonists – the Mazrui and Swahili Muslims in the Mombasa locale. Historical 
sources reveal how these migrant communities, especially from the Indian sub-continent and the 
Persian Gulf, settled along the East African coast from as early as the eighth century as traders, 
guards, or religio-political refugees (Fair, 2001; McIntosh, 2009; Lodhi, 2013; Nicolini, 2014). 
Drawing from the socio-ethnic narrative of the Mombasa locale, it is clear that migrant Muslims 
also became aware not only of their foreign identity but also their place in the socio-political and 
religious negotiations in the host community.  
Therefore, to remain relevant, migrant groups adapted the negotiations in the locale to maintain 
their respective socio-ethnic interests and identities. Consequently, they consecrated waqfs for 
the benefit of their socio-ethnicities including cemeteries, masjids, and madrasas, in the range of 
2.9 per cent (Mandhrys), 3.8 per cent (Basheikhs), and 7.7 per cent (Memons) as shown in Table 
2.
38
 As an established migrant community, Hadhramis also consecrated waqfs for their socio-
cultural wellbeing as evidenced in the waqf khayri of sharif Muhammad Abdallah Riday whose 
usufruct was meant for the “general welfare of the al-Hadhrami masjid” in Mombasa.39 Masjid 
Mbaruk (also Baluchi masjid) in Mombasa was on the other hand established by Mbaruk bin 
Rashid bin Salim el-Kehlany but mainly patronized and managed by the migrant Baloch 
Muslims. 
                                                          
38 See the waqf deeds of Haji Ismail Adam, fols.51- 52 for the benefit of Memon Muslim madrasas; Salim bin Khalfan bin Amir 
el-Busaidi fol. 109 and Haji Mohammed Haji Kassim, fol. 110 for the cemetery of the Memon Muslim community; Kassim bin 
Rashid bin Abdallah el-Mandhry fol. 23; Mwanajumbe bint Ali bin Khamis el-Mandhry, fols. 32; 34-35, and Amria bint Ali bin 
Khamis, fol. 36 for the benefit of the Mandhry mosque, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
39 Waqf deed of sharif Muhammad Abdallah Riday, dated September, 2005, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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Socio-ethnic group No. of waqfs Percentage  
Mazrui 5 4.8% 
Mandhrys 3 2.9% 
Basheikhs 4 3.8% 
Naserpuria Memon 8 7.7% 
Thenashara Taifa 11 10.6% 
 
Table 2. Waqfs with specified beneficiaries in relation to umiji-wamiji dynamics in Mombasa.    
          (Source: WCK, 2015).  
 
As former liwalis, the Mazrui cultivated wider social, political, and symbolic clout above the 
Swahili confederation and the rest of the immigrant Muslim communities in the locale. However, 
as shown in Table 2, the Mazrui commanded a paltry 4.8 per cent compared to 10.6 per cent of 
the Swahili Muslim federation of the overall 29.8 per cent of registered waqfs designated for the 
primary and residual benefits of socio-ethnic enclaves. This suggests that social and symbolic 
capital was the ripple effect of the political clout among the Mazrui that partly accounted for 
their influence in the state agency compared to other Muslim groups. This again emphasizes the 
significance of the position of the Chief Kadhi, as was held in ‘hereditary’ by the ethnic Mazrui, 
both in waqfs as well as socio-ethnic negotiations of the wamiji. 
At stake in the socio-ethnic negotiations of the wamiji in relation to waqfs was the protection and 
advancement of temporal socio-economic and symbolic interests in the Mombasa locale 
manifested in the control of a wide range of endowments from real estate to madrasas; 
orphanages to masjids; and cemeteries. Within this context, control and management of waqfs 
became a constant negotiation between the various socio-ethnic groups as well as individual 
beneficiaries against the WCK. Several scenarios would attest to this observation including 
negotiations pitting the state agency against the waqf of the Mazrui (cemetery, see chapter three); 
the Bamkele (see chapter four); and the masharifu cemetery.  
Taking cue from the Mazrui cemetery, inter-state agency negotiations placed it under the co-
management of the WCK and the NMK with the title of ownership being in the former.
40
 
Besides, the cemetery was used in the past for the burial of combatants of different nationalities 
                                                          
40 Order of the Civil case no. 36 of 1909 at the High Court of East Africa by acting Principal Judge in the matter of the Mazrui 
cemetery between the Waqf Commissioners of Kenya and others (applicants) and Adam bin Suleiman Mohammed bin Ali and 
others (respondents), WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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who fell in the wars first between the Portuguese and the Mazrui, then between Mazrui and 
Sayyid Said bin Sultan of the Bu Sa
c
idi dynasty in Zanzibar (Freeman-Grenville, 1988; Spear, 
1988). In view of this, the cemetery is a public waqf. Owing to its proximity to Fort Jesus from 
where the Mazrui ruled Mombasa, however, political power was clearly core to its usurpation 
hence the name Mazrui cemetery. Accordingly, since it is a public waqf, the Mazrui’s ceremonial 
association with it could not qualify their claim on adverse possession. Nonetheless, this did not 
stop different forums of the Mazrui since the 1980s from persistently pushing to have un-official 
exclusivity over the cemetery confirmed by the WCK.
41
 
Another case concerns the waqf of shaykh Mvita commonly referred to as the ‘masharifu 
cemetery.’42 Endowed in the 1930s primarily for the burial of the Tisa Taifa group of Swahili 
Muslims, the waqf fell in the management of the WCK upon the death of the first mutawalli, 
Abdallah bin Ridhwan.
43
 Along the way, however, the WCK relaxed its control over the waqf 
and some descendants of the endower seized the opportunity to run it as a ‘clan’ cemetery. By 
1998, the cemetery had a caretaker committee under hereditary leadership of the sharif Shatry 
family. While managing the waqf, the Shatrys also rented some sections that realized 
considerable revenue to enable maintenance of the graveyard.
44
 Citing old age, however, the 
chair of the Shatrys at one time invited the WCK to establish a management board and take 
active role in the affairs of the cemetery, an idea that the WCK agreed to implement though they 
left it largely in the hands of the Shatrys.
45
 From 2013 to 2014, the Shatrys insistently petitioned 
the WCK to terminate its claim over the cemetery for their private use though the state agency 
turned down the appeals.
46
 Around the same time, the WCK secretariat had to intervene to allow 
                                                          
41 Correspondence between the WCK and ‘Women of the Mazrui Community,’ May, 1981- April, 1983; correspondence between 
the WCK and ‘Mazrui Cultural and Welfare Society,’ January, 2006 - November, 2013, WCK archive, Mombasa.   
42 The honorific title sharif (pl. ashraf, Eng. sharifs) denotes that the bearer claims genealogy from the Prophet, i.e. has a social 
and spiritual class above ordinary believers. Sharifs are also believed to possess and capable of transmitting baraka (blessings) 
from God. The cemetery acquired this name after falling in to the control of the sharif Shatry family. The name mashaykh is also 
interchangeably used in reference to this cemetery. 
43 Correspondence between the WCK and mutawalli’s heir, Mohammed bin Ridhwan, who had usurped management upon the 
demise of his father, November, 1934; Order of Court on Civil case no. 4 of 1935 in accordance with section 12 of the WCK Act; 
correspondence between the WCK and Register of Titles, February 20th, 1935; correspondence between the WCK and Town 
Clerk, May, 1935, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
44 The WCK records indicate that the cemetery had a positive balance of thirty three thousand seven hundred and twenty nine 
Kenya shillings and ten cents as at December, 1998 which rose to forty five thousand shillings by December 2005, WCK archive, 
Mombasa. 
45 Correspondence between sharif A. Shatry and the WCK, July - August, 1998; the WCK minute 41/98, WCK archive, 
Mombasa. 
46
 Correspondence between the WCK and Shatrys, February, 2013 – April, 2014; the WCK minute 24/2014. See also list of 
cemetery board members of 1998 and 2014 dominated by the Shatrys and consisting of the Mandhrys and the Mazrui, WCK 
archive, Mombasa. 
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a non-sharif to be interred in the cemetery after some members of the committee had objected.
47
 
This illustrates that the sharifs had ‘privatized’ the cemetery.    
This is not to deny that the Shari
c
a allows private cemeteries. On the contrary, there are hundreds 
of private graveyards endowed specifically as such but the two cases were not exclusive. More 
so, private graveyards could also become public on the strength of the principle of ‘waqf by user’ 
as long as their owners do not object to the burial of a non-family member.
48
 In this regard, the 
interment of non-Mazrui soldiers and non-sharifs in the Mazrui and masharifu graveyards 
respectively disqualifies claims of exclusivity by both groups. Accordingly, the fight for 
exclusivity of the cemeteries by the two groups was informed by the internal socio-ethnic 
dynamics of the wamiji in the Mombasa locale. While the Mazrui banked on their established 
political clout, the sharifs sought to capitalize on ‘nobility’ (read social capital) with their 
genealogy supposedly traceable to the Prophet. This echoes the pre-colonial socio-ethnic 
hierarchy that was upheld during the British colonial era and by subsequent postcolonial regimes 
as explained before. And since both cemeteries are strategically located and attracted monetary 
benefits from merchants, the economic aspect in the negotiations needs not to be 
overemphasized.  
6.4.1 Waqf as a Tool for Regional Socio-Cultural Identity and Political Control  
The growth in economic and political strength of Mombasa since the British colonial times, 
undeniably, overshadowed the rest of the neighboring former city-states. However, the eclipsed 
towns did not sink into oblivion. Rather, they reinvented themselves as distinguished centers of 
Islamic culture, knowledge, and authority. It is this cultural capital base that gave these towns the 
much needed clout for the continued negotiations with their nemesis. Within this context, 
negotiations between the former city-states departed from the premise of contrast and 
complimentary binary. As evidenced in the various waqf deeds, endowers designated social and 
religious institutions or communities in specific locales as primary and residual beneficiaries for 
the purpose of advancing temporal socio-religious interests.  
                                                          
47 There are also several public cemeteries in Mombasa including Manyimbo and Kikowani. However, trends point to the use of 
the cemeteries along socio-ethnic affiliations of the Mombasa locale. Interview with Muhammad Shalli, Mombasa, October-
December, 2014.  
48
 For further discussion on waqf by user, see Qureshi, M. (1990). Waqfs in India: A Study of Legislative and Administrative 
Control. New Delhi: Gian Publishing House; Banday, B. (2013). Administration of Waqfs: Law and Practice in Kashmir. New 
Delhi: Dilpreer Publishing House. 
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The waqf khayri of bin Khalfan el-Busaidi whose usufruct was designated for his Liwali Seif 
Masjid in Lamu aptly fits this description.
49
 This is particularly because part of the corpus of the 
waqf was in Mombasa but its usufruct was meant to benefit Lamu. It beats logic, despite freedom 
of choice of beneficiaries guaranteed by the law of waqf, to bypass similar deserving religious 
institutions within the vicinity of the corpus to benefit a far flung institution. Clearly, this does 
not only demonstrate spiritual attachment with the religious institution at Lamu but helped to 
strengthen the position of the town in the continued negotiations for umiji supremacy. Contrasted 
to this are the waqf khayri of bin Dahman at Takaungu designated for the local Muslims; and the 
family waqfs of Nassor bin Mohammed el-Nahdy whose residual beneficiaries were “the poor 
and beggars of Mohammedan Sunni of Mombasa.”50  
Administered from Mombasa, waqfs in neighboring towns became central to the struggle for 
control of socio-cultural and political space of umiji. As emphasized before, nomination and 
appointment of Waqf Commissioners was allegedly made in consideration of waqf-producing 
zones with Mombasa taking the pole position owing to its perceived large contribution to the 
waqf economy (see chapter four). Therefore, Takaungu, Malindi, and Lamu locales had their 
shares of representation determined by the whims of appointing authorities on the basis of 
perceived loyalty with a view to maintaining the political and cultural relationship between the 
coastal miji but disguised on their contribution to the waqf economy. This partly explains the 
public outcry which led to the nullification of the appointment of shaykh Lithome in 2009 and 
his position awarded to Malindi. Paradoxically, Lamu has had no representative in the state 
agency since 2009 despite insistent laments by locals, making the claims of representation based 
on amount of waqfs per region superfluous.
51
 This also subtly illustrates the fading significance 
of Lamu while at the same time emphasizing the pole position of her rival, Mombasa, in the 
negotiations for umiji supremacy. 
Commissioners are only policy makers, yet the actual management of waqfs is bestowed upon a 
skeletal secretariat in Mombasa. To help the secretariat discharge its mandate in Malindi and 
Lamu, the WCK engages agents. This emphasizes the relationship between these miji vis-à-vis 
other miji within the coast but outside the former Protectorate and away from the umiji-wamiji 
                                                          
49
 Waqf deed of liwali Seif bin Salim bin Khalfan, fols. 20-21, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
50 Waqf deeds of Nassor bin Mohammed el-Nahdy, fols. 62-65; 75-76, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
51
  Group interview with Mwalimu Hussein Said, Hamid Abdurahman and Abdallah Swaleh, Lamu, December, 2015. 
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internal dynamics. Further, the long distance between the former city-states, especially with 
Lamu where communication and road network was erratic, meant that important decisions 
affecting waqfs outside Mombasa were delayed. This occasionally resulted in 
disenfranchisement among beneficiaries as decisions were at times not forthcoming since the 
WCK board did not meet regularly.
52
 Dissatisfied by the WCK’s improper attention on far flung 
waqfs, some beneficiaries, with the support from their Commissioners, often demanded that the 
WCK terminate management of the waqfs and return them to respective heirs and beneficiaries, 
or establish miji-based waqf boards.
53
  
Disenfranchisement by beneficiaries and Commissioners from the various towns against the 
WCK in Mombasa is reminiscent of old age negotiations between the former city-states with 
feelings of domination and marginalization evident. The conflict and struggle for control of 
masjid Rhoda in Lamu between the WCK and the descendants of the endower with the support 
of local Commissioners makes a suitable reference. Abu Bakr Manswab Seyyid Hassan and 
sharif Abdallah Salim, the heirs of Shee Batte who consecrated the said waqf, insistently 
petitioned the WCK to hand over its management to them citing alleged embezzlement and lack 
of proper maintenance by the state agency.
54
 For a long time, this conflict inhibited development 
of the waqf as parties engaged in protracted war of words.
55
 At one point a retired Commissioner, 
sharif Abdallah Salim, rallied his lawyer and allies in the WCK to support the bid that had 
degenerated into a contest between Lamu and Mombasa over the management of the waqf.
56
 The 
WCK did not, however, relent on its hold over the waqf.  
By 2013, masjid Rhoda had attracted sponsorship for refurbishment from outside Kenya and like 
other waqfs, the WCK tasked the NMK to undertake the structural designing and award of tender 
for its renovation.
57
 This was in line with the NMK requirements since the waqf sits in a section 
                                                          
52 There were no Waqf Commissioners from 1968-1972. This partly affected negotiations between the NCCK and the WCK that 
led to the dismemberment of the waqf of Salim Mbarak bin Dahman at Takaungu. Again, internal wrangles among 
Commissioners that led to the resignation of the chairman, Prof. Nadji Said (Malindi) around June 2015 inhibited sittings of the 
board until its term expired in November 2015. 
53 Group interview with Mwalimu Hussein Said, Hamid Abdurahman and Abdallah Swaleh, Lamu, December, 2015; Ahmed 
Aboud Hadi, Malindi, October, 2015; Said Sharif Abdallah, Malindi, October, 2015. 
54
 Correspondence between Abu Bakr Manswab bin Seyyid Hassan and the WCK, January, 1969; February - March, 1973; the 
WCK minute 69/1 of February, 1973, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
55
 Correspondence between the WCK and different groups with diverse interest in the waqf from Lamu, February – May 1978. 
56Correspondence between WCK and Advocate, July, 1978; November, 1978; January, 1979; February, 1980; minutes 
3/1979(28), WCK archive, Mombasa.  
57
 Correspondence between the WCK and donors, July- September, 2014; award of restoration contract to the NMK, July, 2013; 
interview with Muhammad Shalli, Mombasa, October-December, 2014, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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of Lamu town declared as protected site and recognized by the UNESCO as well. The renovation 
grant and entrance of the NMK in the fray complicated the negotiations further with economic, 
social, and symbolic interests by different actors at stake.
58
 The Lamu case is one among several 
others illustrating the delicate relationship and continued negotiations between the former city-
states at the level of regional umiji. Taking waqf as an economic and symbolic tool in the 
negotiations for socio-cultural and religio-economic fields at the former Protectorate, one would 
not fail to appreciate the logic in the appointment of Waqf Commissioners and their role in 
maintaining internal socio-regional equilibrium of the coastal miji. 
 
6.4.2 Waqfs and Intra-Religious Jurisprudential Interests: Protecting Sectarian 
Values, Competing for Symbolic and Social Power 
It is acknowledged that the Muslim community is not a monolithic body. It is in this context that 
competing and conflicting ethnic, social, regional, and most importantly, jurisprudential 
affiliations among Muslims in Kenya as explained hereunder should be understood. Foremost 
was the greatest binary contrast in Islam – the Shica-Sunni divide that came out vividly in a 
number of waqf deeds. The waqf ahli of Nassor bin Mohammed el-Nahdy and the mixed waqf of 
Aisha bint Abdallah bin Jabir in which “the poor and beggars of the Sunni Mohammedans” were 
designated as residual beneficiaries aptly fit this description.
59
 Contrasted to these was the waqf 
ahli of Gulamhussein Adamji in which “pilgrims of Karbala in Iraq” [Shica ithna’cashari] were 
identified as ultimate beneficiaries.
60
 Comparing the two sets of waqfs above, it becomes evident 
that endowers were determined to protect their sectarian religious traditions.  
Among Shi
c
a Muslims, the urge was even ardent as endowers sought to further distinguish their 
jurisprudential affiliations as contained in some waqf charters. In the waqf ahli of Alibhai 
Adamji Dhar,
61
 and Hassanali Karimjee Dossaji,
62
 social welfare institutions of the Daudi Bohra 
community of Mombasa were the designated residual beneficiaries. Alibhai also warned in his 
                                                          
58 When the NMK officers visited the waqf at the onset of renovations, it took the intervention of elders to control rowdy youths 
opposed to the NMK’s interests in the waqf. The renovation grant is claimed to have been secured by a local Lamu Muslim who 
is working outside the country. Interviews with Kalandar Khan and Abuswamad A. Ali, NMK, Mombasa, September, 2015. 
59
 Waqf deeds of Nassor bin Mohammed el-Nahdy, Mombasa, fols. 62-65; 75-76; Aisha bint Abdallah bin Jabir, fol. 201, WCK 
archive, Mombasa. 
60 Waqf deed of Gulamhussein Adamji, fols. 38-39, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
61 Waqf deed of Alibhai Adamji Dhar, fols. 78-88, WCK archive, Mombasa.  
62 Waqf deed of Hassanali Karimjee Dossaji, fol. 71, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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waqf deeds that “any beneficiary who renounces the doctrines of Esmaiclia Mustacali sect of 
Daudi Bohra community shall forfeit his interest in the waqf.”63 In a separate waqf ahli by 
Moosaji Issaji,
64
 Faize Hussein of Karachi, Pakistan, and the supreme religious leader of the 
Bohra community of Mombasa were the ultimate beneficiaries and nazir respectively. This was 
not different from the waqf ahli of Jamal Sunderji Mitha in which “the poor and beggars of 
Ismai
clia Khoja community” were designated residual beneficiaries, all of which point to the 
protection of temporal sectarian interests.
65
  
Within mainstream Sunni, there also existed varied jurisprudential undertones that endowers 
protected and advanced through consecrations. Although the majority of Muslims in Kenya 
ascribe to the Shafi
c
i theology of Sunni Islam, there are also pockets of non-Shafi
c
i followers 
especially among migrant communities including the 
c
Ibadi. This could be discerned from the 
waqf charters of Muhammad bin Omar el-Aufi in which the poor of the 
c
Ibadi sect in Mombasa 
are the designated ultimate beneficiaries.
66
 The most contemporary jurisprudential discourse 
witnessed in Sunni Islam, however, regards the question of reform vis-à-vis modernism 
(Salafism) against perceived conservatism.
67
 Islamic reformism in Kenya dates back to early 
nineteenth century through efforts of local scholars like shaykh al-Amin al-Mazrui (1891-1947) 
and shaykh Salih Abdallah Farsi (1912-1982). The reform agenda gained impetus in the 1980s 
following return of indigenous Muslims from universities in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan 
(Seesemann, 2006; Kresse, 2007; Kresse and Mwakimako, 2016).  
Commonly referred to as ahl al-sunna wa
c
l-jam
c
a (people of the sunna and of the community) 
and ahl al-tariqa (lit. people of the way, conformists), the two protagonists have interpretative 
and jurisprudential conflicts revolving around tawhid (unity of God); a return to the ‘true Islam’ 
                                                          
63 Waqf deed of Alibhai Adamji Dhar, fols. 78-88, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
64 Waqf deed of Moosaji Issaji, Mombasa, fol. 120, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
65 Waqf deeds of Jamal Sunderji Mitha, fols. 89; 92-93, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
66
 
c
Ibadis are an off-shoot of the Khawarij (Kharijites) splinter group that emerged following the arbitration of Ali bin Abi Talib 
and Muacwiyyah bin Abi-Sufyan (seventh century). See Nicolini, B. (2014). Notes on Asian Presence along the Swahili Coast 
during the Nineteenth Century. Quaderni Asiatici 107 (September), 61-86; Waqf deeds of Mohammad bin Omar el-Aufi, fols. 48-
49; 56-57; 58-59 and 99, WCK archive, Mombasa.   
67
 The study loosely use the terms ‘Salafi’ and ‘Conservatism’ in relation to the two distinct ideologies on Islamic reform 
discourse. This is not to deny that both camps are essentially reformists though the former are seen as radicals 
(jihadists/fundamentalists) with literal interpretations of the text compared to their protagonists who are seen as moderates or 
conservatives.  See Seesemann, R. (2006). African Islam or Islam in Africa? Evidence from Kenya. In R. Loimeier & R. 
Seesemann. The Global worlds of the Swahili: Interfaces of Islam, Identity and Space in 19th and 20th Century (pp.229-250). 
Berlin: Lit; Richard, G. (2013). Salafi Ritual Purity in the Presence of God. London: Routledge; Lauziere, H. (2016). The Making 
of Salafism: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century. New York: Columbia University Press.  
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as envisioned in the Qur’an and Sunna and exemplified in the lives of early generation Muslims; 
the significance of some Prophetic traditions over others; the evils of bid
c
a (un-Islamic 
innovations); religious imperative of jihad (striving in the course of God); and the threat of 
Westernization on Islam among others (Gauvain, 2013:11; Richard, 2013; Lauziere, 2016). In 
this context, ahl al-sunna wa
c
l-jam
c
a, drawing mainly from Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab 
(1703-1792) and Saudi’s interpretation of Islam, are the local Salafis who claim to champion for 
puritan Islam devoid of bid
c
a allegedly characterizing their nemesis in the faith. Amidst the 
jurisprudential conflicts, waqfs have offered a platform in the range of separately established 
institutions like masjids, madrasas, and orphanages to propagate religious sectarian ideologies.  
As basically a response against perceived conservatism in Sunni Islam, Kenya’s Salafis have a 
commanding presence in almost every village in the Kenyan coast. Their network of waqf 
institutions includes those at Ramisi, Nganja, Vingujini, and Maganyakulo in the South (Kwale); 
al-Mahdi Islamic Institute at Kisauni (Mombasa); and Kikambala/Takaungu in the North. Salafis 
have in some instances also taken control of waqfs from their conservative brethren causing 
protracted bloody conflicts as was witnessed in masjids Musa in Majengo; Bahero in Kisauni; 
and Mlango wa Papa at Old town in Mombasa from 2012 to 2015.
68
 Other takeovers, were 
nonetheless, ‘peaceful’ where the conservative group chose to avoid bloody mess as was in the 
recent cases of Vingujini (2008) and Bomani (2015) in Kwale. What is evidently characteristic 
with the Salafis in Kenya as is in other parts of the world is their rigid approach to interpretation 
of religious dogmas claiming absolute authority to Islam (Gauvain, 2013:3-4). Consequently, this 
easily accords the group symbolic wherewithal to negotiate the socio-religious landscape.
69
 But 
why have masjids increasingly become fields of ideological and socio-economic negotiation and 
confrontations between Muslims in Kenya? From the experiences of Msalani masjid (see chapter 
four) to the recent (2012 to 2015) Salafi-conservatism confrontations witnessed in masjids Musa, 
                                                          
68
 Masjids Musa, renamed shuhada (martyrs’ mosque) and Bahero were suspected of being centers for militant sermons and 
recruitment of sympathizers of the Al-Shabab jihadists in Somalia. In March 2012, security officers invaded the martyrs’ mosque 
killing and arresting some youths with jihadist propaganda materials and weapons. Following the sacrilege vented upon the 
mosque, the government shortly closed it before it reverted to its original name and re-opened a few months later. Two imams 
associated with radical Islam in the area – shaykh Aboud Rogo Mohammad (August 2012) and Abu Bakar Sharif Makaburi 
(April 2014) were also assassinated under unclear circumstances triggering protests and violence in Mombasa. See also Mwangi, 
W. (Daily Nation, January 23, 2015). Mombasa Mosque Renamed Masjid Musa as Normalcy Returns. Retrieved from: 
http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Mombasa-mosque-renamed-Masjid-Musa/-/1056/2599900/-/6ir2dd/-/index.html. (Accessed April, 
2016); waqf of Buker, (waqf deed unmarked), WCK archive, Mombasa. 
69 For discussion on the spread and development of Salafi ideology in the coast of Kenya, see Mraja, M. (2007). Islamic Impacts 
on Marriage and Divorce among the Digo of Southern Kenya. Würzburg: Ergon Verlag.  
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Bahero, and Mlango wa Papa among others, intra-jurisprudential negotiations among Muslims in 
Kenya could be explained within the context of two possible lines of thought:  
In Kenya, apart from mosques serving as “centers of community worship” and other socio-
political functions (Banday, 2013:110), they are also institutions that can play “a vital role of 
directing Muslim opinions and compensate for the absence of strong supporting civic institutions 
amongst Muslims” (Mwakimako, 2007:3). Therefore, controlling a mosque space in the socially 
constructed positions of an imam, mu
c
adhdhin, shaykh, or committee member subtly accorded an 
individual the symbolic and social power as an opinion maker. These honorific titles and 
positions associated with masjids and madrasas became conduits through which holders 
benefited from economic and symbolic capital directed to such institutions either as waqfs or 
ordinary donations as was the case at Rhoda and Msalani masjids in Lamu and Mombasa 
respectively. Accordingly, Kenya’s Salafi-conservatism confrontations should also be 
understood as typical negotiations for the control of economic, social, and symbolic capital in the 
community through the platform of waqfs.  
 
Since the U.S.A 9/11 attacks and the ‘war against terror’, Muslim institutions and personalities in 
Kenya have bared the brunt of state and international security institutions against alleged 
indoctrination and radicalization of Muslim youths. Several madrasas, orphanages, masjids, and 
charitable organizations (both local and international) were shut down while imams alleged to 
harbor connections with terror networks were extra-judicially exterminated (Seesemann, 
2007:157-176; Ndzovu, 2014:118-126). Despite growing disillusionment among cross section of 
Kenyan Muslims due to perceived political marginalization, economic exclusion, and 
exploitation of the Muslim population by successive independent regimes,
70
 none of the 
reviewed waqf charters designated qital (fighting) as beneficiary purpose.
71
  
 
Arguably, Kenya’s Salafi-conservatism confrontation is a discourse over ‘correct interpretations’ 
of Islam manifested in the negotiation between new and old local socio-cultural orders. In the 
                                                          
70
 This position finds credence in the existence of the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) – a quasi-political and militant group 
that advocates for secession of the coast region citing economic exclusion, exploitation, and political marginalization by the state. 
Sympathizers of this group are drawn primarily from coastal ethnicities but cut across the religious divide. 
71 Qital is the specific concept that denotes physical force or fighting in the generic term jihad that generally stands for ‘striving 
in the course of God.’ See Qur’an 22:39; Qur’an 2:190-191; Alterman, J. (2007). Saudi Charities and Support for Terror. In J. 
Alterman & K. von Hippel (Eds.), Understanding Islamic Charities (pp.64-80). Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies. 
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ensued controversies and conflicts that could narrowly be misconstrued for political negotiations, 
waqfs – particularly masjids, orphanages, and madrasas – only accorded the two parties the 
needed platform.
72
 This is, however, not to deny that Kenyan Muslims are informed of the global 
grievances by the umma including the American policy in the Middle-East and its support of 
Israel over Palestine; its invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq; and the ‘war against 
terror’ in which Muslims have become the obvious targets.  
 
6.5 Exploitation of Waqfs: Non-Shari
c
a Activities, Disregarding Principles of 
Sound Investment, and Challenges of Attaining Qurba 
As explained elsewhere in this study, 
c
ana, hikr and istibdal are commercial transactions 
whereby ruined and non-performing revenue generating waqfs are leased, rented out, sold, or 
exchanged, to improve revenues or even acquire better alternatives to fulfill the aspirations of the 
waqif. It is not so common that a mutawalli would disregard shurut al-waqif on these profit 
maximizing investments that put waqf properties in private hands for long periods of lease or 
rent. However, with the authority of the kadhi, shurut al-waqif, especially on period of lease, 
could be disregarded based on best management practices for the good of the waqf. Within this 
background, therefore, 
c
ana, hikr and istibdal are clearly an exception rather than a rule 
undertaken in the best interests of the waqf. Yet it turns out that there are some waqfs whose rent 
or lease contracts fell short of the expectations of Shari
c
a as elaborated in this section of the 
study.  
The Shari
c
a holds that waqfs should only be used in perpetuity for the purpose of seeking qurba. 
This include acts within the legal framework of Shari
c
a that do not stray from the halal 
(permitted) parameters like promotion of religious ideologies other than Islam, engaging in the 
sale of alcohol, and brothels among others. While establishing waqf, therefore, the endower 
essentially sets out to fulfill this basic dogma but how the corpus and usufruct are used in future 
determines whether or not the initial aim remains. This is true when waqfs are looked at through 
the prism of perpetuity. To attain perpetuity, the Shari
c
a allows 
c
ana, hikr and istibdal of the 
corpus, but does not preclude non-Muslims in the business contracts. Although non-Muslims 
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 See also Anderson, D. and McKnight, J. (2015). Understanding al-Shabab: Clan, Islam and Insurgency in Kenya. Journal of 
Eastern African Studies, 9(3), 536-557. 
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who benefit from these contracts are expected to conduct legal businesses according to Shari
c
a, 
this may not necessarily be the case as evident in two scenarios:  
The first case involves unclaimed estate of a deceased Muslim handed over to the WCK by the 
public trustee.
73
 As early as 1938, records indicate that the property was leased several times to 
different people until 1950 when it fell in the leasehold rights of a non-Muslim entrepreneur who 
converted it into a bar and restaurant.
74
 Since then, the waqf changed hands between leaseholders 
until 1992 when the current lessee renovated it to a popular night club in town commonly known 
as Casablanca. All the while, the WCK could only sanction the transfer of leasehold rights and 
obtain minimal consent fee and annual rent but efforts to prevail upon the lessees to stop the un-
Islamic business have proved futile.
75
 
The second case involves some corpus of waqf ahli of the Bamkele at Tudor in Mombasa town 
that underwent similar experiences as the one above until it was converted into a Church. Like 
the previous one, efforts by the beneficiaries to stop the leaseholders from conducting un-Islamic 
worship in the waqf failed. As established by the study, beneficiaries and the WCK lose control 
of how leasehold rights should be enjoyed because early 
c
ana and hikr contracts did not include 
prohibitive clauses against un-Islamic uses of waqfs.
76
 To reverse this trend, the WCK embarked 
on re-drafting the contracts to provide for such clauses and deny the renewal of expired leases 
until lessees complied with the requirement to ensure that businesses undertaken in waqf 
premises were Shari
c
a compliant.
77
  
Another, though yet to be explored, alternative to liberate the above waqfs is the invocation of 
sections 16(2) and 17 of the WCK Act on the disposal of waqfs (see chapter three). The Act 
                                                          
73
 Section 18 of the WCK Act, CAP 109 (1951) provides; “[…] notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Law of 
Succession Act, any property of a deceased Muslim to which no claim has been established within one year from the date upon 
which that property vested in the administrator of the estate or in the Public Trustee shall be handed over to the Waqf 
Commissioners by the administrator or Public Trustee […] in the form of money […] into a Special Fund created for the purpose 
to be known as the Surplus fund.”   
74 Plot 226/xx1, Majestic /Kilindini hotel, currently Casablanca bar and restaurant, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
75 From 1950 to 1960, the property was sub-leased at three thousand Kenya shillings per month while the WCK was entitled to 
ninety shillings per month as rent. In April 1992, the lease holder sold his rights for three million and five hundred thousand 
Kenya shillings where the WCK got one thousand shillings only as consent fee, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
76 Contemporary lease hold contracts drawn by the WCK have a prohibitive clause over non-Islamic use of waqfs. It provides; 
“[…] the lessee hereby covenants with the leaser not to permit or suffer illegal use of the premises or any part thereof which 
would offend in any law and, in particular, the beliefs of Muslims which the leaser in its sole and exclusive discretion considers 
improper and prohibitory under Islam.” Clause (e), lease contract, 2012, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
77 Leasehold of plot xx/62/A Mombasa to Almasi M. Mukira. See also correspondence between lessees and the WCK, 
November, 2011; January - February, 2012, WCK archive, Mombasa.  
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provides for the disposal of waqfs whose initial goals cannot be met and the proceeds used in 
alternative social welfare causes. Presently, the initial purposes of the waqfs have adequately 
been tampered with inhibiting the attainment of sawab and qurba. Thus, this provides enough 
ground for the disposal of the waqfs to acquire alternative corpuses to fulfill the aspirations of the 
endowers rather than wait until 2040 when the leases are set to expire.
78
 
Moreover, a close scrutiny of decisions by the state agency to invest some waqf properties to 
improve their output reveals a disturbing picture. Foremost among violations of principles of 
sound investment regards the period of lease of waqfs in the community. A cross section of 
waqfs that provided for the leasing of the properties restricted the period to ten years.
79
 
Undoubtedly, this was meant to allow for periodic review of the terms of the agreement in view 
of ijar al-mithal. However, the period of lease in Kenya as informed by the land policy ranges 
from 33, 66, to 99 years where properties could be transferred in between from one leaseholder 
to another.
80
 As a matter of fact, majority if not all leased waqfs were committed to the 
maximum period from as early as the 1890s shortly after the establishment of WCK. Even those 
whose leases expired in the 1990s were further renewed for the same period. Considering that 
c
ana and hikr require that priority be accorded the economic and spiritual interests of the waqf, it 
is difficult to imagine that this is achievable in circumstances where waqfs are eternally 
committed.  
A number of grounds could substantiate the foregoing: First, pre-independence lease contracts, 
as narrated elsewhere, were devoid of prohibitive clauses against use of waqfs contrary to the 
Shari
c
a. This partly explains the quagmire facing the waqfs of Casablanca and Bamkele that 
were converted into night club and Church respectively. Secondly, committing waqfs to 
perpetual leases did not consider fluctuation of the economy such as providing options for 
periodic review of rates in relation to ijar al-mithal. Consequently, with the passing of time, 
leased waqfs realized miserable returns in old rates as lessees refurbished and sub-let the 
corpuses at higher prices.
81
 Thirdly, the lease contracts lacked withdrawal clauses that could help 
recover waqfs whose lessees breached the agreement. Against this backdrop, leases became 
                                                          
78  Interview with ustadh Abdulkadir Mao, Bayreuth, April, 2014. 
79
 Waqf deeds of Haji Ebrahim Haji Adam, fols. 30-31; Mwanajumbe bint Ali bin Khamis, fols. 32; 34-35; Mohammed bin Omar 
el-Auf, folio nos. 48/49; Haji Ismael Haji Adam, fol. 51, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
80 See Sections 85 and 88, Registered Land Act, Cap 300 (Revised 2010), Laws of Kenya. 
81 Interviews with Muhammad Shalli and Zubeir Noor, Mombasa, October-December, 2014. 
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avenues for the dismemberment of waqfs and to privilege some ‘noble’ individuals and business 
people contrary to what 
c
ana and hikr envisage.  
A review of some waqf leases could aptly corroborate the above observation. First is the lease of 
Mombasa/Block X1/295 to Lucy Wanjiku Ndichu for a period of 99 years at the rent of twenty 
five Kenya shillings per annum from 1942. In March 2014, the lessee used the premise as 
security for a bank loan of four million Kenya shillings.
82
 This implies that the WCK would 
receive two shillings and eight cents per month as rent of the waqf until the expiry of the lease in 
2041 while the lessee continues to benefit immensely. Clearly, even if the rent was economical 
then, it ceased being so but the contract could not be renegotiated owing to the explained 
reasons.  
Apart from bank loans that lessees benefit from charging waqfs, they could as well trade their 
leasehold rights for profit as provided for by the civil statute, a scenario exemplified by several 
cases. For instance, Rashid Abdallah Ruweiny applied to lease waqf plot no. 165/30 in Mombasa 
in 1981 and offered five thousand Kenya shillings as premium and three hundred shillings annual 
rent for 66 years.
83
 Six years later, Ruweiny sold his leasehold interest to Naushadhussein 
Mohammed Jiwa for thirty thousand Kenya shillings where the WCK only got six hundred and 
forty shillings as consent fee.
84
 Three years later, Jiwa transferred the same plot to Abdushakoor 
Mohammad Hashim Khandwalla for nine hundred and fifty thousand Kenya shillings.
85
  
By 1992, the waqf plot was worthy one million Kenya shillings when it changed ownership again 
from Khandwalla to Ali Islam Said. This time, the WCK got one thousand shillings as consent 
fee.
86
 In July 2001, Ali traded the plot again for two point seven million Kenya shillings to Grace 
Mumbi and Edith Wamatha Njuguna while the WCK got one thousand shillings as consent fee.
87
 
In 2004, the leasehold right of the waqf was again transferred at three million Kenya shillings by 
Njuguna and Mumbi to Jeylan M. Kollatein with the WCK getting its traditional share of consent 
fee and twenty five shillings monthly rent.
88
 Thus, within a span of two decades, the waqf lost 
                                                          
82 Certificate of lease of Mombasa/Block X1/295, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
83 Lease of plot 165/30 Mombasa. See also minutes 86/1981(27); 19/1982(16), WCK archive, Mombasa. 
84 Transfer of lease agreement of plot 165/30 Mombasa, March, 1987, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
85 Transfer of lease agreement of plot 165/30 Mombasa, May, 1990, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
86 Transfer of lease agreement of plot 165/30 Mombasa, February, 1992, WCK archive, Mombasa.  
87 Transfer of lease agreement of plot 165/30, Mombasa, July 2001; correspondence between the WCK and Advocate, June - 
July, 2004, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
88 Transfer of lease agreement of plot 165/30, August, 2004, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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about three million Kenya shillings at the expense of ten thousand six hundred and forty shillings 
as consent fee and annual rent. This scenario reverberates in most of the leased waqfs across the 
community as shown in Table 3. 
 
S/No 
 
Waqf 
Corpus 
Period/Value 
at 1
st
 lease 
Period/Value 
at 2
nd
 lease 
Period/Value 
at 3
rd
 lease 
Period/Value 
at 4
th
 lease 
Period/Value 
at 5
th
 lease 
1 Empty land, 
0.0535 
acres (SFA 
4, plot 
165/30) 
1981 
  
Ksh. 5,000/= 
1987 
 
Ksh. 
30,000/= 
1990  
 
950, 000/= 
1992 
 
Ksh.1 M 
2001  
Ksh. 2.7 M  
(6
th
 value 
2004, Ksh. 
3M) 
2 Empty land, 
0.1315 
acres, Old 
Town (SFA 
1, plot 
175/30) 
1981 
 
Ksh. 
35,000/= 
1986  
 
Ksh. 
650,000/= 
1987  
 
Ksh. 
840,000/= 
2009 
 
Ksh. 7.5 M 
Yet to be 
traded 
3 House with 
land, 
0.9504 
acres, 
Kilindini 
Rd (SFA 5, 
plot 
176/21). 
1942  
 
Ksh. 900/= 
@ year 
1972  
(Sub-leased)  
 
Ksh. 1,010/= 
@ year 
2008  
 
Ksh. 7 M 
2009  
 
Ksh. 25 M 
Yet to be 
traded 
4 Empty land, 
Plot 
132/XLII 
(SFA 8), 
waqf of 
Salim bin 
Ali, Lamu 
1974 
 
Ksh. 
780/=@ year 
1984 (Lease 
extension) 
  
Ksh. 
40,000/= 
1987 
 
Sub-leased @ 
Ksh. 
7,000/=month 
2013 
 
Ksh. 6 M 
Yet to be 
traded 
 
Table 3. Appreciation of some leased waqfs in Mombasa and Lamu towns.   (Source: WCK archive, Mombasa). 
 
As evident from the Table, the value of waqfs shot drastically almost immediately they were 
leased from the WCK at minimal rates. The value of land particularly appreciated in the 2000s, 
making lessees of land waqfs to benefit immensely at the expense of designated beneficiaries and 
causes. Taking waqf corpus no. 3 for instance, the value appreciated at 257.1per cent within one 
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year. The most dramatic rise was that of waqf no. 2 between its third and fourth transfer of the 
lease when the value shot to seven point five million Kenya shillings from eight hundred and 
forty thousand shillings. This represents 792.9 per cent rise within one decade at an average 
appreciation rate of about 66.1 per cent per annum.  
All the while, the WCK was getting one thousand Kenya shillings as consent fee and probably 
less for annual rent. More ironical is the offer for lease of empty waqf lands as evident in cases 1, 
2, and 4 in the Table that are most likely held for speculative purposes. To redress this scenario, 
the WCK undertook valuation of waqfs around 2010 where renewal of leases was since then 
pegged at thirty per cent of the market value of the property with annual rent equal to municipal 
rates or increased at twenty five per cent every ten years as decided by the WCK.
89
 It equally 
restricted the use of waqfs against the Shari
c
a including bars, night clubs, and Churches. These 
efforts, nevertheless, benefited a small portion of waqfs whose leases were expiring around that 
time, but did not affect those whose contracts were running. Worse still, they failed to redress the 
administrative loopholes that ‘noble’ individuals and business people exploited with impunity in 
total disregard of the principles of 
c
ana and hikr. This could not be so vividly captured than in 
the following illustrations: 
 
6.5.1 The Case of Munir Mazrui versus Zubeda Nahdy 
The lease contract of waqf plot 103/30 Mombasa presents a clear case where principles of sound 
investment of waqfs were compromised for the economic benefit of ‘noble’ individuals. The 
corpus was an empty piece of land that attracted two bids when it was offered for lease in 1983. 
The first bidder, Zubeda M. A. Nahdy, offered twenty thousand Kenya shillings premium and 
fifteen thousand shillings annual rent for 66 years. The second bidder, Munir Mazrui, offered 
fifteen thousand Kenya shillings premium with two hundred and forty shillings annual rent for 
99 years. Paradoxically, upon deliberation, the WCK “felt that although [bidder] number two 
above has quoted low figures both premium and rent, they had every reason to believe that it will 
be proper to lease the plot to Munir Mazrui.”90  
                                                          
89 Correspondence between the WCK and Advocate, March, 2011, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
90 Minute 27/1983(26) of April, 1983, the WCK, Mombasa. See also letter of offer of lease to Munir Mazrui, April, 1983; lease 
contract of January, 1984, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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Accepting a lower bid in rejection of a higher offer was undoubtedly not in the interest of the 
waqf as expected by the principles of 
c
ana and hikr. Above all, the alleged winner of the bid had 
by October 1984 paid only half of the premium and annual rent as required.
91
 Despite several 
reminders and petitions from Commissioners, the payments had not been concluded by 2004, 
two decades after award of the lease and the WCK sought to cancel the offer.
92
 In a twist of fate, 
four days after the ‘cancellation’ of the offer, the lessee paid the premium minus the annual rent 
that had accumulated to forty four thousand nine hundred and ninety four Kenya shillings.
93
 The 
payment of the premium cooled down the tempo in the WCK and the lease was not recalled as 
scheduled.  
Argued from the perspective of best management practices and the objectives of 
c
ana, Zubeda 
should have won the bid. More so, continued gross violation of the preferred winner of the bid 
provided sufficient ground to annul the lease so that it could be retendered. Could the socio-
political position of the Mazrui in Mombasa and the coast region as a whole influenced the 
decision?
94
 It is clear that social and symbolic power of the Mazrui informed the award of the 
lease and continues to accommodate the gross violation of the contract. The resultant effect of 
these compromises is to suppress the economic interests of the waqf to buttress the social and 
symbolic privileges of some ‘noble’.95 
 
 
                                                          
91 Payment notice of October, 1984, WCK archive, Mombasa.  
92 Correspondence between the WCK and Munir Mazrui’s Advocate from January, 1997 – January, 1993. See also minutes 
57/93(25); 23/98(7), WCK archive, Mombasa. 
93 Rent demand notice of February, 2005 to Munir Mazrui, the WCK, Mombasa.  See also cancellation letter of January, 2004; 
minute 3/2004(3), WCK archive, Mombasa. 
94 Apart from being an Arab descendant, Munir Mazrui is also an activist associated with Muslims for Human Rights 
(MUHURI), an NGO established in 1997 and based in Mombasa. He also served as vice chairman of the Supreme Council of 
Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM). 
95 In 1998 when the lessee had not completed paying the premium despite several reminders, a relative and Commissioner then, 
shaykh Khamis Muhammad Omar Mazrui volunteered to follow up the matter but failed to yield results. In 2003, the lessee 
undertook to pay the balance in ten days when WCK referred the matter to an Advocate with a view to taking court action, a 
promise that he also failed to keep. While making partial payment upon threats to terminate the contract for breach of trust, he 
left accumulated balances totaling almost forty five thousand Kenya shillings and still the contract was not revoked. It is this 
impunity hindering fulfillment of the endower’s wishes in the waqf that some beneficiaries questioned and cited ‘nobility’ as a 
likely reason for his being tolerated while other tenants were either evicted or had their properties auctioned to recover rent 
arrears. See minutes 23/98(7); 3/2004(3); Munir’s letter to the WCK, 27/11/2003; notice of cancellation of lease, 16/1/2004; 
demand notice, 14/2/2005, WCK archive, Mombasa. Group interviews with Hamid Salim Bamkele, Ali Salim Bamkele, 
Abdurahman Bamkele and Ahmed Bahaidar Bamkele, Mombasa, November, 2015. 
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6.5.2 The Case of Waqfs Leased to Shigog and other Rent Contracts.  
Shigog Investments limited was an enterprise by a prominent Muslim businessman who 
immensely benefited from waqf leases during the 1980s.
96
 With possible social, symbolic, and 
economic influence, Shigog won bids floated for lease of waqfs stretching from Mombasa to 
Malindi and Mambrui in the north coast. The enterprise was awarded a total of thirteen leases in 
one bid that beneficiaries claimed to be against ijar al-mithal eliciting uproar that forced the 
WCK to seek for renegotiation.
97
 As established during the period of study, indeed the rates of 
several waqfs were due for review as negotiated between the WCK and the lessee with others 
earmarked for surrender as shown in Table 4.  
Nevertheless, the negotiations were very delicate and involving several efforts to persuade the 
lessee to cede grounds with the view of “assisting the Muslim community.”98 The WCK could 
not force the lessee to renegotiate or surrender any of the waqfs since the deal was sealed in his 
favor the questionable circumstances notwithstanding. It is one thing to conclude lease contracts 
based on informed valuation of waqfs and it is another to ask the lessee to renegotiate the terms 
of a running lease in view of changed economic circumstances. The later is not guaranteed based 
on mere convictions to sway the lessee to ‘fear God’ at the expense of his economic interests in a 
legally concluded business agreement. Until the renegotiations were concluded, the waqfs 
realized revenues below ijar al-mithal. 
Closely related to leases were also waqfs offered for residential occupancy contracts contrary to 
best management practices of 
c
ana and hikr. Like the leases, a closer scrutiny of how the WCK 
negotiates the tenancy landscape also unveils a pattern with most of the waqfs under its custody 
as pointed out in a brief survey. The first involves a house in Mombasa endowed as waqf khayri 
                                                          
96
 The WCK also leased thirteen waqfs to Kermally Jaffer for 99 years from December 1913. The contract was un-procedurally 
renewed in 1985, seventeen years before the scheduled expiry of the lease. This was contested by the beneficiaries leading to 
court petitions that cost the state agency Kenya shillings eight million as out of court settlement for the surrender of the lease in 
2010. See Civil Suit no. 156 of 2000 in the High Court in the matter of Sultanali Kermally (plaintiff) against the WCK 
(defendants); memo of November, 2006, minute 6/2007, the WCK, Mombasa; correspondence between the WCK and Advocates, 
December, 2007 to October 2010; minutes 108/2007; 10/2010; 29/2010(5); Fairlane Valuers Limited report on waqfs leased to 
Kermally Jaffer, October, 2010, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
97 Since lease agreements had sealed the rates, there was no way other than appealing to the lessees to consider the fate of poor 
beneficiaries of the waqfs either to surrender or increase their annual rents in view of prevailing market rates and persistent 
protests by beneficiaries. Some lessees, however, volunteered to increase the rates even before being persuaded to do so by the 
WCK. Interviews with Muhammad Shalli and Zubeir Noor, Mombasa, October - December, 2014. See also correspondence 
between the WCK and Shigog investments limited, Mombasa, November, 2005; minute 42/2011(4); letter to Shigog Investments 
Ltd requesting for surrender of lease of plot XLI/84 (the waqf of Bamkele), Mombasa, May, 2012, WCK archive, Mombasa.  
98 Correspondence between WCK and Shigog investments limited, Mombasa, November, 2005, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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for the usufruct of masjid Mandhry. This waqf was rented out at modest rates and faced revenue 
decline due to defaulting tenants.
99
 To coerce tenants into paying, the WCK threatened legal 
action against them and this realized some payments though tenants reverted to default shortly 
thereafter.
100
 
 
Waqf name Location Current rent 
@month in 
Ksh. 
WCK 
proposed rent 
@ month in 
Ksh. 
Shigog 
proposed rate 
@ month in 
Ksh. 
Agreed rate 
Said & Atiya Magogoni, 
Lamu 
500.00 35,000.00 2,000.00 Under review 
Ali Mutwafy Old Town, 
Mombasa 
750.00 1,500.00 1,000.00 1,200.00 
Rashid bin 
Soud 
Old Town, 
Mombasa 
750.00 1,500.00 1,000.00 1,200.00 
Bamkele Biashara St., 
Mombasa 
3,250.00 10,000.00 5,000.00 6,500.00 
Mwinyikombo Ndia Kuu, 
Mombasa 
1,875.00 1,875.00 1,875.00 1,875.00 
Mandhry 1 Ndia Kuu, 
Mombasa 
1,250.00 1,250.00 1,250.00 1,250.00 
Mandhry 2 Kibokoni, 
Mombasa 
750.00 1,000.00 1,000.00 1,000.00 
Mwijabu 1 Makadar Rd, 
Mombasa 
6,250.00 25,000.00 7,000.00 8,400.00 
Mwijabu 2 Biashara St., 
Mombasa 
1,250.00 5,000.00 2,000.00 3,000.00 
Shimbwa Mzizima Rd., 
Mombasa 
750.00 1,500.00 1,000.00 1,000.00 
Islam bin Ali Mambrui 433.00 433.00 600.00 600.00 
Muhammad 
Shaksy 
Watamu 833.00 - - Surrender 
Lali Hadaa Malindi 2,292.00 2,292.00 - Under review 
 
Table 4: A cross section of the waqfs leased to Shigog investments limited, Mombasa proposed for review to reflect 
prevailing market rates.        (Source: WCK archive, Mombasa). 
                                                          
99 Letters of reminder to tenant on unpaid rent, April - June, 1938; April, 1954; October, 1955, WCK archive, Mombasa.  
100 Letter to tenants, June, 1942, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
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All the while the WCK did not get prompt revenue from the waqf as expected, beneficence 
aspirations of the endower were affected; and when revenue finally came, repair, maintenance, 
municipal taxes, and administration costs took precedence. On the other hand, tenants who 
accumulated rent arrears disappeared without paying and some even vandalized the waqf as they 
moved out.
101
  
To improve the waqf’s revenue, WCK leased it for 99 years from 1988. Surprisingly, among the 
bidders were tenants who were perennial rent defaulters. The tenants, nevertheless, lost and the 
successful bidder paid fifty thousand Kenya shillings as premium and committed to one thousand 
shillings monthly rent increased at twenty five per cent every ten years.
102
 The lessee then 
renovated and sub-let the waqf for higher income but became a perennial defaulter to the WCK 
rents and municipal taxes.
103
 Despite rent default by a lessee being a breach of contract that 
qualifies cancellation of the agreement as provided in the new (1980s) contract regulations, the 
WCK failed to repossess the waqf making it to suffer revenue deficiency at the expense of 
economic interests of the lessee.
104
 
The second waqf, also in Mombasa, concerns residential properties endowed for the benefit of 
masjid Mwijabu and rented out to improve revenue. By 1970s, the tenants owed the WCK 
thousands of Kenya shillings in unpaid rent prompting the state agency to take legal action to 
recover the arrears.
105
 But why are tenants of waqfs perennial rent defaulters? Despite the WCK 
offering the modest rates in town, most tenants are alleged to be of the low socio-economic 
stratum – widows, unemployed, small-scale merchants, and casual laborers to name but a few.106 
                                                          
101
 Interview with Rashid Mwandeo, the WCK, Mombasa, October-December, 2014. 
102 Lease contract on property no. 45/30, waqf of Mandhry, November, 1988; minute 29/88(18) of 1988, WCK archive, 
Mombasa. 
103 By September 2004, the lessee owed the WCK four hundred and ninety five thousand, four hundred Kenya shillings in unpaid 
rent. By August 2007, the arrears had fallen to two hundred and twenty two thousands, one hundred and fifty one shillings after 
part payment but shot again to four hundred and eighty two thousand five hundred shillings by April 2009 due to default. See 
also letters of reminder of unpaid rent arrears of August, 2007, WCK archive, Mombasa.  
104 Clause 7 of the Lease agreement states; “[…] in the event of rent herein remaining unpaid for a space of fourteen (14) days 
from the date on which the same becomes due and payable or if there be any breach or non-observance of covenants herein on 
the part of the lessee to be performed then in such event the leasers will be at liberty to determine this lease and re-enter the 
leased premises without prejudice to their rights for bringing separate actions for the enforcement of any such antecedent 
breaches.” See lease agreement template, WCK archive, Mombasa.  
105 Letters of reminder on rent arrears and notice to institute legal proceedings to recover rent from tenants, June, 1971- June, 
1984, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
106
 Drawing from land rates in Lamu, for instance, the WCK charges one thousand one hundred and twenty Kenya shillings 
annually against County rates of three thousand two hundred and fifty shillings for a similar property. Interviews with Municipal 
Lands Officer, Lamu, December, 2015; Mohammad Shalli, Mombasa; November, 2014; Thabit Abu Bakar Omar al-Maawy, 
Lamu, December, 2015. 
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This narrative is, however, largely untrue and misleading as established by the study. Faced by 
financial constraints, the WCK failed to maintain the waqf and it became structurally damaged 
attracting the attention of municipal public health officers who threatened to sue for negligence 
and cause of public health hazard.
107
  
Efforts by the WCK in 1987 to raise monthly rent in relation to ijar al-mithal were objected by 
tenants terming the move unfair and inconsiderate to their socio-economic plight.
108
 Against a 
market rate of twenty thousand Kenya shillings the waqf was realizing one thousand seven 
hundred shillings only.
109
 The WCK, therefore, called for bids to lease the waqf and as usual, it 
attracted interest including those from the defaulting tenants.
110
 Finally, it was offered for the 
maximum period at seven hundred and fifty thousand Kenya shillings premium and five 
thousand shillings monthly rent increased at twenty five per cent every ten years. Not without a 
fight though as tenants who lost the bid challenged the award.
111
 A year later, the lessee sought 
permission to develop the waqf to which the WCK consented.  
In July 1998, the WCK was sued by the municipal council for unpaid taxes on the waqf. It turns 
out that the lessee reneged on this responsibility as agreed in the contract.
112
 Despite several 
pleas, he failed to pay council taxes prompting the WCK to invoke breach of contract to 
repossess the waqf. Two weeks after ‘cancellation’ of contract, however, the lessee paid the 
municipal taxes and the takeover was halted. By September 2004, he owed the WCK four 
hundred and ninety five thousand, four hundred Kenya shillings in unpaid rent. It was further 
established that he failed to renovate and develop the premises as earlier agreed, thereby leaving 
the waqf in ruins.  
Plot no. 46/VI at Makadara Road, Mombasa is the third and final in this brief survey. The 
property was consecrated as waqf khayri by Mohammed bin Rashid Badai and vested in the 
trusteeship of the WCK. The corpus of this waqf was a residential flat with two units whose rent 
                                                          
107 Warning notices from the Municipal Health Department, July, 1971-July, 1984, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
108 Letter of reply by tenants on notice to increase rent, July 1987, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
109 WYCO Valuers Company Limited report, January, 2011, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
110 Invitation for bids to lease properties 77/38 & 78/38, Mombasa, WF/169/68, July, 1988; letter of application to lease, July, 
1988, WCK archive, Mombasa.  
111
 Correspondence between Advocate of the complainant and the WCK, October -September, 1988, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
112 Article 4 of the lease agreement states; “[…] the lessee shall pay such rates, taxes, duties, assessments and outgoings of 
whatever description as may be imposed, charged or assessed by any government or local authority upon the land or the building 
erected thereon.” See also correspondence between the WCK, Municipal Council of Mombasa and Shigog Investments Ltd, July, 
1998-March, 1999, WCK archive, Mombasa.  
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experience is not different from the previous two. Again, the WCK sued the tenants to recover 
rent arrears where they were subsequently evicted for default.
113
 Upon eviction of the tenants, the 
flat was rented again but went through the same ordeal and the WCK was unable to maintain it to 
fulfill the aspirations of the endower. By 1987 the waqf was being rented to a composite tenant at 
five hundred and twenty five Kenya shillings per month. In its rent assessment of July 1994, 
however, the Ministry of Public Works and Housing recommended a raise to two thousand four 
hundred and fifty Kenya shillings per unit and the WCK notified its tenant of the proposed 
changes.
114
     
Since the WCK was unable to renovate the flat, the tenant undertook the repairs and recovered 
his costs from the rent as well as by direct refund from the WCK. Clearly, the tenant was 
accorded preferential treatment because every time there were repairs, he only informed the 
Chief Kadhi who authorized him and initiated refund of his incurred expenses.
115
 This was 
against a policy by the state agency that neither allowed repairs by tenants nor refunded 
unsanctioned renovations undertaken by them. Amidst this scenario where the waqf was 
realizing minimal rent but incurring huge maintenance costs, it experienced financial challenges 
that could only be remedied through tasrif as summarized in its account statement of December 
1987 to December 1996 (see Table 5). More so, continued internal borrowing to sustain the waqf 
contradicted a requirement by the WCK Act that such funds be refunded within five years.
116
 
To turn round the waqf output, the WCK applied to the Rent Restriction Tribunal (hereafter the 
Tribunal) to have the rent revised in view of ijar al-mithal.
117
 Upon assessment, the Tribunal 
recommended five thousand Kenya shillings and forty down from the WCK’s plea of seven 
                                                          
113 Civil Suits nos. 50 of 1943 and 271 of 1945, High Court, between the WCK (Applicant) vs Harban Singh Kalsi (Respondent). 
See also correspondence between the WCK’s Advocate and tenant, February, 1943to April, 1945, WCK archive, Mombasa. 
114 Notice of assessment by Ministry of Public Works and Housing, July, 1994; notice to increase rent by September, 1995, WCK 
archive, Mombasa. 
115 Correspondence between shaykh Ali Muhammad Mwinzagu and the Chief Kadhi, November, 1990 to November, 1996; April, 
1997to July, 1999. See also payment vouchers, January, 1991 to November, 1996; invoice for repairs, November, 1999; payment 
voucher, December, 1997; minutes 8/98; 32/98; 3/99(32), WCK archive, Mombasa. 
116
 Section 19 (ii) of the WCK Act provides; “[…] if satisfied that any property the subject of a waqf khairi is urgently in need of 
any expenditure for repairs or for any other purpose, the waqf commissioners may, not withstanding that there exists property the 
subject of that waqf, utilize the revenue arising from the subject of some other waqf khairi for the purpose, if the waqf 
commissioners are satisfied that the amount of the revenue so utilized will, without prejudice to the purposes of waqf in 
connection with which it is used, be repaid out of the property of that waqf within five years from the date of being so utilized.”  
117 The Rent Restriction Tribunal works under the auspices of the Landlord and Tenant Act (reviewed 2007). It seeks to protect 
tenants against exploitation and adjudicate tenancy disputes arising from premises rented for less than fifteen thousand Kenya 
shillings per month. See section 3, Landlord and Tenant Act 2007 laws of Kenya.   
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thousand five hundred shillings per unit. Therefore, the composite tenant was to pay ten thousand 
and eighty Kenya shillings per month in total rent.
118
 However, he appealed to the WCK to pay 
two thousand five hundred Kenya shillings instead, leading to a tug-of-war between the two 
parties. A compromise was, nevertheless, reached in July 1999 with the two parties consenting to 
four thousand Kenya shillings per month waiving six thousand and eighty shillings.  
 
Particulars/Date:   Debit (Ksh.)    Credit (Ksh.) 
Rent (Dec.’87-Dec.’96) @525/= monthly     73, 950.00 
 Municipal taxes    6, 939. 75.      
 Administration fees   7, 844. 65       
 Repair and maintenance   59, 344. 00 
  
 Totals:     74, 128. 40    73, 950. 00 
 Balance:         - 178. 40 
 
Table 5. Statement of account for the waqf of Mohammed bin Rashid Badai, Mombasa, for the period from 
December 1987 to December 1996.                  (Source: WCK archive, Mombasa). 
 
When the WCK commissioned a valuation of some of its waqfs in Mombasa town in 2010, the 
disparity of its rates on waqfs in prime locations in relation to ijar al-mithal came to the fore as 
illustrated in Table 6 below. This made the WCK to implement the rates proposed by the valuer 
in disregard of the rate guidelines from the Tribunal. While others accepted the changes, the 
tenant to plot 46/VI objected and sought audience with the state agency to present counter 
proposals. During the consultative meeting, it was agreed that the tenant would pay six thousand 
Kenya shillings monthly for the rest of his life.
119
 “It is one thing for a tenant to be permanently 
in arrears in his rent”, observed Scott (1987:423), “it is another for him to claim the de facto 
                                                          
118 Rent Restriction Assessment case no. 89 of 1994 in the matter of plot 46/VI, the WCK (landlord/applicant) Vs. shaykh Ali M. 
Mwinzagu (tenant/respondent);  Tribunal Assessment no. 89 of 1994, March, 1997; Rent Control Certificate, April, 1997, WCK 
archive, Mombasa. 
119
 Correspondence between the WCK and shaykh Ali Mwinzagu, June – October, 2011. See also minute 53/2011(8), WCK 
archive, Mombasa. 
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lower rent as a formal privilege. The former is an informal concession that can often, when the 
opportunity arises, be reclaimed. The latter is likely to be territory lost for good.” In this regard, 
conceding to the tenant’s counter proposal for life was clearly a misconceived hikr contract for 
the waqf. 
 
Plot No. Type of waqf 
property 
Location of 
property 
WCK Rent as at 
2010 (in Ksh.) 
Valuers’ 
proposed market 
rates (in Ksh.) 
Msa, 33/38 2 units 
residential flat 
Kibokoni, 
Mombasa 
15, 000.00 20, 000.00 
Msa, 17/697 4 units 
residential flat 
Gulshan, 
Mombasa 
12, 000.00 16, 000.00 
Msa, 24/41 2 units 
residential flat 
Makadara Rd, 
Mombasa 
30, 000.00 36, 000.00 
Msa, 
(37/72)46/VI 
2 units 
residential flat 
Makadara Rd, 
Mombasa 
4, 000.00 12, 000.00 
 
Table 6: Monthly rent charged on selected residential waqfs in Mombasa town as at 2010.  (Source: WYCO Valuers 
Co. Ltd report, January, 2011, WCK archive, Mombasa). 
 
A number of issues in the brief survey of hikr cases merit comments. It turns out that there exists 
profound perception among cross section of Kenyan Muslims, particularly in the former 
Protectorate, that waqfs should be reasonably cheap if not entirely free. This perception was no 
where obvious in three incidents experienced during field work. The first concerns the two 
Swahili women who complained of increased rent on waqf houses (see chapter four). The second 
concerns a rhetorical question common among tenants of waqfs in Lamu posed to the agent 
whenever he goes round collecting rent thus, “kwani cha nskiti nchako?” (Is it yours that which 
belongs to the mosque?).
120
 The irony here is why one would be bothered by public rather than 
personal issues.  
 
The third incident involved a tenant who came to the WCK office to pay his rent following 
threats to sue him for default. While paying, he lamented against the rates being so ‘high’ not 
different from municipal ones yet the property was waqf. “By nature waqf kitu cha rahisi bana!” 
                                                          
120 Interview with Thabit Abu Bakar Maawy, Lamu, December, 2015 (translation is mine). 
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(waqf is naturally cheap!), remarked Jelian Haji Badawi Boosri. In this occasion, Badawi was 
paying thirty four thousand four hundred and seventy Kenya shillings as three years’ rent 
arrears.
121
 While lamenting paying this lump sum as accumulated arrears, he was oblivious of 
having denied the execution of the aspirations of the endower for the past three years. 
Accordingly, drawing from these incidents, perennial default by tenants of waqfs should be 
interpreted as being attitudinal with little to do with the low socio-economic stratum of the 
tenants. In their thinking, tenants are enjoying rights bestowed upon them by their predecessors - 
the endowers. In this view, rent restrictions by the Tribunal on some waqfs in disregard of 
location and market forces of demand and supply only worsen an already bad situation.  
 
Again, since waqfs are perceived as cheap, they are susceptible to dismemberment by 
entrepreneurs. Prospecting entrepreneurs, or their cronies who claim to be of low socio-economic 
background, occupy the waqfs as tenants waiting for the moment when the property shall be 
offered for lease to acquire and develop it to gain higher profits and pay low rents to the WCK. 
This view could not be far from the truth given the propensity by some defaulting tenants turning 
round to bid to lease the waqfs once they were offered or even challenge lost bids.
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Nevertheless, this is not to deny that there could be genuine people of low socio-economic status 
occupying the waqfs, but they must be very few with the majority mainly renting them for 
speculative purposes as argued.  
Another concern regards the apparent inability by the WCK to offer leases and rents 
commensurate to ijar al-mithal as well as implementing terms of the contracts with the view of 
repossessing waqfs from defaulting lessees. However, this could be the tricky part considering 
the aspect of umiji-wamiji being, arguably, a significant consideration in the award of some 
contracts. The main purposes for 
c
ana and hikr are to improve the output of revenue-bearing 
waqfs to maintain their perpetuity, and the economic interests of waqfs should, therefore, reign 
supreme over other considerations when undertaking such business contracts. However, as 
evident in the majority of cases in this section of the study, it is difficult to rule out the socio-
                                                          
121 Researcher’s field experiences, Mombasa, November, 2014. Badawi is a tenant to waqf property Block XX/57, Mombasa, 
paying nine hundred and fifty seven Kenya shillings and fifty cents per month as ground rent fixed on Municipal rates 
(translation is mine). 
122 Group interviews with Hamid Salim Bamkele, Ali Salim Bamkele, Abdurahman Bamkele and Ahmed Bahaidar Bamkele, 
Mombasa, November, 2015; Mwalimu Hussein Soud, Hamad Abdurahman and Abdallah Swaleh, Lamu, December, 2015. 
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ethnic umiji-wamiji dynamics at the expense of sound investment ideals of 
c
ana and hikr based 
on competitive open tendering processes.  
This view is further augmented by protests from several beneficiaries including those of the waqf 
of Bamkele (Mombasa) and the waqf of al-Darmaky (Malindi).
123
 Despite several tenants and 
lessees being perennial defaulters, the WCK do not revoke their contracts with a view of 
awarding them to other interested bidders. Clearly, there is conceivably a complex configuration 
of social and symbolic forces within the state agency that safeguards the economic and social 
interests of some ‘noble’ individuals and locales. This was aptly summed up by an informant that 
rent defaulters in waqfs “ni jamaa zetu, tutafanyaje”? (…they are our people, what can we 
do?).
124
  
In this regard, social and symbolic capital are not only key to establishing, but also maintaining 
meaningful networks for negotiating the lease and rent terrain in the WCK for economic 
benefits. While those belonging to the network of ‘our people’ (read wamiji) or their cronies are 
considered for appointment to the state agency; awarded lease and rent contracts below ijar al-
mithal; tolerated for default; or even accorded room to re-negotiate the rates, those outside the 
network are denied similar favors making the former to behave like a cartel in the Muslim 
community.     
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has summed up the socio-cultural landscape of waqfs in the Kenyan Muslim 
community. Of significance, the discussion has endeavored to bring into fore the various types of 
waqfs and how their manfa
c
a were distributed in relation to the Qur’anic and non-Qur’anic 
formulas. It has been established that though waqfs were consecrated for the purpose of attaining 
qurba and sawab, the ‘distinctly human trait of altruism’ was also an important consideration 
among endowers in relation to the socio-ethnic and cultural negotiations of the Muslim 
community. Consequently, waqfs were also endowed for the purpose of safeguarding temporal 
social, ethnic, regional, as well as jurisprudential interests.   
                                                          
123
 Interviews with Said sharif Abdallah, Malindi, October, 2015; Hamid Salim Bamkele, Ali Salim Bamkele, Abdurahman 
Bamkele and Ahmed Bahaidar Bamkele, Mombasa, November, 2015. 
124 Interview with Rashid Mwandeo, the WCK, Mombasa, October-December, 2014, (translation is mine). 
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Relevant case studies have shown that claims of establishing waqfs as an avenue to retain the 
control of wealth, particularly within the confines of male descendants, do not cut across the 
global Muslim community. This was evidenced by various females being designated as 
beneficiaries and mutawallis in the exclusion of males in some waqfs among Muslims in Kenya. 
On the other hand, use of waqfs as gifts inter vivos, as shown in several instances, could be an 
affront to the Qur’an guidelines of inheritance, albeit unwittingly. However, owing to the limited 
jurisdiction of the kadhi’s courts, such violations could not easily be rectified even as the will 
was evident among some beneficiaries in the community. 
The flexibility and compatibility of waqfs with the ever changing socio-economic and cultural 
needs of the society are aptly propounded by the principles of 
c
ana, hikr, istibdal, and perpetuity. 
The Shari
c
a allows for the contravention of shurut al-waqif, particularly, on lease period so as to 
improve the economic viability of revenue generating waqfs. However, due to competing 
interests, best management practices of 
c
ana, hikr and istibdal were flouted jeopardizing 
perpetuity of the waqfs and designated beneficiaries and causes. This underscores the 
significance of requisite qualifications and unquestionable virtues in the holder of the position of 
mutawalli to see to the best of the waqf under his custody, and by extension, the beneficence 
ambitions of endowers. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion 
At the onset, this study endeavored to explore the development and administration of waqfs as an 
Islamic socio-cultural heritage in a secular state milieu from the British colonial to the 
postcolonial times. The underlying objective was to establish how the interplay of secular state 
policies and civil courts’ judgments during the period under investigation generated trends that 
informed waqf practices among Muslims in Kenya. This is because, as an Islamic institution, 
waqf was expected to be administered by and according to the Shari
c
a with the institutions of the 
kadhi, mutawalli, and the 
c
ulama not only interpreting the normative precepts, but also guiding 
the waqifs towards attainment of qurba and sawab. In chapter three, the study relied on historical 
data to reconstruct this interplay in the trajectory of administration of waqfs. It was established 
that there existed profound state involvement that consequently interfered with normative 
traditions in administration and development of waqfs.  
The urge by the colonial government to control resources as perpetuated by subsequent 
postcolonial governments interfered with normative precepts on waqfs, effectively creating a 
disillusioned community of ‘Muslim peasants’. In the pre-British colonial times, the Islamic 
judicial institution of the kadhi had an extensive mandate in the Shari
c
a including civil and 
criminal matters affecting Muslims. Accordingly, the kadhi and the 
c
ulama also retained their 
traditional roles in waqfs as interlocutors of Islamic knowledge and authority. This changed upon 
establishment of the Protectorate where the jurisdiction of kadhi’s courts was restricted to a 
narrowly defined Muslim personal status law that excluded waqfs (see chapter three). The 
resultant effect was a vacuum in the administration of waqfs that justified the establishment of a 
state agency (WCK) to discharge the role once performed by the kadhis.  
The study pointed out that redefining the jurisdiction of kadhis with a view to establishing a state 
agency to control waqfs by the British colonial government was a conscious process and strategy 
informed by past experiences in India and Egypt where uncontrolled waqfs posed a significant 
opposition to the colonial project. Having waqfs under state control, therefore, meant not only 
controlling resources but also checking the influence of the mutawallis, 
c
ulama, and the diverse 
groups of beneficiaries, both institutions and individuals, who relied on waqfs in the society. This 
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was made possible by appointing Muslims perceived as loyal to the colonial government as Waqf 
Commissioners who worked under strict guidelines and supervision of British officers seconded 
to the state agency (see chapter three).  
The British colonial government also used its legislative powers to establish policies that in 
effect hindered the development of waqfs in the region. Through land laws, it was impossible to 
consecrate or even develop land waqfs without titles of ownership that were difficult to attain by 
the majority of locals (see chapter three). Neither did civil land statutes recognize waqf deeds as 
valid documents in the transfer of waqf lands to the beneficiaries and mutawallis for 
administration as they did not identify legal persons to whom the transfers were made. This was 
because, since the restriction of the mandate of the kadhis’ court, waqfs were categorized as real 
estate whose contracts were guided by civil statutes. As a result, some waqfs were ruined. 
The study further indicated that under the compulsory acquisition policy, the colonial 
government could alienate properties, some of which were waqfs, for public interests. Some of 
the alienated waqfs were, however, not compensated making it impossible to establish alternative 
waqfs as required by the Shari
c
a. Yet, even those compensated, the colonial government used its 
powers within the state agency to ensure that no replacement waqfs were consecrated (see 
chapter three). This dealt a blow both to the spiritual aspirations of endowers and the social, 
economic, and cultural output of the large numbers of beneficiaries.  
The study confirmed that control of the judiciary by the British colonial government also 
influenced the judicial process as rulings were made based on the British understanding of the 
Shari
c
a. This occasioned the ambiguous application of the Shari
c
a consequently invalidating 
some waqfs that would have otherwise been valid (see chapter three and four). The study also 
revealed that civil policies and institutions on waqfs established by the British colonial 
government were seamlessly inherited by subsequent postcolonial regimes. Efforts to question 
and amend the policies on state control to restore waqf administration to traditional Muslim 
institutions and precepts were thwarted during the review of the constitution (see chapter five). 
As a result, the status quo thus remains. This scenario confirmed that indeed civil legislations 
and judicial constructs in a secular state milieu influenced waqf practices among Muslims in 
Kenya. 
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Using extensive empirical data to derive the analysis presented in chapter three and four, it was 
established that strict control of waqfs by the state consequently entrenched socio-economic and 
cultural subordination of the Muslim community. The state did not only influence the decision 
making process in the WCK, but also used waqf resources against designated causes denying 
traditional actors, institutions, and beneficiaries their economic mainstay, ruining their social, 
economic, and cultural significance in the society. Accordingly, a cross section of Muslims was 
disenfranchised and exited from state controlled waqfs to non-labeled waqfs and uncontrolled 
charitable institutions including zakat, sadaqa, private trusts and community associations. These 
did not only guarantee freedom, control, and exercise of social, symbolic, and economic power 
once found in waqfs, but also accorded Muslims the opportunity to express piety within a wider 
framework of Islamic charity and qurba (see chapter five). 
More so, Muslims’ exit from state controlled waqfs was intrinsic, spontaneous, uncoordinated, 
and not declared in the conventional sense of a resistance movement against state control of 
waqfs. Majority of Muslims did not comply with the rule on compulsory registration of waqfs 
during the colonial period when none could be seen to contradict imperial authority. During the 
postcolonial times, imperial control of waqfs was relaxed, though secular state policies, civil 
institutions and judicial constructs on waqfs were not amended, causing an ambiguous relation 
between the state and the institution of waqf. Consequently, Muslims continued with the non-
compliance with registration rule on waqfs apart from relying on non-labeled waqfs and 
uncontrolled charitable institutions as provided by the Shari
c
a for socio-cultural welfare in the 
community (see chapter five). This demonstrates that subordinate communities have the ability 
to discern the contradictions in state policies and react appropriately in proportion to their capital 
at disposal. The alternative charitable practices accorded Muslims the opportunity to reverse 
ownership and control of resources, power, and privileges without arousing suspicion that could 
put them at cross path with imperial authorities. 
In synthesizing waqf as a discursive tradition in Islam, the study reconstructed the historical 
trajectory with a view to exploring and situating the contours in the evolution and development 
of the institution at various epochs in the Muslim world. Significantly, the analysis sought to 
understand the nature of waqfs in Kenya as an evolving tradition vis-à-vis the global Muslim 
landscape. Arguably, the institution of waqf in Kenya suffered stunted growth. It got stuck in the 
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‘formative age’ though it exhibits symptoms akin to the ‘redundancy and stagnation’ and 
‘disillusionment and new awakening phases’ (see chapter five). This explains the ambiguous 
nature of waqfs in the community for its potential as a socio-cultural heritage remains to be fully 
exploited. Waqfs in Kenya are largely perceived along traditional utility patterns and corpuses – 
masjids, madrasas, da
c
wa, and cemeteries among others rather than means to socio-cultural and 
economic development. In the backdrop of changing dynamics of waqfs and Islamic charity in 
the global Muslim civil society, only small portions of waqfs contribute to job creation, 
healthcare provision, education, and food aid during Ramadan and 
c
id festivities in the 
community.  
This is to emphasize that there is limited link with transnational Muslim charitable institutions 
and private foundations, particularly those that have survived state onslaught against the ‘war 
against terror’ in the country. They include the IR (UK), AMA, WAMY, and KFF among others. 
Consequently, very little is felt of the IDB products like APIF and WWF in form of interest free 
loans, grants, waqf shares or other facilities and contemporary trends adopted by the Muslim 
civil society in other parts of the Muslim world to spearhead Islamic charity and provide 
alternatives to state controlled waqfs. Accordingly, the lack of information on the contemporary 
trends on waqfs among the majority of Muslims in Kenya renders the twenty-first century wave 
on the resuscitation of Muslim civil society and Islamic charity sweeping across global Muslim 
umma largely of no effect in the country.  
As pointed out in chapter six, despite their limited contribution, waqfs have an indispensable role 
in the socio-cultural wellbeing of the Muslim community and the Kenyan society at large in the 
provision of health care, education, housing, and job creation. The spiritual benefits that a waqif 
is believed to derive from an endowment needs not to be emphasized. The study further 
confirmed the central place of waqfs in the preservation of the sixteenth century Swahili history 
and culture as evident in the active engagement of the NMK and UNESCO in masjids, 
cemeteries, and whole sections of miji ya kale in Mombasa and Lamu (see chapter three and 
four).  
It was pointed out in the study that institutionalization of socio-ethnic segmentation among 
Muslims in Kenya, and the coast region in particular, predates the British colonial period. During 
the Bu Sai
c
di Sultanate, Arab Muslims were accorded preferential treatment over African 
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Muslims, especially, in administrative positions of the liwali, mudir, and in the judiciary as 
kadhis (see chapter three). The study found out that the British colonial government upheld this 
socio-ethnic hierarchy placing African Muslims at the bottom strata by recognizing Arabs as 
leaders of the communities at the coast. Apparent failure by subsequent postcolonial regimes to 
redress the socio-ethnic hierarchy in the Muslim society only served to heighten socio-ethnic 
tensions among Muslims as evidenced in the appointment of the 
c
ulama occupying the positions 
of Chief Kadhi and Waqf Commissioners (see chapter four). 
Analysis presented in chapters four and six indicates that historical ethnic and regional struggles 
for identity, belonging, and supremacy are endemic in the community manifested in the 
microcosm of the institution of waqf. The Chief Kadhi being the government advisor on Islamic 
issues is also the ‘Muslim opinion’ in the appointment of Waqf Commissioners. The study 
revealed that Commissioners were appointed on historical inclinations as opinion makers and 
symbolic figureheads to maintain socio-ethnic and regional equilibrium rather than on 
professional qualifications and religious virtues (see appendix 3). This provided fertile ground 
for the development of cartel like behaviors that locked out qualified Muslims, waqifs, 
mutawallis, and other stake holders from the state agency not only from the coast region, but also 
the entire country. Consequently, consecration, administration, and benefiting from waqfs are 
perceived as privileges preserved for certain Muslim groups and locales. 
In exploring the complex internal dynamics of the Muslim community in Kenya, the study 
proposed the concept of umiji–wamiji. It is one thing to demonstrate seeming uniform response 
against subordination and it is another to be actually united in purpose. Islam in Kenya is, 
apparently, an insufficient factor of identity, belonging, and mobilization amongst Muslims in a 
predominantly Christian society rendering the umma non-monolithic. The perception of umiji-
wamiji, therefore, provides an invaluable paradigm in re-assessing and understanding the 
relations amongst Muslims themselves and between Muslims and the secular state taking 
negotiations for the control of waqfs as a microcosm.  
The study has appropriately illustrated how the perception of umiji–wamiji is central in Muslims’ 
negotiation of the secular state and civil milieu in the performance and trends of waqfs and 
charity practices (see chapter four and six). Muslims in Kenya have a rather peculiar history and 
society making process as they grapple with multiple internal and external challenges dating 
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back to the pre-colonial times. Three incidents particularly, warrant recall: the furor that 
followed the appointment of shaykh Lithome as Commissioner in 2009 (see chapter four); the 
hostile reception of NMK officials at Lamu where they had gone to inspect the renovation of 
masjid Rodha; and the persistent calls by beneficiaries and the community in Malindi and Lamu 
to disband the state agency and replace it with miji-based waqf boards (see chapter six).  
These foregoing scenarios present different readings. First, they illustrate group cohesion and 
solidarity among wamiji in these miji with a view to excluding non-wamiji. Within this context, 
Muslims strongly identify themselves with miji that in essence, due to colonial and postcolonial 
structures, were socio-ethnically constructed and maintained. There are conscious efforts by 
some Muslims, owing to shared history of socio-economic and cultural exclusion, 
marginalization, and exploitation by the state, to identify themselves with particular locales. 
Consequently, they feel obliged to protect and advocate for temporal interests while perceiving 
the non-wamiji as potential threats to their wellbeing. The discontent by Lamu and Malindi 
against the appointment of shaykh Lithome aptly fits this description. It was not that Lithome 
was not a qualified Muslim. Neither was the position to be simultaneously occupied by the two 
miji nor the entire wamiji. Rather the mere perception that he was an ‘outsider’ and not ‘one of 
our own’ suffices to understand the urge to protect temporal interests of a socio-ethnic group in a 
given locale. 
Moreover, the above position is corroborated by the apparent ‘behavior’ by some Muslims who, 
despite migrating and settling in other miji, continue to identify themselves with their parent miji 
and even perceived as such by their hosts. This begs the question as to what point an ‘immigrant’ 
ceases to be one? Or what does it take for a supposedly ‘immigrant’ to be accepted in the host 
community and be able to shade off his tag? Muslims from Lamu in Mombasa, for instance, 
remain as ‘watu wa Amu’ (people from Lamu). This also applies to other ‘non-indigenous’ 
groups in Mombasa and elsewhere in the former city-states as established by the study. This 
explains, for example, the preference to local dialects by such ‘immigrants’ like kiamu (Swahili 
dialect) as evident in some Lamu 
c
ulama in their sermons and teachings in waqf institutions – 
madrasas, masjids, etc. in the town (and elsewhere in the former Protectorate) despite settling 
there for long periods. This is also true among Muslim socio-ethnic groups within one mji across 
the former city-states.  
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Taking Thenashara Taifa in Mombasa, for instance, their being perceived as one group has 
undoubtedly not stopped them from identifying themselves in the distinct sub-groups within the 
Swahili Muslim federation in relation to the Mazrui-Thenashara Taifa continuum. Thus, in the 
wider context, mentioning one’s mji of origin evokes fond memories of long held traditions of 
identity, belonging, and culture, including scholarly traditions and political alignments. These 
markers of identity, therefore, not only point to who one really is but also what he is capable of 
within the context of fluid umiji-wamiji identity and belonging, and waqfs ownership, control, 
and access in particular (see chapter four and six). 
Secondly, the hostile reception of NMK officials in Lamu and unwavering calls to replace the 
WCK with miji-based waqf boards illustrate the Muslims’ perception of the state agencies as 
tools and symbols of imperial subordination that have not only outlived their usefulness but also 
ought to be dismantled, or better still, re-invented. Through such calls, Muslims have shown that 
their ‘exit’ from state controlled waqfs to retain control of resources within their socio-ethnic 
spaces and locales through symbolic resistance is not only important, but there is also the ardent 
urge to erase such state images within their midst that evoke memories of socio-ethnic and 
regional exploitation, exclusion, and marginalization. On the other hand, the calls also point to 
internal dynamics within the Muslim community to exclude non-wamiji from waqf benefits and 
administration, and by extension, perpetuate the umiji-wamiji discourse among diverse Muslim 
groups in the country. Within this context, it becomes easier to talk of ‘Muslim communities in 
Kenya’ rather than a ‘Kenyan Muslim community’.  
Clearly, relationship among the diverse Muslim groups in the country as evident in the three 
incidents above is ambiguous. This ranges from coastal Muslims against their up-country 
brethrens (read national umiji) to Mombasa against her neighboring miji like Takaungu, Malindi, 
and Lamu (read regional umiji); those within one mji like Mombasa as vivid in the case of 
Mazrui against Swahili federation (read wamiji) to Muslims within one theological and doctrinal 
persuasion like the Sunni as manifested in the case of Salafi-conservatism acrimony. It is this 
fluid but complex and internal rivalry with history and trajectory that inhibits crystallization of 
Muslims into a monolithic community. In view of this, though still part of the global umma, 
unfolding events involving Muslims in some distant parts of the world may not necessarily 
trigger a united response in the local ‘Muslim communities’ owing to the concerns pre-
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occupying them. Thus the perception of umiji–wamiji is particularly important in understanding 
the internal dynamics of the ‘Muslim communities’ in Kenya as opposed to the shared concerns 
of a global umma and could, therefore, form the basis for further research on the ‘Muslim 
communities’ in Kenya. 
 
7.1 Theoretical Implications 
My study endeavored to investigate the enacting of an Islamic socio-cultural practice in the midst 
of a secular state milieu spanning close to a century. Accordingly, invoking Pierre Bourdieu’s 
theory of practice (1977), specifically the concepts of field, capital (social, economic, political, 
and symbolic), and symbolic violence, was relevant as it appropriately fits the state-society 
negotiations between the Muslim community and the British colonial and postcolonial 
governments. As argued in chapter one of the study, constituent concepts in the theory of 
practice appropriately fit the interrogation “of the relationship between religion, class and power; 
religion, race and ethnicity; and religion and colonial conquest” that the investigation undertook 
(Rey, 2007:82). In essence, religion is only one of the significant yet interrelated elements 
constituting human society that Bourdieu envisaged in his works (Rey, 2007; Echtler and Ukah, 
2015). This complex yet ambiguous relationship between the constituent elements came to the 
fore during the decades of colonial project in the East African Protectorate. Waqfs proved an 
important socio-economic resource and an avenue for power control that the British colonial 
government took keen interest in, a scenario that was replicated during the postcolonial period. 
With waqfs among other resources under imperial supervision and control, the socio-economic 
welfare of the Muslim community was dealt a blow. Consequently, this created the power binary 
between the dominant colonial and postcolonial governments and the subordinate Muslim 
community. In his view, Bourdieu understands “the dominated as virtually and structurally un-
free and thus unable to rise up, resist, and act to change the very social order that enables their 
oppression” (Rey, 2007:122; Martin, 2000). However, as demonstrated through Scott’s (1976) 
symbolic (ideological) resistance, the perception that subordinate communities are unable to 
challenge oppression is no longer tenable. Bourdieu’s view partially understands resistance in 
terms of public, and at times bloody protests, and political activities. Accordingly, it fails to take 
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cognizance of the subordinates’ silent yet effective acts of sabotage, desertion, withdrawal, 
feigned ignorance and non-compliance with official demands that require no formal organization 
(Scott, 1985, 2008).  
Symbolic resistance against state control and supervision of waqfs was vividly demonstrated in 
the non-compliance with official requirements for compulsory registration of waqfs by a cross 
section among Muslims; the establishment of community associations; private trusts; and non-
governmental organizations. All these ‘exit’ strategies were in essence vehicles through which 
the subordinate community practiced in fulfillment of religious obligations to attain qurba and 
sawab in place of state controlled waqfs. Significantly, they were (still are) not only uncontrolled 
and uncoordinated, but also accorded Muslims the control over resources and privileges similar 
to those of waqfs. This subtly illustrates that resistance by subordinate groups in the society does 
not necessarily have to take the political dimension especially when it involves mortal risks. The 
main goal of symbolic resistance is to re-create autonomy to resource ownership and control but 
not to confront imperial authority as was illustrated in the alternative acts of qurba and sawab. 
As a socio-cultural heritage, practices of waqf also go beyond the binary power relations between 
the colonizer and the colonized; the ruler and the ruled; or the dominant and the subordinate. In 
view of this, while Scott’s concept of symbolic resistance was relevant in challenging Bourdieu’s 
perception of the subordinate community in the face of imperial authority and control of 
resources, neither of them could adequately explain the non-state waqf milieu amongst Muslims 
themselves in the society. Consecrating waqf is a religious undertaking with wider ramifications 
in the socio-cultural fabric of the society. It involves the waqif’s urge to demonstrate piety to the 
creator while at the same time showing responsibility to the community; the recipients’ role in 
appreciating the waqif in understanding their plight and maintaining the social fabric; the place 
of the 
c
ulama in interpreting and guiding the waqif in living to the Shari
c
a of consecration to the 
later; the role of the mutawalli in ensuring that the waqf fulfills the designated causes; and the 
political leaders, if necessary, not only to endow as part of their individual social responsibility 
and qurba, but also provide conducive environment where waqfs would fulfill their designated 
causes. These are significant aspects of waqf that neither Bourdieu’s nor Scott’s concepts could 
aptly account for, hence the coinage and adoption of the concept of umiji-wamiji.  
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Moreover, Muslims and waqfs existed before, during, and after colonization. Accordingly, the 
concept of umiji-wamiji takes cognizance of the socio-cultural forces and factors that informed 
identity and belonging during and after colonization (the period under investigation) that 
guaranteed or even denied individual’s access to rights and privileges within the ‘Muslim 
communities’. Significantly, it seeks to explain the practices of waqf among Muslims outside the 
secular state milieu.  
The concept of umiji-wamiji, therefore, goes beyond the struggle for material control and 
domination; the power binary between colonizers and the colonized; and relations between the 
secular state and the Muslim community. It aptly describes how ‘intra-Muslim communities’ 
relations are negotiated and mediated outside the glare of the secular state authorities and civil 
institutions in Kenya. It provides a framework to understand how waqfs are appropriated as a 
vehicle through which the complex local Muslim socio-cultural fabric is mediated and the trends 
it generates. More importantly, the concept is efficacious in answering questions (iv) and (v) of 
the study in exploring the various waqfs and how Muslims use them for socio-cultural 
development in the society.  
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Appendix 1 
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    Formal Education  Attainment Employmen
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Sewerage  Pipe
d 
Wat
er 
conn
ectio
n 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Emp
loye
d 
Une
mplo
yed 
 Ma
in 
Pit 
latri
ne 
 
6,49
1,97
5 
17,8
26,4
30 
6,08
4,32
0 
1,18
5,43
0 
526
,30
2 
68,
33
0 
234
,92
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86,3
31 
2,186
,882 
1,989
,740 
973
,57
1 
6,10
0,23
4 
2,62
6,62
9 
Nairob
i 
2.5 6.0 15.5 24.3 36.
5 
12.
1 
3.9 8.9 11.1 35.8 58.
1 
6.1 28.4 
Coast 10.0 8.2 7.2 8.0 5.7 9.7 6.7 7.5 10.3 11.1 10.
2 
6.6 12.9 
Centra
l 
4.8 12.0 16.5 16.4 13.
4 
19.
7 
0.3 13.3 6.6 19.3 11.
1 
16.8 18.5 
R/Valle
y 
32.4 25.1 22.3 21.8 20.
8 
18.
2 
0.8 25.2 23.0 18.4 12.
2 
24.1 18.6 
N/East
ern 
20.6 2.6 1.4 0.7 1.0 1.6 85.
6 
4.0 22.5 7.1 0.3 1.6 1.4 
 
Distribution of opportunities and essential services according to Provincial administrative boundaries. Note how predominantly 
Muslim regions (Coast & N/Eastern) fared.  (Source: The Kenya Population and Housing Census (KNBS), Vol. 2, 2009, Nairobi. 
Retrieved from: 
file:///C:/Users/USER/Downloads/Volume%202Population%20and%20Household%20Distribution%20by%20Socio-
Economic%20Characteristics%20(1).pdf. 
 
Key: 
1. Never attained formal education.  
2. Attained primary School level.  
3. Attained secondary School level.  
4. Attained Tertiary level.  
5. Attained university education. 
6. Attained at least basic literacy.  
7. Attained madrasa education. 
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Appendix 2 
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6,49
1,97
5 
17,8
26,4
30 
6,08
4,32
0 
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5,43
0 
526
,30
2 
68,
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86,3
31 
2,186
,882 
1,989
,740 
973
,57
1 
6,10
0,23
4 
2,62
6,62
9 
Nairo
bi 
West 
0.5 1.4 3.2 4.5 9.2 2.2 0.2 1.9 2.4 35.8 5.6 2.4 4.6 
Mom
basa 
0.7 1.2 2.1 2.9 2.8 2.1 1.4 1.2 2.0 4.5 4.7 1.3 1.7 
Kirin
yaga 
0.7 1.6 1.9 1.3 0.9 2.4 0.1 1.9 0.5 1.3 0.6 2.2 2.4 
Naku
ru 
0.5 1.1 2.0 2.4 2.3 1.3 0.1 1.1 1.7 3.6 3.4 1.3 3.3 
Mand
era 
Centr
al 
3.3 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 23.
0 
0.6 2.9 0.01 0.0
03 
0.2 1.1 
Malin
di 
1.3 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.9 0.9 0.7 1.0 0.4 1.6 
 
Lamu 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 
Kwale 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 
Isiolo 0.5 0.2 0.2 2.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.5 
 
Distribution of opportunities and essential services in Kenya according to District administrative boundaries. Note how 
predominantly Muslim Districts (Mombasa, Mandera Central, Malindi, Lamu, Isiolo, Kwale) fared.  (Source: The Kenya 
Population and Housing Census (KNBS), Vol. 2, 2009, Nairobi. Retrieved from: 
file:///C:/Users/USER/Downloads/Volume%202Population%20and%20Household%20Distribution%20by%20Socio-
Economic%20Characteristics%20(1).pdf). 
 
 
 
211 
 
Appendix 3  
Waqf Commissioners since Colonial Times 
Until 1957: 
- Sh. Al’Amin b. Said al- Mandhry (Mombasa) 
- Sh. Abdallah Salim (cIbadi Muslim, Mombasa) 
- Sh. Mohammad b. Abdallah Shatry (Mombasa) 
- Sh. Ma’amun b. Suleiman al- Mazrui (Mombasa) 
- Sh. Amir b. Naheed al- Nahdy (Mombasa)  
- Sh. Hyder Mohammad al-Kindi (Mombasa) 
*There was no Chief Kadhi from 1950 to 1963 after the resignation of Sh. Sayyid Ali b. 
Muhammad Badawy (Lamu) in 1950. Besides, kadhis were more of judicial officers, so, 
liwalis could nominate one person to the Waqf Commission, though they never sat in the 
waqf board themselves. 
1957-1962: 
Board retained except for Sh. Al’Amin b. Said al-Mandhry. It is not clear who replaced him.  
1962-1967: 
- *Sh. Al-Amin b. Said al-Mandhry (Mombasa) 
- Sh. Abdallah Salim (Mombasa) 
- *Sh. Muhammad b. Kassim al-Mazrui (replaced Ma’amun b. Suleiman al-Mazrui, 
Mombasa) 
- Sh. Abdallah Ndovu Mwidau (replaced Sh. Mohammad b. Abdallah Shatry, Mombasa) 
- Sh. Amir b. Naheed al-Nahdy (Mombasa)  
- Sh. Hyder Mohammad al-Kindi (Mombasa) 
 
*Sh. Muhammad b. Kassim al-Mazrui was appointed the Chief Kadhi in 1963. He was 
replaced in the Commission by Sh. Abdurahman Muhammad Hatimy. 
*Sh. Al-Amin b. Said al-Mandhry resigned in 1965 citing commitment after being 
transferred to serve in Kerugoya, Central Kenya. It is not clear who replaced him.  
1968-1972:  
There were no Waqf Commissioners during this period. Neither was there a Chief Kadhi 
following the resignation of Sh. Muhammad b. Kassim al-Mazrui in 1968 citing ill-health. This 
was also a period of changes in the administrative structure of the government where the 
positions of the liwali and mudir were abolished. Following this change, the mandate to 
nominate one ‘prominent Muslim’ to sit in the waqf board was given to the Provincial 
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Commissioner, Coast Province, and the Commissioners’ term reduced to three years from the 
previous five. 
1972-1975: 
- Sh. Ali Abdallah Ali Maawy (Mombasa) 
- Hon. Juma Ferunzy ((Mombasa) 
- Sh. Awadh Saleh (Mombasa) 
- Sh. Salim Muhammad Muhashamy (Mombasa) 
- Sh. Majid b. Said al-Busaidi (Malindi) 
- Chief Keya Swedi (Mombasa) 
- Chief Kadhi: Sh. Salih Abdallah Farsi (ex-officio) 
1975-1978: 
- Hon. Juma Ferunzy (Mombasa) 
- Sharif Alwi Muhammad Alwi (Takaungu, Kilifi)  
- Sh. Hassanali Mussa Jetha (Indian descent, Mombasa) 
- Sh. Awadh Saleh Sherman Nguru (Hadhramy Muslim, Mombasa)  
- Sh. Hyder Muhammad al-Kindi (Mombasa) 
- Sh. Salim Muhammad Muhashamy (Mombasa) 
- Chief Kadhi: Sh. Salih Abdallah Farsi (ex-officio) 
1978-1983: 
- Sh. Alwi Muhammad Alwi (Takaungu, Kilifi)  
- Sh. Salim S. Bahamadi (Lamu) 
- Hon. Juma Ferunzy (Mombasa) 
- Sh. Ahmad Muhammad Jahadhmy (Lamu) 
- Sh. Hassanali Mussa Jetha (Indian descent, Mombasa) 
- Sh. Seif Salim Omar (cIbadi Muslim, Mombasa)  
- Chief Kadhi: Sh. Nassor al-Nahdy (ex-officio, Mombasa)  
1983-1986: 
- Sh. Mwinyihamisi Mohammad Haji (Kwale) 
- Sh. Muhammad Salim Shirazi (Mombasa) 
- Sh. Al’amin Said al-Mandhry (Mombasa) 
- Sh. Rashid Ali Riyami (Mombasa) 
- Sh. Ahmad Muhammad Jihadhmy (Lamu) 
- Sh. Rashid Azzan (cIbadi Muslim, Malindi) 
- Chief Kadhi: Sh. Nassor al-Nahdy (ex-officio, Mombasa)  
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1986-1989: 
Board retained on recommendations by the Chief Kadhi, Sh. Nassor al-Nahdy. 
1990-1993: 
- Sh. Salim Ali Jeneby (Mombasa) 
- Sh. Ali Abdallah Shikely (Mombasa) 
- Sh. Salim Ali Hussein al-Hadhry (Lamu) 
- Sharif Hussein S. Aidarus Saggaf (Lamu) 
- Sh. Rashid Azzan (cIbadi Muslim, Malindi) 
- *Sh. Al’amin Said Abu Said al-Mandhry (Mombasa) 
- Chief Kadhi: Sh. Nassor al-Nahdy (ex-officio, Mombasa)  
 
*Sh. Al’amin al-Mandhry resigned shortly in 1990 after being re-appointed citing poor 
health. It is not clear who replaced him.  
1993-1995: 
- Sharif Alwi Muhammad Alwi (Takaungu, Kilifi) 
- Sh. Abdulmalik Abdurahman Maawiyah (Lamu)  
- Sh. Bakari Abdallah Mwawasaa (Kwale)  
- Sh. Awadh Swaleh Sherman [Nguru] (Mombasa)  
- Sh. Abdurahman Mwinzagu (Mombasa)  
- Sh. Hamisi Omari al-Mazrui (Takaungu, Kilifi) 
- Chief Kadhi: Sh. Nassor al-Nahdy (ex-officio, Mombasa)  
1996- 1999: 
- Sharif Alwi Muhammad Alwi (Takaungu, Kilifi)  
- Sh. Abdulmalik Abdurahman Maawiyah (Lamu)  
- Sh. Bakari Abdallah Mwawasaa (Kwale)  
- Sh. Abdurahman Mwinzagu (Mombasa)  
- Sh. Awadh Swaleh Sherman [Nguru] (Mombasa)  
- Chief Kadhi: Sh. Nassor al-Nahdy (ex-officio, Mombasa)  
1999-2003: 
- Sh. Ahmed Aboud Hadi (Malindi) 
- Sh. Bakari Abdallah Mwawasaa (Kwale)  
- Sharif. Alwi Muhammad Alwi (Takaungu, Kilifi) 
- Sh. Abdulmalik Abdurahman Maawiyah (Lamu)  
- Sh. Abdurahman Mwinzagu (Mombasa)  
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- Sh. Awadh Swaleh Sherman [Nguru] (Mombasa)  
- Chief Kadhi: Sh. Nassor al-Nahdy (ex-officio, Mombasa)  
2003-2005: 
- Sharif Hussein Ahmad Hussein (Mombasa)  
- Sh. Nassor Muhammad al-Nahdy (former Chief Kadhi, Mombasa)  
- Sh. Abdurahman Mwinzagu (Mombasa)  
- Sh. Abdurahman A. Maawiyah (Lamu)  
- Sh. Khamis Muhammad al-Mazrui (Mombasa)  
- Sh. Ahmed Aboud Hadi (Malindi)  
- Chief Kadhi: Sh. Hamad Muhammad Kassim al-Mazrui (ex-officio, Mombasa) 
2006-2009:  
Board retained on recommendation by the Chief Kadhi, Sh. Hamadi Muhammad Kassim al-
Mazrui. 
2009-2012: 
- Dr. Abdallah Muhammad Abu Bakar Khatib (Mombasa) 
- Sh. Said Muhammad Ali Machele (Mombasa) 
- Sh. Athman Errey (Mombasa) 
- Sh. Hafidh Shihabudin Chiraghdin (Mombasa) 
- *Sh. Ibrahim Lithome (Nairobi) 
- Sh. Amir Swaleh (Mombasa)  
- Chief Kadhi: Sharif Hussein Muhdhary (ex-officio, Lamu) 
*Sh. Ibrahim Lithome (Nairobi) was replaced by Prof. Nadji Said (Malindi) in 2010 following 
complaints from Malindi and Lamu citing lack of representation.   
2012-2015: 
- *Prof. Nadji Said (Malindi) 
- Sh. Juma Ngao (Mombasa) 
- Sh. Zuber Noor (Mombasa) 
- Sh. Said Errey (Mombasa)  
- Sh. Amir Swaleh (Mombasa)  
- Dr. Hamadi Boga (Kwale).  
- Chief Kadhi: Sharif Hussein Muhdhary (ex-officio, Lamu) 
*Prof. Nadji resigned in June 2015 but was not replaced. 
    (Source: WCK archive, Mombasa). 
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Appendix 4           
Key Informants 
1. Abu Swamad A. Ali, National Museums of Kenya, Mombasa.  
2. Abdallah Juma Mwakuyugika, Tiwi. 
3. Abdallah Nassor Said, Malindi. 
4. Abdallah Swaleh, Lamu. 
5. Abdulmalik Sharif, Lamu. 
6. Abdurahim Bakathir, Mombasa. 
7. Abdurahman Bamkele, Mombasa. 
8. Ahmed Aboud Hadi, former Waqf Commissioner, Malindi.  
9. Ahmed Bahaidar Bamkele, Mombasa. 
10. Ali Darusi, Waqf Commission, Zanzaibar. 
11. Ali bin Khamis, Mombasa. 
12. Ali Salim Bamkele, Mombasa. 
13. Amuru Omar, Waqf Commission, Zanzibar. 
14. Dr. Abdallah Kheri, Nairobi. 
15. Dr. Esha Fakii, Nairobi. 
16. Dr. Kalandar Khan, National Museums of Kenya, Mombasa. 
17. Dr. Wario Halkano, Nairobi. 
18. Hamdoun, Waqf Commission Agent, Malindi. 
19. Hamid Abdurahman, Lamu. 
20. Hamid Salim Bamkele, Mombasa. 
21. Maulid Abdi, Tiwi. 
22. Muhammad Abdallah, Mombasa. 
23. Muhammad Hussein Abdulkadir, Malindi. 
24. Muhammad Shalli, Waqf Commission Secretariat, Mombasa. 
25. Mwalimu Hussein Soud, Lamu. 
26. Omar Jenjewa, Waqf Commission Secretariat, Mombasa.  
27. Rahma Abdallah, Mombasa. 
28. Rashid A. Mwandeo, Waqf Commission Secretariat, Mombasa. 
29. Rashid Ali, Mombasa. 
30. Rashid Muhammad Salim al-Mazrui, Takaungu. 
31. Said Hussein Chiphele, Tiwi. 
32. Said Sharif Abdallah, Malindi. 
33. Shaykh A.S. Hussein Muhdhary, Chief Kadhi, (current) Mombasa. 
34. Shaykh Hamad Muhammad Kassim al-Mazrui, Chief Kadhi, (former) Mombasa. 
35. Thabit Abu Bakar Omar al-Maawy, Waqf Commission Agent, Lamu. 
36. Ustadh Abdulkadir Mao, Lamu (informal talks at Bayreuth, Germany).  
37. Ustadh Hamisi Swalehe Mwambewe, Msambweni.  
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38. Ustadh Muhammad Hussein Abdulkadir, Malindi. 
39. Ustadh Salim Swaleh (Swadi), Msambweni. 
40. Ustadh Yussuf Bakari Mwamzandi, Msambweni. 
41. Zubeir Hussein Noor, Waqf Commissioner, Mombasa. 
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Appendix 5 
 
 
 
Masjid Mandhry, Mombasa. Note the 16th century architecture and minaret. (Source: Chembea, S.A., 2014).  
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Appendix 6 
 
 
Inside masjid Mandhry, Mombasa. Note the infusion of modern and ancient architecture in the banaa (manaa) ceiling. 
(Source: Chembea, S.A., 2014). 
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Appendix 7 
 
A copy of a waqf deed in Arabic transcript. The English versions of such deeds were offered by the kadhi courts and attached 
alongside the Arabic versions.      (Source: WCK archive, Mombasa, 2014).   
